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Abstract
The thesis seeks to understand Wesley's doctrine of
sin within a theological context 1
 the context being his
understanding of the 'Christian system'. Central to his
understanding of the 'Christian system' is the concept
of eternal reason, which is rational and relational in
nature, making his theology both holistic and practical.
Chapter one constructs his epistemology, which was
based on Scripture, reason, and experience, which were
derived from the 'scale of assent'. In this scale of
assent special attention was given to 'eternal reason'
and experience. Within the discussion of experience,
the concept of personhood was discussed. While con-
sciousness was not essential where personhood was
concerned, it was essential where personal sin was
concerned.
By looking at such topics as creation, the chain of
being, angelology, and cosmological dualism, chapter two
seeks to outline Wesley's free-will defense of theodicy,
which serves as the presupposition to his doctrine of
original sin. This free-will defense created problems
where the doctrine of God was concerned, and I attempt
to show how Wesley was aware of this problem and sought
to resolve it through 'providence', the 'eternal now',
and 'middle knowledge'.
Chapter three begins by discussing the trinitarian
nature of the image of God, which became an important
systematic development for Wesley's doctrine of Chris-
tian perfection, and original sin, which is the lost
moral image of God, and the marred natural and political
Images of God,. During this discussion topics relating
to Adam and Christ (topics such as 'federal head',
'felix culpa', and 'recapitulation' of Adam in Christ)
are discussed.
From original sin Wesley
	 believed actual sin
arises. Chapter four shows the historical development
of actual sin, which was not in relation to original
sin, but holy living. This actual sin he defined as sin
properly and improperly so called. Sources of influence
are then suggested and traced from Aristotle to Anglican
Moralism. It is then shown how the cognitive and
volitional elements of actual sin entailed an epistemol-
ogy of sin, which suggests the doctrine of sin is
Abstract	 viii
derived from emp1ricism	 which is complicated by his
concept of personhood.	 Some of the problems this
creates are discussed,
Chapter five shows the importance WesIeyhs under-
standing of sin played in the order of salvation, and
the Importance the order of salvation played in Wesley's
understanding of the Christian system.
Finally, some conclusions are briefly drawn from it
all.
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Introduct ions
A Prolegomenoion Method and Structure
As the title indicates, the purpose of this work is
to examine John Wesley's doctrine of sin, which con-
sisted of two main components- original (or imputed)
sin, and actual (or personal) sin. To best understand
the doctrine it must be considered within a theological
context consisting of the necessary doctrines which
precede it, and proceed from it. But an explanation
needs to be offered regarding the significance of how I
have structured this theological context. That is what
I want to do in the first part of this introduction. In
the second part I wish to discuss some of the contribu-
tions I hope both the structure and the content of this
work might make to current scholarship in Wesley
studies, and research in systematic theology in generals
1, Method and Structure
The problem of any thesis is how to organize the
material in an order that best deals with the subject.
How and why I have decided to structure the discussion,
and the methodology used have perhaps become as much a
part of the thesis as the doctrine of sin itself. Yet I
would not want methodology to distract too much from
content. Hopefully, after discussing structure and
method they will recede into the background so Wesley's
doctrine of sin will more clearly emerge. I will begin
by first pointing out the shortcomings of the most
obvious methods one would perhaps expect to use to
discuss Wesley's doctrine of sin.
1.1. The Shortcomings of a Historical Theological
Study
My initial plan had been significantly influenced
by Pelikan, which was to look at the subject as a
discipline of historical theology.' But more specifi-
cally, I had wanted to take the suggestion of Bangs and
utilize a historical theology 'in the Wesleyan mode.t
Within the context of a historical theology in a
' Pelikan, Historical Theolo (1971).
ngs, 'Historical Theology in the Wesleyan Mode', WTL
17(1982), 85-91.
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Wesleyan mode I had hoped to arrange the doctrine of sin
in a simple thematic order so as to trace the theologi-
cal genealogy of each point. However, it was not long
before this method proved insufficient as a means of
exploring either the doctrine's subtleties, or its
relationship with certain philosophical issues and other
Wesleyan doctrines, I became more interested in how
concepts were used by Wesley 1
 and their inter-doctrinal
relationship 1
 and not just where they may have been
derived, Historical considerations are important and
should of course be given, particularly where Wesley's
own doctrinal development is concerned, but it will not
be the primary focus of the work, This treatment of the
subject will implement some of the structural dis-
ciplines of systematlo theology.
1.2. Towards a Wesleyan Pramework for Systematic
Theology
This conclusion introduced the next problem, that
of finding an appropriate and authentically Wesleyan,
systematic framework in which to work, In looking for a
structure one is confronted with the obvious fact
'Wesley never wrote a systematic theology', a phrase
that has been used so often by so many it has by now
become a cliche, 3
 There are two things wrong with the
assumptions of this cliche, First, it perhaps underes-
timates Wesley as a theologian. Second, It reflects a
conception of systematic theology that is perhaps too
narrow, Unless these are first dealt with it will be
difficult to justify the concept of an authentically
Wesleyan systematic framework, We shall next deal with
the first of these assumptions.
There are perhaps several reasons why he never
wrote comprehensively about Christian doctrines, and
consequently why he has not been taken seriously by many
as a theologian. I will suggest only two. First,
perhaps systematic theology was too far removed from
See, Smith, in, A Contemvorary Wesleyan Theo1o y , Charles
Carter, ed., I, 77-98.
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where common people lived for a populist such as Wesley
The driving force of this Oxford don was to bring
theology, even philosophy, down from the top shelf so it
could be easily reached by all. 4 He desired 'plain
truth for plain people,' 5 always writing
ad populum-to the bulk of mankind-to those who
neither relish nor understand the art of
speaking, but who notwithstanding are com-
petent judges of those truths which are
necessary to present and future happiness.'
He generally wrote for the masses, not the theologians.
In this respect his audience dictated his style, In
writing for the masses Wesley became the maestro of the
monosyllable word.' It is easy for serious minded
theologians who are used to writing for other theolog-
ians, and reading the words of other theologians to
forget that Wesley's main audience was the simple people
who made up most of the Methodist societies. Because of
this he was not a 'theologian's theologian',' With rare
exception the Methodist societies were the primary
market of all his publishing ventures, and his channels
for distribution. For that reason the clearer his
theological definitions were, the more concise they
were, the more contracted they were, the better suited
they were for his pastoral purposes. Consequently, his
definitions and theological statements often come across
' This popularization was not just true of theology but of
knowledge in general, as Wesley edited and published material
relating to medicine, Primitive Physick (1747): scIence, A Survey
Philosophy (1763), 'The Desideratum: or Electricity made Plain aix!
Useful' (1760); phIlology, 'Complete English Dictionary' (1764), 'An
English Graninar' (1748), 'A French Graninar' (1751), 'A Latin
Graninar' (1748), 'A Greek Gran,nar' (1765), 'A Hebrew Graninar'(1750): logIc 'A Compendium of Logic' (1750); aix! history, A Short
Roman History (1773), A Concise I11stor of Eng land, 4 vols (1776), A
Concise Ecclesiastical Histor y (1781). He seems to have had an
opinion on about everything, leading one to say that while he was
sometimes wrong, he was never in doubt.
, I, 104.
' DEW, I, 103-4. Also, Elsa Twnez, in, The Future of the
Methodist Theological Traditions, M. Douglas Meeks, ed. (1985), pp.
67-84.
Lawton, John Wesley 's English (1962), pp. 54-56; of. Bryant,
'A Matter of Style', The Preacher's Magazine, 66(1991)3, 42, 51.
• Outler, in, The Wesleyan Theological Heritage, Thomas C.Qien, Leicester R. Longden, eds (1991) p. 43.
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as over-simplified slogans, and unless they are
ly unpacked they can easily be misunderstood.
the nature of the material we are working with,
better we understand its style, its form,
purpose, the better we can hopefully apply I








Perhaps another reason Wesley never wrote com-
prehensively on Christian doctrines was because it would
have distracted him too much from the practical aspects
of ministry. He was too preoccupied by things such as
preaching 1
 pastoring, and publishing, to sit down long
enough to write comprehensively on Christian doctrines.
Consequently, what one finds in Wesley instead of a
published system of theology are published sermons. But
his sermons were not just thrown together haphazardly.
Outler was entirely justified in seeing a structure to
them.
There was a historical precedence for organizing
sermons into a system of Christian divinity. This was
the method used by Perdinando Warner in his work, A
System of Divinity
 and Morality : Containing
 a Series of
Discourses on the rIncial and most im portant Dointa of
natural and revealed Reli g ion (1750). It was a work
consisting of five volumes In which sermons from various
Anglican divines were arranged in a systematic order.
The reason for this method was discussed in the intro-
duction, where he said,
It must be confessed, we abound In volumes of
sermons, on the most necessary and useful
subjects, which in respect of clear and solid
arguments, purity of language, and strength of
reasoning, perhaps cannot be excelled in any
language. But a regular system of doctrinal
and practical divinity, in the method of
sermons[...Jis not to be foundh..Jin the
works of our most eminent divines.'
' Ferdinando Warner,
points or natural and revealed Re 1 11on (Jmlon: 1750),
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Warner's solution of arranging sermons in systematic
order was an effort to combine the practical form of the
sermon with the structural aspects of systematic
theology.
It could be argued Wesley's sermons reflect a
similar certainly an earlier, scheme. The orientation
towards the practical aspects of theology deterred him
from writing systematically about theology, and resulted
in his theology taking the form of sermons, which have
rightly become a doctrinal standard for Methodism.'°
Although they were doctrinal standards, and although
they were to be taken seriously as theology, Wesley
none-the-less thought all preaching should be 'practi-
cal'.'' Perhaps it was this practical orientation
combined with his audience, which dictated his style,
that deterred Wesley from writing a 'systematic theol-
ogy', forcing him to deal with systematic issues through
the form of the sermon.
Whatever the reasons, one must not confuse simple
words with a dull mind, or Wesley's 'plain truth' with
facile theology. His theology was anything but that.
Just because Wesley was primarily a 'folk-theologian'''
who wrote for, and preached to working-class men, women,
and even children' 3 one must not Underestimate him as
theologian.' 4	Yet, in spite of Wesley being seen by
many as an important development in the 'evolution of
io Heitzenrater, 'Plain Truth: Sermons as Standards of
Doctrine', The Drew Gateway , 57(1987), 16-30.
" 'Minutes of Several Conversations' (1791), Works, VIII, 318.
" Outler, 'John Wesley: Folk-Theologian', Theolo gy
 Today,
34(1977): 150-60.
' e.g. 'Hymns for Children' (1763); 'Hymns for Children'
(1790); 'InstructIons for Children' (1745); 'Prayers for Children'
(1772); A Token for Children' (1749), although not written strictly
for children; 'Lessons for Children' (1746, 1747, 1748, 1754).
14 Cutler, 'John Wesley As Theologian—Then and Now', Methodist
History , 12(1974)4, 63-82; and 'Towards a Re-appraisal of John
Wesley As Theologian', Perkins School of Theolo gy Journal,
14(1961)2, 5-14; and 'The Place of Wesley in the Christian Tradi-
tion,' The Place of Wesley in the Christian Tradition, Rowe, editor
(1976), pp. 11-38. Also, Ashley, 'Wesley's Influence on Christian
Thought,' Wesley As a World Force, Telford, ed. (1951), pp. 19-22.
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Protestantism l ,ts it has not been long since Outler had
to persuade the editorial Board of a Library of Protes-
tant Theology to include a volume on Wesley' Neither
has it been that long since Davies called Wesley a
'third class' theo1ogian' It Is granted that so well
trimmed and simply written was his theology, at points
it is almost skin and bones, some might even say
malnourished. This has left many theologians since to
make the wrong conclusion that Wesley was a theological
lightweight, unworthy of even being mentioned in the
same footnote with Luther, Calvin, Owen, or Baxter, But
the substance of Wesley's theology must not be pre-
judiced by either its audience, its style, or its
practical orientation.
The cliche has indeed often resulted in Wesley
being underrated as a theologian. But it has also
attempted to restrict and understand systematic theology
in a far too limited way, Perhaps too many undervalue
the importance of the practical expressions of theology.
Sater has argued that the primary task of theology is
more than	 anything else,	 practical. t '	 Schwöbel,
referring to Herms, has contended that, 'Although
systematic theology is a theoretical activity, it is
provoked by very practical problems and its final aim is
a practical one'. In this respect, as a rational
activity systematic theology should be measured not as a
collection of theories and beliefs, but the quality of
actions	 it produces, which Schwöbel has 	 dubbed
" e.g. Piette, John Wesley in the Evolution of Protestantism
(1937); Hildebrandt, From Luther to Wesley ( 1951); and more recently
Clifford, Atonement and Justification (1990).
Wtler, In, The Future of the Methodist Theolo gical Tradi-
tions, Meeks, ed. (1985), p. 43; 'Be-Appraisal of John Wesley as a
Theologian', in, The Wesleyan Theological Heritage, Oden, Longden,
eds (1991), pp. 40-41; Baker, 'Practical Divinity- John Wesley's
Doctrinal Agenda for Methodism', 	 22(1987), 7-167 (p. 7).
cf. Bavies, History of Methodism in Great Britain (1965), I,
147.
" Sater, Wissenschaftstheoretische Kritik der Theologie
(1973), and, Arbertswerseer Systematischer Theoloie (1976).
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'the consequence cr1terIon'.' On one hand 1 systematic
theology deals with Christian doctrine laid out and
explained in a logical and rational order4 In this
sense it is true, Wesley did not write about theology in
a systematic way, as had Calvin4 But one must remember
that the purpose of systematic theology is not just to
promote a fuller, and a more philosophical study of the
Christian faith. It is also to promote a practical
application and experience of it.20
In response to recent trends to make systematic
theology more practical in its expression and orienta-
tion, Maddox has argued that Wesley was a practical
theologian par excellence, in as much as his theology Is
transformative of the human person, holistic (consisting
of orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy), it recog-
nizes the primacy of praxis, and is contextual (relating
to society and the church)4 21
 The audience for his
theology, and the style of his theology certainly gave
it a practical orientation4
13. Wesley as a 'Holistic' Theologian
I agree with Sauter, and Schwöbel that systematic
theology must have a practical aspect. I also agree
with Maddox that Wesley was a practical theologian, It
must be remembered that Wesley was not just concerned
with 'what to teach', but also with 'how to teach', and
'what to do', 22
 which is what Chilcote has called
Wesley's doctrine of Christian vocation. t ' But I would
suggest that it is perhaps better to call a theology
which rises from the rational structure of a system to
(1978), and
ineorie fur die Praxis- Beitr. zur Theologie (1982).
20 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theolo
	 (1991), p. 4;
of. Wiley, Christian Theology (1940), I, 27.
21 Maddox, 'John Wesley- Practical Theologian?',
	 23(1988),
126-7.
22 'jijg of some late Conversations between the Revd. H.
Wesleys and Others' (1749), Works, VIII, 275; of. p. 280 where it is
stated doctrine is best defended by 'preaching and living'.
23 (2iilcote, Wesley
 Speaks on Christian Vocation (1986), p.
viii.
' Schw6bel, God: Action aix! Revelation (1992),
38; of. Herms, Theologie- - eine Erfarunswissenscli
_________________________	 o 12-13, i37-
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find practical expression, even in order to satiety the
'consequence criterion', a 'holistic' theology. 4
 To
speak of a holistic theology describes a theology that
seeks to integrate the thoughts, activities, and
feelings of whole Christian persons and their experience
as valid sources of theology, although not equal in
authority. Wesley's expression of the sources for
holistic theology was Scripture, reason, and experience.
Any attempt at structuring Wesley's theology must take
into consideration its holistic aspect. The practical
aspects of a holistic theology confront any isolationist
tendencies of theologians who attempt to theologize
apart from the life of the church, The rational aspects
of holistic theology also confront those in the Church
who are so practical in their orientation that they do
not value the importance of theological reflection.
Attitudes such as that verge on becoming theological
utilitarianism, in which the end of orthopraxis,
justifies the unorthodox means, A holistic attitude in
respect to theology acknowledges the inter-dependent and
inter-relational nature of the rational and the practi-
cal, and resents such compartmenta!ization of personhood
and human existence into antagonistic and exclusive
theological categories4 Faith is the orientation of the
whole person into a relationship with God the Father,
through God the Son, in God the Spirit. Because of the
holistic orientation of faith, it must be said that the
rational and practical aspects of theology must not
exist without each other. Both are necessary parts of a
whole, holistic theology.
1.4. Shortcomings of Using the 'Order of Salvation'
A 1 one
Having suggested the holistic aspect of Wesley's
theology one is still left with the problem of struc-
ture.	 In constructing a systematic theology in the
I am not using the term in the same technical sense as
Quine, Word and (b.lect (1960), who used 'holism' to described the
semantic unity in respect to language. See, Dray, in The En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy , Edwards, ed. (1967), IV, 53-58.
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Wesleyan mode, Dunning has suggested that It should be
organized around Justification and sanctification by
faith as a controlling norm, particularly as understood
within the context of Wesley's order of salvation.t1
This also reflects Outler's suggestion, that the order
of salvation is the unifying concept
	 in Wesley's
theology, especially in his sermons 2 To interpret
this structure with its inherent Christian doctrines,
Wynkoop has suggested using 'love as a hermeneutic'.tT
Hence and Collins have suggested using a 'teleological
hermeneutic', in which salvation is seen as goal
orientated, the goal being renewal in Christ's Image,
and glorification.'
Following these leads, I then sought to structure
the discussion of sin around Wesley's order of salva-
tion. This method has already been successfully used by
Collins in his treatment of Wesley's concept of the
moral law.' But as I attempted to use the order of
salvation for my purposes I once again found difficul-
ties.	 The commonly accepted understanding of Wesley's
order of salvation (which will be outlined in chapter
five) provides	 occasion to discuss most doctrines
related to dogmatics. 	 But Wesley's order of salvation
has been generally researched under the assumption that
Wesley was only a practical theologian.	 It has been
wrongly assumed that he was too pragmatic, too practi-
cal, to be interested in speculative issues, but his
corpus of sermons could not reveal anything farther from
the truth. In the coming chapters it will be revealed
Just how speculative Wesley could be. Even so, Wesley's
order of salvation as it is popularly understood does




" See 1 Wynkoop, A Theo 1 ogy of Love (1972).21 Hence, 'John Wesley's Teleological Hermeneutic' (1981):
Collins, 'A Hermeneutical Model for the Wesleyan Ordo Salutis', WTJ,
19(1984)2, 23-37. Collins' conclusion is that if one uses this as
a model Wesley's theology is not elliptical, as conmionly accepted,
but linear, but I think both Collins and Bence take the elliptical
metaphor too literally.
" Collins, 'John Wesley's Theology of Law' (1984).
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not easily provide the occasion to discuss the specula-
tive issues he did, such as
	 epistemological, and
ontological issues, which I found necessary to consider
in order to understand why Wesley said what he said
about sin. The commonly accepted understanding of
Wesley's order of salvation was unnecessarily too
restrictive and could not accommodate the more pecula-
tive aspects of Wesley's theology It could not
adequately reflect the holistic aspect of Wesley's
theology. At the end of my first year of research I
frustratingly concluded that the existing methods
frequently used in analyzing Wesley's theology were
deficient, and too often too restrictive for my pur-
poses.
1.5. Wesley's Concept of the 'Christian System'
What I have done is not merely place several
doctrinal themes under the auspices of a discuion of
the doctrine of sin, which would amount to a 'medley' of
doctrines, rather than a 'system'.'° Instead 9
 I have
tried to organize Wesley's theology around what I think
is an authentically (although certainly not a uniquely)
Wesisyan concept that justifies the unification of many
Christian doctrines and Christian philosophy into
something of a system, which seeks to reconcile the
rational and speculative aspects of systematic theology
with its practical aspects into a holistic theological
system. To do this I have tried to structure the
discussion not just around his understanding of the
order of salvation, but around another broader and more
encompassing concept. That concept is Wesley's under-
standing of the 'Christian system'. Even Wesley's
antagonists acknowledge he had a system, as was revealed
when John-Baptist Malassis de Sulamar wrote, 'A short
' Josiah Tucker (in 'A Brief History of the Principles of
Methodism F. . I together with the Causes of the several Variations,
Divisions, and present Inconsistencies of this Sect are attempted to
be traced out, and accounted for' (1742), pp. 25-26) had accused
Wesley of having a 'medley' of principles, rather than a 'system',
implying he lacked coherence and consistency.
	 For Wesley's
response, see 'The Principles of a Methodist' (1742),
	 IX, 59.
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examen of Mr. John Wesley's system: The doctrine of
original sin examined at the living light of the
doctrine of truthi.,.]' (1757). It was in fact a phrase
Wesley used in at least two of his most important
treatises, 'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and
Religion' (1743), and, The Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin,
According
 to Scri pture, Reason, and Experience (1757),
and a sermon, 'Original Sin' (j759),t We will now
briefly look at each of these,
In the	 sermon, 'Original	 Sin', he described
Christianity as a 'system of doctrines'. In one sense
this definition provides the broadest catchment area
possible to draw from in order to construct What Wesley
understood to be the 'Christian system'. This principle
is not really anything new, and has been an implicit
assumption In Wesley studies for many years. Much work
has already been done
	 in reconstructing doctrines
derived from Wesley's 'Christian system', doctrines such
as Justification in Cannon's, The Theolo of John
Wesley . with Seci p l Reference to the Doctrine of
Justification (1946); sanctification in Lindstrom's,
Wesley
 and Sanctification (1946), and Cox's, John
Wesley 's Concept of Perfection (1964); the sacraments,
in Borgen's, John Wesley
 on the Sacraments (1972):
Christology, in Deschner's, Wesle y 's Christolo (1960);
soteriology, in Collins', Wesle y
 on Salvation (1989),
and Clifford's, Atonement and Justification (1990, which
includes an extensive treatment of Wesley); ecolesiology
in Watson's, The Earl y
 Methodist Class Meeting (1985);
more generally in, A Contem porary
 Wesleyan Theology
(1983): and now, his doctrine of sin. These works alone
validate the concept of Wesley's 'Christian system'. If
Wesley had not been working from a concept of a Chris-
tian system it would have been Impossible to reconstruct
so many distinctively Wesleyan, to say
	 the least
Christian, doctrines.
	 But Wesley's Christian system
31 See DOS (1757), pp. vi-vil, in Works, XI, 194-5; 'An Earnest
Appeal to Men of Reason ani Religion' (1743), , XI, 49; also
'Original Sin' (1759), BEW, II, 182.
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should also be able to accommodate, Just as Wesley
himself did 1 views on science, logic 1 epistemology, even
aesthetics. They should not be left stranded in
isolation from Wesleyan intellectual life, not Just
because they were not stranded by Wesley in his 1 but
because Christian life and theology are the poorer
without them. Christian theology should strive to be as
holistic as Christian life. My argument is that Wesley
was not Just a practical theologian, any more than he
was a only a speculative one, but a holistic theologian
who sought to integrate Scripture, reason 1 and ex-
perience into a theology.
What one sees in the second document where the
phrase is used, Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin, is a defense
of the Christian system against what he saw as the
demise of one of its fundamental doctrines- original
sin. He used Scripture, reason, and experience (the
theological methodology of holistic theology) to defend
it.	 It was Wesley's belief if one did away with
original sin, one might as well do away with salvation
also, illuminating	 the inter-doctrinal relationship
between the doctrines of sin and salvation. More about
the importance of the doctrine of original sin to
Wesley's understanding of the Christian system will be
said below. It is eoi-t to say for now that from that
treatise it became obvious to me that Wesley's doctrine
of sin had profound implications on the 'Christian
system'. It is important to explore what some of those
implications might be for Wesley's understanding of the
'Christian system'.
1.6. The Nature of Wesley's 'Christian System'
But what is the nature of Wesley's 'Christian
system'? On one hand, Baker has suggested it could be
said that Wesley's theology could be organized as a
'practical divinity', divinity being a commonly used
eighteenth century word for theology.	 But Maddox35
ker, 'Practical Divinity- John Wesley's Doctrinal Agenda',
WTJ, 22(1987)1, 7-16.	 (continued...)
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has shown that Wesley was interested in 'speculative
divinity', 54
 as well as 'practical divinity,SS along
with 'mystical divinity', 3
	and, even 'controversial
divinity'1 37
 As a means of interpreting wesley's
divinity, Maddox has suggested that the organizing
principal to Wesley's theology should be 'responsible
grace'. 3
	Although this is indeed another, and helpful
way one could interpret Wesley's theology, it does not
provide the
	 necessary structure
	 for a 'Christian
system'.
What I propose is that in, 'An Earnest Appeal', the
third document under consideration, Wesley endeavoured
to show his Christian system was organized by the
concept of 'eternal reason', which he described as,
the nature of things. The nature of God and
the nature of man, with the relations neces-
sarily subsisting between them. Why, this is
the very religion we preach: a religion
evidently founded on, and every way agreeable
to, eternal reason, to the essential nature of
things. '
From this we might draw four general conclusions
about eternal reason and its relationship with the
'Christian system's First, eternal reason indicates
that the 'Christian system' should be concerned with the
nature of God, which is essential Triune. Second, it
should also be concerned with the nature of humanity,
which was for Wesley made in the image of the Triune
God. Third, it should be concerned with the nature of
relations	 necessarily	 subsisting	 between God and
humanity, which was for Wesley the basis
	 of the
Triune image of God.
	 Fourth, it should also be con-
cerned with the way in which these relations are to be




Works, XIV, 221-2; JVL, tIl, 218.
ENNT, Romans 14.19; Works, XIV, 221.
Maddox, 'Responsible Grace The Systematic Perspective of
Wesley Theology', 1U1 19(1984)2, 7-22; also in Quarterl y
 Review,
6(1986)1, 24-34.
" See, 13EV, XI, 55, but also, 'The Case of Reason Impartially
Considered' (1781), 13EV, II, 591.
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restored between God and humanity, which was for Wesley,
'God the Father, who first loved us, and made us
accepted in the Beloved I,,.), God the Son, who loved
us, and washed us from our sins in his own bloodl...l,
God the Holy Ghost, who sheddeth the love of God abroad
in our heartsE...]'.40.
From this one can see the frequently used, classic
divisions of God, man, and salvation.	 But I would
suggest that the operative word in Wesley's understand-
ing of eternal reason is 'relation', as it figures sig-
nificantly into its interpretation, and also because of
its repetitious use. I would also suggest that to
Wesley, humanity necessarily exists, and consequently
has being only in a prevenient and gracious relation to
God, and that Christianity was 'relational' religion, in
that it seeks to explore and fully restore the estranged
relations between God and humankind.	 Essential to this
structure is the doctrine of sin.
The relational nature of Wesley's religion was
further reinforced by his understanding of the communal
aspect of Christianity, which he expressed in terms of
its sociality. It was Wesley's conviction that, 'Chris-
tianity is essentially a social religion, and that to
turn it into a solitary one is to destroy itE6..1.1t
Consequently, 'Solitary religion is not to be found
there. "Holy solitaires" is a phrase no more consistent
with the Gospel than holy adulterers. The Gospel of
Christ knows of no religion, but social; no holiness,
but social holiness'. 42 To utilize the analysis of
Zizioulas at this point (which will be discussed below),
it could be said that Wesley's ontology of Christian
40 
'The Love of God' (1733), BEW, IV, 345; cf. the trinitarian
ascriptions at the ends of 'Salvation by Faith' (l738) , I, 130;
'The Witness of (kir Own Spirit' (1746), BEW, I 313; 'Sermon on the
Mount, IX' (1748), BEW, I, 649; 'The General Spread of the Gospel'
(1783),	 II, 499; 'Death and Deliverance' (1725), BEW, IV, 214;
'Seek First the Kingdom' (1725), BEW, IV, 223; 'On Guardian Angels'
(1726),	 , IV, 235; 'On Mourning th Dead', BEW, IV, 243; 'The
Promise of Understanding' (1730),	 IV, 289; 'The Image of God'
(1730),	 , IV, 303; 'The One Thing Needful' (1734), 	 IV, 359.
'Sermon on the Mount, IV' (1748), BEW, I, 533.42 Introduction in, 'Hymns aixi Sacred Poems' (1739).
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personhood is that of a person in communion, with
automatic implications for ecolesiology alone.
But eternal reason meant Christianity is not just
relational religion. It also meant Christianity is
rational religion. 'Is it not reasonable then to love
God?l...JIs it not reasonable also to love our neigh-
bour?' 4
 But It is reasonable not merely in the
analytical sense, but in the divine sense. On this
basis relational religion, or religion which seeks to
restore full relations between God and humanity and
relations between human persons, was rational religion.
This was the thesis of 'An Earnest Appeal', and was what
Wesley thought to be the central point of the religion
he preached, In this respect 1
 nothing was more ration-
al, or relational to Wesley than entire sanctification,
in that through entire sanctification relational ity on
both vertical and horizontal dimensions can be restored.
Eternal reason with its rational and relational aspect
comprised the holistic nature of Wesley's 'Christian
system'.
I intend to say a bit more about eternal reason and
relational ity in chapter one, and so I do riot see the
need to discuss It fully here. I will say my con-
clusions are such that Wesley's understanding of the
relational and rational aspects of eternal reason,
particularly as It is discussed in, 'An Earnest Appeal'
can function as a conceptual, even systematic link for
the doctrines in Wesley's Christian system.
When Wesley's understanding of the 'Christian
system' is taken seriously, and obviously I certainly
think that it should, the phrase 'Wesley was no sys-
tematic theologian' proves to restrict not just
systematic theology, but also Wesley as a theologian.
While he had little time to write systematically, he
certainly gave thought to the Christian system, which
influenced what he did write, and did think about the
'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1743),
DEW, XI, 51, 52; the same point is reiterated by 'The Unity of the
Divine Being' (1789), flEW, IV, 61-71.
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implications of what wrote had on the 'Christian
system'. Wesley worked from a Christian system instead
of working to a Christian system, and consequently was
continually working out a Christian system. As he
worked from that Christian system he worked toward its
practical application. What I hope becomes clear is
that his understanding of the 'Christian system' from
which he wrote, certainly included not just an expressed
practical theology, but a speculative theology as well,
and sought to incorporate both into the life of the
church.	 Through his understanding of the 'Christian
system' Wesley indicated a
	 more comprehensive and
holistic	 understanding	 of Christian theology than
perhaps what most Wesleyans have previously allowed him
as a theologian, which made his understanding of
theology more holistic than many modern ones. During
the course of things I will illustrate how Wesley's
understanding of the Christian system included not just
the basic dogmatic issues of justification, sanctifica-
tion, pneumatology, and Christology, but also epistemol-
ogy, ontology, metaphysics, even theodicy, and theologi-
cal anthropology. At the same time I also hope to show
how the doctrine of sin was integral to the holistic
nature of his understanding of the 'Christian system'.44
1.7. Four Doctrines from the 'Christian System'
To do this I have taken four doctrines from
Wesley's 'Christian system',, and have used them as the
framework for discussing the doctrine of sin. Implicit
to their use is the assumption that speculative doc-
trines and systematic issues have profound practical
implications for the 'Christian system'. The doctrines
are: (1) Wesley's doctrine of knowledge (epistemology),
and the relation between the human self, and the
physical and supernatural world (chapter one); (2) his
understanding of the origins of evil (theodicy), or the
" Bryant, 'Wesley's Doctrine of Original Sin and Some
Suggest ions for Its Implica ions on Systematic Theology', a paper
read at a day conference of the Research Institute in Systematic
Theology, 23 May 1991.
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relationship between the attributes of God and the
presence of evil (chapter two); (3) his doctrine of sin
(hamartiology), or the nature of the estranged relation-
ship between humanity and God 1
 and its consequences on
the created order (chapters three and four): and, (4)
his doctrine of salvation (soteriology),, or the nature
of the reconciled relationship between humanity and God,
and the renovation of the Triune (but preponderantly
Christological) image of God (chapter five). This is
outlined by the order of salvation under the headings of
prevenient, justifying, sanctifying, and glorifying
grace. The intense inter-doctrinal relationship between
the doctrine of sin and the remainder of the Christian
system has meant it is impossible to understand the
doctrine of sin in isolation by simply rehearsing a few
of Wesley's	 concise and succinct definitions that
surrounded his doctrine of sin.
2. Two Major Contributions
I hope this thesis will make contributions on at
least two fronts. First, perhaps it is obvious that I
hope this work will contribute to the development of
Wesley studies. Second, I equally hope it makes a
contribution from Wesley studies particularly to the
contemporary discussion of theological anthropology,
especially as it has been developed through the Research
Institute in System Theology at King's College, London.
I would like to start by discussing the first of these
aspirations.
2.!. Two Contributions to Wesley Studies
The first contribution I hope this makes to Wesley
studies is to enlighten a relatively unexplored area in
Wesley's theology. Admittedly, a study of the Vesleyan
bibliographies reveals that a tremendous amount of
material has been written on Wesley's theology. 4
	Yet,
in spite of all the books, articles, and insights,
" These bibliographies are listed in my own bibliography uzxier
their own heading.
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Wesley's doctrine of sin is still a conspicuously dark
area in Wesleyan research.
I would suggest two reasons for this. First of
all, it has already been indicated that most scholars
would agree that the centre of Wesley's theology can be
described as 'two foci of an ellipse'- justification and
entire sanctification by faith. 4 It is no surprise
that of all the areas of Wesley's theology a great deal
of attention has been focused on soteriology and the
order of salvation, and rightly so, The doctrine of sin
has usually only been discussed in the context of
soteriology, and in a subsidiary roles
A second hindrcrnc. to research into the doctrine
of sin has been that Wesley's works have lacked a
reliable text accompanied by a critical apparatus47
However, thanks to the work of Frank Baker (textual
editor), Richard Heitzenrater (general editor), and the
editorial staff of the Bicentennial Edition of Wesley's
Works, this problem will eventually be overcome.
Unfortunately, it will be a number of years before the
volume containing Wesley's treatise on original in will
appear, and much longer before the project will be
completed.
These hindrances notwithstanding, the lack of
research into the doctrine of sin is surprising, given
its importance to Wesley's understanding of the 'Chris-
tian system'. Next we shall look at the importance of
the doctrine of sin to Wesley's 'Christian system' and
at the same time provide some necessary historical
background.
The importance of original sin to Wesley was best
seen through his debate with Dr. John Taylor of Norwich,
noted Hebrew scholar, unitarian, and founder of the
Octagon Chapel In Norwich. 4 '	 The debate started when
" ct Mcconnell, The Essentials of Methodism (1916), pp. ii,
17; Thinning, Grace, Faith, and Holiness (1988), p . 48; Ojtler, ,
1, 45; Canon, The Theology of John Wesley
 ( 1946); Cushnn, John
Wesley 's ExDerimental Divinity ( 1989), pp. 49, 71.
lleitzenrater, Mirror and Memory ( 1989), pp. 205-18.
IV, 244.
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Taylor published a book entitled, The Scrlyture-Dootrine
of 0riinal Sin roosed to Free and Candid Examination
(1740).'' What made the work so controversial was its
denial of any notion of original sin. He argued 1
 the
Cause of Sin is the Choice of our Wills, and
not its proceeding from Adam's first Trans-
gressions; seeing, upon the Supposition, it
would not proceed from it.'°
His appeal, explicitly at least, was to Scripture alone,
using a hermeneutical style that many found difficult to
refute. 1
 Taylor's combination of Biblical and logical
skills were intimidating to many, keeping challengers at
bay for some time. Not that Taylor Was the first to
espouse such theological views, but they did become
immensely popular, smacking of Pelagianism and leaning
heavily to Socinianism which should have come as no
surprise given his unitarianism.'' An English clergy
already caught up in the atmosphere of deism, rational-
ism, and a limp moralism had no problem in accepting,
even advocating, Taylor's fleo_pelagianjrn as the
theological vogue of the day. They also ridiculed"
anyone who held to the Augustinian and Reformed view of
original sin as Wesley did.
The hectic rigours of a heavy preaching schedule,
and the demands of organizing and overseeing an ever-
" Telford incorrectly states that it appeared '1735-6' (see
IV, 68). Taylor was a dissenter ministering to Norwich from
1733, founding the Octagon (lapel there in 1754, and leaving in
1757, when he was appointed as a tutor of divinity at Warrington
Academy upon the opening of the school. This means Tyernian (Life of
John Wesley , II, 18) could not possibly be correct in putting him at
Warrington in 1748 (see Wood, Burning Heart, p. 233).
'° Taylor, Sf06, p. 129.
" See, Storms, Tragedy in Eden (1985).
" It is somewhat surprising that Wesley makes no mention of
Taylor's Unitarian views until his sermon 'On Conscience' (1788),
BEW, II, 484.
" Wesley, however, never called Taylor a Pelagian. Perhaps it
was because Wesley was more sympathetic towards Pelagius than
Taylor, see IV, 158; VI, 175, and below in chapter one. Yet,
Wesley had once warned John Bennett of two extreme mistakes,
Calvinism and Pelagianism, JWL, II, 23.
' See, Redwood, Reason, Ridicule and Reli gion, (1976), who
demonstrated that the greatest weapon of the enlightenment's
atheists was ridicule and caricature. For examples see E. Gibson,
Pastoral Letter (1728), p. 8; Charles Blount, Oracles of Reason,
(1693).
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expanding work undoubtedly prevented Wesley from giving
a reply his full and immediate attention, After several
years. and a number of encounters with Taylor devotees
(people who often ridiculed and derided the doctrine of
original sin to Wesley's face),SS Wesley eventually
responded with, The Doctrine of Oridinal Sin. According
to Scri pture, Reason, and Ex perience (1751). Curnock
was being somewhat over-dramatic when he said Methodism
is indebted to these encounters for his treatise on
Ori g inal Sin, one of Wesley's longest treatises, a full
522 pages in the first edition, Including all the
extractions. It was by no means his best. 	 But it does
point to	 the significance of these encounters in
motivating Wesley to respondS
I would suggest three r
his response,	 The firs
greatest of them all, was
Taylor's thought	 po
specifically the doctri
Taylor had	 done	 in
'Mahomet', 5 ' and even
dangerous than open Deism itself' 5	Wesley thought
they sapped,
the very Foundation of all Revealed Religion,
whether Jewish or Christlanl...lfor they that
are whole have no need of a Ph ysician: And the
Christian Revelation speaks of nothing else,
but the great Physician of our Souls: Nor can
Christian Philosophy, whatever be thought of
the Pagan, be more properly defined than in
Plato's Words: It is (therapy of the soull.
The only true Method of healing a distemper'd
Soul. But what Need of this, if we are in
perfect Health? If we are not diseased, we do
not want a Cure. If we are not sick, why
should we seek for a Medicine to heal our
sickness? What Room Is there, to talk of our
being renewed in Knowledge or Holiness, after





easons for Wesley writing
t reason, and perhaps the




his views 'far more
JVJ, III, 374; III, 520; JWL, III, 179-80; III, 208; CWJ,
II, 106.





have lost that Image? If we are as knowing
and holy now, (nay, far more so) than Adam was
immediately after his Creation? If therefore
we take away this Foundation, That Man Is by
Nature foolish and sinful, fallen short of the
glorious Image of God, the Christian System
falls at once: Nor will It deserve so honour-
able an Appellation, as that of a cunningly
devised Fable.5'
Quite simply, if there is no original sin, there is no
need for salvation, and Christianity serves no purpose.
Original sin was an essential presupposition to Wesley's
understanding of both 'Christian Philosophy', and the
'Christian System'. He wrote, 'We know no gospel
without salvation from sin.'50
The second cause was the threat' a weak doctrine of
original sin posed to his evangelism, which was most
commonly experienced through his preaching, This is a
natural and obvious consequence of what has Just been
said, but needs to be emphasized on its own. In 1159,
in an effort to condense his treatise and popularize his
views on original sin Wesley wrote and published his
sermon, 'Original Sin', In 1760 it appeared in, Sermons
on Several Occasions 1 volume four, Several years later.
in 1782, the sermon appeared as a part of the collection
of tracts published by the what amounted to the first
tract society formed in England by Wesley and Thomas
Cokea' t These tracts were to be used as toolS of
evangelism and distributed specifically among the poor.
As a collection they reveal Just how practical Wesley
thought theology should be.
	
Particularly the pubitca-
tion of the sermon on original sin as a part of the
' DOS (1757), vi,
°	 VI, 327.
• See, 'A Plan of the Society instituted in January, 1782, to
distribute religious Tracts among the Poor', in MAJRL. The plan was
that 'EVERY Member must subscribe half a Guinea, a Guinea, or more,
annually. . .A proportionable iota of Tracts shall be del ivered
yearly to each Subscriber...'. For a full list see, Green, Bibi lo g
-raphy (1896), p. 217. 'A Sermon on Originai Sin' was no, 14 on the
list, and 'A Sermon on the Trinity' was no. 10, See, Albert Hall,
'John Wesley's Tract Society', PWH.S, 12(1920), 138-8; Simon, John
Wesley awl the Last Phase, p, 183; Tyernm.n, Life of Wesley, Ill,
369;	 VI, 343 awl note.S2 Wesley published an entire series of "A Word to... ' tracts
which may be found in the bibliography,
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tract society demonstrated the doctrine's importance not
just to his evangelicalism, but to his evangelism as
well.
The third reason was his and Taylor's shared
doctrine of free-will, or
	 more specifically their
Arminlanism.	 Wesley may have published his spirited
defense of original sin just to show 'Arminlan' did not
necessarily mean 'Pelagian'. When the work did appear
it revealed to everyone just how seriously Wesley took
Taylor's views on sin, and how divergent their views
were, in spite of a shared Arminianism. Their opinions
on original sin were irreconcilable. Re said 1 'The same
person cannot long admire both John Wesley and John
Taylor.
All of this eventually led Wesley to tell Taylor
that in his view it was either,
Christianity or heathenismt for, take away the
scriptural doctrine of Redemption or Jus-
tification, and that of the New Birth, the
beginning of sanctification, or (which amounts
to the same) explain them as you do, suitable
to your doctrine of Original Sin, and what is
Christianity better than heathenism? wherein,
save in rectifying some of our notions, has
the religion of St. Paul any pre-eminence over
that of Socrates or Epictetus?L...IEither I or
you mistake the whole of Christianity from the
beginning to the endi Either my scheme or
yours is as contrary to the scriptural as the
Koran is. Is it mine, or yours?4
Of course the letter to Taylor was not written for
Taylor's eyes only. Wesley eventually published it fo
the public to read. Wesley presented choices depicted
in the starkest of terms in order to jolt his reader out
of complacency in regards to the issue. Sin was a
subject no Christian could afford to remain neutral
about.
IV, 39, and note 2.
" JWL, IV, 68; of. IV, 40!. Privately Wesley prayed
'that God would show him the truth as it is in Jesus', JWJ I IV, 199.
To the credit of both Wesley aixi Taylor, their debate never deterio-
rated to personal attacks, see iflk IV, 67. The closest they ever
came to meeting was when Wesley was on a preaching tour in Ire laM
in 1760, see	 IV, 400-1 for his interesting account.
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Eventually 1
 original sin became not Just a 'test of
evangelical faith', as Wood has put, but a test of
orthodox faith. 5
 Wesley was not prepared to call a
theology Christian at all unless it included an orthodox
view of original sin. This can be seen in a series of
letters and Journal entries in 1764. In a Journal entry
for March 16, Wesley wrote,
I met several serious clergymen. I have long
desired that there might be an open, avowed
union between all who preach those fundamental
truths, Original Sin and Justification by
Faith, producing inward and outward holiness;
but all my endeavours have been hitherto
ineffectual. God's time is not fully come.'
Nearly a month later in a circular.letter dated April
j9,S? and sent to 'forty or fifty clergymen,1e Wesley
made another attempt to gather a group of like-minded
evangelicala who agreed on these 'fundamentaIs'. For
whatever reasons, not many responded to Wesley's appeal,
a fact Wesley lamented at the Conference in Leeds on
August 4, 1769, where he said
Out of fifty or sixty to whom I wrote, only
three vouchsafed me an answer, So I give this
up. I can do no more. They are a rope of
sands and such they will continue10
Although neither an 'ecumenical', or a 'fundamentalist'
movement ever emerged from these efforts, what did
emerge was a clearer understanding of the importance
Wesley gave to the doctrine of sin as a fundamental
Christian doctrine of the 'Christian system'. Histori-
cally, Wesley (with Edwards, liebden, Boston, Jennings,
' Wood, The Burning Heart (1967), p. 232.es jj, V, 47.
.ThiL. IV, 236-39.
• V 60.
e On Wesley's use of the term 'fundamentals', compare with
, I, 530; II, 92-94; and II, 376, and note 7. Agreeing with
Ontler, it can be said Wesley is trying to 'construct the narrowest
possible view of the irreducible 'fundamentals'', but Just how
'consciously tolerant' Wesley was of other theological opinions
(e.g. Calvinism, Catholicism, Moravianism, etc.) is another matter.
'° JWL, IV, 235. Notice the original 'forty or fifty' had by
that time become 'fifty or sixty'.
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Watts, and others),7t was a part of the first wave of
attack against the implications of deism and rationalism
on traditional 1
 orthodox Christianity, a Christianity
that had become for Wesley evangelical at Aldersgate.
All this indicates that to him the theological
presupposition which necessitated the forming of the
ellipse was original sin. 72 Without original sin there
would have been no need for either foci or ellipse.
This forged strong links between Adam and Christ, links
that will be explored in chapter three through three
themes- Adam and Christ as federal heads, the 'felix
culpa' tradition, and the recapitulatory work of Christ.
Indeed, were it not for original sin, Christianity would
have not reason to exist at all. The doctrine of sin
was an essential presupposition to Wesley's understand-
ing of the Christian system.
It is indeed surprising that so little research has
been done, given the importance Wesley obviously gave to
the doctrine. In the research that has been done,
Wesley's doctrine of sin has often been highly criti-
cized by several noted Wesleyan theologians Flew has
said quite simply, 'That there are defects in Wesley's
doctrine [of sin] is undeniable.'' 5 Curtis-admitted
that he found no way of harmonizing all of his state-
ments on sin, and concluded that he 'never entirely
cleared up his own thinking concerning the nature and
" He wrote in the preface of Ori ginal Sin, 'But since none
else will, I cannot but speak, though lying under many peculiar
disadvantages.' In a footnote to this coninent he added, 'Since the
writing of this, I have seen several Tracts, which I shall have
occasion to take notice of hereafter. There are likewise many
excellent remarks on this subject in Mr. ilervey's Dialogues' (1755).
The 'tracts' he refers to were probably Isaac Watts', Ruin and
RecoverY of Mankind (published the same year as Taylor's work),
Samuel Hebden's, The Doctrine of Ori ginal Sin, as Laid Down in the
Assembl y 's Catechism, Explained.,.and Vindicated (1741), and tvid
Jennings', A Vindication of the ScriDture Doctrine of Ori ginal Sin
(published anonymously in 1740 as a refutation of Taylor), and
Thomas Boston, Human Nature in its Fourfold State. Why Wesley was
not acquainted With these works until after the preface was written
is inexplicable, but his familiarity with Hervey can be explained by
JWL, I, 331, 332; III, 205 230, 231, 371-388, etc.
7! 'The Law Established through Faith, II' (1750),
	
, II, 40.
Flew, The Idea of Perfection (1934), p. 332.
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scope of sin.'' 4
	Wesley's concept of sin, said Lee,
took him to a wrong conclusion about the attainability
of Christian perfection,' 5 	 Along those same lines of
attack, Greaves said Wesley's tendency,
to identify sin with conscious sin led him to
identify	 perfection	 With the absence of
conscious sins. Thus he set before us an
ideal of perfection which is both partial and
dangerously apt to encourage pharisaic type of
self-appraisal. '
If Wesleyans are so critical about Wesley's
doctrine of sin, it is not surprising that non-Wesleyans
(particularly those of the reformed tradition) should be
also. In his introduction to Jonathan Edwards' doctrine
of original sin, Holbrook said it was impossible for
Wesley to hold on to an Arminian view of grace and a
reformed view of sin at the same tjme." Storms agreed
with that in his own book on Edwards." The list could
continue.
What most of the criticisms have succeeded in doing
is confirming the importance of the doctrine of sin to
Wesley's understanding of the 'Christian system'. But
because of this his understanding of the Christian
system becomes vulnerable at the point of the doctrine
of sin, They illustrate that unless one first under-
stands Wesley's doctrine of sin one cannot understand
either of his doctrines of justification or entire
sanctification,	 His understanding of original sin had
direct bearing on the attainability of Christian
perfection, and his understanding of personal sin was
developed, not in conjunction with original sin, but in
reaction to the holy living tradition. If his defini-
tion of personal sin is not accepted, chances are
neither will his understanding of entire sanctification.
It would not be hyperbole to say a significant, and
' Curtis, The Christian Faith (1905), p. 378.
s Lee, John Wesley and Modern fleli gion (1938), pp. 185-87.
Greavea, The Meaning
 of Sin (1956), p. 168.
" Holbrook, ed., Jonathan Edwards. 0riinal Sin (1970), p. 3;
but cf. Blaising, 'John Wesley's Ictrine of Original Sin' (1979),
who attempted to show how Wesley did what Holbrook said he could not
do.
" Storms, Tragedy
 in Eden (1985).
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vital portion of Wesley's theology stands or falls by
his doctrine of sin. What one says about Wesley's
doctrine of sin predetermines what one will say about
Wesley's understanding of holiness.
In evaluating and responding to these criticisms
several question should be raised. First, have they
dealt with the ontological issues which serve as the
presupposition to Wesley's doctrine of sin? What is the
nature of God? What is the nature of being created?
What is the relationship between the two natures? What
is the nature of evil?
	 how can one account for evil
given the nature of createdness?
	 Second, have they
treated Wesley's doctrine of sin as a subject of the
wider issues of theological anthropology? What was
Wesley's concept of personhood, and personal identity?
In what way are original sin and actual sin to be
understood in respect to personhood? What role does
epistemology play in the concept of personhood? Third,
apart from the systematic issues, have they given
special consideration to the historical and developmen-
tal aspects of Wesley's doctrine of sin? flow did
Wesley's doctrine of sin evolve and change over the
years? What are the contextual considerations one must
take into account In order to understand that develop-
ment? These questions illuminate problems regarding the
general treatment of Wesley's doctrine of sin. The sum
of these criticisms indicates that there has been a
methodological weakness in analyzing Wesley's doctrine
of sin, which can be summarized by saying they failed to
consider the doctrine of sin in relation to Wesley's
understanding of the 'Christian system'.
It is at this point I hope to make my second
contribution to Wesley studies. I hope to make attempts
to push beyond the order of salvation as the unifying
concept to Wesley's theology to recover Wesley's
'Christian system', which seeks to incorporate both the
relational and rational aspects of systematic theology
into Wesley's theology. By recovering the concept of
the Christian system the Unnecessary and often an-
tagonistic divide in Wesley studies between systematic
Introduction	 27
and applied systematics can hopefully be mended. The
doctrine of sin should be considered within the wider
context of what he said about the doctrine of knowledge,
the concept of personhood and personal identity,
creation, the origin of evil, free-will, the origin of
sin, how actual (or personal) sin relates to all those
issues, and even the consequences the doctrine of sin
has on his understanding of the order of salvation. All
these are related in one way or another to the 'Chris-
tian system'. Trying to understand his 'Christian
system' is the nature of the second contribution I hope
this work will make to Wesley studies.
2.2, The Contribution to other Theological
Discussions
But I have also mentioned another aspiration,
namely that from this study of Wesley some contributions
might be made to contemporary discussions relating to
systematic theology, particularly theological anthropol-
ogy. For the reason of propinquity as much as anything
else, I am most familiar with the work that has been
carried out through the Research Institute in Systematic
Theology, centred at King's College, London. The recent
appearance of, Persons, Divine and Eumant Kind's College
Essays in Theo1oical AnthroDology
 (1991) demonstrates
both the type and the direction of Work that has been
carried out through the Instltute.' I would like to
suggest, and only briefly discuss four areas touched
upon by the Institute's research, although there are
more, as suggested by Schwöbel's chapter, 'Euman Being
As Relational Beings Twelve Theses for a Christian
Anthropology'.° These areas were selected because of
the overlap between them and my own work on Wesley, and
freely admit that my work bears many of the marks of
their impression.	 On the basis of their mutual concern
it is my hope that Wesley studies can enter into
?• Schwöbel, Gunton, eds, Persons, Divine aixi lltziafl (1991).
10 In, Persons. Divine and Hun.n (1991), pp. 141-65.
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dialogue with the contemporary issues of systematic
theology.
The first area touched upon by research through the
Institute is the grounding of Christian theology in a
doctrine of the Trinity. As Schwöbel has pointed out,
the revival of trinitarian theology in many
Christian theological circles in the last
decade is of considerable significance This
resurgence of trinitarian theological reflec-
tion is motivated by the conviction that
Christian faith is irreducibly trinitarian in
character and that a distinctively theological
and authentically Christian perspective from
which theology can engage in dialogue with the
rich diversity of non-Christian and secular
views of reality is therefore necessarily
trinitarian.
The authenticity and integrity of Christian theology is
grounded in trinitarian theology. Unfortunately, the
Trinity has for too long been looked upon as an arith-
metic conundrum placed as a kind of 'intellectual hurdle
to be leaped before orthodoxy can be acknowledged',
which has meant trinitarian theology has been divorced
from	 other	 Christian	 doctrines	 and grievously
neglected 2
	Meyendorff has
	 even suggested that
doctrines have
	 a tendency to be meaningless when
approached separately, which is particularly true where
the Trinity is concerned.' Indeed, the doctrine of the
Trinity has profound implications on all Christian
doctrines, from creation, to anthropology 1
 and even
eschatology.4 But, as Jenson has suggested, the 'point
of trinitarian theology' is not just to ground itself in
the doctrinal orthodoxy of the church, its point is to
root itself in the Church's life and worship of the
Triune God Whether one speaks of orthodoxy, or
doxology, the full potential of trinitarian theology has
not yet been discovered, and only tentatively explored,
' Schwöbel, in, Persons Divine and Human, p. 10.
' Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology (1991), pp 58-9.
Meyendorff, in, Being
 as Co.iinunion (1985), p. 11.
" Gunton, 'Relation and Relativity', in, Promise of Trinitar-
Ian Theology (1991); J.lfrth, 'The Trinity and Eschatology' (1990).
Jenson, 'The Point of Trinitarian Theology' (1990).
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as Gunton's work, The Promise of Trinitarian Theolo
has illustrated.
The second area touched upon by the Institute's
research is that the Trinity is best understood, not in
rational, or Augustinian terms,'' but in relational
terms, that is three Divine Persons in communion with
each other4 This is a positive utilization of the rich
Eastern teaching on the Trinity, as demonstrated by
Zizioulas who argued,
The being of God is a relational being:
without the concept of communion it would not
be possible to speak of the being of God. The
tautology 'God is God' says nothing about
ontology, just as the logical affirmation A =
A is a dead logic and consequently a denial of
being which is life, It would be unthinkable
to speak of the 'one God' before speaking of
the God who is 'communion,' that is to say, of
the Holy Trinity. The Holy Trinity Is a
primordial ontological concept and not a
notion which is added to the divine substance
or rather which follows it, as is the case in
the dogmatic manuals of the West and, alas, in
those of the East in modern times,
	 The
substance of God, 'God,' has no ontological
content, no true being, apart from corn-
munion.I,..Jlhere is no true being without
communion. Nothing exits as an 'individual,'
conceivable in
	 itself,	 Communion	 is an
ontological category?
The Biblical tevelation that love is an essential divine
attribute confirms that points If God is love there
must be another who is the object of that loves The
concept of love speaks of a relationship, Within the
Godhead both the love and the relationship are ex-
perienced and maintained by the economy of the Holy
Trinity, or three divine persons in communion- God the
Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit.
The third area touched upon by the Institute's
research is an ontology of personhood which consists of
a trinitarian image of God that is relational in nature.
In his critique of the body and soul dualism commonly
found In platonic anthropology, Zizioulas has said,
• For a critique of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity see
Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theolo gy
 (1991), pp. 31-57,
• Zizioulas, Being
 as Coimnunign (1985), pp. 17, 18.
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the person is a concept which is ontologically
impossible, because the soul 1 which ensures
man's continuity, is not united permanently
with the concrete, 'individual' man: it lives
eternally but it can be united with another
concrete body and can constitute another
'Individuality'	 . . 1.•°
Gunton has carried this thesis forward through his
critique of the same dualism propagated by Descartes,
saying that in the end it fails to provide an adequate
ontology of personhood, on the basis that the concept of
personhood dissolves into either collectivism or
individualism." This is the unfortunate conclusion of
separating anthropology from the doctrine of God, more
specifically the doctrine of the triune God.
The alternative to this is to look upon personhood
as consisting of a triune image of God that is relation-
al in nature. Such a shift would move away from the
necessity of imposing arbitrary groups of threes on an
anthropological dualism in order to satisfy the concept
of a trinitarian image of God. Several have done both
historical and systematic work on this alternative
solution to Cartesian dualism, A yes has taken the work
of John Macmurray as a way of looking at personhood as
persons in relation." Gunton has also linked the
relational nature of personhood to John Macmurray, but
also Richard of St. Victor, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and
Edward Irving." Schwöbel marks the modern period of
development of the doctrine with R.J Illingworth' In
terms of more systematic investigations as to the
various doctrinal implications, Zizioulas has explored a
trinitarian anthropology and the relationship such a
view would have with a trinitarian ecciesiology.
McFadyen has further added to the relational aspect of a
trinitarlan concept of personhood, and has applied its
" Zizioulas, Being as Cotiinunion (1985), p.28.
" Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology (1991), pp. 87-90.
• Ayes, in, Persons, Divine and Human, Schwöbel, Gunton, eds,
(1991), pp . 120-37.
' Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology (1991), pp. 90-100;
cf. Macmurray, Persons in Relation (1961). See, Ayes, in, Persons
Human and Divine, Schwöbel, Gunton, eds. (1991), pp. 120-37.
•Z Illingworth, Personality-Hunn and Divine (1894)
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implications to social, interpersonal 1
 and political
relations. '
In respect to these three points, it is my con-
clusion that the starting point for Wesley's understand-
ing of the Christian system is the Triune God, par-
ticularly where
	 his anthropology, soteriology, and
understanding of worship were concerned. To Wesley,
humanity was created by the Triune God, in the image of
the Triune God, to be redeemed by the Triune God, so
redeemed humanity can praise and worship the one-in-
three through the three-in-one. Quantrille has demon-
strated that there is enough material on the Wesleys'
doctrine of the Trinity to justify a thesis of its
own.' 4
 Unfortunately, there is not enough space here to
do it justice, Consequently, his doctrine of the Trinity
will only be touched upon in this one, particularly at
the points of anthropology, harnartiology, and soteriol-
ogy	 The most significant and intriguing aspect of his
anthropology as it relates to the Trinity is his
willingness to
	 interpret the
	 image of God as a
trinitarian one, while not using Augustinian categories,
which were mostly rational.
	 Instead, Wesley chose to
understand the trinitarian image of the Triune God in
mostly relational terms. While Wesley's understanding
of the relational nature of the Christian system is not
as sophisticated as developed in modern scholarship,
what one does find in Wesley are the first signs of a
revolt against the purely rational and speculative
approach to the Trinity and to Christian faith 1
 and an
understanding of it in terms of relations, and the
experience of those relations. In this respect Wesley
becomes an interesting theological case study, and an
important figure in the history of theological anthrop-
ology in general, and more specifically in the history
of the doctrine of sin. Current research cannot really
" HcFadyen, The call to Personhood (1990).
" Quantrille, 'The Triune God In the Hymns of Charles Wesley',
(1988).
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afford to overlook him, and can only benefit from a
Wesleyan input into the present discussion.
The fourth area is that theology should not Just be
entirely speculative, but practical in nature, that is
to say, it should not be separated from, but serve the
life and ministry of the church in a practical way.
This point is an implicit assumption particularly to the
work by Gunton, and Zizioulas. It is less of an
assumption and more of a statement in Schwöbel '8, God:
Action and Revelation. I hope that after the above
discussion of Wesley's 'Christian system' one can see
how Wesley might help to explore and understand the need
for a holistic approach to systematic theology. 'Doing'
systematic theology is not Just the act of reconstruct-
ing the truth claims of Christian theology, in many ways
it is incarnating those truth claims in the community of
faith, and in a missionary sense to the world beyond the
community of faith, In short, it is faith expressing
itself through love, The reflective and active and the
pious and merciful aspects of Christian theology were
integral to Wesley's 'Christian system'. In this
respect Wesley has another important contribution to
make to current studies.
Having made this introduction to the structure and
method it is now appropriate to allow method to recede,
start chapter one, and the discussion of Scripture,
reason, and experience. These were the tools Wesley
used to construct his 'Christian system' with its
holistic nature, and to understand the doctrine of sin.
Chapter One
.According to Scripture, Reason, and Experience':
Wesley's Epistemology
1. Introduction
When Wesley wrote his response to John Taylor, on
the title page he indicated his doctrine of original sin
would be according to 'Scripture, Reason, and Ex-
perience'. 1 What Wesley seems to have been suggesting
was that there are three ways in which one may have
'knowledge', or an 'understanding' of something, in this
case original sin. Rivers has shown that as a body of
literature Wesley's work is saturated with the language
of Scripture, reason, and experience. 2 Their prevalence
is owing to the fact that as sources of knowledge,
Scripture, reason, and experience were also the sources
Wesley drew upon to construct his theology, or 'Chris-
tian system'.3
What this chapter will seek to do is establish
Wesley's understanding of Scripture, reason, and ex-
perience as sources of knowledge. We will begin by
assessing the role of tradition in Wesley's doctrine of
knowledge.	 After which we will consider some of the
important sources influencing Wesley's doctrine of
knowledge, and show how his understanding of the 'scale
of assent' can serve as a framework for discussing his
doctrine of knowledge. In that discussion particular
reference will be given to the concept of 'eternal
reason', and the part it plays in the rational and
relational nature of Wesley's theology. 	 Then we will
proceed to	 discuss the part experience played in
Wesley's concept	 of personhood,	 and suggest some
implications for the doctrine of sin.
' cf. 'A Thought on the Manner of Educating Children' (1783),
Works, XIII, 476; BEW, XXV, 254-5 (1747); 'The Repentance of
Believers' (1763), BEW, I, 336; but notice the inverted order in
'The Promise of Understanding' (1730), BEW, IV, 284; 'An Earnest
Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion', BEW, XI, 176; cf. Samuel
Hebden, Doctrine of Ori ginal Sin (1741), as extracted by Wesley in
Works, IX, 415, and 431.
2 Rivers, 'John Wesley and the Language of Scripture, Reason,
and Experience', Prose Studies 4(1981), 252-84.
Langford, Practical Divinity (1983), p. 27; Cushman, Ex-
perimental Divinity (1989), pp. 11-12.
Chapter One
	 34
2. Towards a Wesleyan Epistemology
The branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge
is epistemology. Wesley particularly developed an
interest in epistemology, and metaphysical 4
 enquiry in
the last phase of his ministry, 5
 which is reflected in
many of the titles of his works- 'An Earnest Appeal to
Men of Reason and Religion' (1743), 'A Farther Appeal to
Men of Reason and Religion (1745), 'A Compendium of
Logic' (1750), 'Thoughts Concerning the Origin of Power'
(1772),	 'Thoughts upon Necessity' (1774), 'The Case of
Reason Impartially Considered' (1780), 'A Thought on
Necessity' (1780), 'Thoughts upon Taste' (1780),
'Remarks upon Mr. Locke's "Essay on Human Understand-
ing"' (1782-84), 'The Imperfection of Human Knowledge'
(1784); appearing in, A Surve y
 of the Wisdom of God in
the Creation: or a Com pendium of Natural Philosophy
(1777, 3rd ed,) were also 'Of the Gradual Improvement of
Natural Philosophy', 'Remarks on the Limits of Human
Knowledge', and an extract of Peter Browne's, Essa y on
Human Understanding. This is enough material to
certainly dispel the myth that Wesley was too pragmatic
to delve into speculative or metaphysical issues.
From such works one may see that epistemologically
Wesley was not a strict empiricist, although experience
played an important part in his theology. A strict
empiricist would say experience, not reason, is the
source of knowledge. B
 Neither was Wesley a strict
rationalist, although Wesley did stress the use of
reason in religion, and the positive role it could play.
A strict rationalist would say reason, not experience,
is the source of all knowledge. Neither was Wesley a
simplistic Biblicist, although where the final judge of
all knowledge was concerned, Wesley was indeed 'homo
By metaphysics It is meant here an attempt to explore the
realm of the suprasensible, beyond the world of experience in order
to establish a foundation for all other knowledge, Flew, Dictionary
of Philosophy (1983), p. 229.
Wood, 'Wesley's Epistemology', WTJ, 10(1975), 48-59.





 referring to himself as a 'Bible-bigot'.°
While the authority of Scripture was supreme, Wesley
could not escape from the fact that reason and ex-
perience both influence one's understanding and inter-
pretation of Scripture. 9
 By reason, scripture was
understood. 1 ° By experience, scripture was confirmed.''
Consequently, his theology, even his doctrine of sin,
consisted of the Biblical, the rational,
	 and the
empirical.' 2
 So, before coming to terms with Wesley's
hamartlology (doctrine of sin), we must come to terms
with his epistemology.
2.1. A Quadrilateral or a Triangle?
Those who are acquainted with the Wesleyan quad-
rilateral (i.e. Scripture, tradition, reason, and ex-
perience) will by now be aware of the absence of 'tradi-
tion' In the above discussion. 13 Although it was
omitted from the title page of Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin,
it Is often included by some who saw in Wesley four
sources of doctrinal authority.' 4 However, the role of
tradition in Wesley's epistemology, and especially its
being listed In priority above experience and reason,
JWJ, V, 117 (1765); JWL, IV, 299 (1765); 'The Character of a
Methodist' (1742), in 'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection'
(1777), in Works, XI, 373; 'Preface, Sermons 1746', DEW, I, 105 note
9; 'On God's Vineyard' (1787), DEW, III, 504. See, Joy, 'Wesley: Man
of a Thousand Books and a Book', Reli g ion in Life, 8(1937), 71;
Arnett, 'John Wesley and the Bible', WFJ, 3(1968)1, 3-9.
JWJ, V, 169 (1766); 'On God's Vineyard' (1787),
	 , III,
504.
Kilhistad, Wesley and the Bible (1974).10 
'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered' (1781),
	 , II,
591. , II, 467 (174!) for his somewhat unfair criticisms of
Luther's coninentary of Galatlans (3.6) and his lack of use of proper
reason.
" JWL, VI, 49 (1773); JWJ, I, 471-2 (May 1738). See, Garrison,
'Vital Interact ion: Scripture and Experience: John Wesley's Doctrine
of Authority', Relig ion in LIfe, 25(1956), 563-73.12 See Arnett, 'John Wesley- Man of One Book', (1954), pp. 98
ff; Williams, Wesley 's Theology
 Today (1960), pp. 27-28.13 This is a phrase coined by Out 1 er, and used by many, e.g.
Out ler, 'The Wesleyan Quadrilateral- in John Wesley', WFJ,
20(1985)1, 7-18.14 e.g. 'The Wesleyan appeal to the fourfold norms of Scrip-
ture, tradition, experience, and reason was so widely understood
that it is taken for granted', The Book of Discipline of the United
Methodist Church (1984), p. 45; Williams, John Wesley 's Theology




must be questioned. Epistemologically, tradition is not
strictly a source, but a medium of knowledge. In his,
An Essay
 on Human Understanding, Locke characterized
tradition as a kind of gossip in which the testimony of
a tradition Is weakened by the number of hands it has
successively passed through.'5
That Wesley had a knowledge of, and an appreciation
for ancient authorities,'' or more specifically 'ante-
Nicene' authorities,'' is undeniable. His Intense
interest in early church history led some of his friends
to give him the nickname, 'Primitive Christianity'.1'
Volume one of his, Christian Library alone contained
extracts from works by Macanus, Clement, Ignatius, and
Polycarp, works he thought contained 'what Christ and
his Apostles taught'.' 9
 The authority of the Apostolic
Fathers stood above all others, second only to the New
Testament itself. 2 ° Perhaps that is why he preferred to
call them 'authorities' rather than 'traditions'. He
cherished ancient authority so much he admitted he had
at one time,
bent the bow too far the other way: (1) by
making antiquity a co-ordinate (rather than
subordinate) rule	 with ScrIpture; (2) by
admitting	 several	 doubtful	 wiritings	 as
undoubted evidences of antIquity; (3) by
extending antiquity too far, even to the
middle or end of the fourth century; (4) by
believing more
	 practices to have
	 been
' Locke, Essay, IV.xvi.1O. Wesley objected when Locke said,
'That any Testimony, the farther off it is from the original Truth,
the less force and proof it has' (Essay, IV.xvi.1O). But what Wesley
failed to realize was Locke's differentiation between 'original
Truth' (or the Gospels attestation to the resurrection) and 'tradi-
tional Truth' (or the passing of Truth from one hand to another),
Works, XIII, 463.
" DEW, XXV, 592 (1738); JVL, III, 172 (1756).17 For a showcase of Wesley's patristic knowledge see, 'A
Letter to the Reverend Doctor Conyers Middleton, Occasioned by his
late Free Inquiry', 2nd ed. (1749), In Works, X, 1-79; compare the
list on p. 79 with that in 'On laying the Foundation of the New
Chapel' (1777), DEW, III, 586; also cf. BEW, XXVI, 575 (1755); cf.
'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1745), DEW, XI,
155; and see, JWL, VII, 106 (1782). For a list of Wesley's ref eren-
ces to ancient Christian works see, Campbell, Wesley and Christian
AntiquIty (1991), pp. 125-34.
BEW, XXV, 246 note.
	 For a poem illustrating 'Primitive
Christianity' see DEW, XI, 90-94.
" CL, I, 17; also in Works, XIV, 223.20 Works, XIV, 225.
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universal in the ancient Church than ever were
soE . . • J • 21
Eventually, Wesley came to realize even the Ancient
authorities must ultimately be judged by the authority
of Scripture.22
If ancient authorities were to be judged by Scrip-
ture, certainly traditions were to be also. On this
basis many significant traditions were not accepted by
Wesley.	 There are several instances of this. For
example, after reading John Lacey's, The General
Delusion of Christians with re gard to Prophecy , 2 ' Wesley
developed a sympathy for the Montanists, saying they
were 'real scriptural Christians' 24 Without saying
why, Wesley 'doubted whether that arch-heretic, Mon-
tanus, was not one of the holiest men In the second
century.' 25
 In virtually the same breath Wesley showed
a significantly qualified sympathy for another 'arch-
heretic', Pelagius, saying,
I verily believe the real heresy of Pelaglus
was neither more nor less than this, the
holding that Christians may by the grace of
God (not without it; that I take to be a mere
slander) 'go on to perfection'; or, in other
words, 'fulfil the law of Christ'.'2
21 BEW, XVIII, 212-3 (1738).
22 'A Roman Catechism, with a Reply thereto' (1756), Section I,Question 8. Green (Bibliography, p. 99) points out that this was
not written by Wesley but by an unknown writer from the days of
James II.
' Lacey (see PWHS, IV, 77) was one of the French prophets, a
group of French Huguenots prone to ecstatic and apocalyptic ex-
tremes. Some of their group operated within and on the fringe of
Methodism, causing Wesley untold problems, as can be seen in Bishop
Lavington's attack on Methodism in, Enthusiasm of Methodists and
Pap ists Compared. See flEW, XXVI, 32-33 note. See Schwartz, The
French Prophets (1980), p. 207.24 JwJ, III, 490 (1750). Cf. AM, (1785), 35-6, 'The Real
Character of Montanus', also in Works, XI, 485-6.25 
'The Wisdom of God's Counsels' (1784), BEW, II, 555. Cf. ER(1781), I, 113. It Is interesting to compare Kneidler's suninary of
Montanism, in 'Montanism and Monasticism, Charism and Authority in
the Early Church', SP, 18(1989)2, 229-234, with Gunter's study in,
Limits of Love Divine (1989). There are certain similarities in the
allegations towards both Montantists and Methodists. Also note,
James Clark, 'Montanus redivivus: or, Montanism revived In the
principles and discipline of the Methodists (coemonly called
swadlers)' (Dublin: 1760).2S 
'The Wisdom of God's Counsels' (1784), BEW, II, 556. Cf. ER(1781), I, 245; iffi (1776), I, 14; JWL, VI, 174-5 (1775); JYL, IV,




By attaching to himself the label Arminian he identified
himself with one who had been condemned by the Synod of
Dort. 27
 In spite of the efforts of some to see an Anglo-
Catholic side to Wesley he never hid the problems he had
with the 'Romish traditions' of the Catholic Church.28
By his own admission he also rejected many Anglican
traditions 2 ' when he resorted to field preaching,3°
started using lay preachers, 31
 advocated the use of
extempore prayer, 32
 and even seemed to question the
administration of baptism only by an ordained priest.33
The justification by sympathetic scholars notwithstand-
ing, Wesley dismissed the Anglican tradition of 'Aposto-
lic succession' by ordaining Dr. Thomas Coke for the
work in America.34
In one sense, tradition was an appeal to second-
hand experience,	 which was
	 how Cushman described
Wesley's appeal
	 to 'orthodoxy'.	 'Orthodoxy' was
27 Wesley almost certainly read Simon Episcopius, Confessio
sive declaratio sententiae Pastorum gui in Foederato Bel gio Remon-
(1622), along with Calvin, Defenslo Orthodoxae Fidei de Sacra
Trinitate (1554), developing sympathies for Episcopius, and Ser-
vetus, see BEW, XIX, 204 and notes; for more of Wesley's comments on
the Calvin-Servetus affair see 'On the Trinity' (1775), , II,
378.
28 'A Roman Catechism, Faithfully Drawn out of the Allowed
Writings of the Church of Borne' (1756), Works, X, 91; 'Popery Calmly
Considered' (1779), Works, X, 140-58; cf. Todd, Wesley and the
Catholic Church (1958), who softened Wesley's stand on Catholicism.
29 JWL, VII, 285 (1785), where he admitted did indeed vary from
''the mitred infidels' of the Church of England.' For a less caustic
remark see, 'Prophets and Priests' (1789), BEW, IV, 81. Wesley also
rejected the tradition that St. George was the patron saint of
England. After reading John Byrom's, Poems (1773) he became
convinced that 'Georgius' was a mistake f or 'Gregorius', making St.
Gregory, who sent Austin the Monk to convert England, the 'real
patron of England', JWJ, V, 517-18 (1773).
° cf. Edmund Gibson, 'The Case of the Methodists Briefly
Stated, More Particularly in the Point of Field Preaching', referred
to in 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, I' (1745),
BEW, XI, 178-83.
31 See JWL, II, 93 (1747), II, 149 (1748); III, 146 (1755),
III, 186 (1756).
32 See, Thomas Church, 'Some Farther Remarks on the Rev. Mr.
John Wesley's Last Journal' (1746). To which Wesley replied with,
'The Principles of a Methodist Farther Explained' (1746). For his
remarks on extempore prayer see BFN, IX, 187-88, 195, 538; and
'Catholic Spirit' (1750), BEW, II, 90.
JWL, VII, 23 (1787).
See, JWJ, VII, 15-6 (1784); JWL, VII I
 21 (1780), cf.




criticized by Wesley when It became the theory of
Christianity without any experiential form. 35 On this
basis Wesley summarily, and rather caustically, dis-
missed theoretical orthodoxy which was void of ex-
periential orthodoxy as having little, if anything, to
do with religion.	 He went so far as to call It the
'faith of a devil'. 3 ' However, one should be careful
not to dismiss the importance of orthodoxy to Wesley.
Orthodoxy was Important to him, as his spirited defense
of the Trinity, and original sin clearly indicates. He
did not dismiss orthodoxy in favour of orthopraxis
alone. 37
 Orthodoxy is to be accompanied by orthopraxis,
in the same way a doctrinally correct faith should be
accompanied by a living faith, and a living faith should
be accompanied by works.
	 This was Wesley's point, as
Cushman rightly pointed out.3
But tradition is also an appeal to second-hand
experience, and the theology of a previous generation.
The point is, all traditions, whether Apostolic,
ancient, or modern, were always subjected to Wesley's
personal scrutiny, and valuation, according to Scrip-
ture, reason, and experience. When he failed to accept
a tradition, whatever it was, whatever its source, or
whatever its age, it was essentially on the basis of his
understanding of Scripture and his experience of it. Ul-
timately, a tradition was accepted by Wesley only so far
as It was understood to be Scriptural.39
Cushman, Experimental Divinity (1989), p. 90. Note Wesley's
remark on orthodoxy in JWL, III, 183 (1756), 'OrthodoxyL. ..lor right
opinion, Is but a slender part of religion at best, and sometimes no
part at all.' Although the remainder of the letter appeared in AM
(1779), 598-601, these words did not. Note also, 'On the Wedding
Garment' (1790), BEW, IV, 146; 'On Living Without God' (1790), BEW,
IV, 175; 'The Unity of the Divine Being' (1789), BEW, IV, 66; 'On
the Trinity' (1775), BEW, II, 374-75.
' JWL, III, 183 (1756); cf. 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), I,
119-20; 'The Almost Christian' (1741), BEW, I, 138-9; 'The Marks of
the New Birth' (1748), BEW, I, 418.
" See, Clapper, Wesley
 on Religious Affections (1989). I am
aware of liberation theology's usage of the word and sin convinced of
a certain affinity between what Wesley indicates and the point made
about 'orthopraxis' by liberation theology, e.g. Gutierrez, Theology
of Liberation (1973), pp. 6-20.
Cushman, Experimental Divinity (1989), pp. 86-100.




A more positive, and more appropriate innderstanding
of Wesley's use of tradition is perhaps looking at it as
a history of the right interpretation of Scripture, and
how Scripture was understood in a (as opposed to 'its')
historical context. 4 ° Tradition may then be understood
as the history of Ante-Nicene, Reformation, and Anglican
Biblical interpretation. In this sense Wesley was
certainly 'traditional' in his understanding of the
doctrine of original sin, insofar as the traditional (or
the orthodox) understanding of original sin was what he
considered to be in accord with the right interpretation
of Scripture,	 Scripture was the criteraon by which
tradition was judged. In turn, reason, and experience
helped to interpret Scripture. This was how Wesley was
able to borrow from so many different Christian tradi-
tions, making his one of the most eclectic, and perhaps
most ecumenical theologies one may find. Each tradition
he borrowed from expressed a certain exegetical con-
clusion reached by Wesley. How he partacularly used
many of these influences in the order of salvation will
be seen in chapter five.
All of these traditions formed what can best be
interpreted as a history of exegesis. For Wesley this
was tradition. Yet, in terms of his epistemology
'tradition' was made redundant, cutting it from the
traditional Wesleyan quadrilateral, leavang an epis-
temological triangle.
All this is substantiated when one studies the
epistemological connotations of the words 'Scripture',
'reason', and 'experience' as used by Wesley. Two
documents critical to understanding this are Wesley's,
'Remarks upon Mr. Locke's "Essay on Human Understand-
ing'', and, 'A Compendium of Logic', mainly because he
extracted Locke's 'Essay', and used his own 'Compendium'
to correct its deficiencies.
Relatively little work has been done on Wesley's
epistemology. The two most comprehensive treatments of
the subject have been by Brantley and Shimitzu. Brant-
ley's work was perhaps too focused on Locke's and
Wesley's	 relationship	 with English romanticism to
40 My thanks to Christoph Schwöbel for this insight.
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provide an accurate view of Wesley's epistemology.
However, as Rack has pointed out, the major weakness of
the work was its failure to realize the differences
between Locke and Browne. 4 ' Shimitzu's treatment was
much more comprehensive, as it isolated several of the
major sources of influence upon Wesley's epistemology,
which were not just Locke, but also Browne, Norris, and
Malebranche. 42
 Brantley, and Shimitzu have been helpful
In illuminating the important philosophical sources of
influences on Wesley's thought. However important their
respective works might be, neither gave much treatment
of another important source of Influence on Wesley's
epistemology- Henry Aldrich.
2.2. John Wesley, Henry Aldrich, and Pope
John XXI
From 1782-84 Wesley extracted parts of John
Locke's, An Essay
 concerning Human Understanding (1689)
for publication in the Arminian Ma gazine, under the
general title, 'Remarks upon Mr. Locke's "Essay on Human
Understanding"'. 43
 It was mostly extractions from the
chapters on 'Power' (II.xxi), and 'Of our Complex Ideas
of Substance' (II.xxiii), to which Wesley attached
several critical comments. Most of the material related
to free-will, in keeping with the editorial policy of
the Arminian Magazine. However, his extraction of its
parts should not be taken as Wesley's unconditional
endorsement of the whole. Wesley was so disappointed in
Books 3 and 4 he did not even bother to extract them.
Instead, he published only his unrelenting criticisms of
them. This fact almost makes a mockery of his qualified
endorsement. Wesley did not believe Methodists should
read Locke without either the help of a competent tutor,
or, 'the Remarks in the Arminian Magazine'. 44
	In other
words, Locke is not to be read without Wesley.
41 Brantley, Locke, Wesley (1984). See Rack's review, 'Wesley
and Romanticism', PWHS, 45(1989), 63-5.
42 Shimitzu, 'The Epistemology in the Thought of John Wesley'
(1980).
To see what parts of the Essay appeared in the AN see
Brantley, Locke, Wesley (1984), pp. 221-25.
'Remarks upon Mr. Locke 's "Essay on Human Understand ins"',
Works, XIII, 464; AM, 7(1784), 316; JWL, VII, 228 (1784).
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In writing his criticisms of Locke's Essa y , Wesley
drew upon a text crucial to his own formation as a
logician in the Aristotelian tradition- Henry Aldrich's
text, Artis Lo g jcae Compendium (1691). Airich's was the
text he would have studied while a student at Oxford. It
had replaced the superior work of Robert Sanderson,
Lo g icae Artis Com pendium (1615) as the standard text in
logic at Oxford. 45
	It was also the textbook he used
while a tutor at Lincoln College, and Moderator of
disputations at the college, 4
	Three of his graduates
were given tuition in Aldrich. 47
 In 1750 Wesley
translated Aldrich's latin text 48 so it could be used at
his Kingswood School, 49
 eventually publishing It that
same year as, 'A Compendium of Logic'. 5 ° That Wesley
eventually developed a respect for Sanderson's work is
evident in the fact the second edition (1756) of the
'Compendium' was expanded to include, 'Of the manner of
using logic, extracted from Bishop Sanderson.' 5 ' As one
writer has put it, the result of this translation was
that 'Wesley breathed life into the dry bones of
Aldrich.' 52
 Any attempt to understand Wesley's epistem-
ology which does not take this text into careful
consideration will miss many important insights.
' For a literal English translation of Aldrich see, Rudiments
of Log ic (1827). The British Library copy was bound together with
Hind, Introduction to Logic (1827); cf. Whately, Elements of Logic(1826), which was itself an extraction and adaptation of Aldrich.
Green, Young Wesley (1963), p. 130.
'' Green, Young Wesley (1963), p. 133.
JWJ, III, 459 and n. (1750). The translation took him all
of 'three or four hours' while waiting for the tide to go out so he
could complete his journey from Tan-y-bwlch to Moel-y-don. Benjaniin
Inghain had translated Aldrich himself In September 1733, Heitzen-
rater, Diary (1985), p. 259.
See, 'A Short Account of Kingswood School' (1749); cf.
III, 530-52 (1751).
° Tyerman, Life of Wesley (1878), II, 90; Green, Bibliography(1896), p. 68.
' Wesley read Sanderson's, Log icae Art is Compendium, Artih-
inatickal Logic, and, The Usefulness of Mathematics In 1730 (see
Green, Young Wesley (1963), p. 295). Further use of Sanderson at
Oxford is indicated in Benjamin Inghain's own reading of the text(Heiztenrater, Diary (1985), pp. 26! ff.). Wesley acknowledged the
influence of Sanderson's section 'Of Treating on a Problem' on his
sermons, 'The Means of Grace' (1746), and 'The Nature of Enthusiasm'(1750). Also, see BEW, I, 25 n.




In taking into account the influence of Aldrich's
work on Wesley one must begin with a source that
Influenced Aldrich. What has been completely overlooked
by most Wesleyan scholars is the fact that Aldrich and
Sanderson had themselves relied heavily upon another
work, that of Peter of Spain, (Pope John XXI, d. 1277) a
Thomist, a Dominican, a logician, and Pope. His,
Summulae Log icales became a standard medieval textbook
of logic, which went through some 166 reprinted edi-
tions. 53 A certain amount of similarity between Peter
of Spain's work and his contemporaries has also been
noted. Mullally has noticed a considerable amount of
'literal resemblance' between the systems of Peter of
Spain, William of Sherwood, and Lambert of Duxerre, and
suggested that they studied together In Paris. 54
 But
more recent scholarship has proven that while Peter of
Spain did study in Paris, Shyreswood never studied
there. That fact notwithstanding, Libera has argued
rather convincingly for a strong Parisian Influence at
Oxford after 1250 at the latest. Libera has suggested
that it was perhaps only the zeal of Roger Bacon, the
former Parisian master and regent of arts, that pre-
vented Oxford from succumbing entirely to the Parisian
influence. 55
 This was enough to have established a
Parisian influence at Oxford, which eventually became
the shared logical tradition of Peter of Spain, Henry
Aldrich, and John Wesley.
There are several similarities between the three.
Peter of Spain made the study of grammar a part of
logic, a trait seen In both Aldrich and Wesley. Also
common to all three are the ideas of universals and
predicables, of words as signs and the signification of
objects, and of syllogisms.se	 A more graphic sign of
Mullally, The 'Sunvnulae Logicales' of Peter of Spain, vol. 8
in Publications in Mediaeval StudIes (1945); Kneale, Develo pment of
Logic (1962), pp. 234-35; Thomas, History of the Schoolmen (1941),
p. 462; Kretzmann, ed., CHiMP (1982), pp. 167-78, 877-78.
Mullally, 'Sumulae Logicales' (1945), p. xxi.
Libera, in CHLMP, Kretzmann, ed. (1988), pp. 174-87.
'Compendium' (1750), Works, XIII, 169; ci. Peter of Spain,
'Syllogisms', CDIPT, (1988), pp. 224-5. There Is an anecdote about
Wesley instructing his students to pin the 24 modes of syllogisms
inside their gowns to aid them in their debating skills until the
modes could be memorized.
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influence was the 'square of opposition' which was used
to analyze modal sentences. 57
 All of this was used to
construct modal logic, or the logic of necessities and
possibilities (or contingents). This was derived from
Aristotle's modal theory based on 'possibility', which
eventually became the basis for several other theories,
such as the 'Principle of Plentd (a concept which
will be discussed more fully in the next chapter), 5 the
'best of possible worlds', and can even help to explain
the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human
freedom (two more doctrines that were issues for Wesley,
which will also be discussed in the next chapter).
While it must be admitted that Wesley recognized the
limitations and hindrances many medieval methodologies
placed on natural philosophy and scientific discovery,
and credited Bacon for 'understanding the defects of the
school-philosophy', 59
 he was still indebted to them for
many other things. Examples of such indebtedness are
best seen in his 'Compendium of Logic'. If Wesley did
indeed breathe life into the dry bones of Aldrich,
because of Peter of Spain's influence on both Aldrich
and Sanderson, what was resurrected was not just
Aldrich. To a certain extent it was also Peter of
Spain's brand of medieval and Thomistic Aristotelianism.
The influence of this Aristotelianism on the thought of
John Wesley must not be underestimated.
2.3. Locke and the Schoolmen
Neither should one underestimate Locke's rejection
of this same Aristotelianism. While at Oxford, Locke
would have been exposed to the same medieval Aris-
totelianism, with its emphasis on grammar and formal
logic, as seen in Aldrich and Sanderson. But, Locke had
little or no interest in all that. 9 ° He was, in fact,
Modal sentences characterized another related sentence of
proposition as true, that is, the mode in which it is true, and the
logical relationships between four categorical propositions, which
were traditionally represented by A, E, I, and 0. See Antony Flew,
Dictionary
 of Philosophy (1983), pp. 337-38. See Kretzmann, ed.,
CHUIP, pp. 342-45; cf. 'Compendium of Logic', in Works, XIV, 166.58 Kretzmann, ed., CHIJIP (1982), p. 344.
' NP (1777), I, 15.
° Kneale, L.ogic (1962), p. 312.
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rather dismissive of Aristotle's Importance, saying,
'God has not been so sparing to Men to make them barely
two-legged Creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make
them RationalE.. .j'. In the end, Locke's response to
the philosophy of both Aristotle and the Schoolmen was
one of 'contemptuous antagonism'.' 2
 It Is no wonder
that after reading this material Wesley remarked, 'I was
much disappointed'.' 3
 Such remarks led Wesley to wonder
if it was not Locke's intention,
to drive Aristotle's Logic out of the world,
which he hated cordially, but never under-
stood: I suppose, because he had an unskillful
master, and read bad books upon the subject.'4
On the last point, Wesley's suspicions have been
confirmed by Milton, who has concluded from the evidence
given in the Lovelace Collection that Locke had little,
if any, direct knowledge of the 'Schoolmen'. He
concluded that most of Locke's knowledge of scholas-
ticism came from contemporary English, German, and other
European authors.' 5
 As to the first point, perhaps it
was Locke's intention to drive 'Aristotle's Logic out of
the world', but Wesley could not allow It. Most of his
'Remarks' were not so much an explication of Locke as
they were a defense of Aristotle. This defense put him
into conflict with Locke on many points. One point of
major conflict occurred on
	 a fundamental- Locke's
'degrees of assent'.
2.4. Locke's 'Degrees of Assent'
As important as log-ic was as a tool of epistemol-
ogy, it did not seek to explain an issue crucial to
epistemology- what are the most reliable sources of
knowledge? To a large extent the sources of knowledge
determine the limits of understanding. Locke had
attempted to deal with these Issues in two chapters, 'Of
Probability' (IV.xv), and 'Of the Degrees of Assent'
(IV.xvi). The whole notion of probability was based
" Locke, Essay , IV.xvIi.4.
•2 Gibson, Locke's Theory of Knowled ge (1917), p. 185.
" 'Remarks upon Locke's "Essay"', Works, XIII, 460.
• 'Remarks Upon Locke's "Essay"', Works, XIII, 460.
' Milton, 'The Scholastic Background to Locke's Thought'
Locke News, 15(1984), 25-34.
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upon the mind's ability to judge something to be either
true or false,SS and the likelihood of something to be
true." It was a sort of epistemological gambling based
upon odds, which can range from 'full assurance and
confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, and
distrust'." The grounds of probability were determined
by two things- (1) the 'conformity of any thing without
our own Knowledge, Observation, and Experience': and,
(2) 'the Testimony of others, vouching their Observation
and Experience'."	 Locke's method of assessing the
testimony of others consisted of,
1. The Number. 2. the Integrity. 3. The Skill
of the Witnesses. 4. The Design of the Author,
where it is a Testimony out of a Book cited.
5. The Consistency of the Parts, and Circum-
stances of the Relation. 6. Contrary Testi-
monies.
Based upon these. grounds of probability Locke
constructed the 'degrees of assent', Moore is correct
in saying that it is Locke's understanding of the
'degrees of assent' which furnished an important insight
into his epistemology and philosophy of religion,
providing a clue to the essential unity of Locke's
work." It could well be argued that the 'degrees of
assent' is the linchpin of Locke's empiricism. The
degrees of assent were what separated matters of opinion
from matters of fact, even matters of experience from
matters of revelation.
All this arose from the fact that the degrees of
assent were regulated by the grounds of probability.
The highest degree of probability
is, when the general consent of all men In all
ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with
a man's constant and never-failing experience
in like cases, to confirm the truth of any
particular matter-of-fact attested by fair
witnessesE . . .1 •72
S S Locke Essay , IV • xv, 1.
• Locke, Essay , IV. xv.3.
" Locke, Essay , IV. xv.2.
" Locke, Essay , IV. xv.4.
Locke, Essay , IV.xv.4.
Moore, 'Locke's Concept of Religious Assent', Southwestern
Journal of Philosophy , 8(1977), 25-30.
72 Locke, Essay , IV. xvi .6.
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The next degree of probability was unquestionable tes-
timony and experience. This is, 'when I find by my own
experience, and the agreement of all others that mention
it, a thing to be for the most part sol...1'. 73 The
third degree of assent was the fair testimony about the
nature of things that happen indifferently as a matter-
of-fact,1
 if it cannot be contradicted by another. The
blend of reason and experience within the degree of
assent itself points to the fact that Locke, like Kant,
sought to synthesize reason and experience, which means
that even Locke was not a strict empiricist.?4
The highest degree of assent is revelation, and our
assent to it is by faith. TS
 This sounds orthodox
enough, but closer examination of what Locke meant by
this discloses hidden difficulties when each of the
terms are defined.
	 The first term to be defined is
faith. By faith Locke meant,
the assent to any proposition, not thus made
out by the deductions of reason; but upon the
credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in
some extra-ordinary	 way of communication.
This way of discovering truths to men we call
revelation. '
Faith is based upon honesty being an attribute of God as
a revealer. But honesty was not the only Divine
attribute for Locke, logicality and rationality were
also, The nature of God is that God never reveals any
new simple Ideas by way of Traditional Revelation. This
was to say, God never reveals anything unreasonable.
Since God never reveals anything unreasonable, faith
should not assent to anything unreasonable. If it is
unreasonable it is not revelation. By reason, Locke
meant, 'the discovery of the Certainty or Probability of
such Propositions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at
by Deductions made from such Ideas, which it has got by
the use of its natural faculties, viz, by sensation or
reflection.'' 7
 Reason was reflection upon simple Ideas.
Locke, Essay , IV. xvi .7.
" Cohen, 'Reason and Exper fence in Locke * s Epi sterno logy'1
Phil. Phenomenal Research, 45(1984), 71-86.
Locke, Essay , IV. xvi. 14.
" Locke, Essay , IV.xvfii.2.
'' Locke, Essay , IV.xviii.2.
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To Locke, reason and our
certain to ourselves than t1
by Traditional Revelation.
appeared to be an assent on
God, ultimately faith was
founded on the highest r
Proposition can be recelv
obtain the Assent due to al
dictory to our clear tnt
proposition which is a yr
assented to without an exa
Ideas would always be more
se Ideas which are conveyed
While initially, faith
he basis of an attribute of
nothing else but an assent
aeon. Consequently0 1no
d for Divine Revelation, or
such, if it be contra-
itive Knoiriledg'."
	 No
tter of faith should be
inatfon by reaon. 7	F&th
can never convince us of any Thing, that contradicts our
Knowledge. Although Faith may be founded on the
testimony of God, yet we cannot be sure If it Is a
Divine Revelation if it is 'greater than our own
Knowledge'.° To say or do otherwise would subvert the
principles of assent.'
Snyder has argued that Locke's view of the rela-
tionship between faith and reason was not that much
different from Aquinas, but Locke came to Some rather
unorthodox conclusions. 12 One of which was that reason
alone determines what is a divine revelation. There-
fore, 'Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent
with the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has
a right to be urged, or assented to, as a matter of
faith, wherein reason hath nothing to do.'
	 Reason is
revelation. Revelation is reason.	 The one Who takes
reason from revelation is an enthusiast, an indictment
frequently brought against Wesley. 4
 But the one who
allowed reason to determine revelation was a deist, as
in the case of John Toland, Christianit y
 not Hsterious
(l696)	 Deism had the tendency to acquiesce all matters
of faith to	 the	 authority	 of	 reason.'	 Locke's
Locke, Essay , IV.xviii5.
' Locke, Essay , IV.xviii.8.
'° Locke, Essay , IV.xviii.5.
" Locke, Essay , IV,xvili.5.
• Snyder, 'Faith and Reason in Locke's Essay ', Journal of the
History of Ideas, 47(1986), 191-213.
Locke, Essay, IV.xviil.lO.
" Locke, Essay, IV.xix.4; cf. Gunter, Limits of Love Divine
(1989), pp . 13-26.
Lvies, Worship
 and Theology , (1975), II, 6-8.
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epistemology had a tendency to head in the direction of
deism, rather than enthusiasm4
This regulation of faith by reason could well leave
one to ask, 'What reasons could one have for making the
assent to faith?' The Essa y
 does not supply one with an
adequate answer to this question, In, 'A Discourse of
Miracles' Locke sought to remedy the situation by saying
that miracles accompany revelation,
rather like the credentials of an ambassador
or the passport of a citizen. We believed
what a person said because of the miracles he
carried about with him
	 Here is the simplest
interpretation of Locke's view.
The weakness of this view is the ease with which
miracles can be rationalized and sceptically dismissed
on the grounds of being unreasonable, and looked upon as
mindless enthusiasm,
2.5. Wesley's 'Scale of Assent'
Not surprisingly, Wesley found Locke's Views on the
degrees of assent 'quite unsatisfactory', and preferred
Henry Aldrich on the matter,'' who called it a 'scale of
assent',' In doing so, he was questioning the very
heart of Locke's epistemology, and his relationship
between faith and reason, consequently rejecting Locke's
outline of the matter, A close reading of Wesley's
'Compendium' greatly augments his comment upon Locke at
this point.
2.5.1. Assent on the Basis of Experience
Wesley knew that what Locke called the 'grounds of
probability' (called 'degrees of probability' by
Aldrich) depended first of all on whether or not the
senses had been deceived. Wesley said rather sceptical-
ly, 'Men are often deceived, and often deceive.''' Yet,
in spite	 of this scepticism, Wesley rejected the
idealism of Berkeley, because
	 he found Berkeley's
" Ramsey, in, The Reasonableness of Christianit y
 (1958), p.
14.
• Works, XIII, 463; Mi 7(1784), 314-6.	 Neither was the
concept lacking in Watts, Logick, II.ii.8.
" 'Logic', Works, XIV, 178.
" 'Logic', Works, XIV 178; ct. 'The Trouble and Rest of Good





reasons 'to be mere fallacy, though very artfully
disguised','° Because of the risk of sensory deception,
sensory (even spiritual) experience (either one's own or
that of another) should not be accepted uncritically,
but should be examined by more reliable means (i.e.
reason, and the standing revelation of Scripture), as
the reliability of one's experience is often limited by
deception.
2.5.2. Assent and the Epistemology of
Testimony
In spite of the fear of deception, on the basis of
the 'degrees of probability' there can be developed what
Pricker and Cooper have called the 'epistemology of
testimony', by which the truth of certain statements
regarding the experiences of others may be verified.'
Wesley's own extensive use of testimony, especially the
Individual testimonies of religious experience chron-
icled in the Arminian Magazine, made up what could be
called Wesley's 'epistemology of testimony', But the
difference between the epistemology of testimony as
suggested by Pricker and Cooper and the epistemology of
testimony as it was used by Wesley was that Wesley was
not Just seeking to verify the truth of an individual's
experience. He was also seeking to verify the truth of
Biblical doctrine. Through the epistemology of testi-
mony, experience verified Scripture and the truth of
certain Christian doctrines, Such as justification
entire sanctification, and assurance. In the Arminian
Magazine many testimonies were extracted from personal
narratives and personal religious experiences. This
mesnt testimony, indeed much of religious experience,
was 'narrative dependent'."
'° BEW, )CXV, 186-7 (1725). Wesley would not have disagreed
with Berkeley's argument that Ideas exist only In some mind, a
notion Wesley credited to Protagoras, NP (1777), V, 53-4. See his
exchange of letters with his mother on Berkeley in BEV. XXV, 183
(1725). It is most likely Wesley had read Berkeley's, Three
Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713).
Fr icker, Cooper, 'The Epistemology of Testimony', AS,
61(1987), 57-106.
" Phillips, 'On Appealing to the Evidence', The PhilosoDhical
Forum 22(1991)3, 228-42. He observes that William James concluded
that true ideas are made by true events.
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The epistemology of testimony was also how Wesley
reconciled his empiricism with his supernaturalism, a
dilemma rightly pointed out by Rack, Wesley used the
same criteria to establish the validity of a super-
natural event as he did to establish that of a religious
experience, Implicit to the appeal of testimony is the
assumption that supernatural events were supported by
Scripture, and consequently a Biblical doctrine to
Wesley (a doctrine which was in itself established by
Wesley's own reason and experience).
	 Only after that
would testimony be allowed, subject to the integrity and
number of the witnesses, On the basis of the epistemol-
ogy of testimony Wesley accepted or rejected either the
supernatural, or the spiritual account.
2.5.3. Assent on the Basis of Reason and
Nature•
While individuals deceive and are deceived, 'reason
and nature', on the other hand, 'are not often deceived,
and seldom do they deceive their followers.'' 4 As the
scale of assent proceeded from experience to reason,
Wesley's understanding of the relationship between faith
and reason started to unfold. It began by implying that
reason, and nature, were in some ways less effected by
sin than sensory perception, and consequently more
reliable. We have seen what Locke meant by it, but what
did Wesley mean by 'reason'?
2.5.4. Eternal Reason
Wesley spoke of reason in two ways. First of all
he meant,
eternal reason, the nature of things: the
nature of God and the nature of man, with the
relations necessarily subsisting between them,
Why, this is the very religion we preach: a
religion evidently founded on, and every way
agreeable to, eternal reason, to the essential
nature of things. Its foundation stands on
the nature of God and the nature of man,
together with their mutual relationsI..1It
finishes all by restoring the due relations
between God and man, by uniting for ever the
' Rack, 'Wesley end Romanticism', }'WHS 45(1989), 63-65.




	 and the grateful	 obedient
sonE . . I .
When put into the wider context of his theology this
statement can be interpreted to understand eternal
reason as something of a recurring theme in Wesley1
and a way of understanding his 'Christian system'.
First of all, it unifies the doctrine of God with
anthropology, in that it is concerned with the nature of
God and the nature of humanity, and the characteristics
of the attributes shared between them. For Wesley, the
nature of this relation was expressed anthropologically
as the trinitarian image of the Triune God. The
trinitarian image of the Triune God is the conceptual
and theological link between the nature of God and the
nature of humanity. The nature of the Triune God is
reflected in humanity by understanding the image of God
as specifically the trinitarian image of the Triune God.
This will be shown in chapter three.
It also unifies the doctrine of God and anthropol-
ogy with hamartiology. What will also be argued in
chapter three is that since the essential attribute of
this image is not its rational, but its relational
nature, original sin is the estrangement of the rela-
tional nature between God and humankind as a result of
the loss of the moral image of God.
	 This relational
estrangement Wesley called 'natural man'. That is to
say, relational estrangement is the natural state of
Divine and human relations, without the grace of God.
But no one exists without the grace of God, as preveni-
ent (or as Wesley sometimes called it, 'preventing')
grace is granted to all, Prevenient grace will be
discussed in chapter four as a part of the order of
salvation.
Thirdly, it unifies the doctrine of God, anthropol-
ogy, hamartiology, with a fourth concept- soteriology.
The relation between the Triune God and humanity exists
" 'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1743),
BEW, XI , 55. Cf. 'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered'
(1781), II, 590 aril note 12, where the reader is referred to
Augustine, Do diversis auaest!onibus LXXXIII (q. LXVI, 'Do ideis'),
in Migne, XL.29-31; Aquinas, Super Sent. 1.36; in Sunina Contra
Gentiles, 1.54; Sunmia Theoloica, I, Qq. 55, 56, 93; in De Veritate,
Q. 3; arKi in Quodlibeta, IV. Q. 1.
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in four states, the prevenient state, the justified
state, the sanctified state, and the glorified state4
These states comprise Wesley's order of salvation which
entails the renovation of the trinitarian image of God
in humanity, and renewal of the mind which was in
Christ. What makes this link is the understanding of
the renovation of the image of God as the way by which
the restoration of the relations between God and
humanity is completed. The soteriological termed used
by Wesley to describe this renovation of the relational
aspects of the Triune image of God was entire sanctif-
ication, or love of God and neighbour, all of which was
grounded ontologically in eternal reason. Here is where
Wesley's soteriology is linked with his understanding of
eternal reason.
The concept of eternal reason meant rational
religion was relational religion, or 'the nature of God
and the nature of man, with the relations necessarily
subsisting between them'.	 This was the thesis of 'An
Earnest Appeal', and what Wesley thought to be the
central point of the religion he preached. A religion
which is rational will seek to restore the relations
between God and humankind, 'Is it not reasonable then
to love God?L...lIs it not reasonable also to love our
neighbour?''	 Love restores relations.	 This is
rational religion. By equating this to eternal reason,
the relational aspects of his soteriology (i.e. love
between God and humankind, and love between persons)
became grounded in ontology. The relational aspect of
that ontology was grounded in the Trinitarian nature of
the Godhead. In this respect, nothing was more ration-
al, or relational to Wesley than entire sanctification.
This is the nature of Wesley's 'Christian system'.
2.5.5. AnalytIcal Reason
Obviously, he did not confine his understanding of
reason to eternal reason only. He had another, more
analytical usage of the word. His second definition of
" 'An Earnest Appeal to Hen of Reason aixl Religion' (1743),
BEW, XI, 51, 52; the same point is reiterated by 'The Unity of the
Divine Being' (1789), 13EV, IV, 61-71.
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reason meant one's 'faculty of reaaoning', 	 or 'logic',
which also involved one's 'argument' for thinking some-
thing." In turn he had two understandings of loio.
In the first meaning of 'Logic' was the 'Art of Reason-
ing'," not, as Robbes had said, only ''a well-ordered
train of words''.'°° 	 But, if logic were an art, then
for Wesley, Aristotle was the master painter whose
strokes were to imitated, Another, and less poetical
meaning of logic described the 'operations of the mind',
which included connotations of experience in it also.
These consisted of simple apprehension (the 'bare
conceiving a thing in the mind'), Judgment (the'mind's
determining in itself, that the things it conceives
agree or disagree'), and discourse (the 'progress of the
mind from one Judgment to another').' 0 '	 These opera-
tions of the mind are another instance of Wesley's
preference of Aldrich over Locke. Wesley accused Locke
of having a 'total ignorance of logic'.' 02 Logic for
Wesley meant the art of reasoning and the operations of
the mind.	 Logic in turn meant reason.	 This was
Wesley's most common usage of the word reason.
Wesley exhorted all 'who seek after true religion
Ii.e. rational and relational religioni to use all the
reason which God hath given them in searching out the
things of God.''° 3 In other words, one is to use the
analytical nature of reason to search out eternal
reason, What Wesley tried to do was find a medium
between two extremes- 'undervaluing and overvaluing
" 'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1743),
, XI, 55.
" 'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered' (1781), 	 , II,
5914
" 'Logic', Works, XIV, 161.
'°° , II, 184 and note 68, 'The quotation is not from liobbes
directly but from John Norris, Reflections Upon the Conduct of Human
Life, p . 44', of. Hobbes, Leviathan, I.iv.12.101 
'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered' (178!), ,
II, 590; cf. 'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion'
(1743), BEW, XI, 56. These concepts were derived from Aldrich and
presented In his, 'A Compendium of Logic' (1750), Works, XIV, 161,
and preferred over Locke's concepts, 'Remarks upon Hr. Locke's
Essay ', I 5(1782), 195, in Works, XIII, 456.
" 'Remarks upon Locke's KEssayNs, Works, XIII, 464; AM,
7(1784), 318.103 




Lanalyticalj reason 1 1
 between enthusiasm and rational-
ism 1 something he thought Watts had been more successful
in doing than Locke 1
 although he thought neither of them
had succeeded. Consequently Wesley saw it as his task
to supply their 'grand defect 1
 by pointing out what
reason could and could not do.°'
2.5.6. The Success of Analytical fleason
Within these two extremes there were different
gradations in the utilization of analytical reason. To
begin with, reason can assist in the 'affairs of common
life 1 , such as directing servants on how to do their
work, directing the 'husbandman' when to plough, sow,
and reap.	 It can also direct the painter, the 'statu-
ary 1 1
 the musician to excel.i0S Of course the clergy
should have, 'a good understanding, a clear appre-
hension, a sound Judgment, and a capacity of reasoning
with some closenessi. . .1'. '° To all this Wesley would
add,
To ascend higher still, it is certain reason
can assist us in' going through the whole
circle of arts and sciences: of grammar,
rhetoric, logic, natural and moral philosophy,
mathematics, algebra, metaphysics. It can
teach whatever the skill or industry of man
has invented for some thousand years. It is
absolutely necessary for the due discharge of
the most important offices, such as are those
of magistrates, whether of an inferior or
superior rank; and those of subordinate or
supreme governors, whether of states, prov-
inces, or kingdoms,'°7
Furthermore, analytical reason
	 could	 help provide
religion with an understanding of its Scriptural
foundation and to help in constructing a 'superstruc-
ture' (Wesley's word and one also used by Browne) for
the Christian system.'° All this amounted to a scale of
io4 
'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered' (178!), 13EV,
II, 589; cf. Browne, Procedure (1728), p. 50.
'° 'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered' (i781),
	 ,
II, 590-91.
'° 'An Address to the Clergy' (1756), in, Works, X, 481.
'°' 'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered' (1781), 13EV,
II, 591.
'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered' (1781), 13EV,
II, 592; cf. Browne, Procedure (1728), p . 2. For a completely
different usage of the word see, 'Hymns and Prayers to the Trinity',
No. 31, v. 6.
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ascent within the scale of assent in which there was a
gradation based on the utilization and utility- i.e. the
use, and usefulness- of reason.
Reason can also serve as 'natural religion', or the
'religion of nature' as he called it.
	 For Wesley,	 this
was 'natural	 reason, unassisted by revelation*.IO
Warburton, the Lord Bishop of Gloucester, had accused
Wesley of being an enemy to natural religion. Wesley's
response was,
What does your lordship mean by 'natural
religion'? A system of principles? But I
mean by it, in this place, men's natural
manners. These certainly 'flow from their
natural passions and appetites', with that
degree of reason which they have. And this,
in other instances, is not contemptible;
though it is not sufficient to teach them true
rel igion. 110
Wesley knew reason had a role to play in natural
religion, but that it was not the exclusive element of
it. More shall be made of Wesley's Understanding of
natural religion in later chapters. For now, suffice it
to say that what is described above is essentially an
anthropological view of natural religion in which reason
qualified 'a system of principles', 'natural manners',
and 'natural passions and appetites'. Yet, these were a
'faint and distant resemblance of Christian' virttie.111
All these descriptions could fairly describe the
moral law, none of which was sufficient to replace
revelation in Wesley's scheme of 'true religion'.
One is not saved by either reason, or even love, but by
faith in the merits of Christ's death alone. Wesley
knew that to many people there would be nothing more
unreasonable than this.' 1	The primacy of faith is 	 what
prevented Wesley's view of reason and natural religion
from becoming full blown deism.
BEW, XVIII, 185 (1737).
110 
'AT Letter to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of
Gloucester' (1763), BEW, XI, 502.
'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason arxl Religion' (1743),
BEW, XI, 54.
112 Hendricks, 'John Wesley and Natural Theology', VTJ,
18(1983)2, 7-17.
'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1743),
, XI, 53.
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2.57. The Limits of Analytical Reason
Yet 1
 within this process Wesley knew that reason,
or logic, had its limits, In spite of our reason
everyone is still ignorant, only in different areas. In
spite of reason's use in metaphysics, after all is said
and done we still know little about God and God's
'essential attributes' of omnipresence, omniscience, and
eternity.	 Displaying at least some knowledge of Newton
on this point,t14 Wesley wrote,
The omnipresence or immensity of God Sir Isaac
Newton endeavours to illustrate by a strong
expression, by terming infinite space 'the
sensor ium of the Deity'. And the very heathens
did not scruple to say, 'All things are full
of God'- just equivalent with his own declara-
tion, 'Do not I fill heaven and earth, saith
the Lord?'I...JBut in the meantime, what
conception can we form either of his eternity
or immensity? Such knowledge is too wonderful
for us: we cannot attain unto it.1t5
Not even the intellectual excitement and optimism
of a Newtonian account of the universe could explain it
all.	 If anything, it only illuminated greater ig-
norance, We cannot actually know much of the works of
God, such as the 'fixed stars' 1 the 'Hilky Way',
'comets', the precise distance to the sun, or 'that
wonderful body, 11qht', t In his sermon, 'The Imper-
fections of Human Knowledge' (i784), one sees line after
line in which Wesley displays reference after reference
to science, philosophy, and literature, which amounts to
the makings of a Wesleyan theology of 'culture',' t ' But
he uses these references to human accomplishment and
114 Wesley read Newton's Oticks (1704 ed,) in 1726, Green,
Young Wesley (1963), p. 292.BEW, II, 570 and see note 8 for coiinents on 'the sensorium
of the Deity'. It is more likely that Wesley's knowledge of
Newton's concept of the 'sensorium of the Deity' came from reading
'the famous controversy between Drs. Clarke arxl Leibnitz' (JW, VI,
63).	 For that, see Samuel Clarke, The Works (1738), (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1978), IV, 587-95. Cf. the a,lma nwiidf reference
in 'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1743), ,
XI, 51 and note 2, '1 . . . Jvastain/ Hens agitans molem et magno se
corpore miscens. 0The all informing soul Which spreads through the
vast mass and moves the wholeu, from Virgil, Aeneid, vi. 726-7.
'The Imperfection of Human Knowledge' (1784), , II, 572;
cf. 'Of the Gradual Improvement of Natural Philosophy', NP (1777),
I, 21, V, 235; also in Works, XIV, 487, 488. Cf. Gregory Nanzianzen,
'The Second Theological Oration', XXX.1' cXitler, BEW, II, 568.
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knowledge only to demonstrate human ignorance, The
quintessential 'imperfection of human knowledge' is
illustrated by the Socratic paradox of the more we know,
the more we know that we do not know.t'
My knowledge did not heighten my opinion of
myself for the more I knew, the more I knew
my own ignorance, I was more and more
convinced, that I was very ignorant, even in
what I thought I knew,
	 And I found an
infinite latitude of things 1
 which I did not
know at all.
	 Yea, the farther I waded into
knowledge, the deeper still I found it'1
For Wesley, knowledge was an abyss with a bottom un-
touched by the human mind.
Although rational religion is relational religion,
Which can be expressed in the word 'love', analytical
reason cannot produce either faith, hope, or love.''0
And, as he said to Joseph Benson, head of Kingswood
school, 'an ounce of love is worth a pound of know-
ledge,''" While their concepts were reasonable, reason
cannot produce, or become a substitute for, 'true
religion', which consists of love of God and neighbour.
Faith alone is capable of this.
Neither can reason convict of sin. That is to say,
one does not gain knowledge of sin through reason, As
will be seen in chapter four 1
 only the Holy Spirit
working in conjunction with the moral Law is capable of
doing that, 'The ordinary method of God i to convict
sinners by the law, and that only.'" The truth of
this is confirmed in a corollary way through the
'witness of the Spirit', 'not only by the experience of
the children of God[...lbut by all those who are con-
vinced of sin, who feel the wrath of God abiding on
'' e.g. Plato, 'Euthydemus', in, Dialogues (1937).
' NP (1777), V, 231; cf. Locke, Essay , I.i.6, 'Tis of great
use to the Sailor to know the length of his Line, though he cannot
with it fathom all the depths or the Ocean.' Cf. JWL, IV, 286
(1765); also Wesley in London Magazine (1785), 28, 'When I was young
I was sure of everything. In a few years, having been mistaken a
thousand times, I was not half so sure of most things as before. At
present I am hardly not half so sure of anything but what God has
revealed to men.'
"° 'The Case of fleason Impartially Considered' (1781), BEW,
II, 593-99.
" JWL, V, 110 (1760).
" 'The Law Established through Faith, I' (1750),
	 , II, 23.
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them,'"	 Yet, 'Without this conviction we cannot but
account the blood of
	 the covenant as a common
th1ng(,,.J',''
	 Reason cannot produce 1
 'a deep convic-
tion of our utter helplessnesst,,.j', or a genuine sense
of repentance.'" There is need for an experience of
revelation to show us our sin and the grace for forgive-
ness. More of this will be said below.
2.5.8. The Failure of Analytical Reason
All this served to indicate that reason can only
bring one so far in the quest for the eternal, the
spiritual, and the unseen.
What then will your reason do here? How will
it pass from things natural to spiritual?
From the things that are seen to those that
are not seen?
	 From the visible to the
invisible world?
	 What a gulf is here? By
what art will reason get over the immense
chasm? This cannot be till the Almighty come
in to your succour, and give you that faith
you have hitherto despised. Then, upborne as
it were on eagles' wings, you shall soar away
into the regions of eternity, and your
enlightened reason shall explore even 'the
deep things of God', God himself 'revealing
them to you by his Spirit'.'2'
Here Wesley marked the limits of human reason by a great
divide which cannot be crossed without faith, revela-
tion, and the Holy Spirit4 Together, however, en-
lightened reason could explore the depths of God. The
chasm was created by the limits of reason, limits which
were more than anything else imposed upon human ex-
perience by original sin, a doctrine which was eventual-
ly found lacking in Locke, On one hand, Wesley's views
on rationalism limited by original sin ld him to
conclude that 'by the very constitution of their nature
the wisest of men 'know' but 'in part 1 4 1 ttt
 On the
other hand he would say, 'he that would enlighten the
its 
'The Witness of the Spirit, II' (1767),
	 I 291,.i24 
'The Repentance of Believers' (1767), BEV, I, 351.125 
'The Repentance of BelIevers' (1767),
	 , I,, 352; also,
'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1748), BEW, I, 477-81k
122 
'An Earnest Appeal Men of Reason aixl Religion' (1743),
XI, 57.127 
'The Imperfection of Human Knowledge' (1784),
	 , II, 569.
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head must cleanse the heart'.tt	 In Wesley's view an
intellect sanctified from original sin was a fuller one4
245.94 Assent to Revelation
While reason Is less susceptible to deception 1
 and
consequently more reliable than experience, the most
reliable of all was 'Divine Revelation',
	 This is so
because 1
 as Wesley confidently asserted 1 1 God can
neither deceive, nor be deceivedttI Presupposing such
confident assertions in the doctrine of revelation is
the character and nature of God, the subject of eternal
reason, God does not lie. Upon this simple truth from
the doctrine of God, revelation rests as the surest form
of knowledge available,i30
2.5.10. Assent on the Basis of Analytical
Reason
At one point, Wesley held to a rather clinical, and
Lockian definition of faith being nothing but assent on
rational grounds alone, lie said in a letter to his
mother,
Faith is a species of belief, and belief is
defined, an assent to a proposition upon
rational grounds. Without rational grounds
there is therefore no belief, and consequently
no faithl.,.J. I call faith an assent upon
rational	 grounds	 because	 I hold divine
testimony to be the most reasonable of all
evidence whatever.	 Faith must necessarily at
length be resolved into reason. God is true,
therefore what he says is true, He hath said
this; therefore this is true,'3'
Although this definition appears to have been taken from
Richard Fiddes, it bears evidence of a Lockian in-
fluence. Brantley was correct when he said Wesley had
taken this definition as the only true one.1a2
However, after an exchange of letters with his
mother he admitted, 'I had been under a mistake in
adhering to that definition of faith which Dr. Fiddes
i21 
'The Wisdom of Winning Souls' (1731), BEW, IV, 313.
'Logic', Works, XIV, 178;
	 cf. 'Seek First the Kingdom'
(1725), , IV, 220, 'God[...Jcan neither deceive others nor be
himself deceived, since he is a true as well as an all-knowing
Being.'
'°	
, XXV, 175 (1725).
, XXV, 175 (1725); cf. BEW, I, 418.
'' Brantley, Locke, Wesley
 (1984), p . 27.
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sets down as the only true one.'13 	 lie came to this
conclusion after his mother had written to him in
response to that definition of faith. She wrote1
You are somewhat mistaken in your notion of
faith. All faith is an assent 1
 but all assent
is not faith. Some truths are self-evident1
and we assent to them because they are so.
Others 1
 after a regular and formal process of
reason 1 by way of deduction from some self-
evident principle 1 gain our assent; and this
is not properly faith but science. Some again
we assent to 1
 not because they are self-
evident 1
 or because we have attained the
knowledge of them in a regular method 1 by a
train of arguments 1
 but because they have been
revealed to us, either by God or man, and
these are the proper objects of faith.''4
Later on. in November of that same year she wrote again
to her son on the matter of faith 1
 saying,
I think Pearson's definition of divine or
saving faith is good, and no way defective.S
For though the same thing may be an object of
faith is revealed, and an object of reason as
deducible from rational principles 1 yet I
insist upon it that the virtue of faith, by
which through the merits of our Redeemer we
must be saved, is an assent to the truth of
whatever God hath been pleased to reveal,
because he hath revealed it, and not because
we understand it. Thus St. Paul 1
 'By faith we
understand that the world was made'- q,d.1
('as if he were to say'l rejecting the various
conjectures of the heathen, and not resting
upon the testimony of natural reason, but
relying on the authority of God, we give a
full assent to what he hath been pleased to
reveal unto us concerning the creation of the
world. Now the reason why this faith is
required is plain, because otherwise we do not
give God the glory of his truth, but prefer
our weak and fallible understanding before his
eternal word 1
 in that we will believe the one
rather than the other,
Mrs. Wesley was clearly trying to guide her son away
from Fiddes to other sources in order to understand
faith. The purpose was to ground Wesley's understanding
of faith as assent on the basis of the doctrine of God
and divine revelation, rather than reason.
'	 8EV. XXV, 186 (1725).
'" SEW 1
 XXV, 179, (1725).
Pearson, ExDosition of the Creed (1659), pp. 1-9.
13EV, XXV, 183 (1725).
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25.1!, Assent on the Basis of the Nature of
God
In response to this Wesley came over to her under-
standing of faith being an 'assent to what God has
revealed, because he has revealed it, and not because
the truth of it may be evinced by reason' 1 . The
assent of faith to revelation was then based not on
rationality but on the attributes of God alone4 The
principles of divine faith are those, and only those,
contained in Scriptures, which Wesley termed, 'standing
Revelation' ,'' which means, God is known definitively
through revelation. The assent of faith to revelation
Is ultimately on the basis of faith and the work of the
Holy Spirit, 13
 But what is absent from Locke, but
present in Wesley, is not Just a doctrine of original
sin, but a pneumatology which becomes the ultimate basis
of revelation. Ultimately, the truth of revelation Is
assented to on the basis of the work of the Holy Spirit,
and not on reason alone.
Nonetheless, Wesley would still argue strongly
that,
Revelation never contradicts either sense or
reason. It may indeed transcend both. But it
cannot possibly contradict either, rightly
employed about its proper object.'4°
Revelation may transcend sense and reason, which gives
it a suprarational quality, For Wesley it was faith,
and the Holy Spirit that stood in the gap between
revelation and reason, This (along with the axioms that
God cannot deceive, or be deceived; and that absolute
faith is due to the testimony of God), was for Wesley
axiomatic (i.e
	 'a proposition which needs not, and
cannot, be proved'). 141
	Wesley knew that reason could
only take an individual so far before faith was re-
quired.	 Yet faith was not blind belief in, and/or of
131	 XXV, 188.
'	
'Dives and Lazarus' (1788), BEW I
 IV, 18.
' 'On Working CXit (kir Own Salvation' (1785), , [II, 201:
'On Faith' (179!), BEW, IV, 199; 'A Letter to the Right Reverend the
Lord Bishop of Gloucester' (1763), DEW, XI, 503.140 
'Logic', Works, XIV, 179. Cf. Wesley's extraction of Peter
Browne's, Procedure (1728) in, (1777), 'Of the Improvement of
Knowledge by Revelation', V, 210-24, 'Thus has the Gospel-revelation
improved the knowledge of mankindl...I'.141 
'Logic', Works, XIV, 179.
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the uncertain 1 but in and/or of the most certain, namely
the assent of divine faith into a divine revelation.
Faith occurs because of the limitations of reason, and
its inability to perceive the spiritual world and things
eternal. Only faith was capable of doing that, so that
for Wesley the act of faith was vision. Faith is seeing
Gods 2
2.5.12. Assent on the Basis of Eternal Reason,
or Relationality
These two notions of assent on the basis of reason
and revelation were still none-the-less faith on the
basis of assent, Perhaps because of his understanding
of eternal reason, his understanding of living faith was
not mere assent on the basis of either reason or
revelation.	 It was faith on the basis of one's desire
for a relationship with the Triune God. He said, faith
is not a barely notional or speculative faith-
I...]It is not a bare assent to this proposi-
tion, 'Jesus is the Christ;' nor indeed to all
the propositions contained in our creed, or in
the Old and New Testament, It is not merely
'an assent to any, or all these credible
things, as credible'[..1, It is not onl y 'an
assent to divine truth, upon the testimony of
God', or 'upon the evidence of miracles'243
L..,l., For all this is not more than a dead
faith, The true, living Christian faith,
which whosoever hath is 'born of God', is not
only an assent, an act of the understanding,
but a disposition which God hath wrought in
his heart; 'a sure trust and confidence in God
that through the merits of Christ his sins are
forgiven, and he reconciled to the favour of
God'l...l. And earnest desire of that salva-
tion must precede a living faith.
Living faith is saving, evangelical faith, which is
preceded by an earnest desire to be reconciled to God.
In other words, it is preceded by repentance, and an
earnest desire for a saving relationship with God.
'This faith, then, whereby we are born of God, is 'not
only a belief of all the articles of our faith, but also
a true confidence of the mercy of God, through our Lord
142 See, F2NT (1755), John 1.18; 'An Earnest Appeal to Men of
Reason and Religion' (1743), 	 XI, 46-7; Shimitzu, 'tpistemol-
ogy", p. 182.143 Cf. Aquinas, Sunr Theoloica, II.ii.Q.i.
144 
'The Marks of the New Birth' (1748), BEW, I, 418-19.
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Jesus This faith Is not based on analytical
reason, but on eternal reason- the natures of God and
man, 'with the relations necessarily subsisting between
them'. Faith based on assent was 'the faith of a
demon', or cold, dead orthodoxy.
	 Living faith Is not
just orthodoxy, but the genuine experience of Divine and
human	 relationality,	 provided	 by the new birth.
Experimental relationality grounded in the eternal
reason of the Triune God was Wesley's understanding of
evangelical faith, More about the nature of faith will
be said in chapter five, when faith is appropriated in
context of the order of salvation.
Admittedly, in his understanding of faith, Wesley
relied upon empirical inclinations to develop his Idea
of 'spiritual senses'.' 4 ' With the eyes of faith one
sees things unseen, so that in fact, through faith one
is able to rest upon the object of belief as certain
knowledge.	 But because God's revelation (for Wesley,
this was Scripture) Is more reliable than either
sensation or reason, faith stands at the top of the
'scale of assent' as being the Most certain.
From these 'degros of probability' Wesley con-
structed 'scale of assent', which was derived from
Aldrich.
If, therefore, we were to make a sort of scale
of assent, it might consist of the following
steps
1. Human faith, an assent to a doubtful
proposition: 2. Opinion, to a probable: 3.
What we may term sentiment, and assent to a
certain proposition: 4. Science, to a certain
and evident conclusion: 5. Intelligence, to a
self-evident axiom: 6. Divine faith, to a
Divine revelation.14'
These became the epistemological basis for his corollary
use of Scripture, reason, and experience. Among the
sources of knowledge, nothing is more certain than the
Divine revelation in Scripture 1
 after that, reason,
followed by experience.' 4
	From this Wesley concluded,
'The Marks of the New Birth' (1748), BEW, IV, 419.1e Heizenrater, Mirror and Memory (1989), p. 145.141 
'Logic', Works, XIV, 178. Cf. Wesley's extraction of Peter
Browne's, Procedure (1728), in NP (1777), 'Of the different K1IKIS of
Knowledge and Evidence', V, 192-210.
'Logic', Works, XIV, 178.
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'In what we know or perceive, there are various degrees
of rest, according to the various evidence, certainty,
or probability.'' 4
 The degree of reliability proceed-
ed from experience/sensation, to intelligence/reason,
then to faith/revelation, in that orders When Wesley
said that the doctrine of original sin would be ex-
plained according to Scripture, reason, experience, he
was employing an epistemology based upon 'scale of
assent' that proceeded in degrees from experience, to
reason, and then to revelation.
From this section there are several important
points to be remember for later use. First is the
concept of eternal reason as the nature of God and the
nature of humanity, with the relations necessarily
subsisting between them. This made Wesley's understand-
ing of the personhood as being essentially relational in
nature.	 The relational nature of Christianity is
grounded in eternal reason. In this sense relational
religion is rational religion. The second point to be
remember regards that of revelations It will be later
shown how a general or universal revelation is essential
to Wesley's understanding of actual sin, and how this
universal revelation is provided, not through innate
knowledge, but through prevenlent grace, Which is a work
of the holy Spirit, The third aspect to be remembered is
the importance of experience as the basis of the scale
of assent. Experience was for Wesley the foundation of
all knowledge and essential to his concept of person-
hood. For that reason it merits a more detailed study,
which is what we shall do next.
2.6. Experience and the Concept of Personhood
There is no doubt that Wesley stressed experience a
great deal in his theology Clapper was correct when he
said that for Wesley, 'Experience can confirm doctrine
but not be the source of it'° There is a difference
between saying experience is an epistemological source
of knowledge and saying it is a source of theological
doctrine.	 This is the difference between Wesley and
14 
'Logic', Works, XIV, 118.
iSO Clapper, Wesley on Religious Affections (1989), p. 159.
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Schleiermacher.	 Schleiermacher attempted to ground
theology not Just in metaphysics but in experience 1
 and
the 'consciousness of being absolutely dependent1
orL..Jof being in relation with God.'' 51 While expel'!-
ence followed Scripture, and reason in order of reli-
ability, it was given a place of prominence in Wesley's
theology 1
 and a place of prominence in twentieth century
Wesley scholarship	 In the twenty-eighth Eartley
Lecture, Wilkinson even went so far as to say religious
experience is a Methodist fundamental.'
	 Bett has
even argued that Methodism's greatest theological
contribution was grounding 'religion and theology in the
fact of experience'.' 54
 Williams was also right when he
pointed out that Wesley stressed experience in order to
combat the
	 cold formalism of religion. 1	 Baker
acknowledged that experience played an important role in
Wesley's doctrine of Christian Pertection.'
	 Ex-
perience indeed deserves special consideration,
2.6.1. Sensory and Religions Experience
For Wesley, the nature of experience was two fold-
sensory and religious' 57
 Since there is no innate
knowledge either one's natural senses, or one's spirit-
ual senses must provide one with all knowledge,' 5	 The
'St Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, (1976), I, 4.
' e.g., Clapper, Wesley on Religious Affections (1989):
Matthews, in, Wesleyan Theology
 Today (1985), pp. 406-13. Of course
the interest in experience in regards to Christian doctrine is not
confined to Wesleyans, as can be seen In the theological recon-
structionists. See, Matthews, God In Christian Thought and Ex-
perience (1942), who similarly held to the three sources of theology
being experience, Scripture, and reason. The reconstruct ionists (of
which Matthews, God in Christ is an example) maintained that scrip-
ture derived its authority from experience, p. 114.155 Wilkinson, Religious Experience (1928). This includes a
critique of Schleiermacher using the Wesleyan doctrine of
experience, which he defines as, 'an awareness of God giving
assurance as the self seeks harmonious relations with llim(...Iazxi
mediated through Chr, p. 76.
'54 Bett, The Spirit of Methodism (1937), p. 131.
Williams, Wesley 's Theology
 Today (1960), pp . 32-3. Cf.
JWL, VII, 47 (1781), 'The theory of religion he certainly has. May
God give him the living experience of it.'ISS Baker, A Charge To Keep
 (1954), p. 106.
Cutler has suggested a connection between the two, BEW, I,
276.




concept of 'natural senses' was strongly grounded in an
empirical epistemology, while 'spiritual senses' were
concerned with things such as 'inward feelings' (or
being inwardly conscious of the operations of the
Spirit), t ' and assurance (which has often been called
'immediate inspiration')'° both of which presupposed
revelation made possible by the 'eyes of faith'. 'And
till you have these internal senses, till the eyes of
your understanding are opened, you can have no apprehen-
sion of divine things, no idea of them at all,' 1 '' The
slate of spiritual experience will remain blank. Sensa-
tion and revelation were ultimately for Wesley the two
sources of one's experience. At the moment our concern
is not so much Wesley's understanding of religious
experience (as Important as that may be) as it is his
understanding of sensory experience, the role it played
in his epistemology, and perhaps more Importantly for
our discussion, the role it played In his understanding
of personhood. It is Wesley's concept of personhood
that will play a significant part in his understanding
of sin.
2.6.2. Wesley's Denial of Innate Knowledge
The prominence of experience in Wesley's epistemo-
logy was largely due to his denial of innate knowledge.
He said, 'I think that point, 'that we have no innate
principles," is abundantly proved, and cleared ftom all
objections that have any shadow of strength1! The
'' 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I'
(1745), DEW, XI, 139-40; 'A Letter to the Rev. Dr. Rutherford'
(1768), DEW, IX, 382-3.
"° 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I'
(1745), DEW, XI, 171. Wesley said the term 'inspiration' could be
interchanged with 'assistance'.
'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1743),
, XI, 57.
" 'Remarks upon Locke's, "Essay"', Works, XIII, 455. Also,
'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion', BEW, XI, 56, 'And
seeing our ideas are not innate, but must all originally come from
our sensest..J'. But, cf. 'On Obedience to Parents', DEW, III,
361-62, 'But it is allowed on all hands, if there be any practical
principles naturally implanted on the soul N.e. innatel, that 'we
ought to honour our parents' will claim this character almost before
any other.' Contrary to (kitler, (, II, 589 n.), there is a big
difference between Wesley, and Watts, who argued, 'there is a sense,
(continued...)
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denial of innate knowledge separated him from the likes
of Malebranche, John Norris (two sources of influence on
his epistemology already mentioned above), the Cambridge
Platonists, Leibniz, even Isaac Watts et al., who held
to views of innate knowledge. 163 Ralph Cudworth, a
Cambridge Platonist, had said this Aristotelian notion
had done more to promote atheism than anything else.'64
Wesley obviously did not think so, in spite of his
sympathies with Cudworth and other Cambridge Platonists
on other points.'85
In the sermon, 'On the Discoveries of Faith'
(1788), Wesley declared,
For many ages it has been allowed by sensible
me 1 NIhU est in intellectu quod non fuft
prius in sensu- nothing is in the understand-
ing which was not first perceived by some of
the senses.'66
This quote is frequently taken as Wesley's endorsement
of Locke's empiricism with its doctrine of 'tabula
rasa'.' 87 For example, Brantley cites the same passage,
applies to Locke, and concludes, 'These sentences
epitomize the main point in Book 1 of the Essay and
indeed in the Essa y as a whole.' 166	The quote does
perhaps summarize Locke's position, however, it is not
162( 
.continued)
wherein our first ideas of some things may be said to be in-
nateE.. .1' (Watts, Log ic, I.lii.1.).
163 See, Outler, BEW, III, 361-2 n. Armstrong, 'Cambridge
Platonists and Locke on Innate Ideas', Journal of the Histor y of
Ideas. 30(1969), 187-202; Harris, 'Leibniz and Locke on Innate
Ideas', Ratio 16(1974), 226-42. Adams, 'The Locke-Leibniz Debate',
in, Innate Ideas (1975), pp. 37-67; Adams, 'Where Do Our Ideas Come
From?- Descartes vs. Locke', in Innate Ideas (1975), pp. 71-87.
184 Cudworth, Intellectual System (1845 edition, III, 401), in
Gibson, Locke's Theory of Knowledge (1917), p. 238.
185 Wesley had extracted Cudworth's sermon, 'The Life of
Christ, the Pith and Kernel of all Religion: A Sermon Preached
before the Honourable House of Commons, at Westminster, March 31,
1647' in, CL 17(1752). See Green, Bibliography ( 1896), pp. 78-9.
Also, English, 'The Cambridge Platonists in Wesley's Christian
Library', PWHS 36(1968), 161-8.
168 'On the Discoveries of Faith', BEW, IV, 29; 'Walking by
Sight, Walking by Faith,' IV, 51. For other references found in the
sermons, see	 I, 409; II, 285, 288-89, IV, 21, 30, 50-51, 170,
200. Note also, 'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion',
BEW, XI, 56. Cf. JWL, VI, 229 (1776), and Wesley's extraction of
Brown's, Procedure (1728), in NP (1777) V, 172.
187 Locke, Essay , II.i.2.	 Cf. Aristotle, 'On the Soul',
429b29_430e31.
186 Brantley, Locke, Wesley (1984), p. 6.
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from Locke. Given Locke's dislike of the Schoolmen It
is ironic that it is actually a maxim derived from
Aristotle, quoted by Roger Bacon, 109
 and then again by
Peter Browne.' 7 ° The denial of Innate knowledge was not
unique to Locke, and one cannot label a philosophy
'Lockian' simply because it does. One must question
whether or not Wesley indeed needed Locke to deny Innate
knowledge. He appeared more comfortable quoting Browne,
who was in turn quoting the Scholastics, than quoting
Locke on the matter to make this point. Given Locke's
disdain of the Schoolmen, to quote one in support of the
denial of innate knowledge could possibly be seen as
something of an insult to Locke.
One must be careful in calling Wesley a Lockian
simply because he joined Locke in denying innate ideas.
There were profound differences between the two. There
had to be, otherwise Wesley could not hold to a doctrine
of original sin with any credibility. It was quite
possible for the epistemology of Locke's Essa y to make
the notion of original sin 'altogether unintelligible',
making Augustinianism as doubtful as innateness.'71
Locke's own doctrine of 'tabula rasa' led him to
conclusions about original sin that rejected Angus-
tinianism and approximated Pelagianism, which, as
Spellinan has pointed out, was the position of the
Latitudinarians.' 72
	The wonder is not why Locke denied
original sin but how he held onto to a doctrine of
original 5irov. 5o long.	 He denied the guilt of Adam's
sin, and that Adam's sin entailed the necessity of
sinning through any moral predisposition.
	 What is
108 This quote appears to have come from Roger Bacon, Oper
hactenus indedita Rogeri Baconi. Bacon's version was, 'nichil est in
inteliectu quin prius fuerit in sensu', in Kretzmann, CHIMP, p. 449
note 33. The 'nichil' appears to be a misprint.
170 'On the Discoveries of Faith', BEW, IV, 29 and note 1,
'Another scholastic maxim derived from Aristotle, De Anima (On the
Soul), 111.7 143P1, and discussed at length by Aquinas in Sunina
Theolog ica, Pt. I,Q.84, Arts. 1,7.' But Browne, Procedure (1728),
p. 55. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, I.i.
'" Speilman, John Locke and the Problem of Depravity (1988),
p. 155 and note 1, citing Hatrell's correspondence to Locke (25
March 1695; 3 June 1695).
172 This is the conclusion of Speliman, John Locke and the
Problem of Depravity
 (1988); also in 'Locke and the Latitudinarian
Perspective on Original Sin', llevintPhil, 42(1988), 215-28.
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interesting Is that this position is picked up and
developed by John Taylor in his attack on original sin.
So that when Wesley in turn attacked Taylor, he was In
fact attacking a full blown development of Locke's
doctrine of original sin.
One thing that kept Wesley's denial of innate
knowledge, and the consequential prominence of experi-
ence in his theology, from denying original sin is found
in the constitutive nature of personhood as the subject
of experience.	 Locke's notion of personhood was rooted
in a mind/body duality.	 Wesley's was In a soul/body
duality, with the soul being the receptacle of the image
of God. Consequently, when one discusses Wesley's
soul/body duality one must include within that concept
the understanding that the soul is the receptacle of the
image of God. This assumption will be made in the all
the discussions relating to soul/body duality found
below.	 For Locke, however, the mind served as the
'tabula rasa'.	 For Wesley, the 'tabula rasa' was
ultimately the	 soul, blank of knowledge, but not
entirely blank of the image of God. But, because the
soul was infected with original sin (which was for
Wesley the lost moral, or relational image, and the
marred natural and political images), experience and
even reason are infected by it also. Wesley's under-
standing of the soul, particularly as it related to the
image of God, introduced a crucial departure from Locke
over the essential nature of personhood as the subject
of experience. However, our discussion of the soul will
be covered in two different sections. Later, the role
the soul plays in image of God, and original sin will be
discussed. At the moment, our discussion will be
concerned only with the soul's role in epistemology.
From here proceed many implications for the doctrine of
sin.
2.6.3. Locke's Mind/Body Duality
For Locke, essential to personhood was a conscious-
ness of self 173 involved in a mind/body duality.' 74 The
'' Locke, Essay , II.xxvii.26.
'	 Locke, Essay , II.xxvii.9.
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existence to both mate
For both Locke and Wesi
e In place of 'dualism' simply
ts an ontological antagonism
An example of a 'dualism' in
actantlus, who advocated 'two
ed to one another- body and
eternal, the other frail and
is meant to suggest the two
personhood which owe their
ial and immaterial realities.
v. neither of their dtiiallties
were so much in opposition, as they were in apposition.
Locke defined 'man' as,
nothing truly but a complex Idea of Proper-
ties, united together in one sort of Substan-
ces: Yet there is scarce any Body in the use
of these Words, but often supposes each of
those names to stand for a thing having the
real Essence, on which those Properties
depend. 6
From this formal definition he began his duality of
mind/body when he wrote, 'Socrates asleep, and Socrates
awake, is not the same person; but his soul when he
sleeps, and Socrates the man, consisting of body and
soul, when he is waking, are two personsi. ]' •' He
went on to say,
If the same Socrates waking and sleeping do
not partake of the same consciousness,
Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same
Person. And to punish Socrates waking, for
what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking
Socrates was never conscious of, would be no
more of Right, than to punish one Twin for
what his Brother-Twin didi.,. •J•17$
For Locke, consciousness is what provided the continuity
of personality, and personhood. Mclntyer has made the
point that his idea of the 'conscious' must be under-
stood in its historical context, which gave the term a
different meaning then.
	 She has suggested that it be
given an interpretation of continuity of consciousness
175 Lactantius, 'A Treatise on the Anger of God', xv.176 Locke, Essay, III.x.!8; ci. Wesley, 'Remarks upon Locke's
"Essay"', Works, VIII, 462.177 Locke, Essay , 11.1.!!.




as derived from memory. 179
 Without consciousness there
can be no memory. While Locke held to body/soul
duality, such a view ultimately concludes that persons
do not consist of substance, a conclusion the likes of
Schreck have deemed inadequate.° Locke denied the
validity of unconscious knowledge, seeing it as an
oxymoron. If one thinks, one knows that one is thinking
and what one is thinking.'' Although he never used the
word 'unconscious', implicit to this assertion Is a
'clear conception of a doctrine of the unconscious mind
two centuries before Freud.'' 82	 Socrates awake, and
Socrates asleep are two persons, one conscious, the
other unconscious. Unconsciousness provided a discon-
tinuity of personhood. Where culpability for an act was
concerned, consciousness meant guilt, and unconscious-
ness meant innocence.
Consciousness of one's self, or of one's thoughts
was not the only criterion for personhood. The story of
a 'rational' parrot who carried on a conversation in
Portuguese with Prince Maurice illustrated another one.
Locke used it to raise questions about the nature of
personhood.	 Does reason alone make one a person? If
so, Maurice's parrot was human. In reaction to the
parrot story Locke concluded that the human form as well
as the immaterial spirit go into the making of the same
person. 193 	 A person was a conscious mind aware of its
thoughts, yes. But personhood also consisted of a body,
which	 Maurice's	 parrot	 did not have. Locke was
Mclntyer, 'Locke on Personal Identity: A Re-examination'.
Philosophy
 Research Archives. 3(1977), no. 1103. For a conflicting
opinion see Hughes, 'Personal Identity: A Defence of Locke',
Philosophy , 50(1975), 169-87, who argued that translating 'con-
sciousness' as 'memory' is incorrect.
'° Winkler, 'Locke on Personal Identity', Journal of the
History
 of Philosophy , 29(1991)2, 201-26. Schreck, 'Locke's Account
of Personal Identity', Gnosis, Dec (1990), 89-100. See also, Unger,
Identity , Consciousness and Value (1990) who attempts to separate
the issue of personal identity from metaphysics in order to locate
it in phenomenology. For a fuller discussion of the problem of
identity see, Mackie, Problems from Locke (1982), pp. 173-203. For
an interesting analysis of Gulliver, the Honyhnhnms, and the Yahoos
using Locke's concept of personhood see, Wertz, 'Some Correlations
between Swift's Gulliver and Locke on Personal Identity', JThought,
10(1975), 262-70.
'' Locke, Essay , 1.11.5.192 Priest, The British Empiricists, pp. 55-6.




mystified as to the relationship between mind and body,
particularly as to how the mind was able move or stop a
body. 14 Nonetheless, it took a human mind and a human
form to constitute personhood.
What Is obviously missing is any concept of the
soul as a constitutive part of personhood.. 1 Neither
did he consider the question of the image of God, which
is mentione4nowhere in the Essa y .	 Locke did not deny
that the soul existed, although he doubted whether one
is able to prove the Immateriality of the soul.'	 If
it were material, it would somehow have to be associated
What he did deny was that soul could always
be thinking, in other words, that the soul was always
conscious. 1 Kemerling has pointed out that this
rejection of Descartes' claim that the essence of the
soul is an inseparable quality of thought, and that the
soul must always be thinking renewed the nefarious
suggestion that the human body might be a matter created
with the power to think.' Consequently, Locke's
understanding of the soul bordered on materialism, and
the absence of the concept of the image of God indicates
he was less concerned with theological concepts and more
concerned with philosophical ones.
2.6.4. Wesley's Soul/Body Duality
Wesley did not quibble with how Locke generally
defined the word 'man'. 1 ° But he did differ as to the
constitutive nature of 'man'. Locke's mind/body duality
is in stark contrast to Wesley's understanding of
personhood consisting of a soul/body duality.
Outler placed Wesley within the Platonic tradition
at this point. 190 Aristotle could also be added. But
this association of Wesley with a Platonic/Aristotelian
'	 Locke, Essay , II.xxiii.28.
Locke, Essay , II.xxvii.15.
Locke, Essay , IV.il!.6.
'	 Locke, Essay , II.i.9-!5.1*9 Kemerl ing, 'Locke on the Essence of the Soul'. Southern
Journal of Philosophy . 17(1979), 455-64.189 
'lemarks on Locke's 'Essay'', Works, XIII, 462.
190 See, 'Wandering Thoughts' (1762), BEW, II, 133 note 34.
citler carelessly referred to it there as a mind/body dualism, after




tradition of a body/soul duality must be qualified. For
Plato, all souls were created alike and were differen-
tiated only after becoming incarnate. Plato also
taught that the same soul could go through several
incarnations in human and animal form. 1 ' As Zizioulas
has noted, 'This makes it impossible for a particular
soul to acquire a distinct "personality" of its own on
the basis of a particular body'. 192
 As for Aristotle,
he had no concept of resurrection, so the soul departed
from the body at death and survived only as the
'mind'.' 93
	Zizioulas concluded from this that for
Aristotle,
the person proves to be a logically impossible
concept precisely because the soul is indis-
solubly united with the concrete and 'in-
dividual': a man is a concrete individuality;
he endures, however, only for as long as his
psychosomatic union endures- death dissolves
the concrete 'individuality' completely and
definitively'
With this qualification in mind it could still be argued
that the general concept of a body/soul duality placed
Wesley into the Platonic/Aristotelian traditions, which
were followed by Descartes, Malebranche, 1. Taylor,
James Keill, Samuel Pike, and Robert Bolton, just to
name a few.' 95
 His sermons especially reflected this
duality. ''
For Wesley the body existed in union with a soul
that was made in the image of the Triune God. Eventual-
ly, as it will be seen in chapter three, Wesley came to
understand this Triune image of God as consisting of
moral, natural, and political aspects. Because of
original sin, the moral image was lost, while the
" Plato, 'Timaeus', 4P ff.; 'Phaedo' 249b; 'Republic' 618g.192 Zizioulas, Being as Comunion (1985), p. 28 and notes.193 Aristotle, 'On the Soul', 4!4 a4_28, 415e28_67.
" Zizioulas, Being as Coilwnunlon (1985), p. 28.195 See, 'Wandering Thoughts' (1762), BEW, II, 133 note 34.196 
'What is Man?' (1788), BEW, IV, 22-5; also 'Awake, Thou
That Sleepest' (by CW, 1742), I, 145; 'Wandering Thoughts' (1762),
II, 129-30, 133-4; 'Heaviness Through Manifold Temptation' (1760),
II, 225; 'On the Trinity' (1775), II, 382-83; 'On the Fall of Man'
(1782), II, 405-6; 'The General Deliverance' (1781), II, 438-9;
'The Imperfection of Human Knowledge' (1784), IV, 576; 'On Patience'
(1784), III, 170; 'Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels' (1790), IV,
164-7; 'Death and Deliverance' 1725), IV, 214; 'The Promise of
Understanding' (1730), IV, 281-3, 288; 'The Image of God' (1730),
IV, 296. See also, ENNT (1755), Matthew 10.28, etc.
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natural, and political images were marred. So, when one
speaks of Wesley's body/soul duality, one includes In
the concept a soul in which the moral image Is void,
while the natural and political images are marred.
But the image of God is not to be confused with
innate knowledge. Because there is no innate knowledge,
the soul comes into the world as a blank slate. The
denial of innate knowledge was what separated Wesley
from the Platonic tradition, which generally held a view
of Innate knowledge, and placed him in an Aristotelian
(as opposed to a more narrowly and more inaccurately
defined Lockian) one, which generally denied innate
knowledge. The image of God did not entail an innate
knowledge of God. For Wesley this equally meant we are
born atheists, not just blank slates. 	 No one is born
with an innate knowledge of God.'97
As a blank slate the soul is an immaterial,
thinking substance	 recording	 ideas,	 and deriving
knowledge from those Ideas.' 9 The soul has only the
senses to do this. As imperfect as our bodies are, 'the
soul cannot dispense with its serviceE. . .1. For an
embodied spirit cannot form one thought but by the
meditation of its bodily organs'. 199 But while the soul
perceives by the senses, because it is Immaterial it
cannot be perceived by the senses, only by faith, as
faith alone Is capable of perceiving the immaterial
world. 200
The union of these two natures, one material, the
other Immaterial, Is a mysterious union between the
empirical and the metaphysical. There Is no opposition
'	
'On the Education of Children' (1783), DEW, III, 350, 352-
53; NP (1777), V, 194-202.
NP (1777), I, 178; 'On the Discoveries of Faith' (1788),
DEW, IV, 30-1; 'What Is Man?' (1788), DEW, IV, 22.
' 'On the Fall of Han' (1782), DEW, II, 405; cf. 'The Good
Steward' (1768), DEW, II, 291; 'On the Trinity' (1775), DEW, II,
382. 200 'On the Cnnipresence of God' (1788), DEW, IV, 45; 'On the
Discoveries of Faith' (1788), DEW, IV, 30. There Is one aberrant
quote which should be attributed more to carelessness than incon-
sistency. In, 'Some Thoughts on an Expression of St. Paul, in the
First Epistle to the Thessalonians, Chapter v., Verse 23', AM
(1786), in Works XI, 447-48, Wesley seemed to think the soul was
made of 'ethereal or electric fire, the purest of all matter.' But




between the two as they are naturally joined
together, 20 ' although one cannot precisely tell how such
a union actually exists.20'
I know not how my body was fashioned there Fin
the wombi; or when or how my soul was united
to it: And it is far easier ., in speaking on so
abstruse a subject to pull down, than to build
up.	 I can easily object to any hypothesis
which is advanced; but I cannot easily defend
any. 20 3
He seems to have at least entertained a Cartesian
suggestion that the soul is actually located in the
pineal gland, but finally rejected it as being unfound-
ed. 204
 Ultimately, Wesley saw God as the one respons-
ible for the immaterial acting upon the material in such
a way as to result in action.' 05 In whatever way they
were joined, Wesley was convinced that they were joined
together in Adam in perfect harmony.	 It took sin to
introduce the abnormal dissension, or the dysfunctional
relationship between flesh and spirit. 'And by sad
experience we find that this "corruptible body presses
down the soul"'.206
Wherever, and however they were joined, he thought
the soul controlled every motion of the body but the
involuntary motion of lungs, heart, and the circulatory
system, which (through 'the providence of the great
Creator') is controlled by the brain.' 07 Yet in another
place he was not certain how the immaterial soul
controlled the material body.'°
201 
'The True Original of the Soul', AM 6(1783), 150.202 NP (1777), I, 178; IV, 115; cf. DEW, IV, 283-4, 289.203 DOS, Works, IX, 334-35.204 
'The Imperfection of Human Knowledge' (1784), DEW, II, 576
note 34; 'What is Man?' (1787), DEW, IV, 22; 'The Promise of
UnderstandIng' (1730), DEW, IV, 283-4, 289. It is a thought he
credits to Descartes in, NP (1777), I, 52; V, 252 (ci. Descartes,
passions of the Soul, 1.30-31). Also see, 'Of the Action of God and
Creatures', MI (1786), 276-7, where he attempts to explain how the
immaterial soul acts upon the material body in a more metaphysical
way. 205 
'Of the Action of God and Creatures' MI (1786), 276-7.206 It is derived from Wisdom of Solomon 9.15 in, 'On the Fall
of Man' (1782), BEW, II, 405; also in 'Wandering Thoughts' (1762),
DEW II, 130 (on Wesley's use of the Apocrypha see note 18), 135;
'Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels' (1790), DEW, IV, 165, 166;
'The Image of God' (1730),	 , IV, 298.207 
'What is Man?' (1788), DEW, IV, 23; NP (1777), I, 82.208 
'On The Trinity' (1775), DEW, II, 383.
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Yet, because the soul controls the body death
occurs when the soul leaves the body. 209 Of this one
may be certain. But when is that? Wesley's search for
a satisfactory answer to this question anticipated the
quandary and discussions of modern medical ethics. Is
it the case that, 'Nullus spiritus, nulla vita- 'Where
there is no breath, there is no life'?' 210 Is It when
the heart stops beating?	 Is It when the body grows
stiff? His conclusion was ultimately, 'In many cases
God only can tell the moment of that separation.'211
But when the separation occurs,
The animal machine is like a clock: the wheels
whereof may be in ever so good order, the
mechanism compleat Esici in every part, and
wound up to the full pitch; yet without some
impulse communicated to the pendulum, the
whole continues motionless.212
But the soul was more to Wesley than, as Pyle put
It, just a 'ghost in a machine', controlling, regulat-
ing, and even terminating its mechanical functions. It
was an eternal (in the 'a parte post' sense, or 'the
eternity which is to come'), but not pre-existent,
creation of God. 213 This means the soul has no prior
existence to the soul/body duality. Once soul and body
are inexplicably joined together, the soul Is where one
finds the image of the Triune God; It is where one finds
the lost moral, and the marred natural, and political
images of God; it is where one finds understanding,
liberty, and will; and where one finds an explanation
209 ENNT (1755), 1 cor. 15.51. Cf. Tertullian, 'A Treatise on
the Soul', §51-53.
210 'What is Man?' (1788), DEW, IV, 25; NP (1777), V, 254.
211 'What is Man?' (1788), DEW, IV, 25.
212 NP (1777), I, 164, cf. V, 254; 'What is Man?' (1788), BEW,
IV, 25; 'The Good Steward' (1768), DEW, II, 287. Cf. Tertullian, 'A
Treatise on the Soul', §51 (who held the soul 's corporeality in §5-
7).
213 'On Eternity', Outler, DEW, II, 361. On the pre-existence
of the soul see Plato, 'Timaeus', Dialo gues (1937), II, 16-17 (who,
on this basis, also entertained the notion of transmigration of the
soul, in 'Phaedra', 248-49; 'Meno', 81 ff; Phaedo, 70, 81; 'Repub-
lic' 10.617, etc.). It Is no surprise that Wesley rejected the pre-
existence of the soul as a way to explain original sin (cf. Tertul-
han, 'A Treatise on the Soul', §27). An example of such an attempt
may be seen In Capel Berrow, A La pse of Human Souls in a State of
Pre-Existence, the Onl y Original Sin (1766). Wesley's rejection of
this closes the door f or any possibility of 'transmigration' (See
Origen, 'coninentary on Matthew', 13. 1; Irenaeus, 'Against Heresies',
2.23.1-24.4; Tertulhian, 'A Treatise on the Soul', §31-33).
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for the transmission of original sin. These aspects of
the soul will be explored later in relationship to
original sin.
2.6.5. Consciousness is not Personal Identity
On the basis of a body/soul duality Wesley rejected
Locke's notion that 'consciousness makes personal iden-
tityE . . .1' • 214 	 He argued,
Does knowing I exist, make me exist? No; I am
before I know I am; and I am the same, before
I can possibly know I am the samel. ..i. 'Per-
son,' says he,	 'is a thinking intelligent
being.'	 Is it so?F...]Let none then seek a
knot in a bulrush. The case is plain, unless
it be puzzled by art. I call Cato the same
person all his life, because he has the same
soul. I call him the same man, because he has
the same body too, which he brought into the
world.
But what blessed work will Mr. Locke's
hypothesis make? If there be no personal
identity without consciousness, then Cato is
not the same person he was at two months old;
for he has no consciousness at all of what he
was then. Nay, I have no more consciousness
of what I was or did at two years old, than of
what Julius Caesar did. But am I not the same
person I was then?t. . .
Upon the whole, if you take the word
'person' for a thinking intelligent being, it
is evident, the same soul, conscious or uncon-
scious, is the same person. But if you take
it for the same soul, animating the same human
body, (in which sense I have always taken it,
and I believe every one else that has not been
confounded by metaphysical subtlety,) then you
and I and every man living is the same person
from the cradle to the grave. And God will
accordingly reward every man, or every per-
gonE. ..laccording to his own works; and that
whether he be conscious of them or not; this
will make no manner of difference. What every
individual sows here, he will reap in eter-
nity. 215
In this carefully, and rather well developed argument we
see clearly that the irreducible essence of personhood
is not rooted in a mind/body duality, consisting of
214 
'Remarks upon Locke's "Essay"', Works, XIII, 458.
215 
'Remarks upon Locke's "Essay"', Works, XIII, 458, 459, 460.
Cf. Aristotle, 'On the Soul'. 412s. Here Wesley implies a distinc-
tion between the conscious and the unconscious, the sleeping and the
awake, a distinction he also used as a metaphor to compare those
who had experienced the new birth, and those still in their sins,
e.g. 'Awake Thou that Sleepest' (1742).
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either subjective reflection or awareness. Personhood
consists of a soul/body duality, which exists objec-
tively before God. It will later be shown that although
persons are fallen, through prevenlent grace persons
exist not just as objects but as persons in relationship
with God. It is the objective and relational existence
of persons which constitutes personhood.
Locke's definition of personhood conflicted with,
indeed denied, the Wesleyan and traditional Christian
idea of the soul.215 This fundamental difference
between Locke and Wesley has been regretfully ignored by
scholars who have been quick to label Wesley 'Lockian'.
A 'mind' can be taken away either by amnesia or madness,
but a soul cannot. 217
 The image of God was not derived
from empiricism for Wesley.21e Hence, neither can
personhood, as the soul provides Its continuity. But
because the mind was an immaterial substance to Locke,
and because soul was an immaterial substance for Wesley,
it can be said that for them both personhood does not
equal substance.
2.6.6. Consciousness is Personality
Having started with a body/soul duality, it must be
quickly added that sensation, even 'self-consciousness'
were Important to Wesley's understanding of personality,
but not a constitutive part of personhood. A person can
be without personality and still be a person. Yet, it
is only through self-consciousness that one Is able to
have	 knowledge	 of	 'all	 the	 faculties	 of our
215 Tennant, 'The Anglican Response to Locke' s Theory of
Personal Identity', Journal of the History of Ideas, 43(1982), 73-
90. See also, Taylor, 'The Relation of the Holy Spirit to the
Self', WTJ, 22(1987)2, 84-91, who, while he draws a distinction
between mind and brain, fails to make the distinction between a
mind/body 'dualism' and a soul/body duality. He nonetheless draws
attention to the pneumatological implications on such a view, p. 90.
217 'Remarks upon Locke's Essay"', Works, XIII, 459.
211 This challenges the assumptions made by Eninett, 'The Image
of God and the Ending of Life', The Asbury Theolog ical Journal,
47(1992)!, 53-62, who concluded that the image of God is the basis
for valuing human life and the biblical concept of image is depen-
dent upon at least some cognitive function, and if persons are void
of cognitive functions, they are void of God's image, and where




soul[...J'.21' For Wesley the soul functioned as what
some would call 'mind', so that the soul became the seat
of experience, and sensation. 220 It could well be said
that even for Wesley, 'sensation is generated In the
soul through the medium of the body'. 22 '	 Without
experience and sensation there is no personality.
To illustrate this, Wesley told an anecdote (even
more bizarre than Locke's story about Maurice's parrot)
which had circulated through various sources contempor-
ary to Wesley. 222 	It involved a toad being discovered
in the heart of an oak tree. It was supposed the toad
had somehow been enveloped by the oak either when It was
planted, or as it grew, and lived there for over a
hundred years, in the dark, with no food or water.
Wesley reacted in a curious way to the story. He
assumed its credibility (although the anecdote itself
could have been a test case for the 'epistemology of
testimony'), essentially because of the credibility of
the story's witnesses, and their number, and remarked,
We say, 'it had lived'! 	 But what manner of
life! How desirable! How enviablel.. .1. This
poor animal had organs of sense; yet It had
not any sensation. It had eyes, yet no ray of
light ever entered its black abode. 	 From the
very first instant of its existence there, it
was shut up in impenetrable darkness. 	 It was
shut up from the sun, moon, and stars, and
from the beautiful face of nature; indeed from
the whole visible world, as if it had no
being. 223
The idea that the absence of the presence of sensation
is what distinguishes between what Is and Is not an
animal is an Aristotelian one. 224 But Wesley was making
an implicit analogy to personhood here, a point that
became more obvious when he concluded that being
destitute of sensation also meant being destitute of
reflection, memory, or imagination, all of which could
219 NP (1777), V, 194.
220 
'What Is Man?'(1788), BEW, IV, 22-5.
221 Aristotle, 'Sense and Sensibilia', 436"6-7.
222 it1er's genealogy of this story Is, as usual, as impec-
cable as it is entertaining, BEW, IV, 169 note 3.223 '( Living without God' (1790), DEW, IV, 169. Cf. 'The
Great Privilege of those that are Born of God' (1748), DEW, I, 432-
3. 224 Aristotle, 'Sense and Sensibilia', 436'll-13.
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be said to be acts of self-consciousness. 225
 Reflec-
tion, memory, and imagination as acts of consciousness
are the records of a person's existence.
He expounded upon the concept of memory a bit more
in 'Thoughts on Memory'. There he wrote,
In simply remembering things, the mind of man
appears to be rather passive than active.
Whether we will or no, we remember many things
which we have heard or seen, said or done;
especially if they were attended with any
remarkable pleasure or pain. But in reminis-
cence, or recalling what is past, the mind
appears to be active. Most times at least, we
may or may not recall them, as we please.
Recollection seems to imply something more
than simple reminiscence; even the studious
collecting and gathering up together all the
parts of a conversation or transaction, which
had occurred before, but had in some measure
escaped from the memory.228
As important as memory was to Wesley, his empiricism
rejected Plato's notion that ''all human knowledge is
nothing but remembering.' Yet certain it is, that,
without remembering, we can have but a small share of
knowledge.' 227
 This brought Wesley in close proximity
to Aristotle's notion that experience, not knowledge is
the sum of remembered actions. 226
 Wesley had to admit,
sensory experience is what records life, upon which one
may reflect, of which one may have memory, with which
one may develop imagination. While none of these
actually constitute personhood in and of itself, the
processes of reflection, memory, and imagination are
what record being, perception, and sensation. Without
such a process there can be no record. 229
 Without such
a record, there is no human personality. As Wesley held
no notion of innate experience, without an accumulation
of experience, or to have a mind erased of them is to be
absent of personality.	 But, It is the soul as the
receptacle	 of	 the image of God which provides the
225 'On Living without God' (1790), BEW, IV, 170-71.
228 'Thoughts on Memory' (1789), Works, XIII, 480.
227 'An Address to the Clergy' (1756), Works, X, 489.
226 Aristotle, 'Posterior Analytics', 10O3-6; 'On Memory',449 b 1_453 b
 10.




continuity of personhood, with or without memory and
personality.
2.6.7. Personhood and Personality
What Wesley did was to separate personality from
the identity of personhood. Consciousness may make per-
sonality, and personality may be important to person-
hood, but it does not constitute personhood.23°
Personality is what one has. A person is what one is.
This identity consisted of the objective existence of
the soul before God. In his critique of Locke, Wesley
conceded the reality of the 'conscious' and 'uncon-
scious', but argued it made no difference where the
culpability of sin was concerned. 'God wilit. . .]reward
every[.. .lperson[. . .]according to his own works; and
that whether he be conscious of them or not; this will
make no manner of difference.' According to Wesley's
concept of personhood at least, culpability depended on
the objective reality of the soul existing before God,
whether one was conscious of sin or not. Within the
context of developing his concept of personhood Wesley
did not want to link culpability of sin with conscious-
ness and personality.
This development in thought has profound implica-
tions on Wesley's understanding of personal sin, which
he defined as the willful [i.e. volitional in naturel
transgression of a known [i.e. cognitive in naturel law
of God. In the context of his hamartiology, culpability
for sin depended on knowledge of the law (cognition),
and will (volition). 231
 By making sin contingent on
cognition, and volition he kept personal sin on a
'conscious' level, and on the level of personality.
While consciousness does not seem to be a constitutive
part of his concept of personhood, it does seem to be a
constitutive part of his definition of sin. The crucial
question is this: Is Wesley's view
	 of personhood
consistent with his own understanding of sin? Is his
empiricism consistent with his
	 hamartiology?	 One
° Cf. Joseph Butler, 'Of Personal Identity', in, The Ana1oy
of Reason (1736). Wesley's arguments follow Butler's on this point.
231 Note particularly Wesley's extraction of Locke on the
'will' in Ni 5(1782), 413-7, 476-8, 528-34, 585-7.
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solution could be to say original sin should correspond
with Wesley's concept of personhood, or who we are.
Actual sin should correspond to his concept of per-
sonality, or what we do. Having asked the question we
must leave it for now and explore it more fully in
chapter four.
3. Summary
This chapter has tried to illustrate the epis-
temological grounds for Wesley's use of Scripture,
reason, and experience. While acknowledging Locke's
influence on his epistemology, it has been shown that he
was perhaps more influenced by Henry Aldrich (who was in
turn influenced by Peter of Spain), and a strand of
medieval Aristotelianism, which Wesley defended against -
Locke.	 This emerges more clearly when one compares
Wesley's 'Compendium of Logic' with his 'Remarks on
Locke's Essay'. One significant example of this can be
seen in Wesley's 'scale of assent' which involves a
different understanding of the relationship between
faith, reason, and revelation. Another more specific
example may be seen in Wesley's concept of personhood,
as an objective existence before God, and the subject of
experience.	 In doing so he separated personality from
identity. Wesley and Locke both agreed on the denial of
innate knowledge.	 However in the sermons and several
other places Wesley did not quote Locke to do so. The
reason is empiricism is older than Locke's Essay.
Empiricism alone does not justify calling Wesley Lockian
given the profound differences between the two.
From Wesley's doctrine of experience emerged
several systematic implications that cannot be fully
explored until their appropriate sections below. The
issues to be explored are especially: (1) the relational
aspect of his understanding of rational religion; (2)
the implications his doctrine of the soul has particu -
larly on original sin; (3) the compatibility between
Wesley 's concepts of the 'conscious' and the 'uncon-
scious', and the culpability of sin, especially personal
sin; (4) the importance of revelation to his understand-
ing of actual sin; and (5) the nature of the God who
cannot deceive or be deceived.
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The issue to be explored next is theodicy. Why did
the God who can neither deceive or be deceived, the God
of justice and mercy allow evil? How is evil consistent
with eternal reason?
	 In short,	 'Unde malum?', or,
'Whence came evil?' These sorts of questions must be
addressed in order to understood the origin of evil
which was for Wesley both a chronological and theologi-
cal presupposition to original sin.
Chapter Two
'Unde Malum?', or 'Whence Came Evil?'
1. Introduction
In the last chapter we discovered that Wesley's
understanding of eternal reason consisted 'of the nature
of things: the nature of God and the nature of man, with
the relations necessarily subsisting between themE.. .iIt
finishes all by restoring the due relations between God
and man'.' Rational religion is relational religion,
and consists of God's love for us, and our love for God
and neighbour. But Wesley's concept of eternal reason
also acknowledged the fact that the relations between
God and humanity are estranged and in need of restora-
tion. An attempt to understand why this estrangement is
so must not begin straight away with the doctrine of
original sin. It must begin on a more fundamental level
by asking the question, 'Whence came evil?' The origin
of evil is the presupposition to the origin of sin and
discloses many doctrinal assumptions.
1.!. Theodicy- The Question of Evil
Epicurus Is said to have asked the question, 'What
is the cause of evil?' In answering it, he is quoted by
Lactantius as having concluded that God,
either wished to take away evils, and is
unable; or He is able, and is unwilling; or He
is neither willing nor able, or He is both
willing and able, which alone is suitable to
God, from what source then are evils? or why
does He not remove them?2
Here, in what is a deductive argument, it is maintained
that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent,
and self-contradictory with the Christian belief that
God is good, omniscient, and omnipotent. 3
 That, in
brief, is the issue of theodicy, 4
 which appears to place
1 l3M, XI, 55.
2 Lactantius, 'A Treatise on the Anger of God', xiii (ANF, VII,
27!); cf. the argument of Lvid Hume, Dialo gues Concerning Natural
Religion, pt. x.
e.g. Flew, God and Philoso phy ( 1966), p. 48. Also see,
Mackie, in, The Philosophy
 of Religion (1971), p. 92-3.
The etymology of 'theodicy' is derived from the Greek word
for God (theos), and justice (dikei). The word appears to have
been coined by Leibniz 'in 1697, in a letter to MagliabechiE. . .Jas
the title of an intended work' EMerz, Leibniz (1884), p. 10!; cf.
Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966), p. 6 n.
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the Christian doctrine of God into a 'no win situation'.
Epicurus's question has been used many times by
others as a starting place for the issue of theodicy.
Marcion had queried, 'Unde malum et quare?'- 'Whence
came evil and why?', 5 as had Mani, who was influenced by
the ancient Persian, Zoroaster, as well as Gnosticism.e
Their solution to the dilemma of theodicy, however, was
an ontological dualism consisting of two gods, one evil
the other good. Wesley had displayed a familiarity with
Zoroaster (albeit a limited one), 7 and was undoubtedly
familiar with Marcion's query, but his greatest attack
was on the 'regular system' of the 'Manichees'.9
1.2. Wesley's Interest in Theodicy
There is more evidence than this to indicate Wesley
had a career-long interest in theodicy.'° He often
asked, 'Unde malum?' or, 'Whence evil?','' all the
while maintaining the omnipotence,'' the omniscience, 13
See, Tertullian, Against Marcion, I.il (ANF, III, 272); ci.
Irenaeus, Against Heresies, I.xxvii (ANF, I, 398-9).
e See, Augustine, 'Two Souls, Against the Manichaeans' (391-
92), VIII (NPNF1, IV, 100-!); 'On the Morals of the Manichaeans'
(388), II (NPNF!, IV, 69); 'Confessions' (397-401), 111.12 (NPNF1,
I, 64); Filoramo, A History of Gnosticism (1990); cf. Methodius
(attrib.j, 'Concerning Free-Will'.
See JWL, VI, 118-23 (1774).
• See, DEW, II, 476 and n.
'Thoughts Upon Necessity' (1774), Works, X, 457.
'° See, BEW, XXV, 240-2 (1729), XXV, 258 (1730), XXV, 264-7
(1731); also see AM 3(1780), 604-6, 607-1!; 'The Promise of Under-
standing' (1730), DEW, IV, 285; 'The End of Christ's Coming' (1781),
BEW, II, 476. A close inspection of Wesley's 'Sermon Register'
reveals twenty-seven instances of preaching from this text (1 John
3:8) between 1742 to 1789, leading Out ler to conclude, 'This
confirms the impression of Wesley's serious preoccupation, both
early and late, with the problem of evil, and especially moral
evil', BEW, II, 471.
" e.g. BEW, XXV, 240-2 (1729); BEW, II, 476, 'The End of
Christ's Coming' (178!); AM 3(1780), 604-6.12 e.g. 'Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, VI' (1748), DEW,
I, 589; 'On Divine Providence' (1786), DEW, II, 540-!; 'On the Qn-
nipresence of God' (1788), IV, 44; 'The Unity of the Divine
Being' (1789), BEW, IV, 62; 'Public Diversions Denounced' (1732),
DEW, IV, 320-!; 'Thoughts Upon God's Sovereignty' (1777), Works, X,
361-3.
' 'The Unity of the Divine Being' (1789), DEW, IV, 62.
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the justice, 14 and love of God. His first sermon,
'Death and Deliverance' (1725), was essentially an
attempt to explore the Issue of theodicy. In 'The
Promise of Understanding' (1730) he noted, '"Why are
sin and its attendant pain in the world?" has been a
question ever since the world beganE...l'. 15 Throughout
his career, by his Interest in theodicy, and without any
semblance of Impiety, Wesley sought to apply these moral
categories to God. In doing so he hoped,
That, to the height of this great argument,
I may assert eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God with man.'
Unlike Leibniz, who (as Barth said), 'at the bot-
tomE . . . Ihardly had any serious
	 interest (and from
practical standpoint none at all) in the problem of
evil'	 Wesley took theodicy seriously, and ultimately
saw it as an important test of God's omnipotence through
the divine ability 'to extract good out of evil'.'
	 In
other words, Wesley tried to reconcile evil with eternal
reason.
What this chapter will do is look at Wesley's
understanding of the origins of evil. To do this the
subject will be divided into two sections, an aesthetic
theme, and a moral theme.	 We will first look at his
aesthetic theme in which his doctrine of creation will
be developed.	 Then we will look at his moral theme.
14 e.g. 'The Repentance of Believers' (1767), , I, 344-5;
'Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, IV' (1748), BEW, I, 538;
'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750), flEW, II,
12-3; 'On the Fall of Man' (1782), BEW, II, 4!!; 'God's Love to
Fallen Man' (1782), flEW, II, 424; 'The General Deliverance' (1781),
II, 449; 'A Call to Backsliders' (1778), BEW, III, 211; 'The Promise
of Understanding' (1730), flEW, IV, 285-6.15 
'The Promise of Understanding' (1730), flEW, IV, 285.
A slight misquote from Milton, Paradise Lost, 1.26, found on
the title page of 'Predestination Calmly Considered' (1752), which
was later republished in AM 2(1779), 505 fl, 553 ff, 609 ff. The
quote also appeared in 'The Great Assize' (1758), flEW, I, 365;
'God's Approbation of His Works' (1782), BEW, II, 399; 'On the Fall
of Man' (1782),	 i, II, 401; 'The Promise of Understanding' (1730),
BEW, IV, 282-3; JWL VI, 137, (1775).
j' Barth, Church DogmatIcs (1975), 111/I, 392, with whom Hick
also agrees, Evil and the God of Love (1966), p. 160.
' 'On Mourning for the Dead' (1727), flEW, IV, 239; cf. Augus-
tine, 'Enchiridion' (421-23), XI, XXVII (NPNF1, III, 240, 246).
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Lastly, we will consider some of the implications Wesley
thought his doctrine of free-will had on the omnipotence
and omniscience of God.
2. The Aesthetic Theme- Creation and Eternal Reason
The first aspect of Wesley's aesthetic theme
consisted of the relationship between creation and
eternal reason. Wesley began the aesthetic theme by
strongly asserting the moral attributes of justice and
goodness to God, who is all powerful and all wise. The
God who is good could only create a universe that was
good. A basis for this concept was explored In the
Arminian Magazine, in the article, 'Thoughts on Crea-
tion'. 19
 It indicated a way in which one may understand
how creation may share in certain attributes of God
through relationality, while at the same time being
distinct from God. There, it was argued that God cannot
create anything but what he loves; God cannot love
anything but what resembles the divine Image in some
degree; consequently, creation bears a certain measure
of the image of God because it is the object of God's
love, which Is the primary cause of God's imparting
perfection and happiness by representing the divine self
in creation, which he saw as beautiful and excellent.
This perfection and happiness was God's consubstantial
image.
In contemplating his eternal perfections,
whose simple and indivisible unity Is not only
equivalent, but also infinitely superior to
all possible multiplicity, he saw them so
beautiful and so	 excellent;	 he	 was so
delighted in beholding his consubstantial
image, that by the free Impulsion of the Holy
Ghost, his essential goodness, co-eternal love
and lover, he was determined to produce a
numberless multitude of living images and
lively pictures; not by dividing his sub-
stance, and erecting the different parcels of
it into separate substances; but by creating
real	 beings	 distinct	 from himself, and
representative of his all-beautiful essence.
Thus the free communicative goodness of God,
'° 'Thoughts on Creation' AM (1786), 150-2. I presume this is
an extract, but I have not traced the source yet.
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flowed from the love of his consubstantial
Image, and so all the creatures originally
were representative of the divine perfections;
otherwise God could not have loved them; nor
consequently willed their existenceE. . .J.
Hence none but the Son, or the consubstantial
image of the Father, 'for whom, and by whom
all things were made,' can know the properties
and beauties of nature, the perfect resemblan-
ces and innumerable relations betwixt finite
and infinite; the pictures and the original;
none but he can manifest and reveal them to
finite Intelligences. It is only by this
light and an intercourse with him, that we can
know the Creator and the creatures, the cause
and its effects, the Sovereign Artificer and
his numberless works.2°
In this view, creation Is seen as something apart from
God. But, creation exists only in relation to God, by
love, through the Son and the Spirit. On the basis of
this love, one may see something of a trinitarian
relationality through whom the perfection and goodness
of creation is mediated from God to creation. The
consubstantial image of God and trinitarlan relation-
ality suggest a way in which Wesley could unequivocally
believe in the total goodness of creation. Furthermore,
'as every creature was "good" in its primeval state, so,
when all were compacted in one general system, "behold,
they were very good.'' 2 ' Each part of creation on its
own was good, but the sum total of all the parts of
creation were very good, and better than the whole.22
That creation was very good 'in the highest degree'
meant it was 'without any mixture of evil'. 23
	In the
'very good' creation before the fall, Wesley was
convinced all creation was 'the most perfect order and
harmony', no 'volcanoes or burning mountains', 'no
putrid lakes, no turbid or stagnating waters', 'no
unwholesome vapours, no poisonous exhalations', 'no
violent winter or sultry summer, no extreme either of
20 'Thoughts on Creation' AN (1786), 150-!.21 
'God's Approbation of His Works' (1782), DEW, II, 388.
22 'The Wisdom of God's Counsels' (1784), DEW, II, 552.




heat or cold'. 24
	Here, the aesthetic theme clearly
emerged as impeccable beauty.25
2.1. The Aesthetic Theme- Creation and the
Best World Possible
The very goodness of creation introduced another
aspect of the aesthetic theme- that creation was the
best world possible. It was Leibniz who created the
argument for the best of all possible worlds. Lelbniz
was one of the eighteenth century 'optimists' (along
with King, Jenyns, and Clarke), who thought that
'despite all that is bad within it our universe is
nevertheless the very best that is possible'. 28 Leibniz
argued,
The wisdom of God, not content with embracing
all the possibles, penetrates them, compares
them, weighs them one against the other, to
estimate their degrees of perfection or
imperfection, the strong and the weak, the
good and the evilE...]. The result of all
these comparisons and deliberations is the
choice of the best from among all these
possible systems, which wisdom makes in order
to satisfy goodness completely; and such is
precisely the plan of the universe as it is.27
Although Outler did not explain what he meant, perhaps
this 'best of all possible worlds' theme is what caused
him to suggest that Wesley's theodicy had a 'Leibnizian
ring' to it. 28 However, closer inspection must raise
questions regarding the extent to which this is true.
First of all, Wesley's 'best of all worlds' was not
based on modality (at least not explicitly), but on
eternal reason and the attributes of God. The God who
is perfectly good could not but create a world that was
perfectly good. Secondly, the Optimists believed that
24 
'God's Approbation of His Works' (1782), BEW II, 390-1.
25 For a criticism of the Wesley's aesthetic theme see Joseph
Barker, 'A Review of Wesley's Notions respecting the Primeval State
of Man and the Universe' (London: 1848), pp. 22.
28 A phrase derived from Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being
(1957), pp. 208-26, and used by Hick, Evil and the God of Love
(1966), p. 151.
27 Leibniz, Theodicy , (1952), 225.
28 Oitler, BEW, IV, 280. Wesley was eventually aware of the
famous controversy between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke from 1715-16.
See, JWJ, VI, 63.
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in spite of all that is wrong with creation, creation as
it is now after the fall is the best world possible.
Leibniz and the optimists' thesis must Inevitably
conclude that if this is the best world possible, God
cannot replace this one with a better one. 2 ' That is to
say, a world with evil is not any better than a world
without evil. Wesley would have denied this on two
grounds. First, on the grounds of creation as it is, is
not the same as creation as It was in the beginning.
Had you therefore heard that vain King of
Castile crying out with exquisite self-
sufficiency, 'If I had made the world I would
have made it better than God Almighty has made
it,' 3 °
 you might have replied: 'No: God
Almighty- whether you know it or not- did not
make it as it is now. He himself made it
better, unspeakably better than It is at
present. He made it without any blemish, yea,
without any defect. He made no corruption, no
destruction in the inanimate creation. He
made not death in the animal creation, neither
its harbingers, sin and pain. It was only
I.. .]after man, in utter defiance of his
Maker, had eaten of the tree of knowledge,
thatl. ..]a whole army of evils, totally new,
totally unknown till then, broke in upon rebel
man, and all other creatures, and overspread
the face of the earth.31
Wesley argued for a best possible world, but it was a
world without evil or sin. It was the world before the
fall.
He would also have denied this on eschatological
grounds. Lelbniz's version of the best world possible
implicitly could not accommodate the renewal of creation
as a eschatological aspect of redemption. If this is
the best world possible, what Is the point of re-
creation? It was Wesley's belief that creation would
not always remain in its deplorable state. It will be
delivered from its present state and restored (rather
' This is the question raised by Langtry, 'Can God Replace the
Actual World by a Better One?', Philoso phical Papers, 20(1991)3,
183-92.
° See DEW, II, 397 note 43, part of which says, 'The 'vain
king' was Aiphonso X, 'El Sabio' (1221-84), and his Ironic aphorism
survives in many different versions[...j. Cf. John Norris, 'Sermon
Preached Before the University of Oxford, Mar. 29, 1685', p. 2.s' 
'God's Approbation of the His Works' (1782), BEW, II, 397-8.
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significantly) 'with vast Increase' over its original
state before the fall.32
It must be admitted that Wesley's argument for the
'best possible world' was not an empirical argument, but
an a priori argument (a proposition that can be known to
be true or false without any reference to experience),
something which
	 is somewhat inconsistent with his
empirical methodology. But whatever the t0d oç
argument, to have imagined otherwise would have been an
affront to 'the goodness or the wisdom of God in the
creation'.	 God in his goodness and wisdom, his at-
tributes of morality and omniscience, created from his
omnipotence the best world possible, which was in the
beginning one without sin.
2.2. The Aesthetic Theme- Creation and the
'Chain of Being'
The philosophical principle and structure beneath
Wesley's aesthetic theme and his understanding of the
best world possible was Plato's concept of the 'chain of
being', and the 'principle of plenitude'. Knuuttila has
suggested the principle of plenitude is the natural
consequence of Aristotle's modal theory, 34 which Wesley
employed indirectly through Peter of Spain, and more
directly through Aldrich, as it appeared in his 'Compen-
dium of Logic'. Wesley's own modality, then, is
completely compatible with the 'chain of being'.
Outler has suggested that Wesley derived his
concept of the 'chain of being' from John Hhldrop, whom
Wesley had extracted in the Arminian Ma gazine in 1782,
under the title, 'Free Thoughts on the Brute Creation'.
Outler also reckoned this was the inspiration for
Wesley's sermon, 'The General Deliverance'. 3
 But
Wesley reflected an earlier knowledge of the concept,
and acknowledged a different source of influence. This
' 'The General Deliverance' (1781), flEW, II, 446; cf. ENNT,
Revelation 2!.
cl. Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God (1982), p. 121.
Knuuttila, in, Ilthp
 (1988), p. 344.
, II, 436.
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entire concept is developed at greater length in,
Natural Philoso phy (1777).
The whole progress of nature is so gradual,
that the entire chasm from a plant to man, is
filled up with divers kinds of creatures,
rising one above another, by so gentle an
ascent, that the transitions from one species
to another, are almost insensible. And the
intermediate space is so well husbanded, that
there is scarce a degree of perfection which
does not appear in some. Now since the scale
of being advances by such regular steps as
high as man, is it not probable, that it still
proceeds gradually upwards, through beings of
a superior nature? As there is an Infinitely
greater space between the Supreme Being and
man, than between man and the lowest inect.36
After drawing briefly upon Locke's thoughts on the
subject, 31 the work auickly proceeded to add, 'This
reflection upon the scale of beings, is pursued at
large, by one of the finest writers of the age, Mr.
Bonnet of Geneva, in that beautiful work, 'The Con-
templation of Nature.'' 38 From there he proceeded to
extract Bonnet's work.
The concept found another expression in a later
sermon, 'God's Approbation of His Works' (1782). There
he said,
Every part was exactly suited to the others,
and conducive to the good of the whole. There
was 'a golden chain' (to use the expression of
Plato) 39 'let down from the throne of God'- an
exactly connected series of beings, from the
highest to the lowest: from dead earth,
through fossils, vegetables, animals, to man,
created in the image of God, and designed to
know, to love, and enjoy his Creator to all
eternity. 40
Here, Wesley ascribes the concept to Plato.
It is not surprising to find Wesley so familiar
with the theme, or even influenced by a variety of
NP (1777), IV, 57-60.
NP (1777), IV, 58-9; of. Locke, Essay , 111.6.12.
NP (1777), IV, 60.
' 'The 'proof-text' here is Plato's Thaeatetus, 153C, where
Plato cites Homer's Iliad, viii.19, as a proof-text for the phrase
L...J"the golden chain'', see Outler BEW, 396 n. 40.
° 'God's Approbation of His Works' (1782), II, 396-97.
Cf. Locke, Essay, III.vi.12, where he does not insist upon the
necessity of p\enitude. and says its existence is only probable.
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sources. Lovejoy has noted that there has never been a
period of time in which suOh a variety of writers from
such a variety of disciplines talked so much about the
chain of being than in the eighteenth century. Writers
such as Joseph Addison, William King, Lord Bolingbroke,
Pope, Hailer, Thomson, Akenside, Count De Buffon,41
Goldsmith, Diderot, Kant, Lambert, Herder, and Schiller
all drew from the theme new, or previously evaded
consequences. 42 It was within this rich context Wesley
constructed his own understanding of the chain of being.
It had several aspects. The first, was that
through the chain of being creation was structured as a
hierarchy, in which all the parts of the golden chain
'are admirably connected together, to make up one
universal whole'43.
Secondly, in the paradise state this 'chain of
being' was used to convey the blessings of God as they,
flowed through man to the inferior creatures;
as man was the great channel of communication
between the Creator and the whole brute
creation; so when man made himself incapable
of transmitting those blessings, that com-
munication was necessarily cut off.44
To use the term yet again, for Wesley the chain of being
mediated 'relationality', which was implicit to eternal
reason. This gave Wesley's hierarchical construction of
the chain a mediatorial role. The implication of this
is that man and woman were there to serve creation in a
'quasi-sacramental' way, i.e. by being a means of God's
grace.
Another aspect of Wesley's chain of being was that
the image of God was what separated humanIty from
brute creation. This distinction could not be made on
the basis of understanding, liberty, and will, alone
because Wesley argued that these are found in some
measure In all creatures. He asked,
41 For Wesley's sound rebuke of Buffon's Natural History , see
'Remarks on The Count De Buffon's 'Natural History", AM, 7(1782);
also in Works, XIII, 448-55.
42 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (1957), pp. 183-4.
'Of Evil Angels' (1783),
	
I III,, 16.
'The General Deliverance' (1781), BEW, II, 442.
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What then makes the barrier between men and
brutes? The line which they cannot pass?
	 It
was not reason. Set aside that ambiguous
term: exchange it for the plain word, under-
standing, and who can deny that brutes have
this? We may as well deny that they have
sight or hearing. But It is this: man is
capable of God, the inferior creatures are
not.
The concept Wesley used to speak of this capacity for
God was the Triune image of God.
Another aspect of the chain of being was that while
the creation of human beings may have been the pinnacle
of the Genesis creation account, man and woman were only
the 'via media', the middle link in the chain of
being. 4e
 It must be noted, however, that in his
comments on Psalm 8.5 ('Thou hast made him a little
lower than the angels[...]') In Explanatory Notes on the
Old Testament, Wesley said,
the words more literally rendered are, Thou
madest him a little less than God. And hence
some have inferred, that man in his original
state was the highest of all creatures.41
With that possible exception aside, we are still left
with a question raised by chain of being- what is above
humanity In it?
2.2.1. The Chain of Being and the Plurality of
Worlds
In the eighteenth century many supposed higher life
forms on other planets were above humanity In the chain.
Lovejoy has already drawn attention to the fact that in
1764 Bonnet postulated there could be life on other
planets, and on those other planets higher life forms
could be found to fill in the gaps in the chain of being
between humanity and God, leaving angelic life forms to
'The General Deliverance' (1781), BEW, II, 441.
4S Lovejoy, Chain of Being (1957), pp. 189-95. An opinion also
held by Locke (Essay , III.vi.12); Addison (Spectator, no. 621, Nov.
17, 1714); Bolingbroke (Fragments, In Works (1809), VIII.44, 186;
and Pope (Essay on Man).
' ENOT, (1765). The exact date of publication is disputed
because of it being published in weekly installments. This was an
extraction of Matthew Henry's Exposition, and Poole's Annotations.
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fill in the gap beyond that. 4 But Bonnet was not the
first to contemplate the plurality of habitable worlds.
The plurality of worlds was a tradition of thought with
a history in its own right, a tradition familiar to
Wesley. It was suggested in Cicero's, On the Nature of
the Gods, 4 ' a work well known by Wesley and quoted no
less than eight times in his sermons alone. 50 Addition-
ally, Wesley displayed familiarity with at least three
popular authors on the subject. 51 Two made something of
an obscure appearance in his, Natural Philoso phy . They
were Louis Dutens, Inquiry into the Ori g in of the
Discoveries Attributed to the Moderns (1769), and
Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, Conversations on the
Plurality of Worlds. 52 Another, Christian Huygens and
his work, Celestial Worlds Discovered, Or Conjectures on
the Planetar y Worlds (English translation, 1689), Wesley
quoted in his sermon,	 'What is Man' (1787).	 Wesley
first read this work in September 1759 and remarked,
I read Mr. Hygens's [sicJ Conjectures on the
Planetary World. He surprised me. I think he
clearly proves that the moon is not in-
habitable; that there are neither 'Rivers nor
mountains on her spotty globe'; 53 that there
is no sea, no water on her surface, nor any
atmosphere. And hence he very rationally
infers that 'Neither are any of the secondary
planets inhabited.' And who can prove that
the primary are? I know the earth is. Of the
rest I know nothing.54
The important thing is what did Wesley make of all
this speculation about the plurality of habitable
worlds? In the end, he called it
a very favourite notion with all those who
deny the Christian revelation- and for this
reason: because it affords them a foundation
for so plausible an objection to it. But the
more I consider that supposition, the more I
' Contemp lation de la Nature, 2nd ed. (1769), I, 23-24, 84, in
Lovejoy, Chain of Being (1957), pp. 194-5.
' I.x.25, cf. I.xxxix.98.
° BEW, I, 252; II, 473, 503, 535, 536, 577, 578; III, 86. See
IV, 587.
SI See, BEW, II, 503 note 20.
52 See, NP (1777), V, 3, 114.





doubt it. Insomuch that if it were allowed by
all the philosophers in Europe, still I could
not allow it without stronger proof than any I
have met with yet[...J. 'But', you will say,
'suppose this argument fails, we may infer the
same conclusion, the plurality of worlds, from
the unbounded wisdom, and power, and goodness
of the Creator. It was full as easy to him to
create thousands or millions of worlds as one.
Can anyone then believe that he would exert
all his power and wisdom in creating a single
world? What proportion is there between this
speck of creation and the great God that
filleth heaven and earth? While
We know the power of his Almighty hand
could form another world from every sand55
To this boasted proof, this argumentum
palmarlum [an unanswerable argumenti of the
learned infidels, I answer, Do you expect to
find any proportion between finite and
infinite? Suppose God had created a thousand
more worlds than there are grains of sand in
the universe, what proportion would all these
together bear to the infinite Creator? Still,
in comparison of him, they would be, not a
thousand times, but infinitely less than a
mite compared to the universe.58
Here, Wesley anticipated an argument for the plurality
of worlds, because of the tremendous gap in the grada-
tion between this creation (i.e. the empirical, observ-
able world) and the 'great God that I illeth heaven and
earth'. Wesley's own 'argumentum palmarium' was that
all the habitable worlds combined could still not
compare to the 'infinite Creator'. The plurality of
worlds did not solve the gaps in the chain of being.
2.2.2. The Chain of Being and Angelology
Alternatively, in Wesley's view higher up in the
chain of being from humanity were angels.5'
But the scale of the creation does not
terminate at man. Another universe commences
there, whose extent, perhaps, compared to that
of this, is as the space of the solar vortex
cf. William Broorne, 'The forty-third Chapter of Ecclesias-
ticus Paraphrased', and Collection of Moral and Sacred Poems (1744),
11.99,	 III, 463 note 50.
'What is Man?' (1787), BEW, III, 462-3. But cf. 	 (1777),
V 1 114-6.
For an interesting poetic comparison between angels and men
see Charles's hymn, 'A Dialogue of AI3ELS and MEN' in Hymns and
Sacred Poems, 3rd edn. (1756).
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to the capacity of a nut.	 There shine the
CELESTIAL	 HIERARCHIES,	 like	 glittering
STARS.
Since the reality of angels exists beyond sensory
perception, they can ultimately only be known by
faith. 59 The most basic expression of faith in the
existence of angQ.ls was through philosophy, which is
where he started his argument for their existence.	 He
had two philosophical sources at that point. The first
was Plato, Socrates, and Hesiod. 6 ° Greek philosophy
alone was not enough to supply Wesley with what he
obviously knew about angels. By far the most signficant
source of influence on Wesley's angelology was Milton's,
Paradise Lost. Not only did he quote Milton no less
that 77 times in his sermons alone, he also published,
An Extract from Milton's Paradise Lost (1763), in an
attempt to popularize Milton for Methodists. 61 His
regard for Milton was such that he once said Milton's
account of the creation and fall was, 'not only simple,
easy, and comprehensible, but	 consistent with the
highest reason, and altogether worthy of God'.62
Fletcher's thesis is that Milton's doctrine of angels
was partially influenced by the Scholastics who were
decidedly Christian and non-Jewish, but he also depended
upon Rabbinical sources for his whole treatment of
angels. 63 Fletcher presented a strong case, which has
obvious	 implications	 on	 Wesley's own angelology,
resulting in a second-hand connection between Wesley and
medieval Christian and Rabbinic angelology.
	
Unf or-
tunately that connection cannot be fully explored here.
NP (1777), IV, 110. This was a part of his extraction of
Bonnet.
'On the Discoveries of Faith' (1788), BEW, IV, 31.
SO 
'Of Good Angels' (1783), BEW, III, 4-6.
	
51 An Extract from Milton's Paradise Lost (1763.
	 See, Oscar
Sherwin, 'Milton for the Masses: John Wesley's Edition of Paradise
Lost', Modern Language Quarterl y , 12(1951), 267-85; Samuel J.
Rogal, 'The Role of Paradise Lost in Works by John and Charles
Wesley', Milton Quarterl y 13(1979), 114-19.
62 
'Remarks on Kr. H.'s account of the Gentoo Religion in
Hindostan' in Lloyd's Evening Post, Nov. 30, 1774; and Works, XIII,
403-8.
•3 Fletcher, Milton's Rabbinical Readings (1930), p. 255.
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Ultimately, the existence of angels can be best under-
stood by the revelation of Scripture, which supplies the
defect of experience, and the short-coming of philoso-
phy, or reason. Revelation 'only gives us a clear,
rational, consistent account of those whom our eyes have
not seen, nor our ears heard[...1'. 64 The assent to the
knowledge of angels consisted of a failed empiricism (or
experience),	 philosophy (or reason), and revelation,
which completed the knowledge.
Wesley's own angelology was worked out In three
sermons,	 'Of Good Angels'
	 (1783),	 'Of Evil Angels'
(1783), and 'On Guardian Angels' (l726).
	 It is clear
he believed that
sometime, before the foundations of the earth
were laid God created angels.
	 'And what Is
the duration which has passed since the
creation of angels to that which passed before
they were created-to unbeginning eternity? to
that half of eternity (if one may so speak)
which had then elapsedt'°8
As created beings, they were finite. When God created
angels, they were God's 'first-born sons Intelligent
beings' , created as, 'spirits, even the highest
angels, even cherubim and seraphim, to dwell in material
vehicles, though of an exceeding light and subtle
substance.' 69
 Through an Interesting exegesis of Psalm
104.4, he concluded angels are
not material or corporeal beings; not clogged
with flesh and blood like us, having bodies,
if any, not gross and earthly like ours, but
of a finer substance, resembling fire or flame
more than any other of these lower elements.
And is not something like this Intimated in
those words of the Psalmist, 'Who maketh his
angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of
fire
S4 
'Of Good Angels' (1783), BEW, III, 6.
See Outler's cownents in, BEW, III, 3.
'What is Man?' (1788), BEW, III, 458.
'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
, II, 6.
• 'The Unity of the Divine Being' (1789), BEW, IV, 63. Cf.
JVL, VI, 214 (1776), 'the soul will not be encumbered with flesh and
blood; but probably it will have some sort of ethereal vehicle, even
before God clothes is "with our nobler house of empyrean light.'
e 'Of Good Angels' (1783), BEW, III, 6; ENGF, Psalm 104.4.
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Their understanding,	 sight, knowledge, wisdom,
holiness, and strength are all beyond our comprehen-
sion. 7 ° After being endowed with these 'super-human'
traits, they were then given the moral law, written by
'the finger of God' on the 'inmost spirit' of the
angels. 7 ' By the moral law they knew the perfect will
of God, which they kept willingly, perfectly, and
continually. 72
 This, they were able to do because,
As spirits he has endued them with understand-
ing, will, or affections (which are indeed the
same thing, as the affections are only the
will exerting itself various ways), and
liberty. And are not these- understanding,
will, and liberty- essential to, if not the
essence of, a spirltV3
All of which enabled even the angels to
discern truth from falsehood, good from evil;
and as a necessary result of this, with
liberty, a capacity of choosing the one and
refusing the other. By this they were
likewise enabled to offer him a free and
willing service: a service rewardable in
itself, as well as most acceptable to their
gracious Master.
Because they were given a will, even the angels
were capable of sinning. Eventually this liberty became
the cause of the heavenly revolt, 15
 which first planted
the general root of sin
in heaven itself by Lucifer, 'Son of the
morning'- 7
 till then undoubtedly 'one of the
first, if not the first archangel'. 77
 'Thou
saidst, I will sit upon the side of the
'° 'Of Good Angels' (1783), BEW, III, 6-8; 'On Guardian Angels'
(1726), BEW, IV, 228-9, 233.
' 'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
DEW, II, 7.
72 
'Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, VI ,
 (1748), BEW, I,
583-4.
' 'Of Good Angels' (1783), DEW III, 6. It Is interesting to
compare Wesley's angelology with that of John of Lrnascus, 'Exposi-
tion of the Orthodox Faith', II.iii.
" 'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
DEW, II, 6.
'The End of Christ's Coming' (1781), DEW II, 476.
Isaiah 14.12.
' Milton, Paradise Lost, V.659-60. Notice how Wesley quotes
Scripture and Milton side by side in such a way that only the




 See self-will, the first-born of
Satanl 79
 'I will be like the Most High.'0
See Pride, the twin sister of self-will. Here
was the true origin of evil. Hence came the
inexhaustible flood of evils upon the lower
world. When Satan had once transfused his own
self-will and pride into the parents of
mankind, together with a new species of sin-
love of the world, the loving the creature
above the Creator- all manner of wickedness
soon rushed in, all ungodliness and un-
righteousness, shooting out into crimes of
every kind, soon covering the whole face of
the	 earth	 with	 all manner of abomina-
tionsi. . .1. From the devil	 the spirit of
independence, self-will, and pride, productive
of all ungodliness and unrighteousness,
quickly infused themselves into the hearts of
our first parents in paradise.
The one responsible for evil was the devil, the per-
sonification, of independence, self-will, and pride. The
devil represented quintessential estrangement from God,
the antithesis to relationality. The abuse of liberty,
penultimately caused evil and estrangement. The
ultimate answer to 'Unde malum?' had to be Lucifer's
self-will.
Unfortunately, he was not the only self-willed
angel. When Lucifer fell, 'He did not fall alone, but
soon drew after him a third part of the stars of heaven;
in consequence of which they lost their glory and
happiness, and were driven from their former habita-
tion.' 2
 In Wesley's angelology, this fall occurred in
spite of their existing without flesh and blood, and in
spite of their being endued with 'super-human' traits of
understanding, sight, knowledge, wisdom, holiness, and
strength, many privileges not to be enjoyed by Adam.
The angelic revolt occurred, and evil came about not
because angels were made 'ex nihilo', but because of
self-will, pride, and the abuse of free-will.
	 The
re Cf. Isaiah 14.13.
A phrase used by Polycarp, 'The Epistles of Polycarp', VII
(ANF, I, 34).
eo Isaiah 14.14.
' 'The Deceitfulness of the Human Heart' (1790), BEW, IV, 152,
154; ci. 'An Extract from a Discourse concerning the mercy of God in
preserving us from Evil Angels', AM 10(1787), 202-5.
'The End of Christ's Corning' (1781), BEW, II, 476.
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consequence of this revolt was that it divided the upper
part of the chain of being between good angels and evil
angels, creating a cosmological dualism, in which God
and the good angels are working for humanity, and
against Satan and the evil angels.63
From the philosophical abstraction of a 'chain of
being', he constructed a hierarchy of perfection.
Reichenbach has noted that if one assumes, as Wesley
did that presiding at the top of the chain of being
between humanity and God are angels,
one might follow Thomas Aquinas in holding
that angels are able to know and consequently
differ in their knowledge, and on this basis
be able to distinguish between higher and
lower angels. But if this is the case, the
chain of perfection is not finite but rather
infinite,	 insofar	 as it asymptotically84
approaches, e.g. the perfect knowledge of the
creator.	 For any particular angel with n
knowledge, one could conceive of another angel
with n+1 knowledge. And even if there were
only one being, it would be possible to
conceive of another being either with more
characteristics or possessing characteristics
had by that being more perfectly.63
Such a hierarchy could make the entire concept of 'best
possible world', as suggested by Lovejoy and Hick,
meaningless, as 'these characteristics would exist or be
possessed in an asymptotic series which increasingly
approaches but never reaches the degree of perfection
found in God.' 66
 While such a concept might indeed make
the 'chain of being' meaningless, it is the asymptotic
nature of angelic perfection which in fact prevents the
cosmological dualism from becoming an ontological one.
Furthermore, because of the strong mythological element
in this cosmology Satanic influences are enlarged to
almost ontological proportions. This problem seems to
be at least partially rooted in the 'logic of perfec-
83 'Of Evil Angels' (1783), BEW, III, 16-29.
64 i.e. 'denoting a line or series that approaches nearer and
nearer to a curve or limit but will never reach that curve or limit
within a finite distance' (Flew, Dictionar y
 of Philosophy (1983), p.
29).
lie ichenbach, Evil and a Good God (1982), p. 125.
66 Re ichenbach, Evil and a Good God (1982), p. 126.
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tion' when the attributes of God are combined with
theistic proofs of God's existence.7
As one looks at Wesley's aesthetic theme one may
see (1) that he held to the goodness of God, and
creation; (2) he held to a 'chain of being' within
creation, in which the human role was to serve as a
channel of God's grace to the remainder of creation; (3)
he held to a cosmological dualism; (4) but the most
significantly Wesley did not define evil in aesthetic
terms. His doctrine of an impeccable creation, in which
matter Is ontologically neutral, indicates evil cannot
be defined in those terms. He thought evil could be
completely accounted for through the abuse of free-will,
which Wesley eventually came to understand as being 'a
power of choosing or refusing either good or evil'.
How Wesley came to this conclusion can be seen par-
ticularly in his reactions to the works of William King
and Soame Jenyns, two of the 'optimists' and eighteenth
century heirs of the Augustinlan tradition.
3. Wesley's Moral Theme
William King had argued, like Leibniz, that when
God created the world, God created the best world
possible. 89 He also argued that because it was created
from nothing it was by necessity imperfect. From the
imperfection of creation King explained natural evil,
saying It arose by necessity from matter In motion,90
not all of which is necessarily bad, as pain warns the
soul against danger, which operates to preserve life.9'
To account for moral evil, King introduced his second
• Schwöbel, in, Christian Faith and Theology (1991), pp. 197-
217. What seems to be an implicationotceA.above Is this: while
New Testament studies show that something of a Zoroatrian influence
may be seen in the New Testament documents, the church fathers found
the concept of the chain of being a more tolerable way of accounting
a cosmological dualism to combat the ontological dualism of the
Manichaean heresy.
• 'The End of Christ's Coining' (1781), BEW, II, 476.
See Leibniz coninents on King's work 'Observations on the
Book Concerning 'The Origin of Evil'', in the 'Appendices' of
Theodicy (Huggard, pp. 405-42).
° King, Orig in of Evil (1702), pp. 9-15.
91 King, Orig in of Evil (1702), pp. 150-55.
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main argument. Within this imperfect, but best of
possible worlds, God created the first humans and
endowed them with a will to choose between good and
evil, saying that unless God had done so, 'more and
greater evils would befall the universe from such an
interposition, than from the abuse of free-will'. 92 The
universe simply
	 required free-will to benefit the
universe.
Soame Jenyns, in, A Free In q uiry into the Nature
and Ori g in of Evil (1757), did not argue for free-will
at all. He maintained
that natural Evils exist from some necessity
in the Nature of things which no power can
dispense with or prevent, the expediency of
moral Evil will follow on course: for if
misery could not be excluded from the works of
a benevolent Creator by infinite power, these
miseries must be endured by some creatures or
other for the good of the whole[...j.94
All of which comes from the, 'Evils of Imperfection',
which, 'are in truth no Evils at all, but rather the
absence of some comparative GoodE...]'.°5 Which meant
for Jenyns that,
The true solution then of this incomprehen-
sible paradox must be this, that all Evils owe
their existence solely to the necessity of
their own natures, by which I mean they could
not possibly have been prevented, without the
loss of some superior Good, or the permission
of some greater Evil than themselves; or that
many will unavoidably Insinuate themselves by
the natural relations end circumstances of
things into the most perfect system of Created
Beings, even in opposition to the will of an
almighty Creator, by reason they cannot be
excluded without working contradictions; which
not being proper objects of power, it is not
diminution of omnipotence to affirm that it
cannot effect them.'
Jenyns was clearly more radical in his assertion of the
defective nature of creation as a result of his denial
of free-will. This introduced a necessitarian strand in
92 King, Origin of Evil (1702), p. 356; cf. p. 340.
' King, Origin of Evil (1702), p. 369.
Jenyis, Free Inquiry (1757), p. 102.
Jenyns, Free Inquiry (1757), p. 25.




Jenyns's thoughts.	 Nonetheless, Jenyns was confident
his system could unlock,
all the mysteries and perplexing doctrines
ofl. . .]all those abstruse speculations of
Original Sin, Grace and Predestinationi. . .1
which the most learned have never yet been
able to make consistent with Reason or Common-
sense.
However, it would besystem Wesley would reject.
3.1. Wesley's Response to the Optimists
Wesley was aware of both works by King and Jenyns.
He would have been familiar with King's work as it
appeared in Latin without Gay's introduction, or Law's
copious footnotes. In 1730, Wesley wrote a letter to
his father saying,
A week or two ago I pleased myself mightily
with the hopes of sending you a full satisfac-
tory solution of your great question, have at
last procured the celebrated	 treatise of
Archbishop King, De Ori g ine Mali.	 But on
looking farther into it I was strangely
disappointed, finding It the least satisfac-
tory account of any given by any author whom I
ever read in my life. He contradicts almost
every man that ever writ on the subject, and
builds an hypothesis on the ruins of theirs
which he takes to be entirely new, though if I
do not much mistake, part of it is at least
two thousand years old.	 The purport of this
is, 'that natural evils flow naturally and
necessarily from the essence of matter, so
that God himself could not have prevented
them, unless by not creating matter at all'.
Now this new supposition seems extremely like
the old one of the Stoics, who I fancy always
affirmed, totidem verbls, that 'all natural
evils were owing not to God's want of will,
but to his want of power to redress them, as
necessarily flowing	 from	 the	 nature of
matter' • e
In his next letter Wesley revealed something of a
higher regard for King.	 Nearly fifty years later he
published it in the Arminian Magazine in 1780.'	 It is
a rather straightforward extraction with no critical
' Jenyns, Free Enquiry (1757), p. 110
DEW, XXV, 258.
DEW, XXV, 264-67, which appeared in AM 3(1780), 607-11.
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notes inserted into the text, apart from this introduc-
tory remark.
Though some of the postulata upon which
Archbishop King builds his hypothesis of the
origin of evil be such as very few will admit
of, yet since the superstructure is regular
and well contrived I thought you would not be
unwilling to see the scheme of that celebrated
work. '°°
Wesley was aware that King asserted the necessity of
imperfection of created beings, and also that King saw
God and man both endued with a self-determining power.
Of this latter point Wesley, In his extraction of King,
said,
That man partakes of this principle I con-
clude, (1), because experience shows it; (2),
because we observe in ourselves the signs and
properties of such a power. We observe we can
counteract our appetites, senses, and even our
reason if we so choose; which we can no
otherwise account for than by admitting such a
power In ourselves.10'
Wesley would certainly not have disagreed with that.
However, the 'postulata' upon which King built his
'hypothesis' was what Wesley disagreed with and what
initially led him to call King a 'Stoic', not because
King denied free will, but because he held that evil
flows by necessity from the constitutive manner of
matter's existence.
This point	 becomes more	 abundantly clear in
Wesley 's objection to Jenyns, when he said,
evil did not exist at all in the original
nature of things. It was no more necessary
result of matter than it was the necessary
result of spirit. All things then, without
exception were very good. And how could they
be otherwise?t02
In another place, Wesley declared free will alone was
the
full answer to that plausible account 'of the
origin of evil' published to the world some
years since, and supposed to unanswerable-
'that it necessarily resulted from the nature
100 BEW, XXV, 264.
101 BEW, XXV, 266.
102 'God's Approbation of His Works' (1782), 	 II, 398, and
note Wesley's footnote as enhanced by (Xitler.
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of matter, which God was not able to alter'.
It is very kind of this sweet-tongued orator
to make an excuse for GodI'° 3
 But there is
really no occasion for iti. •,Jb04
If evil did not arise from creation, then, 'Unde
malum?' For Wesley, evil was caused only by the will.
What followed after the ellipsis in the quote just above
were actually these words:
God hath answered for himself. He made man in
his own image 1
 a spirit endued with under-
standing and liberty. Man abusing that
liberty evil, brought sin and pain into the
world. This God permitted in order to a
fuller manifestation of his wisdom, justice,
and mercy, by bestowing on all who would
receive it in infinitely greater happiness
than they could possible have attained if Adam
had not fallen.'06
We must put aside for now the last, and perhaps most
provocative part of the quote, although it does hint at
Wesley's participation in '0 felix culpal' tradition.
What must be pointed out at this moment is Wesley's
belief that evil can be accounted for entirely by the
will, which makes its origins moral, not aesthetic. He
was convinced that, 'Without freedom the origin of moral
and physical evil would be unintelligible and even
impossible. '106
This can be seen in his extraction of Humphrey
Ditton, who was himself responding to Hobbes's material-
ism.'° 7
 Wesley's extraction of Ditton was published
along with the one of King's, Ori g in of Evil in the
Arminian Magazine. It was concerned with two things:
(1) Ditton wished to deny any sort of ontological
dualism, as suggested by the 'Manichees', in order to
'° Perhaps this is an obscure reference to Jenyns's election
as NP for Cambridge 1742-80.
104 
'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), DEW, II, 434. Cf. 'God's
Approbation of the His Works' (1782), BEW, II, 397-8 as referred to
in note 8! above. It is rather Interesting to note that the title
of a chapter in Wesley's 'Historiae et Praecepta Selecta' (Bristol:
Farley, 1748) was, 'The will to sin is sin itself', (see Green,
Bibliography (1896), p. 55).
'° 'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), DEW, II, 434. Cf. 'God's
Approbation of the His Works' (1782), DEW, II, 397-8.
106 
'Of Human Liberty', AM 8(1785), 258.
107 BEW, XXV, 240-2 (1729); cf. AM, 3(1780), 604-6.
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account for evil; and, (2) accounting for the presence
of evil by attributing It to the willful deviation from
God's 'eternal rules and measures of fitness'.
Leading up to the point where Wesley started his
extraction, Ditton argued that one cannot hold to a
materialist's view of creation and free will at the same
time.'° 5
 For Ditton, a denial of ilobbes's (even Descar-
tes's and Newton's) mechanical explanation of the
universe had to be established before the affirmation of
free-will, in order to exonerate God of evil. Once that
had been	 established, free-will accounted for the
presence of evil in the world.
	 In Wesley's extraction
of Ditton we read,
Farther, it no way derogated from any one
perfection of an Infinite Being to endow other
beings which he made with such a power as we
call liberty; that is, to furnish them with
such capacities, dispositions, and principles
of action that it should be possible for them
either to observe or to deviate from those
eternal rules and measures of fitness and
agreeableness with respect to certain things
and circumstances which were so conformable to
the infinite rectitude of his own will, and
which	 infinite	 reason	 must	 necessarily
discover.	 Now evil is a deviation from those
measures of eternal, unerring order and
reason- not to choose what is worthy to be
chosen, and Is accordingly chose by such a
will as the divine. And to bring this about no
more is necessary than the exerting certain
acts of that power we call free will. By
which power we are enabled to choose or
refuse, and to determine ourselves to action
accordingly. Therefore, without having
recourse to any ill principle, we may fairly
account for the origin of evil from the
possibility of a various use of our liberty,
even as that capacity or possibility itself is
ultimately founded on the defectibility and
finiteness of a created nature.10'
The most significant development here is that evil is
defined as the act of not choosing good, and deviating
from eternal reason. It is not defined as the absence
of good, which marks a notable departure on Wesley's
0 Ditton, Discourse (1712), p. 474, 490 (the emphasis is his).109 BEW, XXV, 241-2 (1729); cf. Ditton, Discourse (1712), pp.
424-7 (the emphasis is mine).
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part from the Augustinian tradition of theodicy. 11 ° For
Wesley, abuse of liberty may have indeed arisen from the
defectibility of being a finite creature. But this was
no evil. Evil resulted from an abuse of the will, which
meant the origins of evil was completely moral in
nature. Wesley thought to say otherwise (as King had)
made God the author of evil, in as much as God was
responsible for creation.' 1 ' By making the manner of
creation the presupposition to the definition of evil,
Wesley saw in the	 Optimists a	 strand of neces-
sitarianism, in as much as he called King a Stoic.
This position Is further reinforced by one of his
later sermons, 'The End of Christ's Coming' (1781).
And God created man, not only in his natural,
but likewise in his own moral image. He
created him not only In knowledge, but also in
righteousness, and true holiness. As his
understanding was without blemish, perfect in
Its kind, so were all his affectionst...]. But
it cannot be doubted he might mistake evil for
good.	 He was not Infallible; therefore not
impeccable. And this unravels the whole
difficulty of the grand question, unde malum?
'How came evil into the world?' It came from
'Lucifer, son of the morning': it was 'the
work of the devil'.	 'For the devil', saith
the Apostle, 'sinneth from the beginning;'''2
that is, was the first sinner in the universe;
the author of sin; the first being who by the
abuse of his liberty introduced evil into the
creation.	 'He, of the first, If not the first
archangel,' 113 was tempted to think too highly
of himself.	 He freely yielded to the tempta-
tion, and gave way first to pride, then to
self-wil 1.114
The defectibility of the created nature was precisely
located in the fallibility and imperfection of first the
angelic will, and then later the human will. Human and
angelic wills were not impeccable.	 The defect was not
110 Augustine, City of God (426), XI.9 (NPNF1, II, 210);
Enchiridion (420), XI (NPNF1, III, 240). See my forthcoming annual
lecture to the Wesley Fellowship, 'Wesley and Augustine on the
Origins of Evil'.111 A position also held by Browne, see Winnett, Peter Browne
(1974), pp. 30-49.112 The 'Apostle' was Isaiah, in Isaiah 14.12.
113 Milton, Paradise Lost, V.659-60.
114 
'The End of Christ's Coming' (1781),	 II, 475-6. Cf.
view of Clement of Alexandria, 'The Stromata', 1.17.
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In the manner of creation, but in the will, which was
located in the soul, an immaterial substance. All this
seems to indicate that for Wesley, the defect in
creation was moral and not aesthetic, immaterial and not
material. From here, Wesley attempted to unravel the
entire question of 'Unde malum?'
3.2. Moral, Natural, and Penal Evils
From the abuse of free will, which resulted in the
deviation from eternal reason, the different types of
evil can be explained. In the sermon prepared by Wesley
during the 'Unde malum?' correspondence with his father,
Wesley wrote,
It has indeed been well observed, that all
evil Is either natural, moral, or penal; that
natural evil or pain is no evil at all if it
be overbalanced with following pleasure; that
moral evil, or sin, cannot possibly befall
anyone unless those who willingly embrace, who
choose it; and that penal evil, or punishment,
cannot possibly befall any unless they
likewise choose It by choosing sin. This
entirely cuts off all imputation on the
justice or goodness of God, since it can never
be proved that it is contrary to either of
these to give his creatures Ithel liberty of
embracing either good or evil , to put happi-
ness and misery in their own hands, to leave
them the choice of life and death.115
From this quote it is clear Wesley held to a traditional
division of natural, moral, and penal evil. Moral and
penal evils were completely contingent upon the abuse of
free-will. How natural evil was also contingent upon
the abuse of free-will was somewhat obscured in this
passage. But in other places he demonstrated how even
natural evil was the consequence of Adam's choice of
evil, saying that after Adam's sin,
man made himself incapable of transmitting
those blessings, that communication was
necessarily cut off. The intercourse between
God and the inferior creatures being stopped,
those blessings could no longer flow In upon
them. And then it was that 'the creature',
every creature, 'was subject to vanity', to
sorrow, to pain of every kind, to all manner
" 'The Promise of Understanding' (1730), BEW, IV, 285.
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of evils. 'Not' indeed 'willingly'; not by
Its own choice, not by any act or deed of its
own; 'but by reason of him that subjected it';
by the wise permission of God, determining to
draw eternal good out of this temporary evil.
But in what respects was 'the creature', every
creature, then 'made to subject to vanity'?
E. ..lThe very foundations of their nature are
out of course, are turned upside down.'19
The first humans had not suffered as the result of a
defective creation. Creation had suffered as the result
of a fallen humanity. The chain of being had become
dysfunctional (more of this will be made in the chapter
on original sin).	 The defect that led to the dysfunc-
tion was located precisely in the will.
That natural evil is the consequence of moral evil
was further reinforced by his response to the many
earthquakes which occurred in his lifetime. It became
evident that for Wesley even natural disaster was seen
as the result of moral evil, which God uses to punish
sinful humankind. 1t1 In a sermon by Charles Wesley,
which for many years had been wrongly attributed to
John, 9 we read,
earthquakes are the works of the Lord, and He
only bringeth this destruction upon the earth.
Now, that God is himself the Author, and sin
the moral cause, of earthquakes, (whatever the
natural cause may be,) cannot be denied by any
who believe the Scriptures[...J. Earthquakes
are set forth by the inspired writers as God's
proper judicial act, or the punishment of sin:
Sin the cause, earthquakes the effect, of his
anger. 1
Although used more by Charles as a tool to call sinners
" 'The General Deliverance' (1781), BEW, II, 442-3.
1' BEW, XX, 320 (1750), XX, 323 (1750), JWJ, IV, 211 (1757),
V, 517 (1773); 'Serious Thoughts occasioned by the Late Earthquake
at Lisbon' (1755), in Works, XI, 1-13. See Xitler, BEW, I, 357 note
6. Charles had even written a hymn attributing drought to sin,
Unpublished Poetry (1992), III, 212-13. It is perhaps worth compar-
ing Wesley's views with those of Gregory Nazianzen, Oration XVI, 'On
His Father's Silence, Because of the Plague of Hail', NPNF2, VII,
247-54.
'j Outler, BEW, IV, 524.119 Charles Wesley, 'The Cause and Cure of Earthquakes' (1750),
in, Works, VII, 387.
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to repentance,' 2 °
 it is obvious both Wesleys held this
same interpretation of natural evil as the consequence
of moral evil. What it helps to Illustrate is how John
Wesley thought the material world was affected by the
abuse of free-will, which could have been interpreted as
a defective immaterial world.
Wesley seems to have held to a mythological
explanation of evil, which locates the origin of evil in
a primordial rebellion of creators (Satan, Lucifer, et
al.) against the Creator. A more modern version of this
view is put forth by N.P. Williams In, Ideas of the Fall
and Ori g inal Sin (1924). King's presentation was more
of a metaphysical one, which ascribes moral evil to the
nature of finite existence. A modern representative of
this view is F.fl. Tennant.' 2 ' On the basis of this
interpretation Wesley took his own theodicy out of the
Augustinian tradition, as he refused to define evil
aesthetically, but morally.
4. Free-WIll, Foreknowledge, and the Doctrine of
God
Explaining theodicy by way of free-will may solve
one problem- it may exonerate God of the responsibility
of evil- but It creates others, especially for the
doctrine of God, and the divine attributes of omnis-
cience and omnipotence. Wesley was aware that the free-
will account of the presence of evil created such
problems and sought to address them. Because he was
aware of such s ystematic pressure points, It indicates
he thought systematically about the matter.
4.1. Free-Will and the Paradox of Omnipotence
First, there is the paradox of omnipotence, an
issue of importance even to the contemporary debate on
theodicy.	 Some would argue that while free-will
120 Another example is Charles Wesley, 'Hymns Occasioned by the
Earthquake' Parts I (1750, 6 hymns), and II (1750, 13 hymns).
Several of these hymns found their way into the Collection (1780),
(particularly) 62-63, 65, 441A.121 See Winnett, Peter Browne (1974), pp. 35-6.
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relocates the responsibility of evil from Creator to
creature, it also denies God divine omnipotence, in that
there Is a fundamental difficulty in the
notion of an omnipotent God creating men with
free will, for if men's wills are really free
this must mean that God cannot control them,
that is, that God is no longer omnipotent.'22
A part of the problem is defining omnipotence.
Anglin was right when he said,
The difficulty with the concept of omnipotence
is not so much to prove that a being is
omnipotent as to give a good definition of
'omnipotence'. Everyone knows the riddle
about whether God can create a stone he cannot
lift.	 Moreover, most would agree that,
although it is a silly riddle, it points to a
real problem:	 what exactly	 is meant by
'omnipotence'?' 23
Indeed, it is critical how one defines omnipotence.
What did Wesley mean by omnipotence?
4.1.1. Omnipotence as Power and Restraint
Wesley explained, or described omnipotence in this
way:
Only he that can do all things else cannot
deny himself; he cannot counteract himself, or
suppose his own work. Were it not for this he
would destroy all sin, with its attendant
pain, in a moment. He would abolish wicked-
ness out of his whole creation, and suffer no
trace of it to remain. But in so doing he
would counteract himself, he would altogether
overturn his own work, and undo all that he
has been doing since he created man upon the
earth. For he created man in his own image: a
spirit, like himself; a spirit endued with
understanding, with will, or affections, and
liberty- without which neither his understand-
ing nor his affections could have been of any
use, neither would he have been capable either
of vice or virtue. He could not be a moral
agent, any more than a tree or a stone. If
therefore God were thus to exert his power
there would certainly be no more vice; but it
122 Mackie, in, The Power of God, (1978), p. 28. Who agrees
with Kenny, God of the Philosophers (1979), p. 98. Which raises the
question posed by Angi, 'Can God Create a Being He Cannot Con-
trol?', Anal ysis, 40(1980), 222-3. None of which is new, as Pierre
Bayle raised the same issues in Dictionnaire historiciue et criticiue
(1697), III, 1152.123 Anglin, Free Will and the Christian Faith (1990), p. 48.
Chapter Two	 114
is equally certain, neither could there be an
virtue in the world. Were human liberty taken
away men would be as incapable of virtue as
stones. Therefore (with reverence be it
spoken) the Almighty himself cannot do this
thing. He cannot thus contradict himself, or
undo what he has done. He cannot destroy out
of the soul of man that image of himself
wherein he made him.	 And without doing this
he cannot abolish sin and pain out of the
world. But were it to be done it would imply
no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of
omnipotence. 124
There are several significant aspects to this under-
standing of omnipotence.	 First, it affirmed that God
can do all things.	 It is only because God can do all
things that God is capable of willing not to counteract
the Divine self. In this instance, the initial divine
action was giving humans liberty as a part of the image
of God in order to make them capable of virtue. This
action, because it was divine, cannot be countered.
Secondly, because God is all-powerful God has the power
not to change or re-create the past. 	 God cannot change
the fact that Adam has fallen. In essence, what this
means is that God cannot change the past so that it
would be the case that there never was any evil.'25
What is actually at the heart of Wesley's view of
omnipotence is a view which distinguishes the power of
God from its exercise.' 26 God is all-powerful, which
means God has the power to extinguish sin, but does not
exercise it, because it would be a self-counteraction of
having created a being in the divine image with a free-
will.	 God cannot abolish sin without also abolishing
free-will (also a significant part of the image of God),
since free-will is the cause of sin.	 So Wesley's
definition of omnipotence included the notion that God
124 'On Divine Providence' (1786), DEW, II, 540-1.
125 For an opposing view see Shestov, Athens and Jerusalem,
(1966), who says God can change history. See Anglin, Free Will
(1990), p. 55 note 20.
126 cf. Anglin, Free Will (1990), p. 50. The distinction
between a power and its exercise was also made by Pelagius.
Augustine quoted him as saying that, although God gave the ability
to speak, it was Pelagius who used the ability, Augustine, On Nature
and Grace (415), XLV (NPNF1 V, 138-9).
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had the power to create a person with free-will, and he
did so not by means of limiting his power to control
things, but by limiting its exercise.12'
Anglin argues that there are three ways in which
power can be curtailed. First, the power may be
destroyed, which is clearly not the case. Secondly, the
conditions needed to use the power may not have been
met. Thirdly,
one can curtail a power by exercising another
power whose exercise i inconsistent with the
exercise of the power in questlont.. .1. If God
exercises his power to give created beings an
autonomous role in deciding the future of the
universe then he cannot at the same time
exercise his power of ensuring that everything
in the universe goes according to his perfect
will	 2$
Only an all-powerful God could create a power which
would allow God the freedom to restrain power and limit
its exercise. Because God has limited divine power in
this not everything that happens is in accordance to the
Divine will.
4.1.2. Omnipotence and the Power of
Providential Control
Such a view is not incongruent with the Wesleyan
view seen above, and thus becomes one way through which
the paradox of omnipo4ence may be resolved. However,
Wesley would not have left it at that. While a free-
will defense of the origin of evil means that many
things are not in accordance with the Divine will it
does not mean that God is either powerless, or out of
control of creation. God is in control through the
means of providence, which became another way In which
Wesley sought to resolve the paradox of omnipotence. Of
providence he said, 'There is scarce any doctrine in the
whole compass of revelation which is of deeper impor-
tance than this.'129
12? cf. Anglin, Free Will (1990), p. 52.
12$ Anglin, Free Will (1990), pp. 53-4.
'On Divine Providence' (1786), BEW, II, 537.
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A vast part of the doctrine was worked out in the
sermon, 'On Divine Providence' (1786), much of which he
derived from John Wilkins, Discourse Concernln the
Beaut y of Providence (6th ed. 1680).130 Although he
accounted for evil through free-will, Wesley thought it
was 'a childish conceit to suppose chance governs the
world, or has any part in the government of it',' 3 ' and
cites	 Cicero	 in	 developing	 his	 argument	 for
providence.' 32
	He knew that some would look
	
upon
providence as 'enthusiasm', but said nonetheless,
I know not what thingst. . .iwhich are not owing
to the providence of God; In ordering, or at
least in governing, of which this is not
either directly or remotely concerned. I
expect nothing but sin; and even in the sins
of others I see the providence of God to me.
I do not say, his general providence,' 3 ' for
this I take to be a sounding world which means
just nothing. And if there be a particular
providence it must extend to all persons and
all things.	 So our Lord understood it, or he
could never have said, 'Even the hairs of your
head are all numbered.' And, 'Not a sparrow
falleth to the ground' without 'the will of
your Father which Is in heaven.' But if it be
so, if God presides universis tanquam sin-
gulls, et singulis tanquam universis- over the
whole universe as over every single person,
over every single person as over the whole
universe-'' 4
 what is it (except only our own
sins) which we are not to ascribe to the
providence of God?'35
Through providence God presided over the 'chain of
being', from top to bottom. After God's universal
providence, he developed Thomas Crane's notion of a
'threefold circle' of providence- the outermost circle
of general providence; the intermediate circle of
special or limited providence given to the visible
church; and the inmost circle of peculiar providence
130 Outler, BEW, II, 534.
" 'The Imperfection of Human Knowledge' (1784), DEW, II, 577.
132 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, II.XXX.75, in 'On Divine
Providence' (1786), DEW, II, 535; 'The Imperfection of Human Know-
ledge' (1784), DEW, II, 578.
133 ci'. 'Wandering Thoughts' (1762), DEW, II, 132.
Also, 'On Eternity' (1786), DEW, II, 372. Cf. Augustine,
'Confessions' (397-401), III.xi.19 (NPNF1 I, 67). See also, BEW, II,
57 note 45.
'The Nature of Enthusiasm' (1750), DEW, II, 56-7.
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given to the elect only' 3 God often mediated provi-
dential care through 'guardian angels', who were able to
deliver souls from danger, temptation, and even pain.'37
The full extent of Wesley's understanding of
providence can be seen in his introduction to, A Concise
History of Eng land1 from the earliest times, To the
Death of Geor ge II (1776).
There is yet another objection which may be
made, to all the Histories of England which I
have seen: (I mean the General Histories; for
this objection does not lie against several
particular Histories; such as Lord Clarendon's
History of the Rebellion, or Mr. Neal's
History of the Puritans) that is, they seem
calculated only for Atheists; for there is
nothing about GOD in them. Who would gather
from these accounts, who would have the least
suspicion, that it is GOD who governs the
world? That his kingdom ruleth over all, in
Heaven above, and in Earth beneath? That he
alone changeth the times and the seasons,
removeth kings and setteth up kings, and
disposes all things by his almighty power,
according to the counsels of his own will?
I. ..)Who takes GOD into his account, or seems
to think, he has any concern in the transac-
tions of the lower world? I wish to habituate
the readers of English History, to a nobler
way of thinking: as I desire myself to see GOD
pervading the moral, as well as the natural
world, so I would fain have others to see him,
in all civil events, as well as in all the
Phaenomena of nature.	 I want them to learn
that the Lord is King, be the earth never so
impatient: that he putteth down one and
setteth up another, in spite of all human
power and wisdom. Let there be at least one
History of
	
England, which uniformly ack-
nowledges this: let there be one Christian
History, of what is still called (tho' by a
strong figure) a Christian Country.13
While Scripture was the record of God's revelation in
history, history, in turn, was seen by Wesley as the
record of providences. Through providence, history may
be seen as the context of salvation history. So
prominent and obvious was providence in history and
civil events, they were just as much a means of natural
"S Thomas Crane, Isagoge ad Del Providentiain, Or a Pros pect of
Divine Providence (1672), XXIV.i.271-72, in, BE1, II, 541.
'	
'On Guardian Angels' (1726), BEW, IV, 227, 233.




revelation as nature itself. This seems to suggest that
for Wesley, the only freedom one really has is whether
or not one accepts God's offer of forgiveness in Christ.
The individual may well be in control of his or her
eternal destiny, but God is in control of the destiny of
humanity and history as a whole. In this way providence
could be seen as the banks of river, guiding the river's
course to its eventual end.
How this could be so can be explained by God's
particular election of certain individual persons for a
prescribed task. In 'Predestination Calmly Considered'
(1752) he stated,
I will	 tell you,	 in all plainness and
simplicity. I believe it [election] commonly
means one of these two things: First, a divine
appointment of some particular men, to do some
particular work in the world. And this
election I believe to be not only personal,
but absolute and unconditional. Thus Cyrus
was elected to rebuild the temple, and St.
Paul, with the twelve, to preach the gospel.
But I do not find this to have any necessary
connexion with eternal happiness. Nay, it is
plain it has not; for one who is elected in
this sense may yet be lost eternally. 'Have I
not chosen' (elected) 'you twelve?' saith our
Lord; 'Yet one of you hath a devil.' Judas,
you see, was elected as well as the rest; yet
is his lot with the devil and his angels.
17. I believe election means, Secondly, a
divine appointment of some men to eternal
happiness.	 But I believe this election to be
conditional, as well	 as	 the reprobation
opposite thereto. I believe the eternal
decree concerning both is expressed in those
words: 'He that believeth shall be saved; he
that believeth not shall be damned.' And this
decrees, without doubt, God will not change,
and man cannot resist.13'
In short, providential election did not assure per-
severance of an individual saint. Only the perseverance
of faith could do that. All of which seems to indicate
that for Wesley, some things must happen by necessity,
while others happen only contingently. Without a
certain measure of providential necessity human events
would career wildly out of control. 	 Conversely,	 too
139 'Predestination Calmly Considered' (1752), in, Works, X,
210.
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much providential necessity negates any concept of free-
will.
4.2. Free-Will and the Paradox of Omniscience
Apart from the paradox of omnipotence, there is
also the paradox of omniscience. 4 ° This arises from
the problem of how God's perfect knowledge can be
consistent with the divine and eternal nature, and human
free-will, presupposing that God's omniscience must also
include foreknowledge of all future events. Wesley
admitted to a certain frustration with the paradox
saying, 'if any one asks, 'How is God's foreknowledge
consistent with our freedom?' I plainly answer, I cannot
tell ' 141
4.2.1. Omniscience and the 'Eternal Now'
Still, this did not deter him from trying to find a
model in which free-will was compatible with Divine
foreknowledge. In trying to find a solution to the
problem, like Augustine, Wesley attempted to protect
God's omniscience by arguing that God's foreknowledge is
not inconsistent with free will, saying,
But in order to throw light upon this dark
question it should be well observed that when
we speak of God's foreknowledge we do not
speak according to the nature of things, but
after the manner of men. For if we speak
properly there is no such thing as either
foreknowledge or after-knowledge in God. All
time, or rather all eternityt...lbeing present
to him at once, he does not know one thing
before another, or one thing after another,
but sees all things in one point of view, from
everlasting to everlasting[.. .1. But observe:
we must not think they are because he knows
them. No; he knows them because they are.
Just as I[...]now know the sun shines. Yet
the sun does not shine because I know It: but
'° Although Frederick Sontag has argued '()nnipotence Need not
Entail Cnniscience', Sophia, 29(1990)3, 35-39.
141 BEW, XXVI, 517 (1753), and see note 2. This was in
response to Andrew Ramsay's proposition in, Philosophical Principles
of Natural and Revealed Reli gion, unfolded in a Geometrical Order (2
vols., 1748-49), that 'It was equally a matter of free choice arid




I know It because he shinesi .. .11. In like
manner God knows that man sins; foT he knows
all things. Yet we do not sin because he
knows it: but he knows It because we sin.'42
And his knowledge supposes our sin, but does
not in any wise cause itE. . .1. The sum of all
Is this: the almighty all-wise God sees and
knows from everlasting to everlasting all that
Is, that was, and that Is to come, through one
eternal now.143
Wesley often used the scholastic distinction of
describing eternity as being 'a parte ante' and 'a parte
post', the 'eternity which is past, and the eternity
which is
	 to come'	 (which was also developed by
Locke).' 44
 God alone is eternal in both of these
senses.' 45
 Time itself was a concept created only by an
act of creation and will continue as long as the world
endures and then expire.' 46
 As a part of creation it is
other than God, who transcends temporality. Eternality,
not temporality, is an attribute of God. Although
transcendent of temporality God knows all things which
exist	 or	 occur within temporality simultaneously,
through one 'eternal now'.
	 In this view, God's eter-
' Cf. Just in, 'Expositiones Quaestionum a Gentibus Chris-
tianis Propositarum', Q. 58; Origen, 'Commentary on Rocnans', 8.30.143 
'On Predestination' (1773), BEW, II, 417, 420. Cf.
'Predestination Calmly Considered' (1752), Works, X, 210; cf. 'A
Dialogue Between a Predestinarian and His Friend s
 (1741), Works, X,
261; cf. Calvin, Institutes, III.xxiil.7. It is Interesting to note
that the phrase, 'eternal now' was also used by Tillich in his own
Systematic Theology
 (1963), III, 395-6, and in a sermon by the same
title, The Eternal Now (1963), pp. 122-32. His use was more of an
eschatological manifestation of an eternal existentialism, in which
we have neither past or future, only an eterna now, in which the
flux of time has ceased.
	 This will be our experience of the
eternal.
'' 'On Eternity' (1786), BEW, II, 358-9 and n; cf. 'On the
Eternity of God', MI, 8(1785), 634-37, 'In the pure and absolute
essence of God, and in the exercise of his essential immanent, and
necessary acts, there can be neither past, nor future. All is one
present moment. Because God always knows and loves himself equally
without variation and shadow of change. All his essential acts are
co-eternal, consubstantial, and simultaneous with his essence.'
Locke, Essay, II.xvil.10-22; Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), A Demonstra-
tion of the Being
 and Attributes of God (1705); and Joseph Addison,
The Evidences of the Christian Reli gion (1730). For a Platonic
reference see 'Phaedo', Dialogues of Plato (1937), I, 461 fl. Cf.
Augustine, 'Confessions', 11.13-18.145 
'On Eternity' (1786), BEW, II, 359; ci. 'The Unity of the
Divine Being' (1789), BEW, IV, 61-2.
146 'On Eternity' (1786), BEW II, 360.
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nality is equated with omniscience. 147 Because God is
temporally transcendent, all knowledge Is known to God
simultaneously. Through the concept of the 'eternal
now' compatibility between God's omniscience and human
free-will could be maintained. Wesley thought it
was possible for God to observe human action from the
eternal now without determining It.
Although the footnotes are quite copious and
extremely helpful in making the historical connections
otherwise, It is odd that In the footnotes supporting
this passage Outler did not point out the concept's
connections with sources such as Origen, Boethius,'4
Augustine, and Aquinas. Origen spoke of the Trinity
transcending temporality, meaning the Trinity's intel-
ligence is not measured by times and ages. 149 Augus-
tine's development of the concept was more significant
and comprehensive.' 50 Augustine saw time as a creation
of God. As a creation of God, time is not to be seen as
co-eternal with God. The nature of God's eternality is
that all time (time past, present, and future) is
present to God at once.' 5 ' Since all things are present
to God at once there is no time-scale of God's know-
ledge, no foreknowledge or after-knowledge. From the
'eternal now' God Is able to see the outcome of human
choice and responsibility, not determine it. As Craig
has summarized it,
Adam was free to choose things above or things
below. God foreknew what he was going to
choose, and therefore it was certain that
choice would occur. But God's knowing about
it in advance in no way influenced the choice;
Adam could have chosen either option. Which-
ever alternative he chose, God would have
foreknown. In fact, God's foreknowledge that
Adam freely chose one guarantees that Adam
would freely choose one. It is necessary that
whatever God foreknows should come to pass,
147 cf. 'The Unity of the Divine Being' (1789), BEW, IV, 62.
' Boethius, The Consolation of Philoso phy , V.vi.
'' Origen, 'De Principiis', IV.i.28.
150 See Augustine, 'Confessions' !1.!4'-20, 31; 'On Free Choice
of the Will', III.iv.151 Augustine, Confessions, XI.xxxl.41; cf. 'On the Gospel of
John', Tractate XXXI.5.
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but this necessity is not antithetical to
human liberty. For though it is necessary
that whatever God foreknows should happen,
what is going to happen does not happen of
necessity. What is going to happen Is
causally indeterminate and therefore free.
Therefore, the origin of evil lies only in
Adam's free choice, and God's foreknowledge of
that choice in no way rendered it necessary;
hence, God is just in punishing man for his
sins. 152
In this way the paradox of omniscience is resolved by
giving God foreknowledge of human decisions without
God's foreknowledge determining those decisions.
Aquinas had addressed the same issue in, Summa
Theolog iae.' 53 There, Aquinas 'uses perceptual models
to explain his contention that all temporal things-
past, present, and future- are present to God in
eternity and hence that future contingents are known by
Him as present rather than as future.' 154 But Aquinas
also knew that once God had knowledge of such an event,
it would necessarily happen. The inconsistency between
free-will and foreknowledge was pointed out when Aquinas
said,
the following is a conditional that is true:
If God knew that this is going to happen It
will happen- because knowledge is only of what
is true. And its antecedent is absolutely
necessary: first, because it Is eternal, and
also because It is expressed as having taken
place. Therefore whatever is known by God Is
necessary. 1 5 5
What is at issue is whether events determine God's
knowledge, or if God's knowledge determines events.
Wesley's position was clearly evident in the quote
above. As he succinctly summarized It, 'We do not sin
152 Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge (1988), p.73.
153 Aquinas, Suma Theologiae, la, Q. 14, A. 13,
154 Freddoso, On Divine Foreknowledge (1988), p. 7.
155 Aquinas, Sunmia Theologiae, la.14 art. 13. See also Geach,
Providence and Evil (1977); Anthony Kenny, 'Divine Foreknowledge and
Human Freedom', in Aquinas, ed. Anthony Kenny (1969); Prior, Past,
Present and Future (1967). Craig, 'Aquinas on God's Knowledge of
Future Contingents', Thomist, 54(1990) 1, 33-79, who said, 'If a
theological fatalist is someone who believes that God's
foreknowledge of future events is incompatible with contingency and
human freedom, then Thomas Aquinas was a theological fatalist'.
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because he knows it: but he knows it because we sin.'
For Wesley, events, which were viewed by God from the
eternal now, determined God's knowledge.
One modern discussion of this type of argument
offers a way in which this may be understood. It
attempts to explain the problem of foreknowledge and
free-will through 'backward causation'. 'Backward
causation' Is 'a kind of a posterlorl knowledge acquired
by means of the operation of temporally backwards
causality. The future event causes the past foreknowle-
dge of it', and is an argument used by Anglin, Dummett,
Flew, and Scriven among others. 5
	From backward
causality Kenny has concluded,
if we	 imagine God as exercising reverse
causation as frequently as would be necessary
to provide an explanation of omniscient
foreknowledge of free human actions then the
distinction between past and future again
becomes blurred.151
But Wesley's view is God Is timeless and creation is
temporal. If that is so, 'Indeed, why would God have to
exercise reverse causation more than once? Why could he
not simply wait until the end of Time and then make it
have been the case that he always knew what he will then
know (at the end of Time) simply from having observed
jt?15e God's omniscience, derived from reverse
causation, makes the category of time obsolete, dissolv-
ing the boundaries between past, present, and future.
There is no conjugation of the tenses of 'knowing'. In
God's omniscience there is no 'I have known', no 'I will
know', no 'I will have known', only 'I know'. There Is
only a simultaneous knowledge of everything 'now',
throughout eternity, which seems to be Wesley's point.
156 See, Anglin, Free Will (1990), p. 81; Duninett and Flew,
'Can an Effect Precede Its Cause?', AS Supplementary Volume,
28(1954), 27-62; Michael Dumett, 'Bringing about the Past',
Philosophical Review, 73(1964), 338-59, and 'Causal Loops', in The
Nature of Time, ed. Daymond Flood and Michael Lockwood (1 986), pp.
135-69; Scriven, 'Randomness and the Causal Order', Anal ysis, 17
(1956), 5-9.
Kenny, God of the Philosophers (1979), pp. 103-9.
Anglin, Free Will (1990), p. 9!. The problem with this
view is that God's knowledge then becomes dependent upon human will
and action.
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In this way God's omniscience and human free will are
made compatible by God's eternality.
But one problem with this view is that the past
also determines the future. If God looks at the
beginning from the end, the past Is still necessary,
although its events are determined by the outcome of
free-will, and not God's foreknowledge. The eternal now
on its own does not completely solve the problem of
determinism.
4.2.2. Omniscience and 'Middle Knowledge'
It was not just on the basis of God's eternal
knowledge of things temporal that free will and omnis-
cience could be reconciled. There was also a second,
and more obscure way in which Wesley sought to resolve
the paradox of omniscience. It is revealed less in his
sermons, and more in the Arminian Magazine through a
collection of works he extracted there.
In the first volume of the Arminian Magazine Wesley
extracted three of four essays found in, A Collection of
Tracts Concerning Predestination and Providence. and the
other Points De pending on Them (1719). The editor(s?)
of this publication, which was published in Cambridge,
were anonymous. The volume consisted of John
Plaifere's, An Appeal to the Gos pel, for the True
Doctrin (sic] of Divine Predestination, Concorded with
the Orthodox Doctrin of God's Free-Grace. and Man's
Free-Will (1651); Barnaby Potter's, A Letter of the
Learned Chr. Potter, D.D. Vindicating his Sentiments in
these Controversies (which had been published together
in a single volume with Plaifere in 1651); Thomas
Goad's, The Dis putation concerning the Necessity and
Contingency of Events, in res pect of God's Eternal
Decrees (originally published as, Stimluus Orthodoxus;
Sive Goadus Redivivus. A Dis putation Partl y Theologi-
cal, partl y Methaphysical, concernin g the Necessit y and
Conting ency of Events in the World, in res pect of God's
Eternal Decree in 1661 as an appendix to Laurence
Womack's, The Result of False Princi p les: or. Error
Convinced. Managed in several Dialogues[...I Whereunto
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is added a learned Disputation of Dr. Goades, sent by
King James to the S ynod of Dort); and Laurence Womack's,
The Examination of Tilenus before the Triers in Utopia
(1658). The only work in this collection not extracted
by Wesley in the first volume of the Arminian Magazine
was Potter's. Of the three which appear, the works by
Goad and Plaifere are the most significant to our
discussion here.
Goad, once provost at King's College Cambridge, was
a delegate sent to the Synod of Dort by King James as a
substitute for the ailing Joseph Hall. It has been
popularly assumed that Goad went there a Calvinist and
returned an Arminian. However, Tyacke has shown that
this is not 'borne out by the original records'. 159 In
the 1620's Goad wrote and licensed books against the
Arminian point of view. The only 'evidence' that Goad
had eventually changed his views is based on the
posthumous publication of Stimulus Orthodoxus in 1661.
It is there that Goad's doctrinal shift is speculated
upon by the editor.' 8 ° What is interesting is that
Tyacke concluded that this work, 'a discussion of the
necessity and contingency of events, only indirectly
concerns the Arminian controversy and is moreover
compatible with a Calvinist stance on the points in
question at Dort.'' 8 ' This hardly seems likely when one
realizes that that work utilized a concept employed by
the anti-Calvinists in both the Catholic and Arminian
positions, namely the concept of the 'middle point'
between necessity and contingency.' 2 Goad had said,
The Sum of the Controversy is this: Whether
all things that ever have or shall come to
pass in the World, have been, or shall be
effected	 necessarily,	 In	 respect of an
irresistible Decree,	 by	 which	 God hat?,
everlastingly determined, that they should
inevitably come to passE.. .J. Whether many
'	 l'yacke, Anti-Calvinists (1987), p. 99.
Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists (1987), pp. 99-100.1' Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists (1987), p. 100.162 This concern with future contingents was also raised in 'A
Treatise concerning Election and Reprobation', AN, 2(1779), 161 If,
217 If, 273 If, 329 If, 385 If, 441 ff. Unfortunately there is not
enough space to evaluate It here.
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things have not been done contingently, or
after such a middle Manner between impos-
sibility of being, and necessity of being,
that some things which have been, might as
well not have been, and many things which have
not been, might as well have been, for aught
God hath decreed to the contrary.'3
To Goad things were either done necessarily, or contin-
gently. Goad was convinced that God's omniscience must
consist of an infinity of knowledge. 184 By limiting
God's knowledge to only things that must necessarily
take place, God's knowledge is limited, hence finite.
However, by expanding God's knowledge to incorporate
contingent events it becomes infinite. This
makes his Prescience more wonderful. God, say
we, ab aterno, hath ordered that such Agents
as he created Voluntarily, should have a
double Liberty in their Operations, viz. , a
Liberty of Contradiction, to do, or not to do;
as a Painter may choose whether he will work
or no: and a Liberty of Contrariety, to do a
thing after this or that manner; as a Painter
may use what colours, in what quantity, after
what passion he pleaseth.
Now God leaving to his Creatures free
Liberty to work or not work after this or that
manner, so that for any necessity imposed upon
their Actions by him, whatsoever they omit was
possible to be done, as what they did. And
yet from all Eternity, Fore-knowing whatsoever
his Creatures would do, or not do, his Fore-
Knowledge must needs in In finite, and most
admirablel...). And indeed this Fore-sight of
future Contingents, is the true Character and
Royal Prerogative of Divine KnowledgeE. .
Knowledge of the contingent was created by the Scholas-
tic distinctions of liberty of contrariety and con-
tradiction. This knowledge of the contingent was for
Goad the middle point between what must necessarily come
to be and what is possible. 	 This knowledge was in-
finite. Goad was convinced that without this 	 middle
183 
'A Discourse concerning the Necessity and Contingency of
Events in the World, in Respect of God's Eternal Decrees. By Thomas
Goad, D.D. [Wrote about the Year 1620.1' AM 1(1778), 250-64, 289-
302.
184 cf. a similar view which is more fully developed in 'On the
Eternity of God' i 3(1780), 33-41. I have been unable to trace
this otherwise anonymous source.165 AM 1(1778), 262.
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path one must either walk on the path of Stoicism (i.e.
determinism) or Epicurianism (i.e. where everything is
by chance). What is most Important for our purposes is
that by extracting Goad's work Wesley introduced to his
readers the concept of 'middle point'. In doing so he
was trying to solve the paradox of omniscience.
The concept of the middle point, was explained in
greater detail in Plaifere's work who understood It to
be 'scientia media', or middle knowledge.' In his
work Plaifere demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the
issue, both historically and philosophically. 167
 He put
forward five opinions about predestination. After
showing the weaknesses of the first four he then
suggested a fifth, the position he defended as the most
correct one. In a passage extracted by Wesley, and
later referred to in the London Edition of Arminius's
Works, Plaifere said,
The Fifth Opinion Is that of Arminius, which
he Interpreted according to his own prin-
ciples, in his Theses de natura Del, and of
Vorstius in his Treatls de Deo, and the
Jesuits Molina, Vasquez, Suarez, Becanus, and
others; and may therefore be less acceptable
to some for the sake of the Teachers and
Defenders of It; but a lover of Truth will not
be prejudiced against it, because It hath
besides these, the unanimous suffrage of the
Fathers, Greek and Latin, before St. Augus-
tine, if their Doctrine concerning Prescience
be rightly examined, and explained, namely.
Although Wesley's extract of Plaifere did not appear until
1778-79, he was acquainted with it as early as 1731, when he read
Thoqnas Bennet's, Directions for Studying I. A General System or Body
of Divinity . II. The Thirty nine Articles of Beligion[...] (1714).
In the Introduction of, A Collection of Tracts Concerning Predes-
tination, Bennet's work was appreciated as one that pointed out the
work by Plaifere. Arminius was quoted by Bennet at sone length from
'A Declaration of the Sentiments of ArminiusE. . . 1', on pages 95-99.
Bennet and the editor of, A Collection of Tracts were both obviously
profoundly influenced by Plaifere's work and its understanding of
Arminianism/Molinism and bore its imprint in regards to the know-
ledge of God and predestination.
167 
'An Appeal to the Gospel for the true Doctrine of Divine
Predestination, concorded with the Orthodox Doctrine of God's Free-
Grace, and Han's Free Will. By John Plaifere, B.D. [Wrote about the
Year 1630].' 1(1778), 302ff, 337ff, 385ff, 433ff, 489ff, 545ff;
2(1779), 1ff, 49ff.
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1. That God by his Infinite Understanding,
from all Eternity, knew all things possible to
be.
2. That among other infinite things possible,
in his understanding, he conceived all this
frame of the World that now is, and in It all
the race of Mankind from the first Man to the
last, every one in his several Order, Govern-
ment and Event, only as possible to be, if he
would say the word.
3. That he knew how to alter the ordering
either of all, or of any part, or person in
the race of Men, so as other effects, and
other ends than those that now are, might be
brought forth, if he would otherwise order
them.
4. But that, considering this frame of the
World, and order of Mankind (as now it is) he
judged it was exceeding Good for the Manifes-
tation of the Glory of his Wisdom, Power,
Goodness, Mercy, Justice, Dominion, and
Lordship, if he should Will, or Decree to put
it into Execution, and Into Being.
5. That God infallibly foreknew, that if he
should decree to put it into execution, that
then these, and these particular persons,
would certainly, by this order of Means and
Government, be transmitted, and brought to
Eternal Life; and that those other particular
Persons, under their order of Means and
Government, through their own fault would go
into Perdition, if Justice should be done
them.
6. That though he knew, what these would be1
yet he determined and decreed, out of his own
absolute Will and Pleasure to say, Fiat, be it
so; and to put into Execution, and Into being.,
all this which he had in his Understanding:
and in so doing, he Predestinated all Men
either to Life or Death Eternal.1
Plaifere understood predestination to take place on the
basis of middle knowledge. God considered all things
that were possible. From the realm of the possible God
knew that if grace were offered to certain individuals
they would reject it, while others would accept it. In
explaining middle knowledge, or 'scientia media', what
is astonishing is that Plaifere quoted both Arminius,
and Molina as proponents of middle knowledge. Perhaps
our understanding of the concept, and the significance




of its appearance here would be more accurate if we
examined Arminius and Molina on the matter.
4.2.3. Arminius and Molina on 'Middle
Know I edge'
What Arminius thought regarding the knowledge, or
understanding, of God may be found in his 'Disputations
on Some of the Principal Subjects of the Christian
Religion' (1610), under Disputation IV, 'On the Nature
of God'. By this knowledge, or understanding, God knows
all things and every thing which now have,
will have, have had, can have, or might
hypothetically have, any kind of beingl...]
God therefore understands himself: He knows
all things possible, whether they be in the
capability of God or of the creature; in
active	 or	 passive	 capability;	 in	 the
capability	 of	 operation, imagination, or
enunciation: He knows all things that could
have	 an	 existence,	 on laying down any
hypothesisi . . •J 189
God has this knowledge through 'infinite intuition', by
which God knows all things from eternity, nothing
recentlyl. . .J whether they be considered as future, as
past, or as present'.' 7 ° Such an understanding is
certain, undeceived, and infallible, even with regards
to future contingents.' 7 ' Yet, the certainty of such
knowledge 'does not impose any necessity on things, nay,
it rather establishes in them a contingency'. 172
 At
this point Arminius described the nature of God's
knowledge which accommodates such a notion. God's
simple knowledge may be distinguished by several modes-
theoretical and practical knowledge, and vision and
simple intelligence.'73
XLI. Theoretical knowledge is that by which
things are understood under the relation of
Being and of Truth. Practical knowledge is
that by which things are considered under the
relation of Good, and as objects of the Will
and of the Power of God.	 (Isa. xlii, 8;
xxxvii, 28; svi, 5.)
189 Arminius, Works (1825), II, 120.
170 Arminius, Works (1825), II, 121-2.
Arminius, Works (1825), II, 122.
172 Arminius, Works (1825), I, 123.
173 Arminius, Works (1825), II, 123.
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XLII. The knowledge of Vision is that by which
God knows himself and all other beings, which
are, will be, or have been. The knowledge of
simple Intelligence is that by which He knows
things possible. Some p'ersons call the former
'definite' or 'determinate,' and the latter
'indefinite' or 'indeterminate' knowledge.
XLIII. The Schoolmen say besides, that one
kind of	 God's knowledge	 is natural and
necessary, another free, and a third kind
(mediami middle.	 (1.) Natural or necessary
knowledge is that by which God understands
himself and all things possible.	 (2.) Free
Knowledge is that by which He knows all other
beings. (3.) Middle Knowledge is that by
which he knows, that 'if this thing happens,
that will take place.' The first precedes
every free act of the Divine Will; the second
follows the free act of God's will; and the
last precedes indeed the free act of the
Divine Will, but hypothetically from this act
it sees	 that some particular thing will
occur • 1 7 4
Here Arminius clearly elucidated three kinds of Divine
knowledge- natural, free, and middle. But Plaifere saw
a distinct link between Arrinius and Molina on these
points.
He was right in doing so.	 These were the exact
distinctions made by Luis de Molina (1535-1600) in his,
Liberi Arbitrii cum Tratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia,
Providentia, Praedestnatione et Pre probatione Concordia
(1588). 175	 Molina was convinced that, 'Unless we want
174 Arminius, Works (1825), I, 123-4.
'' This was the first edition. A second and revised edition
was published in Antwerp in 1595. All of section IV was also found
in parallel form in, Commentaria in Primam Divi Thornae Partem, which
was published in 1592, see, Molina, Concordia (1988), p. ix. There
has been a renewed interest in Mol ma in the last 20 years, as the
following list of works relating to Molina reveals: Kretzmann,
CHRP, p. 826; Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974),
Chapter 9; Plantinga, 'Reply to Iobert Adams', in Alvin Plantinga
Profiles (Dordrecht, 1985); Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-
Knowing God (New York, 1986); Costello, The Political Philoso phy of
Luis de Molina, S.J. (1535-1600) (Rome, 1974); Zagzebski, The
Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge (New York, 1991), pp. 125-52;
Langston, God's Willing Knowledge: The Influence of Scotus' Analysis
of nniscience (University Park, 1986), pp. 55-74; Craig, The
Problem of Divine Foreknowldged and Future Contingents from Aris-
totle to Suarez (Leiden, 1988), pp. 169-206; Craig, The Only Wise
God (Ithaca, 1989); Craig, '"Lest Anyone Should Fall": A Middle




to wander about Drecariouslv in reconcil1n our freedom
the contingency of things with divine
it is necessary for us to distinguish
knowledge In God.'' T
 Scientia media was
three ways in which Molina discussed the
God. Molina's first sort of divine
God's natural knowledge. This knowledge
consisted not just of individuals but of all the
possible actions	 and circumstances associated with
individuals. Although this knowledge of all future
contingents existed before 'He created anything by His
free will', it is not dependent upon His will.'' 7 Such
knowledge is a divine attribute and essential to God,
which is why it is called 'natural'.
The third kind of Divine knowledge was God's free
know 1 edge,
by which, after the free act of His will, God
knew absolutely and indeterminately, without
any condition or hypothesis, which ones from
among all the contingent states of affairs
were in fact going to obtain and, likewise,
which ones were not going to obtain.'76
Once again, Craig's observations and comments on this
point are as lucid as they are helpful.
This knowledge	 Is posterior to the free
decision of God's will to create, to instan-
tiate one of the possible orders known by His
natural knowledgeE...]. Since his knowledge is
posterior to the decision of God's will and
since God's decision to create this world is
free, it follows that the content of free
knowledge is not essential to divine omnis-
cience, but Is contingent upon which world God
in fact creates.	 Had God created different
17S( . .contlnued)
Phil fleligion, (1991), 65-74; Walls, 'Is Molinism as Bad as Cal-
vinism?' Faith Phil 7(1990)1, 85-98; MorrIs, editor, 'Two Accounts
of Providence' in, Divine and Human Action (Ithica, 1989) pp.
147-181; Felt, 'Impossible Worlds', mt Phil Quart 23(1983),
251-266; Hamilton, Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century
 Spain
(London, 1963); examples of opposition to Molina may be seen in
Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca, 1989), pp . 15-52; Adams,
'Middle Knowledge and the Problem o Evil', Amer Phil Quart,
14(1977), 109-117; Adams, 'Middle Knowledge', J Phil 70(1973),
552-554.
Molina, Concordia (1988), 4.52.9.
'' Molina, Concordia (1988), 4.49.11.








worlds or even no world at all, the content of
His free knowledge would have been different.
So while it is essential to God to have free
knowledge, the content of what He freely knows
is contingent upon which world He chooses to
create.
In between these two types of Divine knowledge, the
first and third, is what Molina simply called,
middle knowledge, by which, in virtue of the
most profound and inscrutable comprehension of
each faculty of free choice, He saw in His own
essence what each such faculty would to with
its innate freedom were it to be placed in
this or in that or, indeed, in infinitely many
orders of things- even though it would really
be able, if it so willed, to do the op-
positeE. .
Whereas by God's natural knowledge God knew what an
individual could do if placed in a particular set of
circumstances, by middle knowledge God knew what an
individual would do when placed in the same particular
set of circumstances. It is, as Craig has pointed out,
God's middle knowledge which thus provides the
basis of God's foreknowledge of contingent
events in the actual world. By knowing what
every possible creature would do under any
possible circumstances and by willing to
establish a world order containing certain
circumstances, God knows what will in fact
take place in the world.'81
As Molina himself said,
Therefore[.. .lwe affirm that through the
divine ideas (or, through the divine essence
known as the primary object) all contingent
states of affairs are represented with
certainty to God, who comprehends in the
deepest and most eminent way both His own
essence and all things, each of which is
contained in that essence infinitely more
perfectly than it is contained in itself. All
contingent states of affairs are, I repeat,
represented to God naturally, before any act
or free determination of the divine will; and
they are
	 represented not
	 only as being
possible but	 also as
	 being future- not
absolutely future,	 but future under the
179 Craig, Divine Foreknowledge (1988), p. 174. At this point
there are similarities between God's natural and free knowledge, and
Leibniz's view of the 'best of all possible worlds'. See, Sontag,
'()nnipotence need not Fntail Cnniscience', So phia, 29(1990), 35-39.
Molina, Concordia (1988), 4.52.9.
'' Craig, Divine Foreknowledge (1988), p. 177.
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condition and on the hypothesis that God
should decide to create this or that order of
things and causes with these or those cir-
cumetancest...]. [Olnce that determination Is
made, God knows all the contingent states of
affairs with certainty as being future simply
and absolutely, and now without any hypothesis
or condltlon.1e2
In an argument reminiscent of the one seen in
relation to the eternal now, Molina argued on this basis
God may have knowledge of an event without determining
it. Molina quoted Justin Martyr who said,
Foreknowledge is not a cause of that which is
going to be, but rather that which is going to
be is a cause of foreknowledge. For that
which is going to be does not ensue upon
foreknowledge, but rather foreknowledge ensues
upon that which is going to be.1'
This, of course, was precisely the point Wesley was
trying to make through his concept of the eternal now, a
concept which may be traced to Augustine. However, what
Augustine lacked was an understanding of Divine
knowledge which could account for the compatibility of
Divine foreknowledge	 and human free-will. 	 Molina
provided this missing concept, which he called middle
knowledge.	 It was to this concept Wesley eventually
turned through his extractions of Goad, and Plalfere.
Goad and Plaifere were both profoundly influenced
not just by Arminian thought, but by Molinism also.
Implicit to this influence is the relationship between
Molina and Arminius. It obviously is one that must be
explored, particularly now that a critical translation
of Molina has been made available. It Is perhaps
unfortunate that the white heat of the Arminian con-
troversy obviously eclipsed the light of Molina, at
least where Protestants were concerned.
While there Is no evidence to suggest Wesley had
more than just a casual acquaintance with the 'free-
will' controversy between the Dominicans and the Jesuits
iez Molina, Concordia (1988), 4.50.15.
Justin Martyr,	 'Expositiones Quaestionum a Gent ibus
CI-iristianis Propositarum', Q. 58 (RI 6, 1300C), in Molina, Concordia
(1988), 4.52.21; 	 cf. Origen, 'Coninentary on Romans 8' [8.30] (RI
14, 1126C-D).
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precipitated by Molina's work in the sixteenth century
(for example, there is no reference to Molina in his
Ecclesiastical History ), there is enough to suggest that
he had a fuller understanding of the position of
'scientia media' as taken	 by Molina	 against the
Dominicans.' 84 	There seems to have at least been a
connection between Arminius, Molina, mediated to Wesley
through Goad and Plaifere. Consequently, Wesley
attempted to reconcile the paradox of omniscience not
just by Arminianism, but also by Molinism. The presence
of both the 'eternal now', and 'middle knowledge' as
ways of trying to reconcile the paradox of omniscience
indicates Wesley's struggle to deal with the issue.
4.3. Compatiblism, Prayer, and Prophecy
Just as one final remark, perhaps something needs
to be said about compatiblism, prayer, and prophecy.
While offering a free-will defense in order to account
for the problem of evil, Wesley obviously also main-
tained compatibility with the omnipotence and omnis-
cience of God. Such a view is perhaps the best way one
can reconcile even Wesley's views on prophecy, and
prayer.' 5 If everything is predetermined, what good is
it to offer prayers of petition and intercession?' 	 If
nothing is predetermined, what truth is there in
prophecy, which was for Wesley, 'in the proper sense of
the wordE. . .lforetelling things to come'?' 67 In this
way an omnipotent, and omniscient God could providen-
tially lead the course of human history, making prophecy
valid. At the same time God is able to answer prayers
164 Cutler, DEW, I, 78.
See Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (1989), pp. 190-97.186 
'The Promise of Understanding' (1730), DEW, IV, 284-85; 'On
Visiting the Sick' (1786), DEW, III, 391-92; 'Sermon on the Mount,
VI' (1748), I 577-89; 'Hymns of Petition and Thanksgiving' (1746,
nos. 83, 159, 366 in DEW, VII); 'Hymns of Intercession for all
Mankind' (1758, nos. 55, 429-32?, 439 in DEW, VII); 'For Believers
Interceding for the World', nos. 429-65, DEW, VII).
167 
'The More Excellent Way' (1787), DEW, III, 263; cf. 'On
Charity' (1784), , III, 301-3. It is interesting to compare this
understanding of prophecy with the Hanters and Quakers understanding
in Smith, Perfection Proclaimed (1989), pp. 23-72.
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of petition and intercession because not everything has
been eternally determined, especially the eternal
destinations of individuals, which could be decided only
by the free choice of individuals to believe or not.
5. Conclusion
In answer to his question, 'Unde malum?' Wesley
concluded the will unraveled the whole mystery. Without
any concept of free-will God is responsible for evil,
and the author of sin. This means his concern for free-
will (which was later labeled 'Arminianism') arose not
from a soteriological concern, but from the issue of
theodicy. Wesley's aesthetic theme of the perfect
goodness of creation means he ultimately rejected the
notion that evil was to be equated with the defec-
tibility of matter.	 Logically, Wesley could not have
held to such a notion as found in either King, or Jenyns
without creating severe pressures within his own
Christian system. Had he done so, it would have been
even more difficult for him to hold to his doctrine of
entire sanctification, which included that of spirit,
soul, and body.
	 The body, as a part of the material
world, is a part of God's creation. While the body
currently suffers the punishment of the fall, it will be
seen that to Wesley there is no such thing as 'sinful
body'.
The doctrine of salvation becomes linked to the
doctrine of creation. This presupposed two things.
First, that matter actually exists as something more
than a mere idea in the mind of God, but as an objective
world apart from either God or the self, capable of
being perceived by the senses.	 And secondly, that the
matter that was created by God was more than capable of
being good. It was good. This aesthetic view of
creation was rooted in the ontological neutrality of
matter. Instead of locating the cause of evil there,
Wesley located it in morality, the preference of evil
over good, the creature's will over the Creator's will.
As simple, or as obvious as this may seem, it was
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nonetheless an important epistemological and doctrinal
development for Wesley.
While the free-will defense rescued God from
responsibility for evil it did create other problems,
namely the paradoxes of omnipotence and omniscience.
Wesley's solution to the paradox of omnipotence was
primarily the way in which he defined omnipotence, but
it was also through his doctrine of providence. His
solution to the paradox of omniscience was through the
concept of the eternal now, and, in a more obscure way,
through scientia media. His knowledge of Goad, and
particularly of Plaifere suggests Wesley's knowledge was
of Arminius, and Molina.
In addition to the paradox of omniscience and the
paradox of omnipotence, there is also the problem of an
omnipotent and omniscient God who foresaw Adam's fall
and did nothing about it. Wesley's response to this was
'0 felix culpal' This was Wesley's final answer to the
question 'Unde malum?'. His definitive solution to the
problem of evil was the recapitulatory work of Christ.
Theodicy, then is linked to original sin,, which is in
turn linked to Christology, which is in turn linked to
soteriology with its existential and eschatological
elements. While the answer to 'Whence came evil?' might
be the will, 'Why was evil allowed?' is ultimately
answered only through the Incarnation, the Cross, and
the empty Tomb. For Wesley, the only way the doctrine
of God can 'win' in the issue of theodicy is through
'Christus victor'.
Like Irenaeus, Wesley ultimately solved the problem
of evil through the work of Christ and the renewal of
the image of Christ in the soul of each Christian
believer.' In that sense the question raised by 'Unde
malum?' starts an investigation that will find its
answer only through soteriology, and even eschatology.
Through a trinitarian based Christology Wesley was able
to maintain the omnipotence of, more specifically and
significantly, the Triune God.
Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (1986), pp. 16-18.
Chapter Three
Wesley's Doctrine of Original Sin:
'The Loathsome Leprosy'
Who then are the 'poor in spirit'? Without
question, the humble; they who know them-
selves, who are convinced of sinE...]. One of
thesel...]has a deep sense of the loathsome
leprosy of sin, which he brought with him from
his mother's womb, which overspreads his whole
soul, and totally corrupts every power and
faculty thereof.1
1. Introduction
To Wesley it was obvious that something is wrong
with humanity, and the sin of the angels was not enough
to account for human pain and misery. 2 As far as he
could see the world was filled with wickedness, hatred,
and perversion. This was his opening argument In Part I
of his, Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin. 3 He was convinced
that simple empirical observation would easily establish
the universality of sin. Sin could be seen everywhere.
'Look out of your own Doors: Is there any evil
in the cit y , and sin hath not done it?t. ..lSin
in One or a few Cases, does not prove a sinful
Nature: But Sin overspreading 	 the Earth,
does. '4
Going beyond his own personal experience he also
used the epistemology of testimony to provide more
evidence, and utilized a wide variety of authorities,
ancient and modern, to further prove his point. He
referred to the ancient near eastern histories of the
Hebrews and the Egyptians, and also to the Greeks and
Romans through the classics of Plato, Cato, Horace,
Terrence, Lucian, Cicero, Juvenal, Virgil, Sallust,
1 
'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1748), BEW, I, 477.
2 DOS (1757), p. 252, in Works, IX, 324.
The entire first section was later published separately, and
anonymously under the sarcastic title, 'The Dignity of Human Nature'
(1762).
' DOS (1757), p. 84, 252; in Works, IX, 236, 324; cf. 'On the
Fall of Man' (1782), , II, 410, 'Open your eyes! Look around you!
See darkness that may be felt[...J'.
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Florus, and Ovid. 5
 Furthermore, Wesley was convinced
that the geographical explorations of his day, along
with his own experiences among the native Americans,
dispelled the myth of Pigafetta's 'noble savage'' whose
life was enriched by a natural religion. 7 To strengthen
this argument he cited the accounts of the explorer Lord
Anson;' the missionary, Michael Geddes;' the geographer,
Thomas Salmon; '° the philologist, Edward Brerewood; 11
the Muslim, George Sale;' 2 and literary figures such as
Abraham Cowley' 3 , Matthew Prior, 14 and Jonathan Swift.'5
Wesley's conclusion from his empirical observations of
cultural anthropology was that it all confirmed that the
In Part I of Wesley cites the classics no less than 31
times. My thanks go to Dr. Frank Baker f or generously sharing his
text of DOS, which has been prepared for the. It located 5
sources which I had not managed to trace. Wesley published his own
extraction of the latin classics, 'Excerpta ex Ovidio, Virgilio,
Horatio, Juvenali, Persio, et Martiali. In Usum Juventutis Chris-
tianae. Edidit Eccleslae Presbyter' (Bristoliae: Farley, 1749); and
'Phaedri Fabulae Selectae. In Iisum Juventutis Christ ianae' (Bri g
-toliae: Farley, 1750).
' Willey, Eighteenth Century Background (1974), p. 12.
See BEW, XVII, 165-67 (1736).
• George Anson, A Voyage Around the WorldL.. . 1 (1748) in DOS(1757), p. 44, in Works, IX, 215; cf. JWJ, IV, 139.
' Michael Geddes (1650-1713) was an Anglican missionary and
chaplain to the English business community in Lisbon. Wesley read
his Miscellaneous Tracts (1702-6), which contained 'View of the
Inquisition in Portugal' in Feb. 1731 (see 'On Charity', BEW, III,
305, arid note 67).10 Thomas Salmon, A New Geographical and Historical Graitinar,
14th ed., Edinburgh (1771), p. 437, which Wesley quoted In DOS, p.
44, in Works, IX, 215. My thanks to the staff of the British
Library for their immense help In locating this, only to later
discover that Frank Baker had already traced the source.
" Edward Brerewood, Enauiries Touching the Diversity of
Languages and Religions Through the Chief Parts of the Earth (1614),
which Wesley cites in DOS, p. 32, in Works, IX, 208; 'The Great
Assize', BEW, I, 361; 'The General Spread of the Gospel', BEW, II,
485. 12 George Sale (Abdulla Cnar), The Korant.. .11ranslated into
Eng lish[...jwith Notes (1734), which Wesley cited in j, p. 45, in
Works, IX, 216.
' DOS, p. 52, In Works, IX, 220; of. Abraham Cowley, Essays,No. 8, 'The Dangers of an Honest Man in much Company' (Works, 7th
edn. London: Berringman, 1681, p. 132). My thanks again to Dr.
Baker who found this and shared it with me.
" DOS, p. 34, in Works, IX, 210; cf. Prior, Alma, 937-42 (my
thanks to Dr. Baker who gave me the precise location of this quote).
' See, Frank Baker, 'Jonathan Swift and the Wesleys', London
Quarterl y Holborn Review, October 1954, pp. 290-300, where he
discusses the Wesley's unacknowledged use of Swift in the DOS.
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aboriginal state was a heathenish and devilish one.
Even the sociological evidence proved the educated and
so-called cultured European societies were also univer-
sally infected by sin.' Universal human experience
showed that sin,
Is at the Root of Trouble, and it is Unholi-
ness which causes UnhappinessE...JSin is the
baleful source of Affliction; and conse-
quently, the Flood of Miseries which covers
the Face of the Earth, which overwhelms not
only single Persons, but whole Families,
Towns, Cities, Kingdoms, is a demonstrative
Proof of the Overflowing of Ungodliness, in
every Nation under Heaven.'7
This affliction was so pervasive It infected all
humanity and passed from generation to generation like a
'loathsome leprosyI,e so that,
The whole world is indeed, in its present
state, only one great infirmary: all that are
therein are sick of sin, and their one
business there is to be healed.'
What is so particularly appropriate about this metaphor
is that it depicts sickness, and uncleanness. 20
 It
prepares the way for one to understand Wesley's doctrine
of entire sanctification as healing, and purity, and
also relationality which he expressed through love of
God and neighbour. This corresponds with his view that
true religion	 is rational religion and relational
religion.
1.1. Accounting for Sin That is Seen
For Wesley, the problem was not whether there is
sin in the world, but how to account for the sin that is
obviously, and abundantly present. He was convinced it
was not 'owing to bad Education, which propagates ill
IS cf. 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1745).
17 DOS, pp. 85, 87, in Works, IX, 237, 238.
'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1748), BEW, I, 477. Cf. Wesley's
extraction of Ralph Cudworth's sermon on 1 John 2.3,4 in AM,
5(1782), 420; DEW, VII, no. 135 v.8.
' 'The Trouble and Rest of Good Men' (1735), DEW, III, 533,
and note 7.
20 For an insight on the use of illness as metaphor see Sontag,
Illness as Metaphor (1978).
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Customs'. 2 ' The most rational explanation that could be
given for this universal experience was the 'scripture
doctrine' of original sin. 22 At this point he used
scripture to account for what he observed. He summar-
ized the scriptural doctrine in the following way:
They ['the oracles of God'] teach us, That in
Adam all die: [1 Cor. xv. 22, compared with
Genesis 22. & iii.] That by the first Man came
both natural and spiritual Death. That by
this one Man Sin entered Into the World, and
Death in Consequence of Sin: And that from him
Death passed upon all Men, In that all have
sinned. [Horn. v. 12.]23
This accounted for the universal human experience of
original sin, and sin that could be seen. It also
outlined many of the issues he would debate with, and
defend against, John Taylor.
1.2. The Tradition He Defended
There were three creeds Wesley thought represented
the scriptural doctrine of original sin, and consequent-
ly succinctly represented the creedal forms of his
defended views on the subject. As either 'orthodoxy',
or 'tradition', for Wesley they were accepted because
they were based upon what he thought to be a right
interpretation of Scripture. The first creedal source
was the ninth Anglican article of religion on original
sin, which he extracted in, 'A Farther Appeal to Men of
Reason and Religion' (1743).24 The second creedal
source was the Westminster Assembly with both its
Shorter Catechism	 which appeared in the Christian
21 DOS, p. 89, in Works, IX, 238.22 DOS, pp. 140, and 154 where he said, '[...]Experience and
Reason do so strongly confirm this scriptural Doctrine of Original
Sin', in Works, IX, 266, and 273.
23 DOS, pp. 91-92, in Works, IX, 240. The scripture references
in brackets appeared in Jackson, but not in Wesley. Cf. 'Original
Sin' (1759), , II, 173-74 for a more comprehensive statement of
what Wesley thought to be the scripture doctrine; cf. DOS, pp. 428-
30, in Works, IX, 415-16, Wesley's extraction of Samuel Hebden's
understanding of the Scripture doctrine.
24 BEW, XI, 112.
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Library , 25 and the Assembly's Longer Catechism which he
defended against Taylor's attacks. As Wesley saw it,
the Longer Catechism was 'in the main a very excellent
compositioni. . . Igrounded on clear Scripture'. 2* The
third creedal source is perhaps the most significant of
all three because it was written by Wesley himself.
When he compiled the articles of faith for American
Methodism in 'The Sunday Service of the Methodists in
North America' (1784)27 A textual comparison with the
Anglican Ninth Article reveals a large Influence on
Wesley's own formulation of the doctrine. However, his
defense of the Westminster Assembly's article on
original sin indicates a Puritan sympathy and under-
standing of the doctrine.
In Wesley's own mind he was not just defending a
creed. As we have already seen, Wesley was convinced he
was defending a 'grand doctrine' 2 which served as a
part of the foundational support to the 'superstructure'
of the Christianity, which he 'considered as a system of
doctrines'. 29 	'If, therefore, we take away this
foundationi. . .Ithe	 Christian	 system	 falls	 at
onceE. .	 Quite clearly Wesley thought system-
atically about the faith, even if he did not write in
25 
'An Extract from the Assembly's Shorter Catechism', in CL,
31(1753), 111-48; 'Minutes of Several Conversations[...1' (1789),
Works, VIII, 314. For his regard of Puritan authors see, CL, VII, 2
ff., which is also in Works, XIV, 228-30. The first edition of
Wesley's CL contained several Calvinistic tendencies which were not
consistent with Wesley's Arminianism, which were deleted in the
second edition after his death. See, Monk, John Wesley : His Puritan
Heritage (1966), p. 35.
DOS, p. 132, in Works, IX, 261. Taylor attacked the
Westminster Catechism and not the Anglican article of religion.
Wesley's favourite weapon in this defense was Lvid Jennings, A
Vindication of the Scri pture Doctrine of Original Sin (1740), which
he extracted at great length.
27 Sunday Service (1984), P. 309.2* JWL, IV, 146 (1761), 'I think It great pity that the few
clergymen in England who preach the three grand scriptural doct-
rines- Original Sin, Justification by Faith, and Holiness consequent
thereon- should have any jealousies or misunderstandings between them'.
29 
'Original Sin' (1759), DEW, II, 182.
° Works, IX, 194. See Charles W. Brockwell, Jr., 'John
Wesley's Doctrine of Justification', WTS, 18(1983)2, 18-19.
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systematic form, and saw systematic implications as one
doctrine related to another.
1.3. Importance of the Doctrine of the Soul to
Original Sin
Another doctrine which had systematic implications
on original sin was the doctrine of the soul. He even
went as far to say that many 'points of divinity' depend
on the doctrine of the soul. 3 '	 This was not just an
unexpurgated hyperbole which found its way into the
Arminian Magazine. For Wesley it was the truth. The
soul was a doctrinal junction, where many 'points of
divinity' converge.
For example, we have already seen how Wesley's
concept of personhood consisted of a body/soul duality
(a duality denied by Lockian anthropology), and the
importance of the soul to his empiricism. In that
context he gave the soul the following traits: (1) It
comes into the world as a 'blank slate'; (2) the soul
perceives by the senses but it cannot be perceived by
the senses, only by faith; 32
 (3) it is immaterial; 33
 (4)
it is eternal, but not pre-existent.34
What this chapter will try to do is to look at the
relationship between the soul and original sin, in order
to try and understand the metaphysical cause of sin,
which was for Wesley empirically observable. To better
understand this relationship the discussion will be
divided into two sections- speculative anthropology, and
empirical anthropology. The relationship between
speculative and empirical anthropology started with Adam
being created in the image of God, for which the soul
31 See, 'The True Original of the Soul', AM 6(1783), 41-3, 96-
8,149-51, 208-10, 265-7, 321-3, 375-7, 431-5, 492-4, 544-7, 603-6,
664-7. His interest in the doctrine of soul went all the way back
to his Oxford days, when he read a lecture on 'The Souls of Animals'
('De Anima Brutorum') in disputation for his degree in 1726, see
BEW, XXV, 208 note 1 (1726/7).
32 'On the cnnipresence of God' (1788), BEW, IV, 45.
(1777), 1.4.10; 'On the Discoveries of Faith' (1788),
BEW, IV, 30-1.




served as Its receptacle. 35
 This concept, derived from
Genesis 1.27, is basic to understanding Wesley's
anthropology, hamartlology, and soteriology, making the
image of God the first key to understanding Wesley's
'order of salvation'. 39
 It Is not surprising that
Wesley attacked Taylor for separating the Image of God
from the doctrine of the soul. 37
 To Wesley such a move
ultimately served to undo salvation. Because of Its
importance this is where Wesley's doctrine of original
sin must start- the image of God in the soul of man, or
with Wesley's speculative anthropology.
2. The Image of God in the Soul of Adam: Wesley's
Speculative Anthropology
Wesley's doctrine of original sin included trying
to postulate the state of Adam's soul, or his original
nature, before the fall. 39 As he speculated about that,
he was not above even speculating about the location of
Eden before the fall.' 9 Wesley had ultimately to
confess that we cannot know the true difference between
the state of humanity now, and Adam's state in Paradise,
wherever it may have been, before the fall. 4 ° Whatever
Is said about Adam's nature as he lived In Paradise Is
ultimately speculative anthropology. Still, he was
unimpeded and undeterred by this and speculated a great
deal about Adam's Divine image and nature before the
fal 1.41
Wesley explored speculative anthropology through
the concept of the image of God in the soul of man. As
a result, his speculative anthropology has as much to do
'On the Discoveries of Faith' (1788), BEW, IV, 30; 'The
Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 303; NP (1777), I, 180.
' Outler, BEW, IV, 290.
' DOS, Works, IX, 240; ef. Taylor, SDOS (1746), p. 7.
" See his extraction, and defense, of Watts, The Ruin and
Recovery of Mankind, in DOS, Works, IX, 347, 'by a careful survey of
what man is now, compared with what he should be, we may easily
determine, whether man Is at present such a creature as the great
and blessed God made him at first.'
' "An Enquiry into the situation of the Terrestlal Paradise',
AM, 13(1790), 657.40 NP (1777), I, 179.
' A fact missed by Wynkoop, A Theology of Love (1972), p. 106.
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with the doctrine of God as the doctrine of man and
woman, which has been linked together by eternal reason.
Implicit throughout the entire doctrine was something of
an assumption about the nature of the God in which Adam
was supposedly the Image. To be created human meant to
share with God in some way something of the Divine
attributes, which in itself rooted Wesley's personhood
in his concept of eternal reason. The problem would be
in determining which of those attributes humanity is
able to share with God by way of the concept of 'Image'.
Wesley's struggle to determine these attributes
started early in his career, as early as 1730, in the
first paragraph on the first page of the first sermon in
Sermons on Several Occasions. 42 Even before then, in
1725 Wesley had a postal discussion with his mother on
the matter. 43
 One important presupposition to the image
of God was the influence of Wesley's aesthetic theme in
his doctrine of creation. Like the remainder of
creation, Adam was without fault and perfect in every
way.
In the image of God was man made, but a little
lower than
	 the angels.	 His nature was
perfect, angelical, divine. He was an
incorruptible picture of th Uod of glory. He
bore his stamp on evz,ry part of his soul; the
brightness of his Creator shone mightily upon
him.
The just barely 'sub-angelic' man was the best he could
possibly be, living in a world which was the best It
could possibly be. The pristine quality of both
creation and the divine image was obvious to Wesley.
Perhaps the best way to discuss the issue is by
tracing the historical development of Wesley's thought
throughout his career. We will discover four periods of
development. The first period started in 1730 with his
sermon, 'The Image of God'.	 The second period is
related to the emergence of a 	 trinitarian hermeneutic.
42 
'The Image of God' (1730); 'Salvation by Faith' in, SOSO
(1746). For a list of many of the references see BEW, I, 117, note
5.
' BEW, XXV, 164-65 (1725); cf. AN 1(1778), 33-6.
'The One Thing Needful' (1734), BEW, IV, 354.
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The third period consisted of his application of this
hermeneutic to the image of God. The last period
involved understanding the image of the Triune God as
consisting of moral, natural, and political attributes.
2.1. Understanding, Will, Liberty
The first period of development is dated from 1730
when Wesley preached his first university sermon in St.
Nary's, entitled, 'The Image of God'. 45
 In the sermon
he developed the notion of Adamic perfection under three
headings- understanding, will, and liberty, headings
also used to describe angelic perfection. 4 'First with
regard to his understanding', Adam was able to distin-
guish truth from falsehood, and infer truths by making
comparisons. 41
 His understanding was just, and infal-
lible.	 He perceived things with perfect clarity and
without deception, making him 'a stranger to error and
doubt'. 46
	His mind was as quick as it was agile. His
comprehension and knowledge was vast. His will was
equally perfect, and he willed one thing above anything
else- to love.
Love filled the whole expansion of his soul;
it possessed him without a rival. Every
movement of his heart was love: it knew no
other fervour. Love was his vital heat; it
was the genial warmth that animated his whole
frame. '
The purity of his will made evident the liberty he also
enjoyed, a perfect freedom, an unerring understanding,
and a will without corruption. All of these 'gave the
last stroke to the image of God in man, by crowning all
these with happiness'.50
'The Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 290-303. The extant text
is an 18 page manuscript (with 1 blank page between pages 10 and 11
for some reason) in Wesley's abbreviated longhand and cipher,
probably the copy he used in the pulpit. For Out ler's helpful
introduction to this sermon see, BEW, IV, 290-91.
' 'Of Good Angels' (1783),
	 , III, 6.41 
'The Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 293.
' 'The Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 294.
' 'The Image of God' (1730), BEW, 4:294-95. This aspect
anticipates what will later become the 'moral' image of God.
° 'The Image of God' (1730), DEW, IV, 295.
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The nature of the image was extremely rational. It
has already been shown in the previous chapter that
Wesley eventually came to regard these categories as not
being exclusive to humanity. As shall be seen below,
the concept of understanding, liberty, and will remained
unaltered throughout his career, although It would
eventually be subsumed under the category of 'natural
Image'. The love Wesley spoke of as being a part of the
image of understanding, liberty, and will, shall later
be discussed by Wesley under the heading of 'moral
Image', as his categories broaden, his language becomes
more precise, and he moves from a rational understanding
of the image of God to a more relational one.
2.2. A Trinitarlan Hermeneutic
The second development in Wesley's concept of the
image of God consisted of a hermeneutical principlE he
seemed to use throughout his career, which was most
prominently displayed in, Exp lanatory Notes on the Old
Testament (1765). This principe. was responsible for
Wesley's exegesis of the Genesis passages relating to
the image of God. As early as 1748 Wesley showed that
from Genesis 1.1 forward he used a trinitarlan hermen-
eutic which resulted in an assumption about the nature
of God as revealed even In the Old Testament. 5 ' The
picture given of the God of glory was a trinitarlan one,
so that the Image and nature of God was just more than
the product of a trinitarian consultation, it was an
image of the Trinity.
Let us make man- The three persons of the
Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, consult
about It, and concur in It; because man, when
he was made, was to be dedicated and devoted
to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.52
' 'Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, VI' (1748), BEW, I,
581; 'The End of Christ's Coming' (1781), HEW, II, 474, 'To take the
matter from the beginning: 'The Lord God' (literally 'Jehovah, the
Gods'; that is, One awl Three) 'created man in his own image'.
Charles makes much use of this trinitarian interpretation of divine
plurality In his hymns. See, 'Hymns on the Trinity' (1767), No. 88-
92, 95, etc. Cf. Augustine, 'Confessions', 13.5.6.
52 ENOT (1765), Gen 1.26. Cf. Augustine, City of God, XI.26.
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Humanity was made in the image of the Trinity and was to
be devoted to the Trinity.
This trinitarian hermeneutic was by no means unique
to Wesley.	 It was mediated to him in the very least
through his knowledge and use of Matthew Henry's
commentary on the Old Testament, which (along with
Matthew Poole's, Annotations) became the basis of his
Explanatory Notes on the Old Testament. A clear use of
this hermeneutic can be seen throughout the ENOT, but
especially in the Psalms and Isaiah.53
If speculative anthropology has as its starting
point the doctrine of God, it must be recognized that
the centre of Wesley's doctrine of God was a doctrine of
God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit.
Wesley's Patrology, Christology, and Pneumatology cannot
be removed from this trinitarlan context. Each is
robbed of its richness when separated from the other.
2.3. A Trinitarian Image of God
While the hermeneutic was not unusual, how he
applied this hermeneutic, and to what extent, was. This
introduces the third development in Wesley's concept of
the Image of God. It can be seen especially if one
turns to the trinitarian hymns of Charles as they were
edited and published by John, where the trinitarian
hermeneutic can be seen at work trying to understand the
nature of the Image of God. The personal and theolog-
ical influence of Charles upon John has been terribly
underestimated.	 Here Is one frequently overlooked
instance in which Charles' thought perhaps served as a
catalyst to John's. There were 4 collections of
trinitarian hymns, consisting of 223 hymns in all- 11
under the heading of 'Gloria Patri' in the second series
of 'Hymns on God's Everlasting Love' (1742); 24 In a
collection called 'Gloria Patri, or Hymns
	 to the
Trinity' (1746), a collection intended for use on
For other examples of this trinitarian hermeneutic see ENXr,
Psalm 16.1; 41.9; 68.18; 59.21; Solomon's Song, 2.10, 12, passim;
Isaiah 6.3, 8; etc.
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Trinity Sunday; 136 in 'Hymns on the TrInity', 12 of
which found their way into the Collection (1780) as
numbers 244-55; and 52 in 'Hymns and Prayers to the
Trinity', which were published together as one volume in
1767.
In, 'Hymns on God's Everlasting Love' (1742) a
phrase appeared which summarizes well the understanding
of the image of God as developed in all the trinitarian
hymns:
You, whom he ordained to be
Transcripts of the Trinity53
Transcript of holiness Divine,
The Triune God proclaim,
And spirit, and soul, and flesh resign
To glorify His name.5
The 'Transcripts of the Trinity' theme was even more
developed in 'Hymns and Prayers on the Trinity' (1767)
as may be seen in this sample of lines:
Come, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,
Whom on all-perfect God we own,
Restorer of thine image lost,
Thy various offices make known;
Display our fallen souls to raise,
Thy whole economy of grace.3'
An image of a Triune God[...]55
The Triune God of holinessE. . . j5
' Perhaps it is significant to note that the trinitarian hymns
appear in the Collection under the heading 'For Believers Rejoic-
ing', an experiential category, and not under a theological one,
such as 'On the Trinity'. Of course the trinitarian hymns were not
confined to these collections. Trinitarian hymns appeared through-
out the hymns, e.g. 'Hymns for a FamIly' (1767) No. 166, 'Gloria
Patri, &c' For a good summary of the trinitarian hymns in general
see, Rattenbury, The Evangelical Doctrines (1941), pp. 137-51. Also,Quantrille, 'The Triune God in the Hymns of Charles Wesley' (1988).
'Hymns on God's Everlasting Love' (1742), BEW, VII, no. 7;
ef. John's 'transcript of the divine purity' in 'The Lord (Xmr
Righteousness' (1765), BEW, I, 452.
'Hymns on the Trinity' (1767), No. 97.
'Hymns on the Trinity' (1767), No. 14 of 'Hymns and Pray-
ers'; also BEW, VII, 394.
'Hymns on the Trinity' (1767), No. 98 (cf. No. 87); also
BEW, VII, 390.
'Hymns to the Trinity' (1767), No. 14; also BEW, VII, 395.
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And all the glorious persons joined to form thy
fav'rite, man.'°
If looked at chronologically, Charles introduced
the 'Transcripts of the Trinity' theme as early as 1742.
However, it was not fully developed until the publica-
tion of 'Hymns on the Trinity' in 1767. In, 'Hymns on
the Trinity' one sees that man and woman were created In
the image of God as transcripts, written records of the
Trinity. This understanding of 'transcripts of the
Trinity', based on a trinitarian hermeneutic, offers
enough evidence to suggest that certainly by 1770,
Implicit to Wesleyan anthropology and soterioJogy was a
trinitarian Image of God. In 1780, many of the hymns
used to develop the 'Transcripts of the Trinity' theme
became a part of one of the important texts of Methodist
doctrine- A Collection of H ymns for the Use of the
Peop le Called Methodists. With the publication of these
same hymns in the Collection, the trinitarlan image of
the trinitarian God can be seen impressing itself onto
the soul of man and woman, into the anthropology of
Methodism, and into a volume of Wesley's works.
At first it seems rather natural to think that if
God is Trinity, the image of God in man and woman must
be somehow trinitarian in nature. However, this was
something of a doctrinal Innovation. Historically,
there is no precedent for a trinitarian image in the
early church fathers. Perhaps, as Origen seemed to
think, it gave away too much to the Greek notion of the
tripartite soul.e1 While Tertullian employed a trini-
tarian hermeneutic in reading Genesis 1.26, in which the
Trinity was seen to say, 'Let us make man in our
Imagel...]', he fell short of saying it was a trinitar-
ian image.	 Instead, he said it was in 'Christ's
lmaget. e2
	The Christological image of God was also a
SO 
'Hymns on the Trinity' (1767), No. 87; also BEW, VII, 389.
See also, 'Hymns on the Trinity' (1767), Nos. 39, 50, 97, 126;
'Hymns and Prayers to the Trinity', Nos. 10, 18, 28, etc.
Origen, 'De Principiis', 3.4.1.
S2 Tertullian, 'Against Praxeas', p12.
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view held by Irenaeus,' 3 Anthanasius' 4 St. Hilary of
Poltiers, 5 and St. Ambrose.' The predominate under-
standing of the image of God among the Fathers was a
Christological one. John Cassian considered it hereti-
cal to give anything but a spiritual meaning to the
image of God, which denied aspects of the Incarnation as
a pattern for the image of God. 6 '	 However, Justin did
give a 'fleshly' understanding to it, partially in order
to argue for the resurrection of the body.° John of
Damascus gave the image of God a visible and invisible
nature consisting of a body formed from earth, and a
reasoning and thinking soul, which itself consists of
mind and free-will. 69 However, nowhere in any of these
was any indication given that the image of God might be
trinitarlan one.
It was Augustine who suggested a trinitarlan image
of God.'° He located it in the rational soul, 7 ' and
consisted of memory, intellect, and will, 72 although he
did admit there was a trace of an image of the Trinity
in the outer person (i.e. the bodily senses),' 3 but not
Irenaeus, 'Against HeresIes', 5.16.1-3.
Athanasius, 'The Incarnation of the Word', 11-14; 'Defense
of the Nicene Definition', 4.17; 5.20.
St. Hilary of Poltiers, 'On the Trinity', 3.23; 5.7-10. Cf.
Aquinas' remarks on Hilary in, ST, la. 93, 5.
St. Ambrose, 'Exposition of the Christian Faith', 1.7.53.
' John Cassian, 'The Second Conference of Abbot Isaac', §3-5.
66 Justin, 'On the Resurrection', 7.
69 John of Damascus, 'Exposition of the Orthodox Faith', XII.
'° Augustine, The City of God (413-27), XI.26, 28; On the
Trinity (399-419), VII.6.12; cf. XII.5-7; cf. Origen, 'Coninentary on
Matthew', 14.16; Tertullian, 'Against Marcion', 5.8.
71 Augustine, On the Trinity , XIV.4.6.	 The renewed image
included the 'renewal of the mind', see 'Of the Work of Monks',
41. 72 See Calvin, Institutes, 1.15.4; Augustine, On the Trinity
(399-419), VII.6.12; XV.23-25; City of God (413-27), XI.26-28,
XII.23.23; cf. Aristotle, Ethica Eudemia, 1218 k , 1235, 1236.
Although Augustine did see the symbols of the Trinity in man as 'to
be, to know, and to will', Confessions (397-401), XIII.9.12, there
was a trichotomy in humanity which consisted of 'body, soul, and
mind', VII .17.23.
' Augustine, On the Trinity (399-419), XI.!.!. Cf. Clemen-




In the body itself. 74
 Aquinas agreed with Augustine,
saying if the image were just Christological God would
have said, 'let us make man in thy Image', instead of
'our image' , but it was an image based on God's essence,
or the one-In-three.75
Another Protestant theologian to take up any notion
of a trinitarian image of God (one that even involved
some notion of the flesh) was Andreas Osaander. T t
 In
refuting Osiander, Calvin acknowledged that the image of
God existed in the soul as an image of knowledge,
righteousness, and holiness, but explicitly, and rather
tersely rejected that it was in the image of the
Trinity. 77
 Luther, in his commentary on Genesis, on the
other hand, was more diplomatic in his denial of it.7°
Arminius held to body and soul paradigm for the image of
God, but made no explicit reference to spirit being a
part, and it was certainly not trinitarian. 79
 The
notion of a trinitarian image was also found in the
theologies of Bernard, Bonaventure, John oi the Cross,
and even William Law.°
	 But in none of these was it
developed In the same way as it was by Wesley.
For Wesley, however, the nature of the Triune God
impressed the image of the Triune God into the soul of
man and woman. It could be argued that the basis of the
relationship between the human and the Divine was the
Trinity, which grounds the Trinity as a part of Wesley's
understanding of eternal reason. Trinity Is the nature
of God. The trinitarian image of God In humanity is the
nature of humanity. If that is the case, the problem is
finding an appropriate trilogy to fill the categories
' Augustine, 'On the Soul and Its Origin' 1(419-21), IV.20,
'[...JGod is not a body. How, then, could a body receive His image?'
Aquinas, SF, !a. 93, 5.
See Seeburg, The History
 of Lbctrines (1977), II, 369-72.
Also, Andreas Osiander, Disput. de justificatione (1550); Von dern
einigen Mitler Jhesu Christo und Rechtfertigugng des Glaubens
(155!).
' Calvin, Institutes, I.xv.4-6; but, cf. Commentaries on the
First Book of Moses called Genesis, GenesIs 1.26.
Luther, Luther's Works (1958), I, 60-67.
' Arminlus, Works (1825), II, 362-4.
50 Hobhouse, Writings of William Law (1949), pp. 324-25.
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created by a trinitarian hermeneutic. This tends to
lead one into somewhat arbitrary divisions of personal-
ity and personhood that looks for a trilogy in order to
satisfy a hermeneutical presupposition, which Is what
Wesley seemed to do. On this basis he had a propensity
to discuss the image of God with concepts grouped into
threes.
On a more positive side, what the trinitarlan image
of God also indicates is the profundity of trinitarian
theology in Wesley's understanding of the Christian
system. This will become more obvious as we discuss the
order of salvation. The Triune image anticipated
trinitarian salvation. If one then looks at the Trinity
as three persons as the Godhead relation to each other,
there is another link between the relational aspect of
the Trinity and what we will see to be the relational
aspect of the image of God. The relational aspect of
the Trinity is reflected in the relational nature of the
image of God in man.
One way Wesley's trinitarian division could be
explained is through 1 Thessalonians 5.23 which lists
flesh, spirit, and soul. This trilogy is often seen
in the hymns, where it was suggest together they
comprised the image of God, as the parallelism in this
couplet reveals:
Stamped with the Triune character;
Flesh, spirit, soul, to thee resignl. .1
By spirit, Wesley came to mean 'the highest principle In
man, the immortal spirit made in the image of God,
endued (as all spirits are, so far as we can conceive)
with self-motion, understanding, will, and liberty'. By
body he meant, 'that portion of organized matter which
every man receives in the womb, with which he is born
into the woridl.. .1. At present it is connected with
flesh and blood. But these are not the body. They are
et See, ENNT, 1 Thess. 5.23.
$2 
'Hymns on the Trinity' (1767), No. 14 of 'Hymns and Pray-
ers'; also BEW, VII, 395. See also, 'Hymns on the Trinity' (1767),
97, 126; 'Hymns and Prayers to the Trinity' (1746), 10; BEW, VII,
218, 287, 395, 534, 594, 597, 701, 710.
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only the temporary clothing of the body, which it wholly
puts off in the grave.' By soul he meant, what 'seems
to be the immediate clothing of the spirit, the vehicle
with which it is connected from its first existence,
and which is never separated from it, either in life or
in death. Probably it consists of ethereal or electric
fire, the purest of all matter. e 3
 In spite of this
last sentence, a sentence he would have been much better
off without, Wesley did not believe the soul was a
material substance- a view he soundly rejected in two
sermons after this remark was made- 'On the Omnipresence
of God' (1788), and 'On the Discoveries of Faith'
(1788). The most helpful comment this statement can
offer is that the soul is the 'immediate clothing of the
spirit', the means by which spirit is connected to body.
Apart from this there seems to have been little differ-
ence between soul and spirit for Wesley.
There are several reasons why one could be tempted
to interpret the trinitarian image in this way. If this
trinitarian image is understood as one of flesh, spirit,
and soule4 it would implicate the Incarnation as the
pattern for this trinitarian image of the trinitarian
God, as Christ is the very image of God. 5
 Secondly,
because it takes into consideration the totality of the
body/soul duality, it would locate the image of God
within the whole concept of personhood, and not just in
its spiritual component. But thirdly, this view would
correspond to the great commandment of loving God with
all one's heart, soul, mind, and strength, which is how
Wesley described his understanding of Christian perfec-
tion, which in turn was the renewal of the Image of God,
which in turn corresponds to Wesley's understanding of
the sanctification of 'the spirit, the soul, and the
' 'Some Thoughts on an Expression of St. Paul, in the First
Epistle to the Thessalonians, chap. v. ver. 23.' AM, 9(1786), in
Works, XI, 447-48. Cf. Aquinas, ST, la. 90, 1-3.
' cf. harmony of body, soul, spirit in Origen, 'Cofilnentary on
Matthew', XIV.3; Origin De Principiis, III.vi.1-9 where it seems to
imply that the image of God involves body, soul, spirit.
SS 




body'." Such a view would provide greater continuity
of the body/soul duality from image of God to love of
God as the renewal of the image of God. But Wesley did
not develop the trinitarlan image of body, soul, and
spirit in his sermons, and the references to the flesh,
spirit, and soul being the trinitarian Image of God are
scant. He even said in one context that since God was
spirit, so also was man, who was made in the Image of
God.' 7
 In general, Wesley did not seek In the Image of
God a corporeal substance." Although Wesley would use
these categories as a way to talk about the entire
person being entirely sanctified, they were not, In
Wesley's mind, a satisfactory solution to the categories
created by his trinitarian hermeneutic. Neither can
they easily accommodate the relational aspects of the
image of God.	 At best they were a trio, but not
trinitarian.
2.4. The Political, Natural, and Moral Image of God
Instead, he more fully pursued and developed an
image of the Triune God which was political (governing),
natural (rational), and moral (relational) in nature, a
trilogy already noticed and taken for granted by many
Wesleyan scholars.' 9
 This is the final aspect of the
development of Wesley's understanding in the image of
God, and will mark a shift from the image of God being
• 'On Perfection' (1784), DEW, II, 75; based on an exegesis of
1 Thess. 5.23, see ENNr.
' 'The General Deliverance' (1781), DEW, II, 438; 'On Divine
Providence' (1786), DEW, II, 540; 'The Unity of the Divine Being'
(1789), BEW, IV, 63.
• One reason for the reluctance to speak of image of God in
corporeal terms could very well have been the reluctance to attach
to God attributes of feminine gender, as was the case of Gregory of
Nyssa, 'On the Making of Man', XVI .8-9.
' e.g., Wynkoop, A Theology of Love (1972), pp. 109-10;
Carter, in, A Contemporary
 Wesleyan Theology , Carter, ed. (1983), I,
204; CollIns, Wesley on Salvation (1989), p.23; Cho, 'Adam's Fall
and God's Grace: John Wesley's Theological Anthropology', Evangel i-
cal Review of Theology 10(1986)3:20; Deschner, Wesley 's Christology
(1985), pp. 69-70. But see, Cox, John Wesley 's Concept of Perfec-
tion (1964), p. 28; and Thinning, Grace. Faith. and Holiness (1988),




primarily rational to it being more relational. This
suggests that Wesley's move to these categories and
their divisions was perhaps not as arbitrary as one
might imagine. They are much better suited for the
profoundly relational aspect of his doctrine of Chris-
tian perfection. Wesley's body/soul duality depicts
individuality, but the trinitarlan image of God depicted
relationality. For Wesley persons are individuals
involved in divine and human relations. Individuality
and relationality are not opposites, but apposites,
existing simultaneously as light exists as both waves
and particles.
Chronologically, however, Wesley never used these
headings until after publishing an extract of Isaac
Watts's, Ruin and Recover y
 of Mankind (1740), in The
Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin (j757)•90 In Watts, one finds
the ideas of the political, natural, and moral nature of
the image of God, although Watts himself makes no
mention of it being an image of the Trinity. By this
time Wesley had developed: (1) an understanding of the
image of God as an image of understanding, liberty, and
will; (2)
	 a trinitarian hermeneutic; and, (3) an
understanding that individuals were 'Transcripts of the
Trinity'. This concept of the moral, natural, and
political image being the Triune image completed a
significant doctrinal shift.
Three years after publishing the extraction of
Watts, these categories appeared with a trinitarian
connection in Wesley's sermon, 'The New Birth' (1760).
'And God', the three-one God, 'said, Let us
make man in our image, after our likeness. So
God created man in his own Image, In the image
of God created he him. ' Not barely in his
natural Image, a picture of his own immortal-
ity, a spiritual being endued with understand-
'° This extraction is found in Works, IX, 353-97, especially p.
355 where they are mentioned. Also see, 'The New Birth' (1760),
BEW, II, 188 and note 5. Wesley implied he had not read Watts's work
until he finished Part III, DOS, Works, IX, 353. He had, however,
extracted Watts in 1740, and published it as Serious Considerations
concerning the Doctrines of Election and Re probation (1740), which
is chapter 13 of Ruin and Recovery of Mankind. My thanks to Herbert
McGonigle who pointed this out to me.
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ing, freedom of will, and various affections;
nor merely In his political image, the
governor of this lower world, having 'dominion
over the fishes of the sea, and over the fowl
of the air, and over the cattle, and over all
the earth'; but chiefly in his moral Image,
which according to the Apostle, is 'righteous-
ness and true holiness'. In this image of God
was man made."
At that point Wesley's understanding of the image of God
was that the triune God created Adam in an Image which
was a natural, political, and moral Image, or essential-
ly relational in nature.
2.5. The Political Image of God
Comparatively speaking, Wesley did not say much
about the political image of God. It was explained only
slightly in his extraction of Isaac Watts', Ruin and
Recovery of Mankind.' 2	Between it,
	 the relevant
sermons, and the Natural Philoso phy , one can put
together a composite view of the political image, from
which we may derive the following traits. First, it
consisted of a governing trait, as Adam was made 'the
governor of this lower world', which essentiaflys poke of
the Adamic relationship with the remainder of creation
beneath him in the chain of being.' 3
 As governor of the
lower world, he was given 'dominion over the brutes'.'4
In Wesley's extraction of a work by Samuel Hebden, also
found in the Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin, there is the
concept of the 'political image' as man's vested
dominion over creation without using the phrase 'politi-
cal image' to describe it.' 5 This dominion was seen as
one of the blessings 'which God gave at first to Adam'''
because It resulted in peace and harmony with the brute
" 'The New Birth' (1760), BEW, II, 188. The emphasis was his.
Cf. 'Free Thoughts on Brute Creation' (an extract of John Hildrop,
Free thoughts upon Brute Creation: or, an Examination of Father
Bougeant's Philosophical Amusements, 1742-43), AM, 6(1783), 35.32 DOS, Works, IX, 355, 38!.
'The New Birth' (1760), DEW, II, 188.
' Works, IX, 381; also ENOF, Gen. 1.26. Cf. Chrysostom,
'Concerning the Statues', Homily 7.3.
' DOS, Works, IX, 400-0!.
" DOS, Works, IX, 381.
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creation. 7 Other implications of the political image
got short treatment In Wesley's, Natural Philosophy
(1777), which was, after all, a survey of the domain of
humanity (albeit fallen humanity), but it does not add
much more than what has been already said.9e
What is curious is that although Wesley never
thought of himself as a politician (saying, 'I am no
politician: Politics lie quite out of my
	 rovince'),
and thought it best that Christian ministers should
steer clear of political controversy 100
 (which he did
not always do himself), he did go through a period of
interest In political issues. But nowhere Is this
developed into any comprehensive political theory of
civil government, yet Wesley's assumptions on such
matters may be seen in much of what he said. 101 Some of
DOS, Works, IX, 381; cf. 'The Apocalypse of Sedrach',
VI. ge NP (1777), II.li.3.
'Free Thoughts on the Present State of Public Affairs. In a
Letter to a FrIend.' (1770), p. 1; in Works, XI, 14.100 
'How far is it the duty of a Christian minister to preach
politics?', in AM 5(1782), 151, and Works, XI, 154-55.
Wesley wrote several political tracts, e.g. 'Free Thoughts
on the Present State of Public Affairs' (1770); 'Thoughts upon
Liberty' (1772); 'Thoughts Concerning the Origin of Power' (1772,
Wesley's response to the spread of democracy); 'Thoughts on the
Present Scarcity of Provisions' (1773, a plan to solve unemployment,
reduce the national debt, and lower taxes); 'Thoughts upon Slavery'(1774); 'A Calm Address to our American Colonies' (1775). In this
tract he extracted Samuel Johnson's 'Taxation No Tyranny', resulting
in several counter-publications, e.g. Caleb Evans', 'A Letter to the
Rev. Mr. John Wesley, occasioned by his 'Calm Address'' (1775);
'Political Empiricism: a Letter to the Rev. Mr. John Wesley' (1776),
by an unknown author; and, August Toplady's 'The Old Fox Tarr'd and
Feather'd' (1776). Still Wesley continued to write on political
matters with tracts such as, 'Some Observations on Liberty' (1776,
Wesley's response to Richard Price's, 'Observations on the Nature of
Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and
Policy of the War with America', see JWJ, VI, 100); 'A Seasonable
Address to the More Serious Part of the Inhabitants of Great
Britain, Respecting the Unhappy Contest Between us an our American
Brethren: With an Occasional Word Interspersed to those of a
Different Complexion' (1776); 'A Calm Address to the Inhabitants of
England' (1777); 'Thoughts upon God's Sovereignty' (1777); 'A
Serious Address to the People of England, with Regard to the State
of the Nation' (1778); 'A Compassionate Address to the Inhabitants
of Ireland' (1778); 'An Account of the Conduct of the War in the
Middle Colonies. Extracted from a Late Author' (1780); 'Reflection




these assumptions will be discussed below under the
heading of 'liberty'.
2.6. The Natural Image of God
He did say considerably more about the natural
image of God. He took It to be endued with understand-
ing, will, and liberty, 102
 primarily rational concepts
already mentioned above and developed in his early
sermon, 'The Image of God' (1730). This Is as close as
Wesley came to Augustine's trinitarian understanding of
memory, intellect, and will. Understanding, will, and
liberty functioned as Wesley's understanding of the
Image of God until his reading of Watts, when he
modified and enlarged it to be the political, natural,
and moral image of God, and subsumed the understanding,
will, and liberty under the heading of natural image.
Wesley's basic concept of Adam's original right-
eousness as understanding, will, and liberty remained
intact throughout his career, as a comparison of 'The
Image of God' (1730) with his sermons, 'The General
Deliverance' (178!), and, 'On the Fall of Man' (1782)
reveals.' 03
 However, there were some further develop-
ments.
First, in 'The General Deliverance' he added 'self-
motion', which was just a way of separating animate from
inanimate objects, such as 'machines, stocks and
stones'.'° 4
 This was explained in a bit more detail in,
Natural Philosophy, and illustrates a Newtonian Influ-
ence.' 05
 It should come as no surprise to discover that
101( . 
. continued)
Protestant Association' (1781, a stinging satirical poem by Charles
regarding the Gordon Riots); 'French Liberty: or, an Account of the
Prison of Bicetre in France' AM, 4(1786).102 
'The End of Christ's Coming' (1781),
	 II, 474-75; 'On
the Fall of Man' (1782), DEW, II, 409.b03 Cf. 'The General Deliverance' (178!), DEW, II, 438-39, and
'On the Fall of Man' (1782) DEW, II, 409-10. Cf. his extract of
Thomas Boston, Human Nature In its Fourfold Statel...] (1720) in
'Part VII.' of DOS, Works, IX, 434-64.104 
'Heavenly Treasure in Earth Vessels' (1790), DEW, IV, 163.
NP (1777), I, 151 ff.
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'self-moving' was a part of the remains of the image of
God after the fall.°
Secondly, perhaps because of the concurrent
development of the free-will aspects of Arminianism, the
heading of liberty was a bit more emphatic In, 'The
General Deliverance' (1781). There he stated that
without liberty, which was freedom of choice, Adam would
not have been any different from 'a piece of marble'.101
The concept of liberty was given a prominent role in the
image of God, giving it an important part in Wesley's
understanding of what it means to be human. 'Man was
made with an entire indifference, either to keep or
change his first estate: it was left to himself what he
would do; his own choice was to determine him in all
things'.'°	 All of which left Wesley to exclaim in his
sermon 'On the Fall of Man' (1782),
'So God created man in his own image: in the
image of God created he him?'	 Mark the
emphatical repetition? God did not make him
mere matter, a piece of senseless, unintel-
ligent clay, but a spirit like himselfi. . .IAs
such he was endued with understanding, with a
will, including various affections, and with
liberty, a power of using them in a right or
wrong manner, of choosing good or evil.
Otherwise neither his understanding nor his
will would have been to any purpose; for he
must have been as incapable of virtue or
holiness as the stock of a tree. Adam, in
whom all mankind were then contained, freely
preferred evil to good.109
Although Adam was made in the image of God, 'F...)yet he
was not made immutablel...). He was therefore created
able to stand, and yet liable to fall'.''° The natural
image (as understanding, will, and liberty) is what
enabled him to do one or the other- to keep the moral
law, or to break it. This understanding of liberty was
largely based upon a scholastic understanding of
liberty. In his sermon, 'What is Man?' (1788) he would
speak of a 'liberty of contrariety', or 'a power to do
109 
'Heavenly Treasure in Earth Vessels' (1790), BEW, IV, 163.
'°' 'The General Deliverance' (1781), BEW, II, 439.
'The Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 295.
109 'On the Fall of Man' (1782), BEW, II, 409-10.
110 
'The New Birth' (1760), DEW, II, 189.
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or not to do', and 'a liberty of contradiction', or
'the power to act one way or the contrary'.' 1 ' We have
already seen the importance the concept of liberty has
played in Wesley's theodicy, and its implications on
doctrine of God.
But the concept of liberty had more than just
abstract or speculative consequences. While not formally
a part of the political image of God, the concept of
liberty did have profound political consequences for
Wesley. If liberty is a part of the image of God, then
liberty must be considered a basic and fundamental human
right. It was on this basis that he stood firmly
against slavery, saying,
Liberty is the right of every human creature,
as soon as he breathes the vital air. And no
human law can deprive him of that right, which
he derives from the law of nature.
If therefore you have any regard to
Justice, (to say nothing of Mercy, nor of the
revealed Law of GOD) render unto all their
due, Give Liberty to whom Liberty is due, that
is to eveiy child of man, to every partaker of
human nature. Let none serve you but by his
own act and deed, by his own voluntary choice.
Away with all whips, all chains, all compul-
sion? Be gentle towards all men. And see
that you invariably do unto every one, as you
would he should to unto You.'''
Such a view was not derived from political theories of
human rights, but more likely from Anthony Benezet, a
French born Quaker.'' 3
 Obviously for Wesley the image
of God had moral implications, especially where slavery
was concerned. He was unequivocally against slavery,
and on this issue he did become politically involved, so
" 'What is Man?' (1788), BEW, IV, 24. See Outler's note 19
in which he attributes this to a scholastic distinction differen-
tiating between the liberty of angels and that of men. However, he
makes no connection between Wesley and his extraction of Thomas
Goad, A Discourse Concerning
 the Necessity and Contingency of Events
in the World, in respect of God's Eternal Decrees in the AM, where
this distinction also appeared. It should also be noted that this
is slightly different from the type of liberty Locke discussed in
the section extracted by Wesley in AM, 5(1782), 476-8.
" 'Thoughts upon Slavery' (1774), p. 51. For an excellent
treatment of this subject see, Smith, John Wesle y and Slavery
(1986), but note that he refers to Wesley's third edition, which has
a different pagination than the first.
" Smith, John Wesley
 and Slavery (1986), p. 78.
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much so thatis last letter was to William Wilberforce,
the Parliamentary campaigner for the abolition of
slavery. 1 1 4
But he was also equally against the American cries
for liberty.'' 5
 He never sought to cover his Toryism,
which he defined as 'one that believes God, not the
people, to be the origin of all civil power'.' In
defense of this position, Wesley wrote, 'Some Observa-
tions on Liberty: Occasioned by a late Tract' (1776).
The 'late Tract' was Richard Price's, 'Observations on
the nature of Civil Liberty, the principles of Govern -
ment, and the justice and policy of the war with
America' (1776). There, Price had argued for an
understanding of moral and physical liberty, which
Wesley denied, arguing for religious and civil liberty
instead, of which Wesley thought the Americans had
plenty.'' 7
 In 'Thoughts upon Liberty' Wesley argued
that religious liberty Is a right to
every living manE.. .1 as he is a rational
creature. The Creator gave him this right
when he endowed him with understandingE. . . I
this is an Indefeasible right; It is in-
separable from humanity. And God did never
give authority to any man, or number of men,
to deprive any child of man thereof, under any
114 See, JWL, VIII, 264-65.
115 See, Charles Wesley, 'The American War', in Unpublished
Poetry
 (1988), I, 41-57; Jarboe, Bibliography (1987), entries 75,
1996-2000 for a series of publications on this poem. For John on the
Revolutionary War see, Alderfer, 'British Evangelical Response to
the American Revolution', Asbury
 Seminarian, 18(1964)2, 22-48; Cop-
plestone, 'John Wesley and the American Revolution', Reli gion in
Life, 45(1976), 89-105; Holland, 'John Wesley and the American
Revolution' Journal of Church and State, 5(1963), 199-213; Hutchin-
son, 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: A Fresh Look at Wesley and the
American Revolution', Christian Advocate 9(1965)12, 12-13; Morgan,
"The Dupes of Designing Men": John Wesley and the Amer I can Revo I u-
tion', Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church,
44(1975), 121-31; Allan, '"I Fear God and Honour the King": John
Wesley and the American Revolution', Church History , 45(1976), 316-
28; Stokes, 'The Baptist and Methodist Clergy in South Carolina and
the American Revolution', South Carolina Historical Magazine,
73(1972), 87-96; Harvey, 'The Wesleyan Movement and the American
Revolution' (1962).
uS JWL, VII, 305-6 (1785).117 Observations on Liberty: Occasioned by a late Tract'
(1776), in Works, XI, 90-118; cf. 'Thoughts upon Liberty' (1772),
p16.
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colour or pretence whatever. What an amazing
thing is it, then, that the governing part of
almost every nation under heaven should have
taken upon them, in all ages, to rob all under
their power of this liberty!11'
To Wesley, civil liberty consisted of a 'liberty to
enjoy our lives and fortunes in our own way; to use our
property, whatever is legally our own, according to our
own choice.''' 9 Wesley rightfully said what they really
wanted was not liberty, but independence. 120 To Wesley,
The spirit of Independency, which our poet so
justly terms
The glorious fault of angels and God;12'
(that is,	 in plain terms, of devils) the same
which so many call lfberty(. ••]122
What Wesley really objected to was what he saw as the
'indefensible' republican notion that power had its
origin in the people. To him, 'There is no power but of
God.'' 23 He was convinced that instead of independence
the Americans should long for real liberty,
liberty from sin, true civil liberty; a
liberty from oppression of every kind; from
illegal violence; a liberty to enjoy their
lives, their persons and their property- in a
word, a liberty to be governed in all things
by laws of their country. They will again
enjoy true British libertyE...1'24
Much more could be said about Wesley's concept of
liberty, indeed much needs to be said, as it is an area
which still remains relatively unexplored. But the
temptation to head In such a direction here must be
'j' 'Thoughts Upon Liberty' (1772), Works, XI, 37-38.119 
'Thoughts Upon Liberty' (1772), Works, XI, 41.
120 'Some Observations on Liberty: Occasioned by a late Tract'
(1776), p. 5.
121 A quote from Pope, 'Elegy to the Memory of an Unfortunate
Lady', 1. 13. See ()jtler's footnote, BEW, III, 606. The Latin
translation would be 'felix culpa'.
122 'The Late Word of God in North America' (1778), BEW, III,
606-7.
123 'Thoughts Concerning the Origin of Power' (1772), in Works,
XI, 52-3. Later on, when he wrote, 'Some Observations on Liberty' he
quoted himself verbatim from the passage above, with one difference-
'The supposition, then, that the people are the origin of power, or
that 'all government is the creature of the people', though Mr.
Locke himself should attempt to defend it, is utterly indefensible'
('Observations on Liberty' (1776), pp. 18-19; in Works, XI, 104).




resisted. It is suffice to say that for Wesley, liberty
was a part of the image of God, an image which guaran-
teed certain human rights. But to press a political
theory which propagated a definition of liberty which
sought to usurp the power of God was not a liberty in
the image of God, but the image of Satan, the essence of
original sin itself. This in itself could be the cause
of 'National Sins and Miseries', which were subject to
punishment by God. t25
	To Wesley, a liberty which saw
people as the origin of power, and not God was liberty
in the image of Satan. The positive side of Wesley's
concept of liberty was that it was to be used to
maintain a right relationship with God as creator, and
with other human beings, as God's creation in the Divine
image.	 Even his concept of liberty was marked by a
shift from being rational to relational.
2.7. The Moral Image of God
The third area in which Adam was created in the
image of God was in a moral image, endued with know-
ledge, righteousness, and true holiness,' 29
 which
entailed 'the knowledge of God, his will, and his
law'. 27
 This is the most relational of all the aspects
of the image of God, and after reading Watts, Wesley
would say to Taylor, 'this is the chief part of that
'image of God' in which man was originally created.'12
He used the attributes of righteousness
	 and true
holiness to describe the image of God before his 1757
extraction of Watts, 129
 but after 1757 they were
specifically subsumed under the moral image. Likewise,
he had developed an understanding of the moral law in
his sermon 'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the
125 
'National Sins and Miseries' (1775),
	 1 III, 569-76.12 
'The End of Christ 's Corning' (1781),	 , II, 475; 'On the
Fall of Man' (1782), BEW, II, 41!.
127 ENNT (1755), Colossians 3.10.
129 DOS, Works, IX, 34!, 38!; ENYT (1765), Gen. 1.26; cf.
Arminius, Works (1825), II, 151.
129 ENNT (1755), Ephesians 4.24.
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Law' (175O).° But again, it was not until after his
reading of Watts that it could be applied to, and
subsumed under, the heading of the moral image of God.
In short, the moral image of God was knowledge of God's
moral law. Bather than discuss the moral law here, it
will be discussed under the heading of prevenient grace,
for reason that will be more obvious then. What can be
said now is that to this moral law, God 'required full
obedience in every pointi...]. No allowance was made for
any falling short'. 13 ' This meant Adam walked with God
by sight, not by faith, as faith is presupposed by sin,
based upon a covenant of works, not grace.' 32
 In
keeping the moral law, Adam '"loved the Lord his God
with all his heart, and with all his mind, and soul, and
strength" ' • 1 3 3
Either the new-created man loved God supreme-
ly, or not. If he did not, he was not
innocent; since the very law and light of
nature require such a love to God. If he did,
he stood disposed for every act of obedience.
And this is true holiness of heart.'34
For Wesley, this was the essence of Adam's original
righteousness, and true holiness, which was,
the love of God, governing the senses, appe-
tites, and passions[. . .lproperly and directly,
a right temper or disposition of mind, or a
complex of all right tempers.'35
Or, to put it yet another way,
The love of God is righteousness, the moment
it exists in any soull. . .1. And yet he had a
power either to follow the dictates of that
love, (in which case his righteousness would
have endured for ever,) or to act contrary
130 For the significance of this development see Out ler,
'Introduction: (1750), DEW, II, 1-3.
131 'Justification by Faith' (1746), DEW, I, 184.132 
'The Law Established through Faith' (1750), BEW, II, 27;
'The Law Established through Faith, II' (1750), II, 39-40; cf. 'The
Righteousness of Faith' (1746), I, 203 and note 210, where the
dialectic between the covenant of works and grace is taken up by
Wesley. Cf. Arminius, Works (1825), II, 22-24, who specifies that
Adam had no need for faith in Christ.
'	
'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 184.
134 Isaac Watts, Ruin and Recovery of Mankind (1740), p. 6 as
extracted by Wesley in DOS, Works, IX, 354. It was also quoted on
p. 345, but as Wesley found it in Taylor SDOS, p. 186.135 DOS, Works, IX, 342.
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thereto; but love was righteousness still,
though it was not irresistible.'3
This was not just 'negative righteousness', or even an
imputed righteousness, but a positive, and dynamic
righteousness and holiness, experienced, and maintained
by Adam's obedience to the moral law before the fall.'31
Because he was righteous and holy he was also happy. In
holiness was the fullness of love, and happiness was the
enjoyment of that love.'36
In this way the moral law and original righteous-
ness were also joined together in love. The love of God
is righteousness, a righteousness lost in original sin,
but restored in entire sanctification. Each aspect of
the moral image of God, and the moral law has love as a
focus. Love was the essential character of the moral
image, and the moral law of God, as seen in Adam before
the fall, and the essence of righteousness.' 39
 The
fullness of the moral image was contingent upon Adam's
obedience to the moral law.
In all, before the fall, Adam's political, natural,
and moral image of God resulted in the supreme perfec-
tion	 of	 man-morally, physically, spiritually, and
intellectually.' 40
 There was perfect balance and
symmetry in all human relationships- between humanity
and God, between humanity itself, and between humanity
138 DOS, Works, IX, 344. For Taylor's objections to the notion
that Adam loved God supremely see, pp. 345-46.
See Cutler's comments in BEW, I, 196 note 90, where he
directs inquiries to St. Irenaeus, 'Against Heresies', 3.22.5; and
St. Athanasius, 'Contra Gentes', 3.
136 'Justification by Faith' (1746),
	 , I, 185 and note 18;
'The Mystery of Iniquity' (1783), I3EW, II, 452
139 This doctrine was in conflict with Taylor's own understand-
ing of original righteousness. Taylor argued that,
to say, God created Adam righteous, is to affirm a contradic-
tion, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteous-
ness. For a righteousness wrought in him without his knowledge
or consent, would have been no righteousness at all (Taylor,
SDOS (1750), p. 161, in DOS, Works, IX, 342).
Wesley's counter-argument was simply that Adam's original righteous-
ness consisted of the image of God in which 'man was originally
created' (DOS, Works, IX, 341).
140 DOS, Works, IX, 293. The texts he was discussing with
Taylor at in that particular context were Ephesians 2.15. 19-22;




and creation, giving the concept of original righteous-
ness an understanding of the original 'rightness' of all
human relationships. This rightness of relations meant
Adam's pleasure was uninterrupted by evil of any kind.
Neither his body nor his mind knew sorrow or pain of any
kind. He was incapable of suffering. 'To crown all, he
was immortal.'' 4 ' This was a notion explored early in
his career, but not fully developed until the latter
part, when he became more concerned with speculative
anthropology. 142
Using the categories of political, natural, and
moral image was a significant development for Wesley in
at least two ways. First, in terms of his empirical
anthropology, it was under the heading of moral image
that Wesley started to develop an understanding of the
moral law, and eventually the concepts of conscience,
and prevenient grace, which will be discussed more fully
in chapter five. In doing so, there was a shift from
the image of God being primarily rational, as was seen
in his 1730 sermon, 'The Image of God', to being
essentially relational. Secondly, this will also prove
to be a crucial development in Wesley's understanding of
the order of salvation, particularly Christian perfec-
tion. A comparison of two sermons, 'Christian Perfec-
tion' (1741) with 'On Perfection' (1784) reveals that it
was only after 1757 that
	 Wesley started to think of
Christian perfection as being renewed in the moral image
of God.' 43
 While Wesley may well not have started
preaching the attainability of Christian perfection in
this lifetime until after his reading of Gell in 1741,
he did not have a working definition of original sin
which would have accommodated such a view until after
141 
'The General Deliverance' (178!), 13EV, II, 438-40.142 
'The Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 294 and note 10; 'The
General Deliverance' (1781), 13EV, II, 438-39; 'The End of Christ's
Coming' (178!), 13EV, II, 474; 'On the Fall of Man' (1782), BEW, II,
405-07; 'On Perfection' (1784), 13EV, III, 72-73; 'The New Creation'
(1785), , II, 510; 'On Temptation' (1786), 13EV, III, 159;
'Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels' (1790), 13EV, IV, 162.
's 'On Perfection' (1784), 13EV, III, 75.
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his reading of Watts. 144
 These new-found categories
enabled Wesley to have 'perfection' without 'perfec-
tionism'. The significance of this will be developed in
a later chapter.
2.8. Summary of Development
In the development of Wesley's concept of the image
of God there were these important aspects: (1) the Image
of God as understanding, will, and liberty, and the
original righteousness of Adam which reflected both a
rational understanding of the image of God, and Wesley's
aesthetic theme of creation; (2) the trinitarian
hermeneutic which sought to understand creation from a
trinitarian point of view; (3) the poetic expression of
this hermeneutic in the trinitarian hymns of Charles as
published by John, especially as those hymns appeared in
the Collection; and, (4) the influence of Watts and the
formation of the political, natural, and moral image of
God, which Incorporated his earlier ideas on Adam's
original righteousness, and the trinitarian aspects of
the image of God. This marked a shift from the image of
God being rational to the image being relational In
character.
It must be emphasized again that the creation of
the category of the moral image of God was an important
development for Wesley's own Christian system, especial-
ly where his understanding of Christian perfection was
concerned.	 The category of the moral image of God
corresponded well to Wesley's notion of Christian
perfection being the renovation of the moral image of
God, which resulted in right relationships between God
and neighbour, as will be seen later.
The fall of the first man and woman Is where
speculative anthropology ended for Wesley, and empirical
anthropology began. Because of the image of God in the
soul of man, speculative anthropology said as much about
the doctrine of God as It did the doctrine of humanity.
Empirical anthropology, on the other hand, says more
144 Outler,	 I, 83-85.
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about the doctrine of humanity than the doctrine of God.
In the same respect, in speculative anthropology,
Wesley's Adam was created in God's Image. His empirical
anthropology tended to create fallen Adam in fallen
humanity's image. Without the fall the entire image of
God, 'in which Adam was first created, now remains in
all his posterity'. 145
 To Wesley it was clearly evident
this was not the case. What this section will attempt
to do is outline Wesley's understanding of the nature
and consequences of Adam's fall.
3. The Fall and Its Consequences: Empirical Anthropology
When Wesley spoke of 'the Fall', he technically
spoke of a series of events which began with Eve's
unbelief, and ended with the eating of the fruit, and
the breaking of the moral law.'46
Here sin began, namely, unbelief.
	 'The woman
was deceived,' says the Apostle.' 47
 She
believed a lie: she gave more credit to the
word of the devil than to the word of God. And
unbelief brought forth actual sin.'4
It will perhaps be remembered that in the sermon, 'The
Law Established Through Faith' (1750) Wesley said faith
did not exist under the covenant of works, because faith
presupposed sin. It would initially appear either
Wesley contradicted himself, or he changed his mind. If
one gives Wesley the benefit of the doubt, 'belief' in
this context means thinking God to be true. If living
under a covenant of works meant Eve knew nothing of
faith, more specifically 'saving faith', she could still
'believe' God. When she stopped believing God, she no
longer thought God to be true. This is what brought
about the actual sin. When Wesley talked about personal
sin (the subject of the next chapter) there was a
deliberate substitution of 'faith' for 'belief', saying,
'the loss of faith must precede the committing outward
145	
, Works, IX, 291.
'	
'The New Birth' (1760), BEW, II, 189.147	 Timothy 2.14. Cf. his cofilnents in ENNT (1755).
'	
'On the Fall of Han' (1782), BEW, II, 402-03.
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sin.'' 4 ' Sin was not defined here in terms of unbelief.
Unbelief led to sin, just as faith led to obedience.
With Adam, however, it was a different matter. It
was, 'Not by sinful inclinations but by yielding to
temptation, he did lose the love and image of God'.'5°
This temptation was not because he was deceived by Eve
(who was 'more easily deceived, and more easily de-
ceives'), but because he was persuaded by her.' 5 ' He
sinned with his eyes open.
	 He rebelled
against his Creator, as is highly probable,
Not by stronger reason moved,
But fondly overcome with female charms.'52
And if this was the case there is no absurdity
in the assertion of a great man that 'Adam
sinned in his heart before he sinned out-
wardly, before he ate of the forbidden fruit;'
namely by inward idolatry, by loving the
creature more than the Creator.153
If Adam had been persuaded it was certainly not on
rational grounds, but by feminine charms in an appeal to
the senses.' 54
	Through his action he exemplified the
human propensity to worship creature rather than
Creator. While all individuals might be born 'atheists
in the world', this 'does not screen us from Idolatry.
In his natural state every man born into the world is
' 'The Great Privilege of those that are Born of God' (1748),
DEW, I, 441; cf. 'The Wilderness State' (1760), DEW, II, 208-1!,
214-17.
'° DOS, Works, IX, 345.
'' ENNT (1755), 1 Timothy 2.14; cf. 'On the Fall of Man'(1782), DEW, II, 403, 410.
152 Notice once again the influence of Milton, cf. Paradise
Lost, IX.998-99.
' 'On the Fall of Man' (1783), DEW, II, 403; cf. ENNT (1755),
llomans 1.25; 'Spiritual Idolatry' (178!), DEW, III, 103-14; 'Dives
and Lazarus' (1788), DEW, III, 15; 'Original Sin' (1759), DEW, II,
179; 'On the Wedding Garment' (1790), DEW, IV, 144-45; 'The Deceit-
fulness of the Human Heart' (1790), BEW, IV, 154.
' In, 'Wiser than the Children of Light' (1735), DEW, IV,
366, Wesley said that such a temptation was to tempt one at one's
most tender part about us, 'through the Eve of our natures'. For an
even more provocative view of women see 'Hymns for Children, and
Others of Riper Years' (1768), 'HYMNS for GullS. HYMN LXVII'.
'1 AhI dire effect of female pride?! How deep our mother's sin,
and wide,! Thro' all her daughters spread?! Since first she
pluck'd the mortal tree,! Each woman would a goddess be/ In her
Creator's stead.
2 This fatal vanity of mind,! A curse intail'd on all the kind,!
Her legacy we feel,! We neither can deny nor tame! Onr inbred
eagerness for fame,! And stubbornness of will.'
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a rank idolater.' 5
	The meanest forms of which are
pride and selfwil1.'58
Wesley's exegesis of the Genesis passage, with Its
dire warning of the risk of succumbing to the wiles of
feminine allurement, and putting one's wife above God's
command, must be put In the context of Wesley's own
views on sexuality and marriage. His hearty endorse-
ments of a single life were made public in a series of
tracts, 'Thoughts on Marriage and a Single Life' (1743),
'Thoughts on a Single Life' (1765),' and, 'A Thought
upon Marriage' (1785). 158
 In the last one he warned
that seeking happiness in a wife was no different from
idolatry. Then, quoting himself from, 'On the Fall of
Man' (1783), he remarked, 'Is It not, in effect, loving
the creature more than the Creator?' 159
 Adam's fall
could also be a Methodist preacher's fall by putting
wife and family before the circuit.'8°
The point really to be made here is that like
Augustine, Wesley believed Adam and Eve sinned in their
hearts before eating the fruit.' 8 ' Eve was deceived and
no longer believed, and Adam was persuaded and no longer
loved. For Wesley, inward idolatry and unbelief were
the spiritual dynamics precipitating the fall, and
becoming the, 'description of the existential situation
of man throughout history', making faith and love, trust
155 
'Original Sin' (1759), BEW, II, 179 and note 41, where
Outler states, 'Cf. Thomas Manton, Works (168!), IV.4!: 'Every man
is naturally an Idolater, and he makes the creature his God;' also,
Stephen Charnok, Works (1684), 1.4: 'that secret atheism which is in
the heart of every man by nature'.'
'	
'Original Sin' (1759), BEW, II, 179.
'' Works, XI, 456-63.
'	 Works, XI, 463-65; cf. JWL, VI, 139 (1775).
'	
'A Thought upon Marriage', AM, 8(1785), in Works, XI, 463-
65.
180 The Freudian analysis of this and other aspects of Wesley's
ministry will be left up to the likes of Abelove, Evangelist of
Desire (1990).
'' 'On the Fall of Man' (1782), BEW, II, 403 and n.; cf.
Augustine, Enchiridlon (421-3), !3, 45. Attention should also be
given to Wesley (DOS, Works, IX, 417), quoting Samuel Hebden,
Doctrine of Ori ginal Sin (1741), where no less than six sins were
listed as being implied in the fall, viz, unbelief, irreverence,
ingratitude, pride and ambition, sensuality, and robbery.
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and relationships, the crux of issue of sin. 2 In a
more secondary way, it also established a paradigm for
the relationship between inward and outward sin, which
will play an important part in his understanding of
personal sin. 3
 It was the inward sin which preceded
and gave rise to the outer, resulting in the fall. This
will be discussed later as the 'ordo peccare'.
When Adam and Eve sinned, they did so freely. As
seen in the previous chapter, this single act of willful
disobedience (with all theparxdoxes it created) is, for
Wesley, what accounts for the presence of evil, sin,
pain, and suffering in the world. Original sin was
entirely a moral issue, not an aesthetic one. It all
happened because the moral law was violated and the
Adamic covenant was broken, 'and by breaking this
glorious law welinigh effaced it out of his heart',4
not because there was a material defect in either Adam
or creation. 165
 This was 'the Fall'. What followed was
God's punishment and the consequences of Adam's willful
disobedience.
3.1. The Loss of the Moral Image
Corresponding to his theodicy and accounting for
evil not aesthetically, but morally, is the loss of the
162 In this respect Wesley provides the answers to the problem
posed by Hannah, 'Original Sin and Sanctification: A Problem for
Wesleyans', WI'S, 18(1983)2, 49-50.163 
'The First-fruits of the Spirit' (1746), BEW, I, 239-40,
245-46; 'On Sin in Believers' (1763), BEW, I, 320; 'The Repentance
of Believers' (1767), BEW, I, 336-44; 'Christian Perfection' (174!),
BEW, II, 106; 'The Wilderness State' (1760), BEW, II, 210, 215-16.164 
'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
flEW, II, 7.185 It is worthwhile to compare Wesley with Methodius on the
entire issue of theodicy and the fall. See, Methodius, 'Concerning
Free-Will', especial ly where he says, 'For this was the meaning of
the gift of Free Will. And man after his creation receives a
coninandment from God; and from this at once rises evil, for he does
not obey the divine coninand; and this alone is evil, namely,
disobedience, which had a beginning.' Charles' poetic expression of
the fall may be found in 'HYMN II', in, 'Hymns for Children, and
Others of Riper Years' (1768). The first edition was probably dated
1747, although there seems to be some uncertainty about this. See
Baker, Bibliography , flEW 32-33, unpublished.
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moral image of God.	 With it, Adam lost original
righteousness and true holiness,' that is, the image
of perfect love, righteousness, and liberty. Without
the image of love there is no human liberty, only
slavery to sin.	 Without knowing and loving God, 'the
image of God would not subsist.lsT One of the first,
and most profound consequences of breaking the moral law
and losing the moral image was relational, as Adam and
Eve experienced estrangement from, and broken communion
with, God.' They no longer loved God with all their
heart, soul, mind, and strength. They no longer loved
God because they no longer trusted God, or believed God
to be true.	 The disintegration of their relationship
with the Divine quickly resulted in the experiences of
guilt, sorrow, fear, and despair.IB9	 The estranged
relationship between the human and Divine eventually
resulted in dysfunctional human relationships.	 The
cause of this dysfunction was they no longer loved their
neighbour as themselves. More than anything else, the
loss of the moral image meant the loss of communion with
God, and the beginning of a dysfunctional relationship
between Adam and Eve. It is particularly this relation-
al aspect of original sin Wesley's doctrine of entire
sanctification will seek to restore. The moral image as
a part of original righteousness represented the
perfection of this relational aspect.
The loss of the moral image of God froNi the soul
was compared to, and as traumatic as, the loss of the
soul from the body, equating the loss of the moral image
with spiritual death. In other words, the loss of
relationality resulted in spiritual death. This spirit-
'On the Fall of Man' (1782), BEW, II, 411.
'' 'The New Birth' (1760), BEW, II, 189.
ise DOS, Works, IX, 283-84; cf. 'Original Sin' (1759), BEW, II,
179, 'The will of God meantime is not in his Ethe one who bears the
image of Satan instead of the image of God) thoughts, is not
considered in the least degree; although it be the supreme rule of
every intelligent creature, whether in heaven or earth, resulting
from the essential, unalterable relation which all creatures bear to
their Creator.'




ual death was eventually followed by physical death,17°
which 'hastened on to death everlasting', or the eternal
loss of relationality with God.' 71 Taylor objected to
such an all-encompassing notion of death, saying, 'no
evil but temporal death came upon men In consequence of
Adam's sin'. 172
	Wesley's counter-argument was that God
made Adam a living soul in an immortal body, that is, a
duality. As a consequence of his eating the forbidden
fruit, God took from him the lives he gave Adam as a
living soul, and Adam suffered 'all evils which could
befal his soul and body; death temporal, spiritual, and
eternal ' • 173
For the moment he tasted that fruit he died.
His soul died, was separated from God;
separate from whom the soul has no more life
than the body has when separate from the
soul • 174
Although a duality, the body and soul were actually a
unity. What affected one affected the other.175
If the moral image of God was the chief way in
which Adam was created in the image of God, then the
loss of the moral image (resulting in the loss of
original righteousness), and its relational aspects
should be the primary way in which one thinks about
Wesley on original sin, thus correcting distortions and
deficiencies of many traditional post-Wesley views of
sin. When looked at in this way it can be said that
Wesley's underlying understanding of original sin Is the
deprivation of the moral Image of God and original
righteousness, providing a
	 relational	 and ethical
170 One of Wesley's explanations for Adam's physical death was
atherosclerosis, see 'The Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 297 and
note 19.
171 'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 185; cf. 'The
Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 298; DOS, Works, IX, 24!, 245.
172 DOS, Works, IX, 240.
' DOS, Works, IX, 245. Cf. 'The Way to the KIngdom' (1746),
DEW, I, 227.
174 'JustIfication by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 185. Cf. 'The New
Birth' (1760), , II, 189. Cf. Gregory Nazianzen, 'Oration II'
§17, '1.. . )the soul may be to the body what God is to the soul F. ..)'.
175 'Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels' (1790), 13EV, IV,
165; 'The Image of God' (1730), DEW, IV, 296.
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understanding of original sin.' 7 Entire sanctification
then becomes the restoration and purification of right
relationships between one's self, God, and neighbour.
3.2. The Marring of the Natural, and Political
Images
But Wesley's view of original sin was not exclu-
sively understood in terms of deprivation. The depriva-
tion of the moral image and the consequence of rela-
tional estrangement inevitably resulted in the marring,
and the depravation of the natural, and the political
images.' 77 All of Adam's personhood was corrupted by
the fall.
The natural image (Adam's rationality and under-
standing) was not lost as much as it was marred.'79
Adam did not become an aratlonal creature, but an
irrational one. The evidence of this could be seen in
the 'absurdity' of Adam attempting to hide himself among
the trees of the garden from the 'eye 	 of Omni-
science'.' 79	His understanding was marred by error and
ignorance, confusion and mental slowness, largely
because it 'found the want of suitable organs'.' 9 ° 'And
by sad experience we find that this "corruptible body
presses down the soul''.''
	
Original sin was what
' Aspects said to be lacking in Wesley by Hyrison, 'Original
Sin as Privation', WTJ, 22(1987)2, 69. Cf. Hannah, 'Original Sin and
Sanctification: A Problem for Wesleyans', WTJ, 18(1983)2, 47-53;
Wynkoop, A Theology of Love (1972), pp. 165-83.
' This view of deprivation resulting in depravation was one
picked by many Wesleyan theologians after Wesley, but one largely
ignored by others. See, Hannah, 'Original Sin as Privation', WTJ,
22(1987)2, 70-79.
' 'The End of Christ's Coming' (1781), BEW, II, 474-5.
Wesley extracted Samuel Hebden, Doctrine of Ori ginal Sin (1741), who
traces the doctrine of original sin as being the loss of the image
of God back to Irenaeus, 'Against Heresies', 3.20.2; 4.10.1-2); and,
Tertullian, 'The Soul's Testimony', 3; see, DOS, Works, IX, 430.
'" DOS, Works, IX, 242. This was Wesley quoting Hervey,
Thereon and Aspasio, 'Dialogue 11', Works (1819), II, 357-58. Cf.
'On the Fall of Man' (1782), BEW, II, 403.
eO 
'The Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 298.
'' It is derived from Wisdom of Solomon 9.15 in, 'On the Fall
of Man' (1782), , II, 405; also in 'Wandering 'Thoughts' (1762),
BEW, II, 130 (on Wesley's use of the Apocrypha see note 18), 135;
'Heavenly Treasure In Earthen Vessels' (1790), BEW I, IV, 165, 166;
'The Image of God' (1730), BEW, IV, 298.
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placed limits upon human understanding. His mental
capacity decreased, while his life became filled with
'grief and anger and hatred and fear and shamel...l'.12
The human mind had no freedom left, and consequently, no
liberty, or virtue.
Indeed, what else could the human mind do when
it had no freedom left? Liberty went away
with virtue; instead of an Indulgent master It
was under a merciless tyrant. The subject of
virtue became the slave of vice. It was not
willingly that the creature obeyed vanity; the
rule was now perforce; the sceptre of gold was
changed Into a rod of iron. Before, the bands
of love indeed drew him toward heaven; yet if
he would, he could stoop down to earth. But
now, he was so chained down to earth he could
no so	 much as lift up his eyes toward
heaven. 1 e 3
Freedom had been exchanged for slavery, tyranny was
experienced instead of benevolence, and virtue was lost
to vice. All this points to the fact that even the
inner-personal relationship, and the harmony between
body and soul was critically effected. 'For all this we
may thank Adam'.'84
The political image was marred as well, influencing
Adam's relationship with the world around him. The
chain of being become as dysfunctional. Adam ceased to
mediate blessing to the remainder of the brute crea-
tion, 185
 with which he strted to be in conflict. 'As
man is deprived of his perfection, his loving obedience
to God, so brutes are deprived of their perfection,
their loving obedience to man'.' Wesley even ques-
tioned whether we have any dominion over the brutes at
all as a result of Adam's sin, saying, 'I may shoot a
bear, and then eat him; yet I have no dominion, unless
it be over his carcass'.' 87
 Disorder and chaos became a
way of life.	 All were subject to 'vanity', and became
victims to that barbarous and ravenous 'monster, death,
182 'The Image of God' (1730), DEW, IV, 298.
'	
'The Image of God' (1730), DEW, IV, 298-99.
184 'God's Love to Fallen Han' (1782), DEW, II, 423.
'	
'The General Deliverance' (178!), DEW, II, 442.
'The General Deliverance' (1781), DEW, II, 443.
'' DOS, Works, IX, 347-48, 353.
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the conqueror of all that breathe'. 1
	Wesley said with
Watts, 'If beasts suffer, then man is fallen'. 199	To
top it all off, weeds grew from the soil in which Adam
consequently had to toil.'' 0
 In general, Adam was
totally corrupt 'in every faculty of the soul', with 'no
soundness in the soul', and he was consequently respon-
sible for the corruption of the world around him.'91
3.3. Original Sin and Total Depravity
In this respect, Wesley did not lack in 'negative
superlatives' in describing humanity apart from the
grace of God. 192 'By nature ye are wholly
corrupted'. 19 ' We are '"conceived in sin", and "shapen
in wickedness"', so that in our natural state there is
'"no good thing''. All imagination and thoughts of the
heart are '"evil", "only evil", and that "continual-
1 y" ' • 1 9 4
There were several metaphors used by Wesley to
describe this total depravity. One was the 'image of
Satan'. Using the strongest language possible, Wesley
said that instead of the image of God, Adam became
stamped with the Image of Satan, the personification of
pride, self-will, and self-love. 195
 Adam even demon-
'The New Creation' (1785), BEW, II, 508-9 (Wesley's
adjective for the monster was actually 'fell', but see Outler's note
44); cf. 'God's Approbation of His Works' (1782), DEW, II, 395; 'The
General DelIverance' (1781), DEW, II, 443.
'' DOS, Works, IX, 389, quoting Isaac Watts, Ruin and Recovery
of Mankind, p. 389.
190 'On the Fall of Man' (1782), BEW, II, 405.
" 'The Way to the Kingdom' (1746), BEW, I, 225; cf. ENNT
(1755), Romans 6.6; and, DOS, Works, IX, 319, '[...lwhen man, the
lord of the visible creation, rebelled against God, every part of
the creation began to suffer on account of his sin.'
" Collins, Wesley on Salvation (1989), p. 22.
'' 'Original Sin' (1759), BEW, II, 185. Cf. 'Justification by
Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 185; 'The Righteousness of Faith' (1760),
DEW, I, 212; 'The Way to the Kingdom' (1746), DEW, I, 225; 'The
Circumcision of the Heart' (1733), DEW, I, 403; 'Self-denial'
(1760), DEli, II, 242.
" 'Original Sin' (1759), BEW, II, 183; cf. Psalms 51.5,
Pomans 7.18.
On the 'image of Satan' see, DEW, XIX, 97 (1739); 'The
Repentance of Believers' (1767), DEW, I, 351; 'Original Sin' (1759),




strated a resemblance with 'the image of the beast, in
sensual appetites and deslres'.'' The marred was mixed
with the Satanic, and even the beastly. Another metaphor
Wesley frequently used was that of sin as disease.
Wesley used medical metaphors of sin as a disease, and
sickness, more than he used legal, or forensic ones,
which had dominated the Western doctrine of salvation
since the time of Anselm. 197
 He said, '"The whole head
is sick, and the whole heart faint. From the sole of the
foot even unto the head there is no soundness, but
wounds and bruises and putrifying sores."' 19
 He often
referred to the disease more specifically as 'leprosy'.
When the image of God was lost sin overspread the entire
human soul, like a 'loathsome leprosy' until
	 it cor-
rupted the soul's every power and faculty.' 99
 It is not
just that a part of us is missing. Because of self-
love's perversity the part of our humanity that remains
is sick. Without the image of God Adam became sick with
a leprosy of the soul. 20 °	 Wesley said, 'Know your
disease I
But he continued to say just as insistently,
Know your cure! Ye were born in sin; therefore
'ye must be born again,' 'born of God' . By
nature ye are wholly corrupted; by grace ye
195( 
.continued)
Needful' (1734), IV, 355; BEW, XIX, 97 (1739). Cf. J. Arndt, True
Christianity, Chapter 2, 'What the Fall of Adam Is', which can be
found in Wesley's CL, I, 172; and Luther, Works, I, 63.196 
'The New Birth' (1760), BEW, II, 190.197 Ckitler, DEW, I, 79. Cf. 'The Circumcision of the Heart'
(1733), DEW, I, 404; 'The One Thing Needful' (1734), DEW, IV, 356,
357; 'The Trouble and Rest of Good Men' (1735), DEW, III, 533-34;
'Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, VI' (1748), DEW, I, 586;
'Original Sin' (1759), DEW, II, 184; 'On Sin in Believers' (1763),
DEW, I, 323 and note 43; 'On the Death of George Whitefield' (1770),
DEW, II, 342; 'On the Education of Children' (1783), DEW, III, 349;
'On Friendship with the World' (1786), DEW, III, 134-35; 'c2auses of
the Inefficacy of Christianity' (1789), BEW, IV, 86-7.
Isaiah 1.5-6 in, 'Original Sin' (1759), BEW, II, 176.
'" cf. Gregory Nazianzen, 'Oration II', § 21-22.200 
'The One Thing Needful' (1734), DEW, IV, 354; also, see
DEW, VII, nos., 1, 31, 38, 47, 68, 82, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 383,
384, 385, 386, etc. Cf. Luther, Works, I, 62, 64. 'Bet after the
Fall death crept like leprosy into all our perceptive powers, so
that with our Intellect we cannot even understand that image'.




shall be wholly renewed. 'In Adam ye all
died;' in the second Adam, 'in Christ, ye all
are made alive.'201
Wesley often used analogies of sin as a sickness, and
the Platonic concept of 'therapy of the soul' 202 as
salvation. The hymns of John and Charles Wesley are a
catalogue of such analogies between sin and sickness,
'therapy of the soul' and salvation. Examples of these
analogies can be seen in the following:
Speak, gracious Lord, my sickness cure,
Make my infected nature puret.
My Sin's incurable disease,
Thou, Jesus, thou alone canst healL..J204
Wouldst thou the body's health restore,
And not regard the sin-sick soul?
The sin-sick soul thou lov'st much more,
And surely thou shalt make it whole.205
This genre of medical analogies provided an alternative
way of looking at the problem of sin, and a fresh way of
looking at salvation as sin's solution. It is a view
which sees original sin as a sickness resulting from the
lost image of righteousness, holiness, and love, marring
the character of humanity, i.e. body, soul, and spirit,
and sees salvation as healing, resulting in wholeness,
holiness, and love.
Where total depravity was concerned Wesley certain-
ly stood with the Reformers. The reason for Wesley
having such a strong doctrine of total depravity was
somewhat simple. 'This then Is the foundation of the
new birth- the entire corruption of our nature',20
hence the logicality of the sermon, 'Original Sin'
preceding the sermon, 'The New Birth' in volume four of
Sermons on Several Occasions (1760). But by using the
strongest language possible Taylor accused Wesley of
201 'Original Sin' (1759), BEW, II, 185.
202 'Therapeia psucheis', or 'therapy of the soul' is a
Platonic concept found in Politia, IX:585.D; Laches, 185e; Gagias,
513a; Republic, 585a. Wesley uses the Greek phrase at least twice,
DOS, Works, IX, 194; 'Original Sin' (1759), BEW I II, 184.
203 DEW, VII, 238.
204 DEW, VII, 556-557.
205 DEW VII, 559.200 
'The New Birth' (1760), BEW, II, 190.
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having a depravity that was so total it seemed to
despise humanity. When this charge was made by Taylor,
Wesley argued, the cross was sufficient reason to deny
God's despising depraved humanity, and cause enough for
the children of God to love as they have been loved.20'
But what separated Wesley from the Reformers was
prevenient grace, the first step in the order of
salvation. In this respect there was no such thing as a
'natural man', as everyone had a certain measure of
prevenient grace. This will not be explored here, but
in chapter five.
3.4. Summary
Wesley firmly believed that what we have lost in
Adam is an essential part of our humanity- our image of
God, and our relationship with God.	 Without these we
are incomplete.	 Without these, 'no man shall see the
Lord'. As a result, the individual's relationship with
God is estranged.	 But the relationships with those
about us are also strained because we seek to manipulate
them to serve us. We do not love our neighbours as
ourselves. Sin is love locked onto the self, and the
quintessential personification of that selfishness is
Satan, whose image fallen humanity bears. 	 Because this
love is so void of God's image it Is perverse, ironical-
ly,	 making it the strongest form of self-hatred
possible.	 Self-love in the Image of Satan is a love
that seeks to devour all in its path, especially the
self. This self-love could even be said to be the root
of all sin. 208 How can we love ourselves properly until
we love God first, and with all our being? Quoting
Augustine's Confessions, Wesley would say, 'Thou has
made us for thyself; and our heart cannot rest till it
resteth in thee.'20'
207 DOS, Works, XIX, 327.
208 BEW, XXV,, 331 (1732), Susanna's remark to John.
209 Augustine, Confessions, I.i in, 'The Unity of the Divine
Being' (1789), I3EW, IV, 64 and note 27. Found also in Wesley's
extract of John Norris, 'A Treatise on Christian Prudence', 3rd ed.
(1749), p. 4.
Chapter Three	 180
By looking at original sin as the lost image of
God, as a disease tantamount to spiritual leprosy, and
as lost and dysfunctional relationships, the emphasis
is shifted from sin being a 'thing', to sin being a
deprivation of God's image, spiritual health, love for
God and neighbour.	 Sin then becomes moral, and rela-
tional. A humanity without the image of God is a sick
humanity. But such is an Individual's natural state.21°
Only Christ can heal us of this 'loathsome leprosy',
heal our souls, and restore our relationships between
ourselves and God, and ourselves and our neighbours.21'
Prevenient grace was the first step made towards a
sinner's recovery. But faith alone is able to make the
sinner completely whole, 'which is the one medicine
given under heaven to heal' our sin sick souls.212
Faith must precede the renovation of love just as surely
as trust	 must precede the re-establishment of an
estranged relationship.
4. The Fall and Christology, or Adam and Christ
However, before ending our discussion of original
sin some attention needs to be given to relationship
between the fall of Adam and the death of At one
point it was stated in the Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin,
'"Christianity lies properly in the knowledge of what
concerns Adam and Christ."' 213 Knowledge of the
relations between Adam and Christ provides another
insight into eternal reason as 'the nature of God and
the nature of man, with the relations necessarily
subsisting between them'. In Wesley's thought there are
three profound links in the relation between Christ and
Adam. The first theme regards Adam as a 'federal head',
and Christ as the 'representative of all mankind'.
	 The
second theme looks upon original sin as the 'felix
210 Cf. Wesley's extraction of Thomas Boston, Human Nature in
its Fourfold Statel. ..J (1720) in Works, IX, 443, 449.
211 'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1750) BEW, IV, 477.212 
'The Circumcision of the Heart' (1733), BEW, I, 404.213 This is Wesley (in DOS, Works, IX, 429), quoting Samuel
Hebden (Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin, 1741), quoting Augustine. I have
not yet found the precise location of the Augustine quote.
Chapter Three	 181
culpa', or the happy fault, which was based upon the
assumption that if Adam had not sinned, Christ had not
died.	 The third theme is based upon the 'recapitu-
lation' of Adam in Christ, or what we lost in Adam, we
gain in Christ. All three themes are intertwined
together and significant consequences of the original
sin, serving as links between creation and redemption,
the fall of Adam and the death of Christ, consequently
creating	 essential	 links between hamartiology and
soteriology.
4.1. 'The Head of All Mankind'
The presupposition to both '0 felix culpa?' and the
theme of 'recapitulation' was in many respects Adam as
'the federal head'. To Wesley, Adam was the 'represent-
ative of mankind', or a 'federal head'. He joined in
the debate which was actually between Watts and Taylor,
carried on in Taylor's 'Supplement' to his, Scripture
Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin. In responding to 'Section VI'
of Taylor's 'Supplement', Wesley said,
My reason for believing he was so [that Adam
was 'a federal head or representative of
mankind'], in some sense, is this: Christ was
the representative of mankind, when God 'laid
on him the iniquities of us all, and he was
wounded for our transgressions. ' But Adam was
a type or figure of Christ; therefore, he was
also, in some sense, our representative; in
consequence of which, 'all died' in him, as
'in Christ all shall be made alive.'
But as neither representative, nor
federal head, are scripture words, it is not
worth while to contend for them. The thing I
mean is this: The state of all mankind did so
far depend on Adam, that, by his fall, they
all fell into sorrow, and pain, and death,
spiritual and temporal. And all this is
noways inconsistent with either the justice or
goodness of God, provided all may recover
through the Second Adam, whatever they lost
through the first; nay, and recover it with
unspeakable gain; since every additional
temptation they feel, by that corruption of
their nature which is antecedent to their
choice, will, if conquered by grace, be a
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means of adding to that 'exceeding and eternal
weight of glory.'214
His reasoning started with Christ as a representative of
mankind and went back to Adam, who was seen as a
prefigure of Christ. On this link it was reckoned that
if we were not ruined by the first Adam, who was the
representative of humankind, neither can we be restored
by the second Adam, who is Christ.. 215 Likewise, If we
do not derive our corruption from Adam, neither do we
derive our new nature from Christ.216
In Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin, Wesley particularly
stressed Adam as the federal head, and drew upon
Jennings in the defense of the six propositions of the
Larger Catechism of the Westminster Assembly of Divines
to build his case. The first proposition said,
The covenant being made with Adam as a public
person, not for himself only, but for his
posterity, all mankind descending from him by
ordinary generation, sinned with him, and fell
with him, in that first transgression.217
Because he was a public person, or a federal head his
sin was imputed to all his posterity.216
At this point Wesley's traducianism is linked to
the concept of Adam as a federal head. The image of God
was created in Adam's soul. But it is also the soul
which reproduces and replicates the image of a fallen
humanity, void of the moral image and marred in the
natural and political images.	 In a letter to Dr. John
Robertson, when Wesley was presented with the 'three
214 DOS, Works, IX, 332. He also quotes, James Hervey, Theron
and Aspasio, Works, II, 150-5! for support; and, tvid Jennings, A
Vindication of the Scripture Doctrine of Ori ginal Sin (1740), pp.
18-24 in DOS, Works, IX, 255-57; Isaac Watts, The Ruin and Recovery
of Mankind (1740), in DOS, Works, IX, 376, 379, 380; cf. 'Justifica-
tion by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 185-86; and Hymn 125 in BEW, VII, 236.
215 On the federal headshlp of Christ see 'Justification by
Faith' (1746), DEW, I, 190 and note, where Outler attributes this
concept to Hugo Grotius, De Veritate Religionis Chrlstianae (1642),
which Wesley would probably known through Le Clerc's 1709 revision.
210 Wesley quoting Hebden, Doctrine of Ori ginal Sin (174!), in
DOS, Works, IX, 428-29.
217 DOS, Works, IX, 262.
" DOS, Works, IX, 393-97, where he again extracts Isaac
Watts, Ruin and Recovery of Mankind, pp. 427-448; and Samuel Hebden
in DOS, Works, IX, 409-15.
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opinions concerning the transmission of original sin',
immediate creation, traduction, or pre-existence,
Wesley responded, 'I care not if there were none. The
fact I know, both by Scripture and by experience. I
know it is transmitted: but how it is transmitted I
neither know nor desire to know.' 22 ' Four years later
in Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin, he admitted, 'And if you
ask me, how, in what determinate manner, sin Is propa-
gated; how it is transmitted from father to son: I
answer plainly, I cannot telli. . .J'. 22 ° But he knew,
'You may transmit to your children a nature tainted with
sin, and yet commit no sin In so doing.' 22 ' He was
apparently trying to steer clear of any notion of
concupiscence. In a fashion which was typical for
Wesley he was more interested in the observable facts
rather than speculation about their cause.
But it is not entirely accurate that Wesley never
offered explanation for the transmission of original
sin. Instead of concupiscence, he eventually used the
doctrine of soul as a way of explaining the universality
of original sin. Two years after his letter to Robert-
son, Wesley published the Ex p lanatory Notes on the New
Testament. In his comment on Hebrews 12.9, it became
quite clear that he held to the immediate creation of
the soul. Whether this was through insufflation or not
he does not say. 222 However, such a view was inconsis-
tent with his understanding of Adam as a federal head.
If the constitutive element of personhood is the soul,
the soul had to have been somehow present in Adam. The
turning point came In 1762 when he received a letter
challenging his view of the Immediate creation of the
219 BEW, XXVI, 519 (1753). In this letter Wesley was specifi-
cally responding to Andrew Michael Rwnsay, Philosophical Principles
of Natural and Revealed Reli gion, unfolded in a Geometrical Order (2
vols, 1748-49), who opted for the pre-existence of souls in order to
explain original sin.220 DOS, Works, IX, 335. Also, JWL, III, 107 (1753).
221 DOS, Works, XIX, 282.
222 ENNF (1755), Hebrews 12.9. Cf. Bengel on same passage.
N.B. Augustine on insufflation in 'On the Soul awl Its Origin' (419-
21), 1.17.
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soul. 223 This was one of the rare instances when Wesley
publicly changed his opinion. He eventually extracted
for publication in the Arminian Magazine, the work
referred to in the letter, The Ori g in of the Soul.224
There he explained original sin by what he called 'the
traduction of souls from Adam', or, 'anima est ex
traduce; that all the souls of his posterity, as well as
their bodies, were in our first parent'. 225 He hypothe-
sized that when Adam sinned he lost the moral image of
God, while marring the political and natural image.
Since like begets like, when he begot a son, the son was
in the image of fallen Adam. In his extraction of Isaac
Watts, for the Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin, he said, 'Adam,
after his sin, propagated his kind according to the law
of nature;- not in the moral image or likeness of God;
not 'in righteousness and true holiness;' but in his own
sinful likeness[. ••],226 This same thought was
repeated in his extract of Thomas Boston's, Fourfold
State of Man, likewise Included in the Doctrine of
Ori g inal Sin. From this he concluded,
Original sin is by some defined to be, The
depravation of righteousness, and inclination
to evil, contracted from the generation
itself, and derived from Adam to all his
posterity. For as sickness is not only a
privation of health, but also an evil affec-
tion of the body; so original sin is not only
the want of righteousness, but also a prone-
ness to unrighteousness, arising from the sin
of Adam, and conveyed unto us by natural
propagation. 227
To say otherwise, once again, would make God the author
of sin. Not to say this would allow Wesley's empirical
notion of the soul as 'tabula rasa' to disallow original
223 JJ, IV, 486 (1762); JWJ, V, 37-9 (1763); Cf. Augustine,
'On the Soul and its Origin' (419-21), 1.16-27.224 In AM, 5(1782), 46-9, 195-7; 6(1783), 41-3, 96-8, 149-51,
208-10, 265-7, 321-3, 375-7, 431-5, 492-4, 544-7.
225 AM, 5(1782), 195. See Schibli, 'Apponius on the Origin of
the Soul', SP, XXIII, 178-85, where he states traducianism is found
in Tertullian, while giving a helpful survey of the early fathers on
this issue.220 DOS, Works, IX, 378; cf. 'Heavenly Treasure in Earthen
Vessels' (1790), BEW, IV, 162.227 AM, 6(1783), 434.
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sin. The soul is a blank slate, born in the state of
atheism, but because the traduction of the soul is the
traduction of a soul sick with original sin, it is a
soul whose image is marred and devoid of aspects of
God's image. The soul became not just a constitutive
part of personhood, but an essential way to account for
the universality of original sin as well. The traduc-
tion of the soul was for Wesley a metaphysical explana-
tion of an empirical observation.
It must be added, however, that before changing to
a view of traducianism in 1763, his doctrine of Chris-
tian perfection forced Wesley to admit the possibility
of an 'immaculate conception'. In question 21 of
'Thoughts on Christian Perfection' (1759), it was asked,
'if two perfect Christians had Children, how could they
be born In Sin, since there was none in the Parents?'
To which Wesley made this curious (and rather embarrass-
ing) response:
It is a possible, but not a probable case; I
doubt whether it ever was or ever will be.
But waving this, I answer, Sin is entailed
upon me, not by immediate generation, but by
my first parent.	 'In Adam all died; by the
disobedience of	 one, all	 men were made
sinners;' all men, without exception, who were
in his	 loins when he ate the forbidden
fruit. 2 2 e
In spite of his doctrine of original sin, and Adam as a
federal head, Wesley's creationism had to outrageously
admit that an immaculate conception was at least a pos-
sibility, if not just a logical abstraction.	 His
traducianism would have denied such a view. Such
statements as this indicate that Wesley's doctrine of
Christian perfection could at times be theologically
misinformed and rather naive.
22e 
'Thoughts on Christian Perfection', in 5050 (1759). What
nkes this response even more curious is the exchange of letters
between Richard Thompson and Wesley in which this issue caine up. In
that particular context Wesley appears to deny the possibility, DEW,
XXVI, 57! (1755), and 575 (1755). Cf. Augustine, 'On Marriage and
Concupiscence', 1.20 lxvi iii, who uses concupiscence to explain why
children of wrath are born of holy matrimony.
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Adam as the federal head in whom both the body and
souls of all humanity existed, and the traduction of
those souls from generation to generation becomes the
linchpin of Wesley's empirical anthropology. We are the
way Adam became after the fall because we participated
in body and soul, in both the guilt and consequences of
Adam's sin. 229 However, because of the cross, this fall
was a 'happy fault'.
4.2. '0 Felix Culpat'
'0 felix culpa!' was introduced briefly in the last
chapter on theodicy. If God is all knowing, did he not
see the fall? Wesley's response was, 'He certainly did
foresee the whole,' 23 ° in the 'eternal now'. If God saw
it, could he not have stopped it? Wesley's response to
this was, 'it was undoubtedly in his power to prevent
it: for he hath all power both in heaven and earth.'23'
Why, then, did God permit evil? 'He saw', said Wesley,
'that to permit the fall of the first man was far best
for mankind in general; that abundantly more good than
evil would accrue to the posterity of Adam by his
fallE...J'. 232 Because of his sin,
We may now attain both higher degrees of
holiness and higher degrees of glory than it
would have been possible for us to attain if
Adam had not sinned. For if Adam had not
sinned, the Son of God had not died.233
Wesley	 quite	 clearly,	 and rather adamantly,
be! ieved,
The fall of Adam produced the death Christ!
Hear, 0 heavens, and give ear, 0 earth! Yea,
229 DOS, Works, IX, 332; ENNT (1755), Romans VI.14. Cf. James
Hervey, Works (1819), Thereon and Aspasia (1755), II, 150-5!; BEW,
VII, 236-37. The issue of guilt will be more fully discussed in the
chapter on baptism.
230 'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), DEW, II, 425.
231 'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), DEW, II, 424.
232 'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), DEW, II, 424; cf. DOS,
Works, IX, 253.
233 'On the Fall of Man' (1782), 13EV, II, 4!! and note 60, cf.
'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), DEW, II, 425 and note 9. Cf.
Luther, Works, I, 93, 'And the divine object of the Gospel is, that
we might be restored to that original, and indeed to a better and
higher, imagel...]'.
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Let earth and heaven agree,
Angels and men be joined,
To celebrate with me
The Saviour of mankind;
T' adore the all-atoning Lamb,
And bless the sound of Jesu's name!'3'
If God had prevented the fall of man, 'the
Word' had never been 'made flesh'; nor had we
ever 'seen is glory, the glory as of the only-
begotten of the Father'. Those mysteries
never had been displayed 'which the very
angels desire to look into'. Methinks this
consideration swallows up all the rest, and
should never be out of our thoughts. Unless
'by one man judgment had come upon all men to
condemnation' neither angels nor men could
ever have known 'the unsearchable riches of
Christ' 235
In short, 'felix culpa' means God is to be praised for
the fall, because as a result of the fall there was
Incarnation. Incarnation and crucifixion are the
driving force behind what is almost a doxology for the
original sin.
All these references, found in the later years of
Wesley's ministry, illuminate a theme Lovejoy called,
'the paradox of the Fortunate Fall'.' 3 This places
Wesley in the '0 felix culpa!' tradition as suggested in
works by Irenaeus, 23 ' Augustine, 238 Ambrose,' 39 Rupert
of Deutz, Hugh of St. Victor, Du Bartas,"° John
Donne,' 41 John Wyclif,"' and John Milton.' 43 	 Such a
view is not without its problems.
First of all, if one applies moral categories to
God, as was done in the issue of theodicy, 'felix culpa'
'' Charles Wesley, 'Hymns on God's Everlasting Love' (1741),
p. 3!. Cf. AM, 1(1778), 191-92, 'The Universal Love of Christ'.
235 'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), BEW, II, 433.
239 Lovejoy, History of Ideas (1965), p. 277.
Irenaeus, 'Against Heresies', III.xx.1.
238 AugustIne, 'On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, and on
the Baptism of Infants' (411-12), 1.39-45; 2.37-8; The City of God,(413-27) 12.23.22.
239 Ambrose, 'De Institutione Virginis' (393), 17.104; cf.
'Enarrationes in xii. Psalmos Lvidicos', 39.20.
"° Lovejoy, History of Ideas (1965), p. 279-81.241 John Donne, LXXX Sermons (1640), p. 171.242 John Wyclif, 'Sermon XC', in Select Eng lish Works of John
Wyclif, Thomas Arnold, ed. (1869), I, 320-321.243 John Milton, Paradise Lost, XII.462 U.
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creates another divine dilemma, in which redemption
takes on attributes of 'act utilitarianism', 244
 that is
to say, the soteriological ends Justifies the hamar-
tiological means.
	 The happiness f holiness justifies
the misery of evil.
	 On this basis Wesley could argue
with all seriousness for a view by which evil is seen as
a 'positive blessing'. 245
 Creation is improved upon
only as a result of sin and evil, which means evil was
necessary in order to make a renewed creation the best
world posslble. 24
 In the second place, it seems to
suggest God needed sin in order to warrant Incarnation,
which would make Incarnation look like an afterthought,
or a Divine reaction in response to human action. Any
'free-will' defense of theodicy risks drawing such a
conclusion. However, this must be balanced against
God's omniscience and omnipotence and their respective
paradoxes, only this time in the context of Incarnation
instead of theodicy. In the third place, it would seem
that the paradox of the fortunate fall would ultimately
render the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians
meaningless and pointless. If the fall is indeed
fortunate does it really matter if God Is the author of
sin? Given this proverbial theological Pandora's Box,
Lovejoy has suggested the themes of the fall and
redemption were better left separate. That is perhaps a
bit extreme, but it does illumiivate how the combination
of 'free-will' and 'felix culpa' does create a potential
systematic pressure point.
In a more positive sense, 'Felix culpa' saw in the
fall not just what humanity lost through Adam, but what
humanity might gain through Christ. God alone, from the
244 
'Act utilitarianism' seeks to assess the value of an act
purely on the basis of the amount of happiness the result is able to
produce.
245 
'Death and Deliverance' (1725), BEW, IV, 213; 'On Guardian
Angels' (1726), BEW, IV, 234; 'On Mourning the Dead' (1727), BEW,
IV, 239; 'The Love of God' (1733), DEW, IV, 344; and in a less
obvious way in 'Scriptural Christianity' (1744), DEW, I, 167-8.
Note that with the exception of 'Scriptural Christianity' all the
other sermons were before 1733.
246 Schrader, 'Evil and the Best Possible Worlds', Sophia,
29(1990)2, 40.
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vantage point of the 'eternal now', could see the fall
from the perspective of the cross. Regardless of the
cause, whether Divine or human, 'felix culpa' bound sin,
Incarnation, and salvation together for Wesley, with
Incarnation as the consequence of sin, and salvation the
consequence of Incarnation. Salvation culminated in the
renovation of the image of God in man and woman.
4.3. 'What We Lost in Adam, We Recover In Christ'
At this point 'felix culpa' is best understood in
the light of 'recapitulation', the third theme. A
statement from, Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin offers the
simplest description of what recapitulation means,
'What we lost in Adam, that is, a being after
the image and likeness of God, this we recover
by Christ.' (Irenaeus, 1. 3. c. 20.)247 Again
'They who receive the ingrafted word return to
the ancient nature of man, that by which he
was made after the image of likeness of God.'
(Ibid. 1.5, c. 10•)24e He likewise speaks of
our 'sinning in Adam:' 'In the first Adam,'
says he, 'we offended God; in the Second Adam,
we are reconciled: ' And frequently of 'man's
losing the image of God by the fall, and
recovering it by Christ.' 24
This indicates Wesley's awareness of Irenaeus's doctrine
of recapitulation. However, to Wesley, Christ will do
more than restore what was lost. He will make improve-
ments upon it. Glorification and the final renovation
of the lost image of God would be of a 'higher degree'
than all Adam's perfection, because glorification is
perfection in Christ, the second Adam. Because of
Incarnation, salvation is teleological, not archaeologi-
cal. It renews in the image of Christ, not Adam. While
Adam was the best he could possibly be, he was not the
best that could possibly be. Christ is. Because of
Christ, redeemed sinners will have a greater capacity
for holiness than the pristine Adam, a capacity enlarged
247 Irenaeus, 'Against Heresies', 3.18.1.
Irenaeus, 'Against Heresies', 5.10.1-2.
249 Irenaeus, ainst Heresies, 111.18.1-7. Also, Wesley's
extraction of Samuel Hebden's Doctrine of Original SinE...) Vindi-
cated (his defense of the Westminster Catechism against Taylor's
attacks) in Works, IX, 430.
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by the sanctifying and glorifying grace of salvation.250
Recapitulation was Wesley's ultimate answer to the
problem of evil. What we lost in Adam is improved upon
and restored through Christ. This justified not just
the fall, but also God creating man in the image of
liberty, knowing liberty would be abused resulting in
sin, so human persons might be renewed in the image of
Christ. 25 ' This reminds one once again just how Wesley
justified liberty, free-will, the fall, and even evil
itself all by the cross and the renovation of the image
of God, enlarged and improved upon by Spirit infused
grace. Or to put it more succinctly, in Wesley's way of
thinking, Christian perfection justified Adam's fall.
To Wesley, entire sanctification redeemed the doctrine
of God from the 'no win' situation created by theodicy.
The themes of 'felix culpa', 'recapitulation', and
'federal head' do show how for Wesley much of Christian-
ity lies properly in the knowledge of what concerns Adam
and Christ. 252 However, Wesley's anthropology is not so
much archaean as it is teleological, looking forward to
Christ, not backward to Adam. The Christian's renova-
tion is not in Adam's pristine image, but in Christ's
glorified image.	 These three themes give even the
doctrine of creation a teleological aim.
4.4. Summary
Wesley saw the doctrine of original sin as a
Biblical doctrine which found authentic and accurate
expression through various creedal forms, the Anglican,
the Puritan, and eventually the Methodist. As a
Biblical doctrine, original sin was an essential part of
the foundation of the Christian system, and he defended
it through reason, empiricism, and the epistemology of
250 'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), BEW, II, 434. Cf. 'God's
Approbation of the His Works' (1782), BEW, II, 397-8 as referred to
in note 8! above.
251 'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), BEW, II, 434. Cf. 'God's
Approbation of the His Works' (1782), BEW, II, 397-8.
252 This is Wesley (in DOS, Works, IX, 429), quoting Samuel
Hebden (Doctrine of Ori g inal SinI. ..J, 1741), quoting Augustine. I
have not yet found the precise location of the Augustine quote.
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testimony. Key to the doctrine of original sin,
however, was the doctrine of the soul, which served as
the receptacle for the image of God. Wesley understood
this image to be one of the Triune God, and eventually
expressed It as being political, natural, and moral in
nature. Through the fall the moral Image was lost,
while the political and natural images were marred.
These three strands made up both the Image of God and
original sin. Through the lost moral Image, the
relationship between God and huvanity became estranged,
human relationships became self-serving and dysfunc-
tional. Through the marring of the political image, the
relation9hip between humanity and creation also became
dysfunctional. Through the marring of the natural image
the relationship between body and soul also became
dysfunctional. One may conclude that original sin was
indeed relational for Wesley. It was concerned with the
Divine and human	 relationship,	 the Inner-personal
relationship, and inter-personal relationships. The
moral, natural, and political images also provided
Wesley with a doctrine of original sin which allowed
Wesley to talk about the attainability of Christian
perfection in this lifetime as the renewal of the moral
image of God. But from original sin spring most, If not
all personal sins, which is the subject of the next
chapter.
Chapter Four
Actual Sin: 'Properly' and 'Improperly So Called'
1. Introduction
In the last chapter we looked at original sin. One
way Wesley described it was as an infection, or a
loathsome leprosy, which infects the whole person of
every person in the entire world. He was convinced
that, 'From this infection of our nature (call it
original sin, or what you please) spring many, if not
all, actual sins.'' Another metaphor he used to speak
of the relationship between original sin and personal
sin was that of root and branches. The root of original
sin bears the branches of actual sin, with all its
wicked fruit. 2 These metaphors suggest a strong link
between original sin and actual sin for Wesley, although
original sin was not actual, or personal sin. There was
a distinction to be made between imputed and actual sin.
When he came to speak of actual sin there was a
variety of ways in which he spoke of it. However, the
way Wesley eventually came to talk about actual sin was
sin 'properly' and 'improperly' so called. Although
actual sins proceed from original sin, the distinction
between proper and improper sin was not developed in
relation to original sin, but in relation to holy
living. This would seem to suggest that Wesley's
doctrine of actual sin is a complex matter.
What this chapter will seek to do is to show that
in spite of the relationship between original sin and
actual sin he sought to establish in the first section
of Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin, his understanding of actual
sin was actually developed in conjunction with his
concern for holy living. After that, we shall suggest
possible sources of influence for Wesley's understanding
of actual sin. Finally, we shall list the different
aspects of actual sin in order to look at them more
systematically.
2. The Historical Development
Early in his career, at the same time he was being
influenced by the holy living tradition, and was trying
1 Works, IV, 264, 274.
2 
'On Perfection' (1784), BEW, III, 76.
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to come to terms with the origins of evil, Wesley also
started to struggle with the issue of personal sin. As
was the case even with the issue of 'Unde malum?' this
struggle was also documented in a series of letters
Wesley exchanged with family and friends from 1725-31.
By looking at these letters one can trace the early
development of Wesley's definition of personal sin, much
of which developed in reaction to the works of Thomas h
Kempis, Jeremy Taylor, and later on William Law. Each
had in one way or another influenced Wesley with an
emphasis on the importance of holy living. However,
despite their significance to Wesley's spiritual
development he did not accept them uncritically. Often
he sought his mother's and father's advice on what to
accept or reject about their writings (particularly
those of Kempis and Taylor), and often wrote to others
to advise them on similar matters. It was this reaction
to Kempis, Taylor, and Law and his understanding of holy
living which helped him to formulate a definition of sin
which he used throughout the remainder of his career.
During this period we will see three aspects of Wesley's
definition start to emerge, and here they are listed as
they appeared in his letters chronologically: (1) that
sin does not include infirmities; (2) that sin must
include a knowledge that a sinful action is contrary to
God's will; (3) that sin is in some sense determined by
whether it was voluntary or involuntary. These three
developments are not intended to be definitive as they
are didactic.
2.1. Personal Sin and the Concern for Holy Living
The prelude to this development is marked by
Wesley's concern in establishing the nature of sin in
relationship to holy living. It began with Wesley
questioning the extreme asceticism of Kempis, which
implied that the body's influence on the soul was the
source of many sins, and denied any attainment of
happiness, or joy in this lifetime. In a letter to his
mother, he wrote,
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I can't think that when God sent us into the
world he had irreversibly decreed that we
should be perpetually miserable in it. If it
be so, the very endeavour after happiness in
this life is a sin, as it is acting in direct
contradiction to the very design of our
creationE. . .J.Another of his tenets, - which is
indeed a natural consequence of this, is that
all mirth is vain and useless, if not sinful.
But why then does the Psalmist so often exhort
us to rejoice In the Lord, and tell us that it
becomes the just to be joyful? I think one
could hardly desire a more express text than
that in the 68th Psalm: Let the righteous
rejoice, and be glad in the Lord; let them
also be merry and joyful.3
At the heart of this concern is a bewilderment over the
nature of sin. To which Susanna responded with what has
become a well known quote in Wesleyan circles,
I take Kempis to have been an honest, weak
man, that had more zeal than knowledge, by his
condemning all mirth or pleasure as sinful or
useless 1 in opposition to so many direct and
plain texts of Scripture. Would you judge of
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of pleasure, of
the innocence or malignity o actions? Take
this rule. Whatever weakens your reason,
impairs the tenderness of your conscience,
obscures your sense of God, or takes off your
relish of spiritual things; in short, whatever
increases the strength and authority of your
body over your mind; that thing is sin to you,
however innocent it may be in itself.	 And so
on the contrary.4
Central to this description of sin was the body/soul
duality and the assumption that whatever caused the body
to dominate the mind was ultimately sin, which makes sin
appear rather rational in nature. Reason, conscience,
and spiritual sensibility are all essential to one's
spiritual well being. If one is to take this as a
definition of sin it is not just rational, but largely
empirical and highly subjective in nature. 	 But	 what
Mrs. Wesley actually offered son John was more of an
ascetic rule than it was a definition of sin. She
modified, and significantly simplified the ascetic rule
of Kempis, so as not to exclude happiness and joy, while
at the same time realizing the peril of sensuality,
, XXV, 162 (1725).
DEW, XXV, 166 (1725), which also appeared in AM 1(1778), 33-6.
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which resulted in the dualism of body and soul, rather
than a duality. While this would not become his
definition of sin per se, it would become an Implicit
principle of his ascetic rule which tried to mortify the
'triplex concupiscentia' (this will be discussed at
greater length below). This asceticism profoundly
influenced the formulation of his holy living ethic,
which determined for many Methodists what behaviour was
and was not sin. This eventually found expression, for
example, in the 'General Rules of the United Societies'
(1743).
2.2. Infirmities are not Sins
This concern over the nature of sin provided the
context for the first development in Wesley's under-
standing of sin, namely that sin does not include
infirmities. It resulted as a part of his reaction to
Jeremy Taylor's, The Rule and Exercises of Hol y Living.
In another letter written June 18, 1725 to his mother,
Wesley wondered If Taylor had not set the target
of perfection so high that no one would be able to
attain it, and wondered if some of his rules were not
'altogether impracticable'. 	 Two other things bothered
Wesley where Taylor was concerned. One was that
according to Taylor, no one could have the assurance
that one's sins were forgiven, which was to cause In the
Christian a sense of humility. Another was Taylor's
view that every 'weakness, deformity, or Imperfection'
as also being necessary to humility. Wesley concluded,
'God deliver us from such a fearful expectation as this!
Humility is undoubtedly necessary to salvation, and if
all these things are essential to humility, who can be
humble, who can be saved?'5
Where Wesley wrote his comments about weakness,
deformity, or Imperfection being necessary to humility,
his mother added her own comment In the margin, 'Weak-
ness, deformity, or imperfection of body are not evil in
themselves, but	 accidentally become	 good or evil
S BEW, XXV, 168-9, cf. Taylor, Holy LIving , 2.4.17.
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according as they affect us and make us good or bad.'
Later on, in a letter responding to her son's queries
Susanna Wesley incorporated this marginal annotation to
her son's letter into her reply.
Weakness, deformity, and imperfection of body
are not moral evils, and may accidental]y
become good to us. Yet surely they are not to
be desired, for strength and comeliness are
valuable blessings, may be of great use, and
ought to be enjoyed with thankfulness. If
they prove incentives to pride, 'tis our own
fault: a humble man will improve all those
advantages for God's servlce[.. .1.'
Here, she was quick to pick up on and point out that,
'Weakness, deformity, and imperfection of body' are not
moral evils. The moral neutrality of weakness, defor-
mity, and imperfection was fundamental to the concept of
infirmities. These infirmities were the conditions of
one's humanity and were inescapable in this lifetime.
However, depending on how one reacting to infirmities
determined whether they resulted in humility or pride.
2.3. The Cognitive AspectajSin
In a later letter to his mother, Wesley reflected
upon his own personal deficiencies and imperfections and
wrote,
My being little and weak, whereas had it not
been for a strange concurrence of accidents
(so called in the language of men) I should
very probably have been just the reverse, I
can easily account for; I can readily trace
the wisdom and mercy of Providence in allott-
ing me these imperfectionsi...]. But here the
difficulty was likely to lie: Why would
Infinite Goodness permit me to contract a
habit of sin even before I knew It to be
sinful, which has been a thorn in my side
almost every since? 'How can I skill of these
thy ways?' So well that I am verily persuaded,
had it not been for that sinful habit, I had
scarce ever acquired any degree of any
virtuous one. Is not this the finger of God?
Surely none else could have extracted so much
flEW, XXV, 169 note 3.
'	 , XXV, 173 (1725).
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good from evill	 Surely it was MERCY not to
hear my prayerl
Here, in the context of his 	 reflection upon
personal infirmities, begins the second aspect of his
development, that sin must in someway	 include an
awareness of an action being sinful. With a somewhat
sarcastic note, Wesley started to develop his under-
standing of the importance of cognitive awareness to a
proper understanding of sin, based upon the assumption
that no Christian would deliberately develop a sinful
habit knowing it was sin. This cognitive aspect of sin
will become more fully developed in a later exchange of
letters.
2.4. The Volitional Aspect of Sin
We now turn to the third aspect of Wesley's
understanding of sin, i.e. that it somehow must be
determined by whether an action is voluntary or involun-
tary. One of Wesley's earliest complete definitions of
personal sin is found in a letter dated June 19, 1731,
his response to Mary Pendarves's letter in which she
expressed concern over the salvation of those who denied
the divinity of Christ and the Trinity.	 Wesley
responded by saying,
That sometimes even a good man falls a prey to
the cunning craftiness of these deceivers I
can easily believe, having known one (other-
wise) strictly virtuous person who was under
that infatuation several years. That such an
one has nothing to hope for from the terms of
the gospel is likewise exceeding plain, seeing
exactly equivalent to the words of the Church
of England (who did rashly adopt them in her
Liturgy), 'This faith, except every man keep
whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall
perish everlastingly', are those of the very
person they thus outrage, 'He that believeth
not shall be damned.' Not that we have
authority to apply this general sentence to
any one particular offender; because, all sin
being a voluntary breach of a known law, none
but he who seeth the heart, and consequently
how far this breach of his law is voluntary in
each particular person, can possibly know
BEW, XXV, 213 (1727), italics mine. 	 Cf. Taylor, Unum
Necessarium (1655), Chapter VIII, 'Sins of Infirmity'.
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which infidel shall perish, and which be
received to mercy.'
The significance of this passage is that sin is not
defined by unbelief, or infidelity. For Wesley, even
infidelity as a sin was defined as being a voluntary
breach of a known law. Something of his father's
influence in this response may be seen when one looks at
a letter Wesley received from his father some six years
earlier. Wesley's original letter, to which his father
had replied, is not extant. But from what his father
said, it seems as though the issue of heresy, and
theological infidelity had been under discussion. To
which Wesley's father replied, 'But is there not a
distinction between what is wilful and what may be in
some measure involuntary? God knows, and doubtless will
make a difference?''° The significant point for us is
this- In as much as heresy was deemed a sin, it is clear
Wesley started to see a difference between voluntary and
involuntary sin. Wesley's response to Mary Pendarves
displayed a similarity to his father's thoughts on the
aspect of sin being a voluntary action.
2.5. Sin as the Wilful Transgrsion of the Known
Law of God
The volitional aspects of sin came into maturity in
the last exchange of letters we will look at, an
exchange between Wesley and Ann Granville. She wrote to
Wesley regarding one of her friends, a young lady who
feared nothing she did was acceptable to God, and that
all she did was sin. She had fasted to the point that
her health had been destroyed, and was even fearful of
sleep, thinking it was a sin. 1 ' To which Wesley
responded in a pastoral tone,
If God were to mark all that is done amiss,
who could abide it? Not the great Apostle
himself, who even when he had 'finished his
course' on earth, and was ripe for paradise,
' BEW, XXV, 289 (1731). Cf. where he applies the same principle
in, 'On Schism' (1786), BEW, III, 66-7.
° BEW, XXV, 182, (1725). Cf. his remarks in 'On The Trinity'
(1775), DEW, II, 377.
' DEW, XXV, 316 (1731).
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yet mentions himself as not 'having already
attained' that height, not being 'already
perfect'
Perfect, indeed, he was from sin,
strictly speaking, which is a voluntary breach
of a known law, at least from habits of such
sin. As to single acts he 'knew whom he had
believed'. He knew who had promised to
forgive these, not seven times but seventy
times even. Nay, a thousand times a thousand,
if they sincerely desire it, shall all sins be
forgiven unto the sons of men. We need except
none • 1 2
In these two letters one can see Wesley combining
volitional and cognitive aspects to his understanding of
personal sin. In this last letter Wesley implemented a
fully developed definition of sin which he would use the
remainder of his career. Sin is a voluntary transgres-
sion of a known law of God. This approximates Wesley's
extracted definition of evil as being, 'a deviation from
those measures of eternal, unerring order and reason-
not to choose what is worthy to be chosen, and is
accordingly chose by such a will as the divine,' which
in turn has as its foundation the concept of eternal
reason.' 3 In those terms, sin properly so called is a
wilful deviation from what one knows to be the eternal
reason, or order of things.
2.6. Sin Properly and Improperly So Called
But the last letter did more than only provide a
definition of sin. It also demonstrated Wesley's
concern with defining personal sin in such a way as to
include the attainability of Christian perfection In
this lifetime. During this period, from 1725-3!, Wesley
came to this understanding of sin during his struggle
with the holy living tradition as seen in Kempis,
Taylor, and Law, a concern one can see not just in the
early period but through the successive periods of his
career. All along the way Wesley was concerned with
defining actual sin to make holy living more acces-
12 DEW, XXV, 318-19 (1731).
13 DEW, XXV, 241-2 (1729); cf. Ditton, Discourse (1712), pp.
424-7.
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sible.' 4	For this reason, it Is difficult to actually
discuss personal sin without also having to discuss holy
living.	 The classic example of this came in 'A Plain
Account of Christian Perfection' (1766), where he said,
Now, mistakes, and whatever infirmities
necessarily flow from the corruptible state of
the body, are no way contrary to love; nor
therefore, in the Scripture sense, sin.
[To explain myself a little farther on
this head: (1.) Not only sin, properly so
called, (that is, a voluntary transgression of
a known law,) but sin, improperly so called,
(that is, an involuntary transgression of a
divine law, known or unknown,) needs the
atoning blood. (2.) I believe there is not
such perfection in this life as excludes these
involuntary transgressions which I apprehend
to be naturally consequent on the ignorance
and mistakes inseparable from mortality. (3.)
Therefore sinless perfection is a phrase I
never use, lest I should seem to contradict
myself. (4.) I believe, a person filled with
the love of God is still liable to these
involuntary transgressions. (5.) Such trans-
gressions you may call sins, if you please: I
do not, for the reasons above-mentioned.]15
This became Wesley's definitive statement on the
relationship between sin and sanctification. What one
says about sin inevitably implicates the doctrine of
sanctification. The attainability of Christian perfec-
tion was conditioned by the definition of actual (or
personal) sin, and the definition of sin was determined
by Its volitional and cognitive aspects. It is one of
two significant instances in which Wesley actually used
the phrase 'sin, improperly so called'. The other place
was in 'Remarks on Mr. Hill's Review' (1772). 16 While
14 e.g. 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), 	 1, I, 124; 'The First-
fruits of the SpIrit' (1746), BEW, 240; 'The Marks of the New Birth'
(1748), , I, 420-1; 'The Great Privilege of those that are Born
of God' (1748), BEW, I, 436; 'On Sin in BelIevers' (1763), BEW, I,
320; etc.
'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1766), Works, XI,
396. Although the first edition of 'A Plain Account' appeared in
1766, it was the 4th edItion (1777) which was used as the text in
Works. At this point Wesley was extracting a section from his own
'Thoughts on Christian Perfection' (1760). However, the section
which appears in the above text in brackets did not appear in
'Thoughts on Christian Perfection', which makes it an interpolation
unique to 'A Plain Account'.
• Works, X, 398.
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sin improperly so called is implied in nearly every
other instance, the term is not actually used.
2.7. The Discussions of Sin and Sanctification
The relationship between sin and sanctification
continued to appear into the last decade of his life, as
his sermon, 'On Perfection' revealed. There, he was
answering some objections to Christian perfection from
an imaginary opponent who argued that Christian perfec-
tion, 'cannot consist with salvation from sin.' To
which Wesley said,
I answer, I will perfectly well consist with
salvation form sin, according to that defini-
tion of sin (which I apprehend to be the
scriptural definition of it):
	
'a voluntary
transgression of a known law'. 	 'Nay, but all
transgressions of the law of God, whether
voluntary or involuntary, are sin. For St.
John says, 'All transgression of the law is
sin.' This I deny: let him prove it that can.
To say the truth, this a mere strife of
words. You say none is saved from sin in your
sense of the word; but I do not admit of that
sense, because the word is never so taken in
Scripture. And you cannot deny the pos-
sibility of being saved from sin in my sense
of the word. And this is the sense wherein
the word 'sin' is over and over taken in
Scripture. 17
From his Oxford days until the end of his career Wesley
defined actual sin in such a way that made holy living,
and Christian perfection attainable in this life time.
It should perhaps be pointed out that there appears
to have been at least one anomaly to this distinction,
which appeared in 'The Spirit of Bondage and Adoption'
(1746), where Wesley said,
Whosoever thou art, dost thou commit sin, or
dost thou not? If thou dost, is it willingly,
or unwillingly? In either case God hath told
thee whose thou art- 'He that cominitteth sin
is of the devil.'	 If thou coinmittest it
willingly thou art his [i.e.
	
'the devil's')
faithful servant.	 He will not fail to reward
thy labour. If unwillingly, still thou art
17 
'On Perfection' (1784), BEW, III, 79.
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his servant.	 God deliver thee out of his
hands I
Here, at least, Wesley clearly indicates that sin,
whether willful or not, makes one a child of the devil.
Below we will see at least one example of where Wesley
thought the cognitive aspect of sin was unnecessary to
sin's culpability. These, however, were exceptions and
not the rule. The main point to be made here is that
the doctrine of personal sin was understood in order to
reinforce his doctrine of Christian holiness, not the
doctrine of original sin.
3. Sources of Influence
We have seen when it appeared, and we have seen
examples of how he used It at different points in his
own career 1 but where did Wesley get such a definition
for actual sin? Perhaps the significance of this
definition can be better understood if a brief outline
of the background to the concept is given.
3.1. Its Aristotelian Roots
Historically, and philosophically the emphasis on
knowledge and will as being necessary to wrong doing is
found in Aristotelian ethics.	 Aristotle considered
happiness and human perfection as 	 legitimate objects
of philosophical concern. 19 	According to Aristotle
every person desires what is good. It is obtaining the
good which brings happiness. 	 Aristotle listed four
conditions to doing a	 'just or temperate act' which
contributed to	 one's quest for happiness: (1) one
should know what one is 	 doing;	 (2) one should
' 'The Spirit of Bondage and Adoption' (1746), BEW, I, 264.
19 Kretzmann, ed., Cffl11P (1988), p. 657. There is as a par-
ticularly enlightening chapter on, 'Happiness: The Perfection of
Man' in which Georg Wieland traces the Aristotelian concept of
happiness in the Christian tradition. What many have overlooked is
the connection between Aristotle's concept of happiness and the
perfection of man and Wesley's concept of happiness as Christian
holiness, which is concomitant with Christian perfection. Much work
needs to be done relative to this area. For a work that started
with the Aristotelian notion of the perfectibility of man and
brief ly mentions Wesley, see Passmore, The Perfectibilit y of Man (1970).
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deliberately choose to do it; (3) one should choose to
do It for the action's own sake; (4) one should do it as
an instance of a settled and immutable moral state.2°
Similarly, anything done with knowledge and deliberation
is considered a crime, while an harmful act done
Involuntarily or out of ignorance must be called an
error. 21 Aristotle listed several ways one may be
ignorant In situations. One may be ignorant of who one
is, what one is doing, what or whom one is acting on,
and sometimes also what one is doing It with, and what
end, and even how one is doing it. However, even an
action which is done involuntarily through ignorance
must involve pain and regret. 22 In regards to voluntary
actions, their choice must be rational and cannot relate
to impossibilities. 23 In short the voluntary consists
of things about which we deliberate, and we deliberate
about things that are in our power to do, and things
which can be done. 24 Cognition and volition were both
used by Aristotle to help determine the goodness or
badness of an action.
3.2. Its Theological Hoots
Theologically, and more biblically the beginning of
an emphasis on the differences between the severity of
sins can be traced to the Patristic period as the church
attempted to Interpret Hebrews 6.4-8, and 10.26-31. As
a result, even the 'Didache' distinguished between
forgivable and unforgivable sins. 25 The Shepherd of
Hermas made the same distinction based on baptism. Sins
before baptism were forgivable, but sins after baptism
were not. 2	Tertullian divided sin into 'spiritual' and
20 See, Aristotle, Nicocnachean Ethics, 1103-1109'.
21 ArIstotle, 'Rhetoric to Alexander', 142724-40.
22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 11!0b20_1111521.
23 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 11!1'5-30.
24 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1!1220-31. Cf. Plato, Laws,
IX.860. But note IX.863 where ignorance is given as a cause of
crime, not an excuse.
25 'The Teaching of the Apostles', §11.
25 'The Shepherd of Hermas', Man. 4.3.
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'corporeal' categories, 27 and isolated what he called
the 'seven deadly sins'. 29 But Tertullian would allow
only one act of repentance after baptism for sins which
were not deemed deadly. 29 	In response to the Decian,
and other persecutions as the question of the lapsed
sought to divide the
	
church, distinctions between
forgivable and	 unforgivable sins became even more
Important. In 251 the Council of Carthage decided that
all sins were forgivable. 30 After this a distinction
was still maintair but its meaning was changed from
forgivable and unforgivable sins, to sins small and
great, and sins mortal and venial.
3.3. Its Catholic Roots: Moral Theology
After 25!, and the Council of Carthage, even
Augustine made a 'proper' distinction between 'trivial'
and 'heinous' sins, which were caused by 'ignorance' and
'weakness'. 31	Aquinas, perhaps largely through an
Aristotelian influence, significantly developed the
concept of 'mortal' and 'venial' sins in his Summa.32
Eventually it was confirmed by the fourteenth session of
the Council of Trent, In conjunction with the sacrament
of penance and extreme unction. 33 While Wesley did not
use precisely the same language as Catholic moral
theology, the concept was there, a fact not wasted upon
his opponents, especially McGowan (a one time Methodist-
local-preacher-turned-Baptist), and Hill, who accused
Wesley of being a Jesuit. 34 	Naturally, wrapped up with
those concepts were many Catholic doctrines Wesley would
27 Tertull ian, 'Repentance', III.
29 Tertullian, 'Against Marcion', IV.9.
29 Tertullian, 'On Repentance', V; cf. 'On Baptism', XX.
30 Cyprian, 'Epistles', LV.6, 17-23.
31 Augustine, 'Enchiridion', 	 78-8!. Cf. Augustine's defini-
tion of 'proper sin' in 'De Libero Arbitrio', 3.xix.
32 Kretzmann, CHIMI' (1988), p. 661-2. Aquinas, ST, !a2ae.72-88.
'Canones et Decreta Degmatica Concilii Tridentini, Sessio
Decimaquarta' (1546), in Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, II, 139-40.
See, John McGowan, The Foundry Budget Opened; or, the
Arcanium of Wesleyanism Disclosed (1780), p. 40 ff.; Rowland Hill,
'Imposture Detected, and the Deed Vindicatedi. . .1' (1777), p. 56 ff.
See Wesley's response to Hill in Works, X, 408.
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have rejected.	 It Is not likely that he borrowed it
directly from Catholic moral theology anyway.
3.4. Such Distinctions not Found in Reformers
When one comes to the Reformation period It is
obvious Wesley did not get the concept there. Such a
distinction was certainly not present in either Luther
or Calvin. Luther defined sin as faithlessness. For
Calvin, any falling short of the perfect law of love was
deemed a sin. More immediate historically to Wesley,
Calvin's view was affirmed by the Westminster Confession
which concluded that one must sin by necessity, every
day in word, thought, and deed, due to 'any want of
conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God'.
While Wesley agreed with the Westminster Confession on
original sin, he disagreed with it when It confirmed
that Wesley obviously believed there were some things
Calvinists called sins that were little more than
conditions of our humanity, things he would have rather
called 'infirmities.' However, both Luther and Calvin
fully and unequivocally denied any notion of venial or
mortal sins.3
3.5. Its Anglican Roots: The Moralists
The most likely source of influence on Wesley would
have been the Anglican Moralists of the seventeenth
century. 37 Albert Outler traced the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary sin to a group of Moralists
who had a profound Influence on Wesley_ 3e John Ket-
'The Great Privilege of those that are Born of God' (1748),
BEW, I, 431-443. Wesley joined William Parker who criticized the
Assembly for advocating a sinning religion In his work, The Late
Assembl y of Divines Confession of Faith Examined (1651). Note
Schaff, Creeds of Christendom (1977) II, 678.
Calvin, Institutes, (II.viil.58), I, 361.
Allison, The Rise of Moralism (1966), p. xli. Another
Anglican who made this distinction was Joseph Hall. See More and
Cross, Anglicanism (1935), pp . 648-9.
BEW, I, 315. Allison would include in the list of moralists
names such as Hooker, Andrewes, Donne, and Ivenant, Moralism, p. xi.
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tiewell , ' Samuel	 Bradford,4° Hugh Binning, 4 ' John
Weemse. 42 The distinction was also present in Jeremy
Taylor, a name curiously omitted by Outler in his list,
but included by Allison in his work on moralism. In his
work, Unum Necessarium (1655), Taylor used the distinc-
tion between mortal and venial sin when he said, 'Sins
are not equal, but greater or less in their principle as
well as in their event'. 43	Although he made this
distinction he also maintained that,
Every sin is directly against God's law; and
therefore is damnable and deadly in the
accounts of the divine justice, one as well,
though not so grievously, as another. For
though sins be differenced by temporal and
eternal, but by greater and less in that kind
which God hath threatened I...]. Every one
according to the quantity and quality of his
sin must pay his fineE...i. The smallest
offence is a sin, and therefore it isF...l'a
transgression of the law,' a violation of that
band by which our obedience unites us unto
GodE. . .]every sin, though in the smallest
instance, Is a turning from God and a conver-
sion to the creature.44
The volitional aspects of actual sin were clearly
present in Taylor's thought, but the cognitive aspects
were not as pronounced. Still, there was a distinction
made between sins which was explicitly developed in Unum
Necessarium and implicitly applied in Hol y Living , which
was read by Wesley.	 Combined, these works reveal a
concern	 for	 defining sin	 in such a way as to make
holy living more attainable in this life.
' John Kettlewell, The Measures of Christian Obedience (1681),
Book IV, Chapters 3-4. Green does not reckon Wesley read this until
1733, Young Wesley (1963), p. 299.
° Samuel Bradford, The Credibilit y of the Christian Pevelation
(1700), p. 445.
4' Hugh Binning, Fellowshi p With God (1671), pp. 216-18, which
Wesley extracted in vol. 17 of CL.
John Weemse, The Portraiture of God in ManE.. .1 (1627), pp.
300, 326.
' Jeremy Taylor, Unum Necessarium, Works, VII, 84, see pp. 83-
150. I can find no reference left by Wesley of his ever having read
Unum Necessarium. Cf. Claude Fleury, Les Moeurs des Israelites
(1683), which Wesley read while in Georgia (JWJ, I, 198, 201, 202,
etc.) and eventually extracted and published as 'The Manners of the
Antient Christians' (1749).
Taylor, UnuinNecessarlum, III.21.a., III.26.d.
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It is worth mentioning that Wesley would have also
been familiar with Richard Kidder's, A Discourse
Concerning Sins of Infirmity and Wilful Sins (1704),
although there is no record of Wesley reading it until
1733, which pushes it just beyond the 1725-31 time frame
we are specifically studying. 45 It was a mere thirty-
three pages long, and was concerned not just with the
nature of sin, but also with restitution for sin as an
ethical principle of holy living, forming something of a
doctrine of penance. In it Kidder pointed out that,
Two things are required to make a Sin wilful
or presumptuous. 1. That it be a Sin against
Knowledget. ..1. This is the great Aggravation
of our Fault, and that which leaves us without
Excuse, or any Shadow of it. He that sins
against Conscience, is turned Rebel to Heaven,
his Guilt increaseth to the greatest Bulk and
Stature. 2.	 That it	 be committed after
Consideration; this makes it a deliberate
Sin.
In this work one sees once again the cognitive and
volitional elements involved in defining actual sin
within the context of an explication of a holy living
tradition.
3.6. Richard Lucas and John Wesley
Of the Anglican moralists, perhaps It was Richard
Lucas who had the greatest influence on Wesley's
understanding of actual sin during this period of his
development.	 There is good reason to make a connection
between the two.	 According to Green, Wesley had read
Lucas's, Reli g ious Perfection: or, A Third Part of the
Enq uiry after Happiness (1685) in 1730, 	 just a few
months before the exchange of letters with Mary Pendar-
yes and Ann Granville, 4	 when his version of Lucas's
definition of actual sin first appeared. When he did he
Green, Young Wesley (1963), p. 299.
' Richard Kidder, A Discourse Concerning Sins of Infirmity,
and Wilful Sins, with another of Restitution. (1704), p. 18.
' Richard Lucas, Reli gious Perfection: or, A Third Part of the
Enquiry after Happiness (1685) (London: 1717, 4th ed.). For
Wesley's regard of Lucas see Alexander Knox's remarks in Southey,
Life of WesLey (1925), II, 345.
Green, Young Wesley (1963), pp. 129, 131, 139, 294.
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would have discovered Lucas struggling with the same
issue he was- defining sin In such a way as to make
religious perfection possible.
In doing so Lucas concluded that generally speak-
ing, sin was falling short of the law of God, but before
a sin was to be considered mortal it had to deliberate,
and the law of God had to be known, otherwise it was a
venial sin. Lucas consciously drew upon Scholasticism
to make the distinction between mortalvenial sins.49
In making it he said,
And thus I distinguish Venial from Mortal Sin:
Mortal Sin proceeds from the Heart, either
Habitually corrupted, or deceived and captived
for the time; but Venial Sin results from the
Imperfections and Infelicities of our Nature,
and our State. Mortal Sin is truly Voluntary
and Deliberate in the Rice [sic] and Birth of
it, and mischievous and injurious in Its
Consequence: But Venial sin is very far In-
deliberate in its Beginning, and, if not
indulged, almost harmless in its Effects:
Deficiency is, as it were, the Essence of the
one, Malignity of the other; in the one we see
more of Frailty, in the other more of Wicked-
ness: in the one something nearly ally'd to
Necessity, in the other to Presumption: the
one is the Transgression of the Law of
Perfection, the other of the Law of Sincerity;
the one is repugnant to the Letter, the other
to the Design and End of the Law; the one is a
Violation of (od's Commands, taken in the most
favourable Construction, the other a Violation
of them in a rigorous one. That this was the
notion of St. Jerome, and others, who impugn'd
the sinless Perfection of the Pelagians, is
very plain.50
To Lucas mortal sin was deliberate, the result of
malignity, resulting in wickedness, and a presumptuous
transgression of the perfect law of God. Venial sin was
undeliberate, and relatively harmless if not indulged,
and the result of frailty resulting in an infraction of
the law of sincerity.
Lucas knew that the presupposition to such a view
of sin was a doctrine of revelation. He went on to say,
First, The Law must be sufficiently revealed.
Secondly, The Transgression of it must be
' Lucas, Enquiry (1717), p. 304.
° Lucas, Enquiry (1717), p. 312.
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truly Voluntaryl...]. And this imports two
things: 1. A Knowledge of the Law. 2. A
Consent to the Breach of ltL..J. From all
this now put together 'tis easy to conclude
what sort of a Description we are to form of
Mortal Sin: 'us such a Transgression of the
Law of God, as Is vicious in its Original,
deliberate in its Commission, and Mischievous
in its Tendencies or Effects: The Heart is
corrupted and misled by some Lust or other,
and so consents to the Breach of the Moral Law
of God, a Law of Eternal and Immutable
Goodness: Or if the Sin consists in the Breach
of any Positive Law, it must yet imply in it
some Moral Obliquity in the Will, or in the
Tendency of the Action, or both. So that
Presumptuous, or Mortal sin, call itt] by what
name we will is a Deliberate Transgression of
a known Law of God, tending to the Dishonour
of God, the Injury of our Neighbour, or the
Depravation of our Nature.5'
Lucas's understanding of sin was presupposed by a
general and universal revelation of the law of God, then
conditioned by recognition of that law, and then a
wilful violation of it. He was also confident that
defiance of that revelation constituted mortal sin and
the depravation of human nature. The cognitive and
volitional aspects of actual sin are so pronounced in
Lucas one cannot help but see an almost verbatim
affinity with Wesley. This understanding of sin,
combined with a concern for 'holy living' gave rise to a
definition of personal sin which made Christian perfec-
tion a possibility.
Once this connection between Wesley's understanding
of personal sin and Moralism is made one can see how he
used Moralism as a weapon to combat Calvinism.	 As his
career developed Wesley became greatly, and more
actively 'anti-Calvinist'. Perhaps one of the reasons
Wesley became so insistent on making such a distinction
between what he eventually called proper and improper
sin was because he saw Calvinism's (more specifically
the Westminster Assembly's) definition of sin as the
greatest threat to the accessibility of holy living and
Christian perfection.	 We have already seen several
Lucas, Enquiry , (1717), pp. 327-30 (the emphasis is mine);
cf. pp. 297-311.
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examples of how Wesley defined actual sin in respect to
Christian perfection. In a letter dated 1772 Wesley
reaffirmed this career-long distinction based on the
cognitive and	 volitional aspects	 of sin, saying,
'Nothing is sin, strictly speaking, but a voluntary
transgression of a known law of God. Therefore every
voluntary breach of the law of love is sin; and nothing
else, If we speak properly.' But he went on to add a
barb, saying, 'To strain the matter farther is only to
make way for Calvinism. '52 On one hand, defining sin in
this way made the way clear for Christian perfection.
But on the other hand, not to define sin in this way
made the way clear for Calvinism. Wesley was convinced
its definition of sin, a definition which was far more
encompassing than what Wesley liked, made Calvinism the
greatest enemy of Christian perfection. 53 Here, Wesley
used Anglican Moralism to combat Calvinism, and defend
his doctrine of entire sanctification.
3.7. Wesley's Understanding of 'Sincerity'
Although It proved a useful weapon against Cal-
vinism, there was a part of Moralism which Wesley
rejected, a part which was often associated with this
definition of sin, and one just seen In Lucas above. He
rejected their concept of 'sincerity', which Johnson
defined as, 'honesty of intention'. 54 Outler has
remarked that 'sincerity' was the 'shibboleth' in the
eighteenth latltudinarians. 5 ' Allison, in his work on
moralism, said he believed Edward Fowler was the first
to make sincerity a prerequisite to justification.5'
Wesley, however, saw sincerity as merely being the
52 JWL, V, 322 (1772).
See, 'Remarks on Mr. lii 1 '5 RevIew' (1772), Works, X, 397.
Samuel Johnson, DictIonary (1755).
Outler, BEW, I, 134-5, note 19. 'LatitudinarianIsm' had its
beginning in the 17th century as an attempt to find common ground
between the Anglicans, the Presbyterians, and Dissenters. Life and
piety were stressed more than belief and reasoning.
' Allision, The Rise of Moralism (1966), p. 144, cf. Edward
Fowler, The Design of Christianity ( 1671).
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hallmark of an 'almost Christian', 57 clearly denying
Fowler's teaching that it was a prerequisite to jus-
tification by faith. 5	 Neither did sincerity prove
one's justification to Wesley, which many assumed would
be revealed by self-examination. 	 Wesley believed that
the act of examining one's self was a search for a state
of faith, not for a sincere heart. 59 On this basis he
also refuted Thomas Sherlock's notion of the 'conscious-
ness of our sincerity' was to be understood as a type of
assurance.°° Wesley's concept of assurance was primari-
ly based on a 'witness of the Spirit'. He did have a
concept of sincerity, which he more specifically called
'Godly sincerity' as referred to in 2 Corinthians 1.12.
Wesley thought	 Godly sincerity consisted of being
without 'tincture of guile, dissimulation, or disguise',
in short a sincerity which was without sin. He
applied this exegesis in his sermon, 'The Witness of Our
Own Spirit', and stated sincerity was, 'actually hitting
the mark which we aim at by simplicity'. Simplicity was
having a single eye, and the Intent to
glorify God in all that one does. Accordingly
it impliesE. ..Ithat all our actions flow on in
an even stream, uniformly subservient to this
great end; and that in our whole lives we are
moving straight toward God, and that con-
tinually- walking steadily on in the highway
of holiness, In the paths of Justice, mercy,
and truth.
'13. This sincerity is termed by the
Apostle 'godly sincerity' , or the sincerity of
GodE...lto prevent our mistaking or confound-
ing It with the sincerity of the heathens (for
they had also a kind of sincerity among them,
for which they professed no small veneration);
likewise to denote the object and end of this,
as of every Christian virtue; seeing whatever
' 'The Almost Christian' (1741), BEW, I, 134-6.
'The Righteousness of Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 216.
'The Spirit of Bondage and of Adoption' (1746), 	 11, I, 263-
4.
° See, Thomas Sherlock, 'Discourse VIII', in, Several Discour-
ses Preached at the Temple Church (1754, 2nd ed.), pp. 227-49. See
'The Witness of the Spirit, II' (1767), BEN, I, 288 note 11.
' ETh1N (1755), 2 Corinthians 1.12.
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does not ultimately tend to God sinks among
'the beggarly elements of the worldl.e2
For Wesley, Godly sincerity was something completely
different from heathen sincerity. Godly sincerity was
the product of holy living, not its presupposition as
was assumed by many Moralists. Sincerity never figured
into Wesley's understanding of sin, as he definition of
sin might imply, but it did his understanding of
holiness.
3.8. Summary of Development
Now that Wesley's understanding of personal sin
has been developed chronologically, we may isolate
three essential elements. First, there was for Wesley
sin properly so called, which consisted of a cognitive
element. One must know something is a sin before it can
be a sin, which presupposed some sort of revelation of
the moral law. Second, sin properly so called also
consisted of a volitional element. One must voluntarily
break the known law of God before it can be a sin, which
excluded any notion of determinism.	 Proper sin was
mortal sin for Wesley. This was the sin that Christians
should avoid	 because it	 estranged one from God.
Deliberate sin severs the saving relationship. Third,
from these two elements there arose another distinction
which Wesley called infirmities, which he eventually
came to call 'sin improperly so called', or venial sin.
This sin in and of itself did not break the saving
relationship because it did not involve wilful defiance
of God's law, known or unknown. These are the involun-
tary transgressions which arise from the nature of our
human existence, which have been conditioned by the
fall, or from a lack of choice. Each of these aspects
will be looked at in more detail below.
12 'The Witness of Our Own Spirit' (1746), BEW, I, 306-8; cf.
'An Israelite Indeed' (1785), BEW, III, 286.
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4. A Systematic Analysis- Sin Properly, Improperly So
Called
Having now looked at the historical development and
isolated its three elements it Is now appropriate to
consider a more systematic analysis of actual sin. To
conduct the analysis, proper sin will be considered
first, with its cognitive	 and volitional aspects,
followed by Improper sin.
4.1. Sin Properly So Called- The Cognitive Aspect
Because of the cognitive element involved in his
understanding of sin properly so called, there must be
by sin's very definition something of an epistemology of
sin. Accordingly, this epistemology must be based upon
Scripture, reason, or experience. The are five aspects
of this which merit discussion at this point.
First of all, this defanition was largely presup-
posed by the denial of innate knowledge. We are born
with no knowledge of anything, no knowledge of God, and
no knowledge of God's moral law. We are all born
ignorant atheists, with no knowledge of what sin is, or
is not.	 This atheism, and amorality is due to the
deprivation of the moral image of God. Because we are
born blank slates there is but one way we may gain
knowledge, that is through experience. For Wesley, there
were two fundamental sources of experience. They were
sensation and revelation, which in turn produced two
types of experience, namely sensory and religious.
Consequently, it is by experience that one becomes aware
of sin.
Secondly, this definition of sin properly so called
was largely based upon a basic tenet of empiricism in
which cognition equaled coisciousness. No one can be
cognizant of something and not be aware of It. When
applied to the definition of actual sin, this means we
must have a cognitive awareness of sin through either
the experiences of sensation or revelation. If one
experiences a knowledge of sin one must have an aware-
ness of that knowledge.
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Thirdly, because cognition equals consciousness,
the empirical nature of the cognitive aspect of proper
sin locates personal sin in the nature of personality.
By this definition what becomes sin is ultimately
determined by	 one's experience, either by way of
sensation or revelation. The hazard of appending the
definition of sin completely to experience Is that it
may be too easily reduced to subjective relativism, to
recall even the words of Mrs. Wesley, 'that thing is sin
to you'. This has always been a potential point of
misunderstanding and abuse where Wesley's definition of
actual sin is concerned.
Fourthly, this definition of personal sin is
consequently located more in personality, and not in the
constitutive nature of personhood, which was for Wesley,
the body/soul duality.	 Here is	 a contradiction
between his concept of personhood, and the cognitive
aspect of his doctrine of sin. 	 It will be remembered
that Wesley separated personhood and personality. 	 As
important as personality is to personhood, it is not
what made up the constitutive parts of personhood. The
constitutive parts of personhood consisted of a body/-
soul duality (in which the soul serves as the receptacle
of the image of God) which existed objectively before
God. As such, the soul provided the continuity of
personhood, which exists objectively before God. This
was Wesley's attempt to deny the validity of Locke's
assertion that consciousness makes identity. According
to Wesley's concept of personhood It is this objective
existence before God which determines not just personal
identity, but culpability of sin as well.	 In reacting
to Locke, Wesley had a problem with making the cul-
pability of sin contingent upon consciousness.	 In his
own definition of actual sin, Wesley had no qualms about
it.	 According to this statement there is culpability
irrespective of consciousness, which implies the
possibility of sinning without cognition, especially
where the unregenerate are concerned. While conscious-
ness may not have constituted personal identity where
his concept of personhood was concerned, consciousness
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and cognition of sin was a constitutive element where
his understanding of sin was concerned. Because he
divided personhood from personality, this cognitive and
volitional aspect of actual sin is developed as a part
of his understanding of personality. It will be later
shown how this consciousness of sin constituted con-
science for Wesley. This would also seem to imply that
not only is creation ontologically and morally neutral,
but acts are also, at least until one becomes conscious
of the sinfulness of those acts, resulting in con-
science. This is not something Wesley would have wanted
to imply. The problem is reconciling Wesley's one might
anachronistically term psychology, and its concept of
personhood with his hamartiology.
When taken at its worst, the definition of sin
properly so called, with its cognitive aspect would seem
to indicate that the law of God does not exist as
objective knowledge which has a reality independent of
the knower. 3 That is to say, the law is not real until
realized. This definition is indeed at its worst when
it stands isolated from the order of salvation. While
it stands on its own within the context of an empirical
epistemology in which innate knowledge is denied, the
single most important issue then becomes how does one
become cognizant, or aware, of the law of God, so that
one may become cognizant or aware of sin? To what
extent may one remain blissfully ignorant of God's law?
Are not some of our vilest offenses done as acts of
ignorance? This is a valid point raised by Greaves, who
preferred to define sin as ignorance, in his critique of
Wesley's doctrine of sin.4
This introduces the fifth aspect of his definition
of sin properly so called. This definition of actual
sin is strongly dependent on a doctrine of general, or
universal revelation of the moral law. 	 Unfortunately,
the contingency of universal revelation is not provided
by his definition of sin.	 it i	 only assumed by it.
See, Flew, Dictionary of Philosophy (1979), p. 303.
•4 Graves, The Meaning of Sin (1956), p. 63.
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For Lucas, revelation was an explicitly stated presup-
position to the doctrine of sin. For Wesley, this
general, or universal revelation of the moral law is
eventually provided by prevenient grace, the first step
in the order of salvation. This prevenient grace must
be an essential part of any Wesleyan doctrine of sin,
and concept of personality. While revelation is not a
constitutive part of personhood, which consists of the
body/soul duality, it is a constitutive part of human
personality. It must be universally infused into human
consciousness, without it being innate knowledge.
Perhaps the crucial problem in putting all of this
together is not Wesley's need for a doctrine of univer-
sal revelation, or the cognitive aspect of his under-
standing of actual sin, but accounting for a compulsory
experience of the cognitive aspects of revelation. To
say there is universal revelation through prevenient
grace is one thing, but to say there is a universal
consciousness of that revelation is something altogether
different, and can only be verified, or Invalidated
through an empirical study of anthropology, which Wesley
more or less attempted to do in the first section of his
Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin.
It is this revelation of the moral law which we
have already seen as a part of the moral image of God,
which constituted Adam's original righteousness. But
the moral image, and the moral law with it, was lost in
the fall. What we will see later is how prevenient
grace re-inscribed a certain measure of knowledge of the
moral law onto the soul of each individual person as an
act of God's universal prevenient grace. In this
respect, prevenient grace was concomitant with universal
revelation for Wesley, which can be supplied only by a
systematic formulation of Wesley's thought, and not
through historical reconstruction only. If the cogni-
tive aspect of Wesley's understanding of actual sin is
to have any relevance or meaning the problem of con-
sciousness, conscience, and revelation must be resolved.
Hopefully, it will be shown how these problems are
resolved in the next chapter on the order of salvation.
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4.2. Sin Properly So Called- The Volitional Aspect
The cognitive aspect of sin properly so called
presents only one set of problems.	 The volitional
aspect presents another. 	 It Is appropriate that the
cognitive aspect be discussed first because it must
presuppose the volitional aspect.	 One cannot wilfully
violate the law of God unless one first knows the will
of God. Even so, volition was the most significant
aspect of actual sin. Going back to Wesley's definition
of sin improperly so called, he defined it as 'an
involuntary transgression of a divine law, known or
unknown'. 85 In view of that he could say that God,
will punish no man for doing anything which he
could not possibly avoid; neither for omitting
anything which he could not possibly do.
Even if one knows God's law, but unwillingly has to
break God's law, that act is not a sin. The justice of
God would not permit punishment for the unavoidable sins
of commission or omission. In the strictest, and most
literal sense of the word, the volitional aspect of
actual sin defended the justice of God, or 'theos
dikei'.
He gave at least one example of a curious, if not
provocative, hypothetical situation which he thought il-
lustrated the point of volition. He was talking about
the sin of schism when we said,
Suppose you could not remain in the Church of
England without doing something which the Word
of God forbids, or omitting something which
the Word of God positively commands; if this
were the case (but blessed be God it is not)
you ought to separate from the Church of
England. I will make the case my own. I am
now, and have been from my youth, a member and
a minister of the Church of England. And I
have no desire nor design to separate from It
till my soul separates from my body. Yet if I
was not permitted to remain therein without
omitting what God requires me to do, it would
then become meet, and right, and my bounden
duty to separate from it without delay. To be
more particular.	 I know God has committed to
85 Works, XI, 396.
'iboughts upon God's Sovereignty' (1777), Works, X, 363.
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me a dispensation of the gospel. Yea, and my
own salvation depends upon preaching it: 'Woe
is me, If I preach not the gospel.' If then I
could not remain In the Church without
omitting this, without desisting from preach-
ing the gospel, I should be under a necessity
of separating from It, or losing my own
soul. '
It seems as though Wesley were preparing his own defense
for separation with the Church of England on the grounds
of 'sin improperly so called'. If this situation were
to happen the course of action Wesley was prepared to
take was a course of action he would unwillingly take.
The aspect of sin improperly so called Is what gave
Wesley's understanding of actual sin something of a
quality of moralism.
Wesley saw the application of justice as a test
case of God's sovereignty. While the cognitive aspect
of this definition of actual sin must presuppose the
volitional aspect, both conditions must be satisfied
before something may be properly called sin. Divine
justice demands that this be so.
Standing on its own, the volitional aspect seems
frightfully Pelagian. The reason is probably that
Wesley differed from Luther and Calvin in that he
included liberty as a part of his understanding of the
image of God, and also as a part of prevenient grace.
Luther was only willing to speak about the 'bondage of
the will', and understood this as an Important conse-
quence of original sin. While Wesley's understanding is
that actual sin springs forth from original sin, his
definition of actual sin was not adopted with original
sin In mind. This volitional, and moralistic aspect of
actual sin was not so much intended to reinforce
original sin as much as It was to make Christian
perfection a possibility in this lifetime. This has a
tendency to appear to weaken Wesley's doctrine of
original sin, giving it what may appear to some as a
semi-Pelagian characteristic.
Si 
'On Schism' (1786), BEW, III, 67.
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This makes it all the more important that the
volitional aspect of actual sin be understood with
original sin as a fundamental presupposition. His
doctrine of original sin with its strong language of
depravity concluded we are born sinners. Therefore, we
sin because we are sinners. 	 Although actual sin is
defined not so much by what one is, but by what one
does, what one does is influenced by what one is. We
wilfully sin because we are sinners by nature and by
birth. In view of this there are even more questions
which must be asked. To what extent is this freedom to
sin, or not to sin granted to the unregenerate? Are the
works of the unregenerate nothing more than 'splendid
sins'? To what extent is this freedom to sin or not to
sin granted to the regenerate?
Wesley's understanding of the volitional and
cognitive aspects of sin formed a radical departure from
Luther's understanding of sin as unbelief, and Calvin's
understanding of sin as any falling short of the law.ee
For Wesley, sin did involve unbelief, and it also
involved a falling short of the law so far as one was
aware of the law, but these aspects did not help to
define sin. They only helped to describe the act of
sinning, or the 'ordo peccare'. For the believer, the
'ordo peccare' consisted of,
the unquestionable progress from grace to sin.
Thus it goes on, from step to step. (1). The
divine seed of loving, conquering faith
remains in him that is 'born of God'. 'He
keepeth himself', by the grace of God, and
'cannot commit' sin; (2). A temptation arises,
whether from the world, the flesh, or the
devil, it matters not; (3). The Spirit of God
gives him warning that sin is near, and bids
him more abundantly watch unto prayer; (4). He
gives way in some degree to the temptation,
which now begins to grow pleasing to him; (5).
The Holy Spirit is grieved; his faith is
weakened, and his love of God grows cold; (6).
The Spirit reproves him more sharply, and
saith, 'This is the way; walk thou in it.'
(7). He turns away from the painful voice of
God and listens to the pleasing voice of the
ee 'On Perfection' (1784), BE',!, III, 79, where Wesley denies
that all transgression of the law is sin.
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tempter; (8). Evil desire begins and spreads
in his soul, till faith and love vanish away;
(9). He is then capable of committing outward
in, the power of the Lord being departed from
him. 89
In the 'ordo peccare' the Spirit plays a significant
part in cognitive aspects, making the volition possible.
The Spirit's part in prevenient grace will be seen
below.
4.3. Sin Improperly So Called
Those issues relate mostly to the	 soul, and
consequently to metaphysics, largely because cognition
and volition were acts of the soul. Infirmities relate
mostly to the body, and the most observable consequences
of original sin. Wesley was never quite certain as to
how to resolve the relationship between the cognitive
and volitional aspects of sin with the concept of body,
the other constitutive part of the duality of person-
hood. To what extent is the body corrupt? 	 Is corrup-
tion the same as sinful?
Wesley was not keen to identify the body with the
New Testament pejorative meaning for 'flesh' (or sarx).
For Wesley, 'Flesh sometimes signifies corrupt nature;
sometimes, the body, sometimesE. ..]the whole man.' 7 ° By
corrupt nature he meant, among other things, being
'carnally minded', 'in a state of nature', 'before we
believed in Christ', our 'corrupt' and 'evil' 'nature'
and 'passions'. 7 ' He did not mean by the concept what
others might call the 'sinful body'.
'But surely we cannot be saved from sin while
we dwell in a sinful body .' A 'sinful body'?
I pray, observe how deeply ambiguous, how
equivocal, this expression is! But there is
no authority for it in Scripture: the word
'sinful body' is never found there. And as It
is totally unscriptural, so it is palpably
absurd. For no body , or matter of any kind,
° 'The Great Privilege of those that are Born of God' (1748)
, I, 438-40.
70 ENNT (1755), John 1.14.
71 ENNT (1755), Roctns 7.5, 25; Galatians 5.16, 17, etc.
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be sinful: spirits alone are capable of sin.
(...lOnly the soul can be seat of sin.72
There was what appeared to be a disjunction between the
body and the soul where sin was concerned. Corruption
was seen by Wesley as the same thing as sin. Although
he extracted a prayer which instructed Christians to
pray for forgiveness of, 'The sins of our souls and the
sins of our bodies', such a prayer was not consistent
with his views on sin and the body. 73 Only the soul,
which was the subject of cognition and perception,
volition and free will, could be ultimately responsible
for sin, in as much as evil and sin were defined as
choosing not to do God's will. 	 The body was ontologi-
cally and morally neutral for Wesley, a concept sug-
gested by his mother in the letter above, and reaf-
firmed by his own understanding of creation and created-
ness. To say otherwise would have jeopardized Incarna-
tion theology.	 When Christ became flesh, or a whole
person, he 'united himself to our miserable nature, with
all its innocent infirmities.' 74 To speak of infir-
mities was the way in which Wesley discussed the
ontological neutrality of the body, all of which was the
consequence of his aesthetic view of creation, and free-
will account of evil.
Nonetheless, Wesley was able to talk about what
Augustine referred to as the 'triplex concupiscentia', a
concept which was derived from exegesis of 1 John 2.15-
16. In his comments on 1 John 2.16 in his, ENNT Wesley
wrote,
The desire of the flesh- Of the pleasure of
the outward senses, whether of the taste,
smell, or touch. The desire of the eye- Of
the pleasures of imagination, to which the eye
chiefly is subservient; of that internal sense
whereby we relish whatever is grand, new, or
beautiful.	 The pride of life- All that pomp
in clothes, houses, furniture, equipage,
manner of living, which generally procure
honour from the bulk of mankind, and so
72 'On Perfection' (1784) DEW, III, 79-80. See also, 'The
First-fruits of the Spirit' (1746), DEW, I, 240 for similar view.
Gill, Wesley 's Prayers (1951), p. 96.
flNT (1755), John 1.14.
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gratify pride and vanity. It therefore
directly includes the desire of praise, and,
remotely, covetousness. All these desires are
not from God, but from the prince of this
world.
The problem was that the soul had to live in a material
world, which sometimes led to the desire of the flesh,
the desire of the eye, and the pride of life. The
sermons of Wesley are scattered with references to the
'triplex concupiscentia', 7 which he understood to be a
part of original sin.77
For	 Augustine,	 the	 'triplex	 concupiscentia'
consisted of the three kinds of 'vice', which he called
pleasure, pride, and curiosity. He also saw a cor-
respondence between them and the temptations of Christ-
food (lust of flesh), the kingdoms of the world (pride),
and leaping from the temple (curiosity). 78 From these
three vices, or temptations, all sins spring. This was
elaborated upon in, Confessions. 79 However, the dif-
ference between Augustine and Wesley is that Augustine
used the central idea concupiscence to help explain
original sin, a move Wesley took pains to avoid.°
Wesley did not see original sin as the resultofconcupis-
cence, but concupiscence as the result of original sin,
saying,
From this evil fountain [inbred corruptioni
flow forth the bitter streams of vanity,
thirst of praise, ambition, covetousness, the
lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye and the
pride of life.8'
Wesley did, however, use concupiscence, or more specifi-
cally the 'triplex concupiscentia', to account for
actual sin. This will be an important distinction and
divergence from the Augustinian tradition for Wesley,
ENNF (1755), 1 John 2.16.
Outler's index to the Sermons lists 41 references.
' 'Original Sin' (1759), BEW, II, 179-82.
Augustine, On the Psalms, VIII.13.
Augustine,	 Confessions,	 X.xxx.4!;	 X.xxxiii.49-xxix.64.
Also, see On Patience, §14-16.
° Augustine, 'On Original Sin', §38-45; 'On Marriage and
Concupiscence', chs. 17-28; 'Sermons on the New-Testament Lessons',
LXII.6.
81 
'The Way to the Kingdom' (1746), BEW, I, 226.
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especially where his doctrine of Christian perfection is
concerned. It stands to reason if concupiscence is
caused by original sin, and if original sin can be dealt
with at the root by entire sanctification, then so may
concupiscence.
His exegesis of 1 John 2.16 is applied throughout
the sermons. For example,
These idols, these rivals of God, are in-
numerable: but they may be nearly reduced to
three parts. First, objects of sense, such as
gratify one or more of our outward senses.
These excite the first kind of 'love of the
world', which St. John terms 'the desire of
the flesh'. Secondly, objects of the imagina-
tion, things that gratify our fancy, by
grandeur, beauty, or novelty. All these make
us fair promises of happiness, and thereby
prevent our seeking it in God.	 This the
Apostle terms, 'the desire of the eyes'
whereby chiefly the Imagination is gratified.
They are, thirdly, what St. John calls 'the
pride of life'.	 He seems to mean honour,
wealth,	 and	 whatever	 directly tends to
engender pride.82
Sensory perception contributed greatly to provide the
soul with a vast of array of temptations, leading Wesley
to conclude, 'how numberless must the temptations be
which will beset every man, more or less, sooner or
later, while he dwells in this corruptible bodyl'3
Because of the relationship between the body and soul,
which is a union of the metaphysical with the material,
one must be careful about what one is furnishing the
soul with through the senses. It can lead to idolatry.
And,
the first species of this idolatry is what St.
John terms 'the desire of the flesh'E...lthis
expression equally refers to all the outward
senses. It means the seeking happiness in the
gratification of any or all of the external
senses; although more particularly of the
three lower senses, tasting, smelling, and
feeling. 84
82 'The Unity of the Divine Being' (1789), BEW, IV, 65.
'On Temptation' (1786), BEW, III, 159-60; cf. 'On Patience'
(1784),	 III, 170.
'Spiritual Idolatry' (1781), BEW, III, 105-6.
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But it also can lead to a cynical view of aesthetics,
beauty, and even of innovation.
We may farther suppose him to have gained all
that gratifies 'the desire of the eyes';
whatever (by means of the eye chiefly) conveys
any pleasure to the Imagination. The plea-
sures of Imagination arise from three sources:
grandeur, beauty, and novelty.(...] For all
this is manifestly implied in a man's gaining
the whole world.es
It must be pointed out, however, that in his essay,
'Thoughts upon Taste' Wesley did adopt aesthetics to a
religious use, by which aesthetic worth Is measured by
whether or not end of it all Is 'the • pleasing all men
for their good unto edification." ' 	 Otherwise, Wesley
was hesitant to develop 	 a positive view of aes-
thetics.
It is ironic that while Wesley did not find the
cause of sin in what we called his aesthetic theme of
creation, he does find a reason to see a cause for sin
in an aesthetic view of the beautiful. Perhaps the
difference Is things created by God speak of Divine
glory, while things created by humans speak of human
glory.	 The difference is what could also been seen as
Creator creating creatures, who participated in a
fallen nature through the loss of the image of God, and
the fallen creatures creating creatures which become
jdols. eT
	This made Wesley skeptical of beauty, because
of its appeal to the 'triplex concupiscentia'.
The aesthetics of human made objects also became
'The Important Question' (1775), BEW, III, 183-4. See also,
'An Israelite Indeed' (1785), BEW, III, 282-3; 'On Riches' (1788),
I3EW, III, 524-5; and his dismissive attitude towards 'European arts'
in 'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1743), BEW,
XI, 61.
' 'Thoughts on Taste', AM, 3 (1780), 662, in Works, XIII, 470,
which was provoked by Alexander Gerard, 'Essay on Taste'. See, Rack,
Reasonable Enthusiast (1989), p. 352.
ei It is at this point that a Wesletheory of aesthetics
could possibly (in fact needs to) be developed, which is in-keeping
with what eventually became Wesley's holiness ethic. It has become
particularly tragic that in many subsequent Wesleyan traditions the
nature of the holiness ethic has excluded any competent theology of
aesthetics.
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the trappings of wealth.' 6 In response to the increas-
ing wealth of the Methodists, Wesley felt compelled to
say,
If any of you have now twice, thrice, or four
times as much substance as when you first saw
my face, faithfully examine yourselves, and
see if you do not set your hearts, if not
directly on money or riches themselves, yet on
some of the things that are purchasable
thereby, which comes to the same thing. All
those the Apostle John includes under that
general name, 'the world'; and the desire of
them, or to seek happiness in them, under that
form, 'the love the world'. This he divides
into three branches, 'the	 desire of the
flesh',	 'the desire of the eyes', and 'the
pride of life'. Fairly examine yourselves
with regard to these. E. . .11 am afraid your
own heart condemns you. You are not clear in
this matter.''
To Wesley love of 'Mammon' and love of the world (which
consisted of desire of the flesh, desire of the eye, and
pride of life) simultaneous in consequence.
Wesley was fearful thatwiLo.&tirestraint of self-
denial sensation could lead to sensuality.' 0 While the
body might well have been ontologically neutral for
Wesley, it was nonetheless the medium by which the soul
was subjected to gross temptations. These temptations
were always a threat as long as the soul was in body.
Here is precisely where Susanna Wesley's ascetic rule
was applied to be applied, in an effort to combat the
'triplex concupiscentia'.
4.4. Summary
The subject of personal sin was a complicated issue
for Wesley. The source of many of the complications is
in reconciling Wesley's concept of personhood, hamar-
tiology, and soteriology. This created problems where
the method of their discussion is concerned. Because
Wesley developed an interdependent relationship between
" 'The L.nger of Riches' (1781), BEW, III, 228-46.
" 'The L1.nger of Increasing Riches' (1790), BEW, IV, 183; cf.
'The Use of Money' (1760),	 , II, 263-80;	 'Thoughts upon
Methodism',	 10(1787), 100-02, 155-56, in 13EV, IX, 527-30.
'° 'Self-denial' (1760), 13EV, II,, 238-50.
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the issue of personal sin and original sin, and even
between original sin and holy living, all these distinc-
tions in personal sin must be discussed in respect to
the order of salvation. It is within the order of
salvation that Wesley seeks to reconcile his psychology,
hamartlology, and soteriology. It has by now become
widely accepted that the order of salvation is the key
to understanding the 'inner consistency' to Wesley's
sermons, and indeed the remainder of his thought. 91 It
is within this framework many of the Issues of sys-
tematic theology are brought to light. 92 It is certain-
ly within this framework, more specifically in its
relation to Christian perfection, that Wesley's under-
standing of personal sin actually takes place, and the
person experiences 'therapy of the soul'. In the next
chapter we shall place all these within the structure of
the order of salvation to try and see them resolved.
91	 , I, 13.
92 See Collins, Wesley on Salvation (1989), p. 137.
Chapter Five
Wesley's Order of Salvation:
The Re-Inscription of the Image of God
1. Introduction
From the beginning it has been argued that Wesley's
doctrine of sin must be set in a theological context to
be properly understood. It has been proposed that the
best way to understand that context is by recovering
certain doctrines from Wesley's Christian system. An
important concept to his Christian system is the concept
of eternal reason, which emerged in chapter one. In
chapter two we saw that Wesley defined evil as not
obeying God, or as a deviation from the eternal reason,
or the will of God. The initial deviation from eternal
reason was demonstrated by angelic disobedience which
led to a heavenly revolt, which in turn led to a
division in the chain of being, creating a cosmological
dualism between creatures who share in a right relation-
ship with God and those who do not. This revolt was not
accounted for ontologically, but morally, that is to say
by way of free-will. In chapter three original sin was
seen as participation by the human race in that devia-
tion from the eternal reason. In chapter four we saw
how actual sin is the individual's wilful participation
in transgressing God's law, which was for Wesley,
essentially the same as eternal reason. Among other
things, this chapter will demonstrate that for Wesley
the goal of grace is for the believer to have the mind
that was in Christ, which in itself was the image of
eternal reason. 1 To have the mind of Christ one must be
renewed in the image of God.
The theological context of the doctrine of sin
extends to the doctrine of salvation for two reasons
first, in many respects original sin determined the
content and goal of salvation, which is Christ restoring
what we lost in Adam through original sin. What we lost
in Adam was the moral image of God, while the natural
and political images were marred. Second, because
Wesley's understanding of actual sin was developed not
in conjunction with his doctrine of original sin, but in
' There are no less than 5! references to 'the mind of Christ'
as mentioned in Phil. 2.5. For a listing see DEW, IV, 679.
Chapter Five	 228
conjunction with his concern for holy living. Actual
sin cannot be rightly understood unless It is placed
within the context of the order of salvation. As the
order of salvation is discussed, the subtleties of
actual sin will start to emerge. For Wesley, relations
between God and humankind were restored, and the Image
of God	 Is renewed through prevenient, justifying,
sanctifying, and glorifying grace. The experience of
God's grace becomes the structure of Wesley's order of
salvation.
This chapter will consist of two major sections,
one on the nature of Wesley's order of salvation, and
another on the order of salvation itself.
2. The Nature of Wesley's Order of Salvation
This section will briefly discuss some of the
characteristics of Wesley's order of salvation,
beginning with its historical and biblical precedents.
2.1. It has Historical and Biblical Precedence
The order of salvation had a long history before
Wesley's use of it. For example, it occupied a sig-
nificant place in the thoughts of Germans Jacob Spener,2
and David Hollaz; 3 the Puritan theology of Peter Martyr,
Martin Bucer, John Bradford, Richard Baxter, John Owen;4
and the Scottish theologian, Thomas Boston. 5 Outler was
convinced that origins of influence on Wesley were more
primitive than	 those, saying it was derived from
Irenaeus's doctrine of the recapitulatory work of Christ
as the	 ground of	 salvation.	 The doctrine of
2 Erb, Pietists (1983), p. 6; cf. Schinid, Doctrinal Theology
(1876), pp. 407-99.
Schwöbel, God: Action and Revelation (1992), pp. 127-31.
Wallace, Puritans and Predestination (1982). Wesley would
have been familiar with at least Baxter, and Owen.
Thomas Boston, Human Nature in Its Fourfold State (1720).
Wesley adapted Boston's fourfold state to a threefold state:
'natural' (when one neither fears nor loves God), 'legal' (when one
fears God), and 'evangelical' (when one loves God) as used in 'The
Spirit of Bondage and Adoption' (1746), DEW, I, 249-66; cf.




recapitulation certainly Indicated the grounding of the
order of salvation in the work of Christ. However,
Wesley's order of salvation Is not just about the work
of Christ, it is about the believer's experience of the
work of Christ.
Even so, Wesley developed the order of salvation
not because it was historical, but because he thought It
was biblical. To him, the order of salvation was 'The
Scripture Way of Salvation', thinking the Christian
religion should be taken 'in its native form, just as It
is described In the oracles of God'.7
2.2. Experience is the Interface between Dogmatics
and Ethics
Although the doctrine did have a Biblical and
historical precedence, Wesley's order of salvation was
to be experienced, not just believed. Empiricism's
reduction of experience into a 'subjective' category of
thought carried with It the potential of reducing the
order of salvation to that of a mere 'phenomenorof
religion'. Wesley was aware of the excessiveness of
enthusiasts- such as the French prophets which was often
caused by the subjective nature of experience. 9 As a
'phenomenon of religion', empirical observation could
have established the order of salvation as nothing more
than a 'variety of religious experiences'. 9 On this
basis modern critics of the order of salvation have said
it reduces the doctrine of salvation and the effects of
God's grace	 to a	 psychological description of a
religious phenomenon.'0
'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), 	 , II, 155-6.
BEW, XIX, 33, 72-3, where he encountered 'French prophets';
cf. 'A Second Letter To the Author of the Enthusiasm of Methodists
and Papists Cocnpar'd' (1751), BEW, XI, 399-429, p. 399. See, George
Lvington, 'The enthusiasm of Methodists and papists compar'd',
Parts I, II (1749), and III (1751); and, 'The Bishop of Exeter's
answer to Mr. J. Wesley's late letter to his Lordship' (1752).
' James, The Varieties of Reli gious Experience (1982); cf.
cushinan, Experimental Divinity (1989), p. 54.
10 SChWöbeI, God: Action and Revelation (1992), pp. 126-27 has
cited as 'a particular drastic example of this criticism', Martin
Rade's, &Iaubenslehre, Zweiter Band. Drittes Djch: "VomGeist",
(1927).
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Schwöbel's own research into the order of salvation
has brought him to more positive conclusions regarding
the part the order of salvation can play in systematic
theology. He has suggested that the order of salvation
reconstructs personal experience from the perspective
and orientation of faith, and also reconstructs the
relationship between divine and human action as it is
disclosed in revelation. In this way personal
experience becomes the 'interface between dogmatics and
ethics' which enables the rational aspect of systematic
theology to satisfy the need to be practical. On this
basis the order of salvation can provide systematic
theology with an important practical orientation in
respect to both Christian ethics, and the praxis of the
church. 1 1
If one applies Schwöbel's analysis of the order of
salvation specifically to Wesley's order of salvation it
can be seen how Wesley's experimental religion becomes
the interface between dogmatics and ethics, between
orthodoxy and orthopraxy. The experimental aspect of
the order of salvation meant Wesley strongly believed
that the Christian's experience of God's grace resulted
in a radical transformation of the believer as the
direct consequence of the new life. 	 In this way his
theology, and more specifically his doctrine of
salvation, was never divorced from ethics and other
practical issues, giving Wesley's theology the holistic
quality spoken of in the introduction.12
2.3. It is Teleological in Nature
The order of salvation draws from the holistic
experience of Christian pilgrimage, which consists of
'the several stages of the Christian course, the steps
which a Christian successively takes in his Journey to
the promised land[.. .1 1 , 13	 a pilgrimage which is in
1j Schwöbel, God: Revelation and Action, pp. 130-31, 138-39.
12 BEW, XI, 16.
13 
'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1748), 13EV, I, 475, and note 470;
cf. Wesley's 'Preface' to Sermons on Several Occasions (1746), BEW,
(continued...)
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itself teleological, or goal orientated, in nature.
Wesley's order of salvation moves towards a goal, or
end- the 'therapy of the soul',' 4 in which the believer
has the mind which was in Christ through the renewal of
the image of God in the soul of human persons. In this
respect his soteriology is not archaeological, but
teleological, in-as-much-as the goal is Christ-likeness
and Christian perfection, not Adam-likeness and Adamic
perfection.' 5 In Wesley's sermons there was always an
emphasis on growth and progression leading to renewal in
the image of God, through having the mind which was in
Christ.' 8 What enabled this growth in grace was the
notion that grace increases the capacity to receive more
grace, a thought found in Gregory of Nyssa's receptacle
imagery.'' By incorporating the order of salvation into
the framework of the Christian system, the experiential
is incorporated with the rational, giving Christian
theology a teleological and dynamic quality.
2.4. It is Attained by Faith
The way one progresses in pilgrimage and attains
the goal of salvation- or renewal in the image of God
and the mind of Christ- is by faith. Faith alone is
able to make us whole, 'which is the one medicine given
under heaven to heal' our sin sick souls.' 8	 'In
asserting salvation by faith,' Wesley wrote,
we mean this: (1.) that pardon (salvation
begun) is received by faith producing works.
(2.) That holiness (salvation continued) is
faith working	 by love. (3.) That heaven
13( 
.continued)
I, 105-06; cf. 'Sermon on the Mount, XI' (1750), flEW, I, 668-69;
'Sermon on the Mount, XII' (1750), flEW, I, 677.
14 DOS, Works, IX, 194.
' There is, however, one archeological reference in 'On
Mourning for the Dead' (1727), flEW, IV, 239.
'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1766/77), Works,
XI, 426. Although first published in 1766, it is the revised
edition of 1777 that is actually published in the Works.
17 See Harrison, 'Receptacle Imagery in St. Gregory of Nyssa's
Anthropology', SP, XXII, 23-27; also Gregory of Nyssa, 'On the Soul
and the Resurrection'.
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Although, after 1770 one sees in Wesley's sermons an
emphasis on works. This was an emphasis resulting from
the antinomian controversy Wesley was engaged in, and
" 'Minutes of some late Conversations' (!749, Works, VIII, 290.
20 See Pattenbury, Conversion of the Wcsleys (1938). I am aware
of the differing opinions	 to the significance of Aldersgate,
especially to the later period of Wesley's life. See, Outler,
'Towards a Pr-AppraisaI of John Wesley as a Theologian', The Perkins
School of Theology Journal 14(1961), 8, who discounts the importance
of Aldersgate; and cf. Collins, Wesley on Salvation (1989), p. 55-
64, who argues for its significance. Lawson has said, 'Wesley's
evangelical experience was the conversion of a moralist, which left
hima moralist still, though now a victorious moralist', John
Lawson, 'The Conversion of the Wesleys' (1987), p. 30. Cf. David L.
Cubie, 'Placing Aldersgate in John Wesley's Order of Salvation',
WTJ, 24(1989), 32-53, who equates Aldersgate to Wesley's personal
Pentecost.
21 
'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I'(1745), BEW, XI, 177-78, where Wesley admitted that from 1725-28,
'II...lI was utterly ignorant of the nature and condition ofjustification. Sometimes I confounded it with sanctification-
particularly when I was in Georgia'; cf. 'Minutes of Some Late
Conversations' (1749), in Works, VIII, 290; cf. 'Principles of a
Methodist Farther Explained' (1746), BEW, IX, 222-23.
22 'Hypocrisy in Oxford' (174!), BEW, V, 395.
23 'On God's Vineyard' (1787), I3EW, III, 505, where he also
says, 'Who has wrote more ably than Martin Luther on justification
by faith alone? And who was more ignorant of the doctrine of
sanctification, or more confused in his conceptions of it?'
24 'Hypocrisy in Oxford' (1741), BEW, IV, 395-96.
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not a fundamental theological shift away from the
doctrine of salvation by faith. 25 In 'The Scripture Way
of Salvation' he had said, 'The end is, in one word,
salvation: the means to attain it, faith' which became
Wesley's guiding principle after 1738.28
2.5. It is Existential in Nature
By faith Wesley thought the Christian could be
renewed in the moral image of God and the mind of Christ
in this life time. This gave his order of salvation a
preponderate existential nature. He was convinced that
the words, 'Ye are saved' meant salvation here and now,
not something received only in the distant future. 27 In
this respect 'now' was an important word in Wesley's
order of salvation.	 The sinner can be justified by
faith 'now'. The believer can be sanctified by faith
'now'. The sanctified can be freed from sin 'now'.
Wesley sought to place as much of salvation as possible
on this side of death. However, this 'now-ness' created
a dialectical tension between the existential and
eschatological aspects of salvation, that is between
what is attainable here, and what is attainable only
after the resurrection, all of which is highlighted by
the question, 'How much of the image of God can be
restored in a person now?' 	 Only an investigation Into
the order of salvation itself will provide the answer.
2.6. It Is Trinitarian in Orientation
As the investigation proceeds It will also be
discovered that the order of salvation was characterized
by a trinitarian orientation. The importance of the
Trinity to Wesley's theology has already been noted in
chapter three, so there is not much need to revalidate
25 Gunter, The Limits of Love Divine (1989), pp . 262-66.
Outler agrees with the point that Wesley always held to the doctrine
of justification by faith, Outler, 'Towards He-Appraisal of John
Wesley as Theologian', The Perkins School of Theolo gy Journal,
14(1961), 8-9.
26 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), DEW, II, 156.
27 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), DEW, II, 156; cf.
'Salvation by Faith' (1738), DEW, I, 121.
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the point here. Perhaps it is worth noting that Wesley
held that God the Father was the 'Author of faith and
salvation' alone, through the merits of God the Son, and
that the power and faith of salvation is contingent upon
God the Spirit. 29 Wesley frequently expressed It in
trinitarian ascriptions such as, 'God the Father, who
first loved us, and made us accepted in the
BelovedE...], God the Son, who loved us, and washed us
from our sins in his own bloodE. . .1, God the Holy Ghost,
who sheddeth	 the	 love	 of	 God	 abroad	 in our
heartsl. . •]• 2 	In this respect Wesley's doctrine of
salvation is not solely Christologically centred, as
suggested	 by	 Deschner,	 or even pneumatologically
centred, as suggested by Outler and Carter. 3 °	 It is
trinitarian centred.
This trinitarian emphasis found expression in two
ways. The first way was through the experience of
salvation. The person was seen to be created by the
Trinity, in the image of the Trinity, redeemed by the
Trinity, to be ultimately renewed in the image of the
Trinity. By experiencing the Trinity in the order of
salvation his trinitarian theology was not so much
speculative as it was experiential (or 'experimental').
Wesley said (quoting Jean-Baptiste de Saint-Jure, also
'the Marquis de Renty'), "'I bear about with me an
experimental verity and a plenitude of the presence of
the ever-blessed Trinity'". 31 The experience of the
Trinity was often the subject of Wesley hymns. For
example,
29 
'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1745),
BEW, XI, 107-08.
29 
'The Love of God' (1733), DEW, IV, 345; cf. the trinitarian
ascriptions at the ends of 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), DEW, I, 130;
'The Witness of Our Own Spirit' (1746), DEW, I, 313; 'Sermon on the
Mount, IX' (1748), DEW, I, 649; 'The General Spread of the Gospel'
(1783), BEW, II, 499; 'Death and Deliverance' (1725), DEW, IV, 214;
'Seek First the Kingdom' (1725), BEW, IV, 223; 'On Guardian Angels'
(1726), DEW, IV, 235; 'On Mourning the Dead', BEW, IV, 243; 'The
Promise of Understanding' (1730), DEW, IV, 289; 'The Image of God'
(1730), DEW, IV, 303; 'The One Thing Needful' (1734), DEW, IV, 359.30 Deschner, Wesley 's Christology (1985); Carter, Person and
Ministry of the Holy Spirit (1974); DEW, I, 8!.31 
'On the Discoveries of Faith' (1788), DEW, [V, 37, note 80.
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Creeds and books can nothing do,
Unaccompanied by grace;
Grace must form my soul anew,
Give me to discern Thy face,
Bring my faithful heart the power
God in persons three to' adore.32
I find, and every moment feel
The Triad in my heart.33
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost were all three a part of the
Christian experience of salvation. While most
Methodists would not have been able to articulate any
comprehensive doctrinal statement of the Trinity, they
were able to relate to others a heart-felt experience of
the Trinity.34
The experience of the Trinity through salvation
inevitably gave expression through worship, which is the
second characteristic of his trinitarian theology. The
experience of a trinitarian salvation shaped the nature
of early Methodist worship, which was primarily worship
of the one-in-three through the three-in-one, or worship
of the triune God through God the Father, God the Son,
and God the Holy Spirit.'5
2.7. It is Dialogical in Nature
While the triune God alone was seen by Wesley as
the author	 of faith and salvation, God does not
participate in salvation alone. 	 On this basis Wesley
also said there were three parts to justification,
upon God's part, his great mercy and grace;
upon Christ's part, the satisfaction of God's
justice by the offering his body and shedding
his blood, 'and fulfilling the law of God
perfectly'; and upon our part, true and living
faith in the merits of Jesus Christ.'
32 "Hymns on the Trinity" (1767), No. 6 "Hymns and Prayers".
' "Hymns and Prayers to the Trinity" (1767), No. 33.
' See, AM, 13(1790), 247, 441; (1779), 204; JWL, VI, 265; VII,
392; Rack, 'Early Methodist Visions of the Trinity', VdHS, XLVI, 38-
44 57-69. Perhaps this helps to explain early Methodists' visions
of the Trinity.
" Bryant, 'Singing Theology: The Wesleys on the Trinity', The
Preacher's Magazine, 68(1991)1, 43-44.
'The Principles of a Methodist' (1742), BEW, IX, 5!; cf.
'The Wedding Garment' (1790), BEW, IV, 148.
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While the	 primary cause of justification was the
Trinity, Wesley's doctrine of justification also
accommodated human response and participation in the
process. Wesley's expression for this participation was
free-will, or the ability to say yes or no to God's
gracious offer of salvation on the basis of the merits
of the death and resurrection of Christ. This implies
that Wesley had a progressive Christology, namely,
beginning with a 'satisfaction' atonement and then
progressing to embrace a 'moral example' Christology
which is validated by human participation. 37 It will be
suggested below that one	 might see	 this as the
dialogical nature of the relationship between the triune
God and the human person.	 It will be seen that the
dialogical nature of salvation had implications for the
nature of	 the atonement	 and the	 nature of the
righteousness of Christ as the basis of justification,
both of which accommodated a human response. This
accommodation of a human response ultimately shaped the
nature of justification itself.
2.8. It is Dialectical in Nature
The last feature of Wesley's order of salvation,
and perhaps the cause of much misunderstanding, is its
dialectical nature. Wesley's order of salvation is
filled with unsynthesized dialectics, which result in
what would perhaps be better called paradoxes. Within
its framework one sees doctrines and traditions working
together in one system which would ordinarily seem
mutually exclusive outside of the framework. For
example, one sees at the same time a doctrine of
religious experience as influenced by Pietism, and a
doctrine of knowledge as influenced by rationalism and
empiricism; the Reformation doctrine of justification by
faith, and something of a Catholic doctrine of works; an
understanding of God's omniscience and omnipotence which
allowed free-will; a salvation which is experienced as
both crisis and process; a salvation which advocated
My thanks to Mark Forrester for making this point.
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both baptismal regeneration, and rebirth; a
sanctification which may be obtained now, but Is also
yet to come; a theology in which both the sacrament of
the Lord's supper, and preaching as means of grace are
honoured. This list names just a few.
Perhaps for our interests the greatest dialectic
was created by Wesley's reformed/Augustinian doctrine of
original sin (which had, comparatively speaking, a weak
doctrine of existential sanctification), and his
doctrine of sanctification which had been influenced by
the eastern church	 (which had, comparatively speaking,
a weaker doctrine of original sin). The link holding
the two together within his own order of salvation was a
definition of personal sin, derived from Catholic-
influenced Anglican tradition of moralism, a hybrid one
might well call 'Anglo/Catholic moralism'. As one looks
at this	 strange collection of doctrines, Wesley's
theology takes on the appearance of a 'cut-and-paste'
theology.	 Perhaps this is why Wesley is looked to as a
paradigm for ecumenism, and why so many different
traditions	 look	 to	 Wesley	 as their theological
patriarch. Sometimes one's interpretation of Wesley is
like taking a ink blot test.	 What one sees in Wesley
depends greatly on what one brings to Wesley.
Nonetheless, It must be admitted that in his theology
one finds curious, and sometimes bizarre, combinations
of theology, all of which were held together within
Wesley's Interpretation of the Christian system- his
order of salvation.
3. Constructing the Order of Salvation
Having now looked at several attributes of the
nature of Wesley's order of salvation, we will now
attempt to reconstruct it. There are two key sermons
one must consider in understanding Wesley's order of
salvation- 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), and
'On Predestination' (1773). 	 Of, 'The Scripture Way of
se See, Campbell, Wesley and Christian Anti quity (1991), pp.
55-71.
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Salvation' Outler has said, it is 'the most successful
summary of the Wesleyan vision of the ordo salutls in
the entire sermon corpus.' 39 For this reason Collins
and others have used this sermon as the blue-print by
which they have	 constructed	 Wesley's	 order of
salvation. 40 	But this sermon on its own provides an
incomplete picture of what Wesley eventually understood
as the order of salvation.	 In, 'The Scripture Way of
Salvation', Wesley acknowledged that 	 the order of
salvation consisted of 'the entire work of God, from the
first dawning of grace in the	 soul till	 it is
consummated in glory'. However, in that sermon the
order of salvation started only with prevenient grace
and stopped with entire sanctification. 4 ' The sermon,
'On	 Predestination'	 added	 predestination	 and
glorification, two	 essential concepts to a fuller
understanding of Wesley on salvation. The sermon, 'On
Predestination' shows how God predestined salvation, and
to what end this salvation was predestined. Admittedly,
the order of salvation as it will appear here is a
composite sketch made from snap-shots of two sermons.
There were subtle shifts in Wesley which would have
altered the above list at different points in his
career, which means it cannot, and indeed is not said to
be definitive. 42 However, from this greater list there
are	 five	 fixed	 reference points- predestination,
prevenient grace, justification by faith, sanctification
by faith, and glorification. These will serve as the
main points in Wesley's order of salvation, as it is
used in our discussion of the issues relating to his
doctrine of sin, and these points will be filled in with
other material.
Outler, DEW, II, 154.
40 Collins, Wesley on Salvation (1989), p. 12. Deschner has
suggested a link between the history of Christ and the order of
salvation, and that Christ's history in turn was a recapitulation of
Israel's history, Wesley 's Christology (1985), p. 60.
" 
'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), DEW, II, 156-62.
' See Collins, Wesley on Salvation (1989), p. 12.
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3.1. Predestination
The issue of predestination was an Important one to
Wesley. 43 Unfortunately, it will only be briefly
discussed here. It must be pointed out that several of
the philosophical and theological elements of
predestination (the 'eternal now', God's foreknowledge,
etc.) were discussed in chapter two, where it was shown
how Wesley's doctrine of free-will arose out of the
issue of theodicy. Given his doctrine of free-will as a
presupposition, predestination	 was not determinism,
which	 would	 have	 made	 morality	 impossible	 by
contradicting the justice of God. 	 Consequently,
predestination was not a 'chain of causes and effects'
but simply showed, 'the method In which God works--the
order in	 which the several branches of salvation
constantly follow each other',	 which is	 to say,
presupposing the origin of evil and original sin,
predestination was the ordering of salvation. 45	'In
other words,' he wrote,
God decrees from everlasting to everlasting
that all who believe in the Son of his love
shall be conformed to his image, shall be
saved from all inward and outward sin into all
inward and outward holiness. Accordingly it
is a plain, undeniable fact: all who truly
For example, see, 'Serious Considerations on Absolute
Predestination. Extracted from a late author [Robert l3arclay]'
(1741); 'A Dialogue between a Predestinarian and His Friend' (1741),
Works, X, 259-266;	 'The	 Scripture	 Doctrine Concerning
Predestination, ELection, and Reprobation' (174!), also in,
Preservative against Unsettled Notions in Religion (1758); 'Serious
Thoughts upon the Perseverance of the Saints' (175!), Works, X, 284-
98; 'PredestinatIon Calmly Considered' (1752), Works, X, 204-59.
For an example of this kind of argument see 'Predestination
Calmly Considered' (1752), Works, X, 233-34. For Wesley's attack
upon Henry Home's determinism in Part I 'Essay II. Of Liberty and
Necessity', in, Essays on the Principles of Natural Religion
(Edinburgh: 1751), see 'Thoughts upon Necessity' (1774), in Works,
X, 457-74. For a similar attack upon the determinism of David
Hartley, in his Observations on Man (1749), see Wesley's, 'A Thought
on Necessity', AM, 3(1780), in Works, X, 474-480; also 'Fate and
Destiny, inconsistent with Christianity: in eight Conferences
between Epenetus and Eutychus: extracted from Mr. Edward Bird', AN
3(1780); 'An extract from a volume entitled, A Review of Dr. Priest-
ley's Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity. Whether Liberty be
essential to practical Virtue; and of moral and practical
Necessity',	 11(1788), 12(1789), 13(1790).
'On Predestination' (1773), BEW II, 416.
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believe In the name of the Son of God do now
'receive the end of their faith, the salvation
of their souls'; and this in virtue of the
unchangeable, irreversible, irresistible
decree of God: 'He that believeth shall be
saved; he that	 believeth	 not	 shall be
damned. '4 8
From this two points should be made. First, this view
of predestination constructs the ordering of salvation
which the believer perceives, rather than a prospective
pattern which is pre-set. Second, predestination is
what gave salvation its teleos, which was conformation
of the redeemed to the Christological image of the
triune God. By looking at predestination in this way he
harmonized the concept of eternal decrees to his views
of free-will, free-grace, and Christian perfection.
3.2. Prevenient Grace
The first step in the order of salvation 'is
usually	 termed	 (and	 very	 properly)	 "preventing
grace'. 4 '	 It consisted of 'all the "drawings" of "the
Father"', Christ's illumination of the soul, and all the
"convictions which the Spirit works'. 4 '	 This is the
universal human experience of the irresistible workings
of the Holy Spirit.	 In doing so prevenient grace as a
work of the Spirit became a constitutive element in
Wesley's epistemology of sin, since the concept
Includes, 'the first wish to please God, the first dawn
of light concerning his will, and the first slight
transient conviction of having sinned against him. ''
This epistemology of sin was actually made possible by
the re-inscription of a certain amount of free-will, and
the moral law.
' 'On Predestination' (1773), BEW, II, 418.
' 'On Working Ont Onr Own Salvation' (1785), BEW, III, 203.
' 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), BEW, II, 156-57;
cf. 'Heaviness through Manifold Temptations' (1760), BEW, II, 230.
It is interesting to compare Wesiey' doctrine of prevenient grace
with the 'Canones et Decreta Dogmatica Concilli Tridentini' (1546),
fifth session, chapters V-VI, Scharf, Creeds (1990), II, 92-93.
' 'On Working Ont Onr Own Salvation' (1785), BEW, III, 203.
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3.2.!. Prevenient Grace and Free-Will
It was seen in chapter three how in the fall, the
moral image of God was completely lost, while the
natural and political aspects of the image of God were
marred. Prevenient grace assured that every person had
a certain measure of 'free-will' supernaturally restored
In order to guarantee that a decision for good or evil,
obedience or disobedience would be made. 5 ° MacFadyn
has Interpreted this characteristic of free-will as the
'dialogical' aspect of the Divine-human relationship.51
I shall use the term to describe Wesley's understanding
of God's prevenient restoration of the human ability to
say yes, or no to God's offer of saving grace and a
right relationship with the Father, through Son, by the
Spirit. Without the dialogical aspect of free-will
there is only a monologue, in that the human response is
denied by God.	 Without prevenlent grace, the divine-
human relationship would be just that, a monologue.
A free-will that was essentially dialogical in
nature was the sort of free-will Wesley spoke of. It
was not a type of Pelagian freedom from original sin,
but the ability to say yes to God's salvation in order
to be freed from the sickness of sin, ad restored to a
right relationship with God. The re-inscription of
liberty and will was seen by Wesley to be in-itself a
gracious,	 prevenient	 act-	 the	 hallmark	 of his
Arminianism.	 Without the	 dialogical nature made
possible by prevenient grace, Wesley would have been no
different from Calvin.	 Without original sin and the
deprivation of the moral image, Wesley would have been
no different from Pelagius. He stood a hair's breadth
from what he considered a precipice on either side. The
dialogical nature of free-will is what provided him the
balance from falling into either extreme.
SO 'Predestination Calmly Considered' (1752), Works, X, 229-30;
cf. 'Remarks on Mr. Hill's Review' (1772), Works, X, 392.
McFadyen, Persorthood (1990), pp. 42-3, 224-30.
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3.2.2. Prevenient Grace and the Moral Law
Liberty was not all that was re-inscribed. So was
the moral law, which was for Wesley, 'the knowledge of
God, his will, and his law'. 52 In other words, the
moral law was tantamount to 'eternal reason' as the
nature of God.
First, the moral law is predicated on knowing God's
will. Thus, knowing God's will is to know God. The
moral law had its beginning 'beyond the foundation of
the world', 53 and was in fact given to the angels in
heaven. 54 	This pre-existent law was, 'a copy of the
eternal mind, a transcript of the divine natureE. .
But the law is more than just a picture of God. It is
God. God's law is God's will, and 'the will of God is
God himself'. 58 Consequently, to be filled with
knowledge of God's law is to be filled with God.
Collins has suggested that this theme of 'a copy of the
eternal mind' shows something of a Platonic influence,
and suggested it was probably mediated to Wesley through
John Norris, one of the Cambridge Platonists. 5 '	 On the
other hand, Outler, 58 and Deschner, 5 ' have both observed
52 ENNT, Colossians 3.10.
'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
, II, 6.
' 'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
II, 8.
'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
1Ø II, 9, 10.58 
'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
, II, 13.
Collins, 'John Wesley's Platonic Conception of the Moral
Law', WTJ, 21(1986), 116-28; Collins, 'John Wesley's Theology of
Law' (1984), pp. 60-65. He is correct in saying Wesley refers to
Plato's Phaedrus, but it is indirectly. He it Is more likely that
he Is quoting Cicero, De Off iciis, 1.5, where there is in turn a
reference to Phaedrus, 250d. See, C*jtler, BEW, II, 9, note 22.
Also, see English, 'The Cambridge Platonists in Wesley's "Christian
Library"', PWHS, 36(1968), 161-68. Wesley extracted several
Cambridge Platonists (Ralph Cudworth, Nathanael Culverwel, Henry
More, Simon Patrick, John Smith, John Worthington) in 7 of 50
volumes contained in the CL. He 'changed' their views by editing
them, with his deletions becoming an index of his disagreements with
them. In addition to their views on moral law, Wesley also agreed
with them that sanctification is the perfection of the believer
(e.g. Cudworth, CL, XVII, 32; Worthington, CL, XXIII, 270).
BEW, II, 9 note 20.
Deschner, Wesley 's Christology (1985), p. 95.
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the deliberate Christological connotations of the moral
law, and the assignment to the moral law the
Christological predicates of Hebrews l.3,° in which
Christ Is seen to be not just the personification of the
moral law, but its incarnation. Christ is moral law, or
eternal reason incarnate. In either case, the moral law
is established as a picture of the divine mind which is
tantamount to 'eternal reason' (as was discussed in the
Introduction and chapter one), and integrated into the
created order, which provides more evidence as to the
centrality of 'eternal reason' to Wesley's 'Christian
system'.	 The 'divine mind' or 'eternal reason' is
eventually expressed as God's image, revealed
Christologically, and born anthropologically, in the
souls of human persons, by which the believer is able to
have the 'mind which was In Christ'.
Second, the eternal moral law of God was to be
distinguished from the ceremonial law of Moses.8'
Wesley did have a variety of ways of expressing the
contents of the moral law. 82 In one instance he
described it as the golden rule; 83 in another, as the
Sermon on the Mount; 84 and in still another, the ten
commandments. 85	Where Adam was concerned, the content
of moral law was given to him in Genesis 2.17, shortened
by Wesley to the phrase, 'Do this and live', 8	 which
was 'engraved on his heart by the finger of God' and
80 See, ENNr, Hebrews 1.3.
81 'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
BEW, II, 4-5; 'The Law Established through Faith, I' (1750), II, 21;
'The Law Established through Faith, II' (1750), II, 33-4; ENN
(1755), Galatians 2.16. This coninon distinction Is also found in
calvin, Institutes, 2.7.1-3; Luther, E pistle to the Galatians, 2.19,
4.27; Arminius, Works (1825), II, 198-201. Cf. Irenaeus, 'Against
Heresies", 4.12-17 (ANF, I, 475-84).
82 Collins, 'John Wesley's Platonic Conception of the Moral
Law', WTJ, 21(1986), 117.
• 'Upon our Lord's Sermon on the Mount' (1750), DEW, I, 660-61.
84 'Upon (kir Lord's Sermon on the Mount, V' (1748), DEW, I,
555-60; and, Works, XI, 486.
'Upon our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, V' (1748), DEW, I,
55!; 'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750), DEW,
II, 6.08 
'The Righteousness of Faith' (1746), DEW, I, 203, 210; 'What
is Man?' (1787), DEW, IV, 26; 'The Duty of Receiving the Lord's
Supper' (Robert Nelson, attr. to Wesley), DEW, IV, 527.
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'coeval with his nature'. 7 The moral law as the golden
rule, the ten commandments, and even the sermon on the
mount were all different expressions of the same thing,
a point missed by Oswalt, who thought Wesley was at best
vague on this point. They were commonly expressing
love for God and neighbour, the way in which Wesley
ultimately understood the moral law.' The moral law
gave the moral image both relational and ethical aspects
and all its Christological connotations.7°
The purpose of the moral law being re-inscribed
onto the hearts of individuals was threefold. First, It
was to convince the world of sin. However, the moral
law had to always work in conjunction with the Holy
Spirit, although the Holy Spirit need not work with the
moral law. This ultimately made conviction of sin, 'the
peculiar work of the Holy Ghost, who can work It without
any means at all, or by whatever means it pleaseth
him[. . J71 The preaching of the law enhanced the re-
inscribed moral law and helped the Holy Spirit to
convict individuals of sin. This was both the prelude
and the presupposition to the evangelical preaching of
the Gospel in Wesley's ministry, perhaps one of the keys
to the frequently astonishing and incredible responses
(often described as 'madness' by his critics) to his
preaching. 12 This is virtually inseparable from the
07 'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
DEW, II, 7; cf. 'Justification by Faith' (1746), DEW, I, 184; 'Upon
Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, V' (1748), DEW, I, 552-53.
Oswalt, 'Wesley's Use of the Old Testament in his Doctrinal
Teachings', WTJ, 12(1977), 46.
'The Love of God' (1733), DEW, IV, 330-45.
70 'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
II, 7.
' 
'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
DEW, II, 15; cf. DEW, XXVI, 482-89 (1751).
72 e.g. William Warburton, 'The doctrine of grace; or, The
office and operations of the Holy Spirit vindicated from the insults
of infidelity and the abuses of fanaticismt. . .1', 2 vols, paginated
continuously (1763), pp. 208 ff.; and Wesley's response, 'A Letter
to the Right Reverend The Lord Bishop of Gloucester. Occasioned by
his TractE.. .1' (1763), in DEW, XI, 467-538; note also, 'A Farther
Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I', in DEW, XI, 196-201.
See, Hiliman, 'Grace in the Preaching of Calvin and Wesley' (1978),
p. 63; Holland, 'A Species of Madness": The Effect of John Wesley's
(continued...)
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second use of the law in bringing the sinner 'unto life,
unto Christ, that he may live', by acting the part of a
'severe schoolmaster', driving by force, rather than
drawing by love. 73 The third use of the law, was
initially the means by which the Spirit prepared the
believer for 'larger communications of the life of God'
by convincing the believer of remaining sin; and
secondly, it was the means 'whereby he empowers them to
do what his law commands; and lastly, 'In confirming our
hope of whatsoever it commands and we have not yet
attained, of receiving grace upon grace, till we are in
actual possession of the fullness of his promises'.74
While the content of the moral law may have been
Christological in	 nature, its	 application to the
believer's life was the activity of the Holy Spirit.75
This indicates an important role for the law, not
just in the conversion of sinners, but also In
conviction of sin in believers. 78 For all practical
purposes it could be said Wesley's rigorous schemes for
self-examination, and even Susanna Wesley's simplified
ascetic rule for that matter, can be seen as an
extension of the third use of moral law in the life of
believers. 77 In this way Wesley sought to combat the
72( 
.continued)
Early Preaching', PWHS, 39(1973), 77-85; Sargant, Battle for the
Mind (1957), p . 78; Dimond, The Psychology of the Methodist Revival
(1926), pp. 99, 117, 163; Wood, The Burning Heart (1967), p. 230;
Out 1 er, BEW, I, 200-01.
'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
BEW, II, 16. This should be compared to his advice given 'A Plain
Account of Christian Perfection' (1777), Works, XI, 387, 'Q. In what
manner should we preach sanctification? A. Scarce at all to those
who are not pressing forward: To those who are, always by way of
promise; always drawing, rather than driving.'
" 'Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law' (1750),
, II, 16-17.
cf. Calvin's use of the law, Institutes, 2.7.6-13; and
Luther's use of the law, Comentary on Galatians, 3.19. While
similarities may be seen, Wesley's uses of the moral law seems to
have been his own, (Xitler, BEW, II, 15 note 60.
'On Sin in Believers' (1763), PEW, I, 317-34.
See, 'A Collection of Forms of Prayers for Every Bay in the
Week' (1733); 'A Scheme of Self-Examination, used by the first
Methodists in Oxford', in AM 4(1781), 319; 'The Nature, Design, and
General Rules of the United Societies' (1743), PEW, IX, 69-75;
(continued...)
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Antinomians, who, in one sense, asserted that Christ had
abolished the moral law." It was this problem Wesley
sought to address in his three sermons on the law.'' On
the other hand, there was the inherent danger in re-
inscription of the moral law leaning towards moral ism.
It was only because of his doctrine of original sin and
total depravity that he could say no one could be saved
by the works of the moral law.'°
It is therefore difficult to accuse Wesley of
allowing for sin to be committed through ignorance of
the moral law. 'Whoever said or thought so?' Wesley
responded to such a charge, and replied, 'Ignorance is
not, but mistake is.'' Sin done in ignorance is not
really possible especially when kept together with
Wesley's understanding of the moral law of God, and the
role of the Spirit in animating the moral law. Unless
the cognitive and volitional aspects of his
understanding of sin are related to this aspect of his
concept of prevenient grace his doctrine of sin is
critically and severely weakened.
3.2.3. Prevenient Grace and 'Natural
Conscience'
From the re-inscription of the moral law comes
Wesley's concept of 'natural conscience'' 2 or as some
.continued)
'Rules of the Band Societies, Drawn up Dec. 25, 1738', BEW, IX, 77-
8; 'Directions given to the Band Societies, Dec. 25, 1744', BEW, IX,
79.
" See, 'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' (1749), Works,
VIII, 278; 'A Dialogue between an Antinoinian and his Friend' (1745),
Works, X, 266-76, Wesley's transcription of his conversations with
Zinzendorf; 'A Second Dialogue between an Antinomian and his Friend'
(1745), Works, X, 276-84, Wesley's response to William udworth's,
'Dialogue Between a Preacher of God's Righteousness and a Preacher
of Inherent Righteousness' (1745).
" 'The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law'
(1750), 'The Law Established through Faith, I and II' (1750), DEW,
II, 1-43.
'° 'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII,
278.
si JWL, IV, 155 (1761).82 
'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), DEW, II, 156-57.
The most influential source of influence on Wesley's understanding
(continued...)
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writers contemporary to Wesley chose to call it, the
'moral sense'." He spoke of it in terms of the marred
'remains of the image of God' as including 'some
discernment of the difference between moral good and
evil, with an approbation of one and disapprobation of
the other, by an inward monitor excusing or
accusingE...J.'' 4 Wesley objected to the word 'natural'
as there is really nothing 'natural' about its presence
in man. It is a,
supernatural gift of God, 	 above all his
natural endowments. No, it is not nature but
the Son of God that is 'the true light, which
enlighteneth every man which cometh into the
world'. So that we may say to every human
creature, 'He', not nature, 'hath shown thee,
0 man, what is good. ' And It is his Spirit
who giveth thee an inward check, who causeth
thee to feel uneasy, when you walkest in any
instance contrary to the light which he hath
given thee.'5
For Wesley, conscience is one's consciousness of Christ
sensitized by the Holy Spirit, all of which are the
gifts of Father. This fact notwithstanding, Wesley also
introduced an element of rationality, saying, 'Many
cases of conscience are not to be solved without the
utmost exercise of our reason.'''
The re-inscription of the will and the moral law
amounts to a partial renovation of the volitional and
moral aspects of the image of God. Those, together with
the marred remains of the image of God enabled Wesley to
confidently say,
Yet this [the impossibility of seif-salvationi
is no excuse for those who continue to sin,
and lay the blame upon their Maker by saying:
'It is God only that must quicken us; for we
cannot quicken our own souls.' For allowing
e2( . 
. continued)
of conscience was his maternal grandfather, Samuel Annesley, whose
sermon on Acts 24.16 (published in, The Morning-Exercise at
Cripplegate, 1661), Wesley abridged and published in the CL, in
addition to quoting it in his sermon 'On Conscience' (1788).
" 'The Witness of Our Own Spirit' (1746), 	 , I, 302, and
note 9 where cxmtler traces the use of the phrase 'moral sense'.
' 'Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels' (1790), BEW, IV, 163.
" 'On Conscience' (1788), BEW, III, 482.
• 'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered' (1781), BEW, II,
592.
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that all the souls of men are dead in sin by
nature, this excuses none, seeing there is no
man that Is in a state of mere nature; there
Is no man, unless he has quenched the Spirit,
that is wholly void of the grace of God. No
man living is entirely destitute of what is
vulgarly called 'natural conscience'. But
this is not natural; it is more properly
termed 'preventing grace'. Every man has a
greater or less measure of this, which waiteth
not for the call of man. Everyone has sooner
or later good desires, although the generality
of men stifle them before they can strike deep
root or produce any considerable fruit.
Everyone has some measure of that light, some
faint glimmering ray, which sooner or later,
more or less, enlightens every man that corneth
into the world. And is seared as with a hot
iron, feels more or less uneasy when he acts
contrary to the light of his own conscience.
So that no man sins because he has not grace,
but because he does not use the grace which he
hath.
Conscience	 as	 Christ-consciousness, 	 evoked	 and
sensitized by the Holy Spirit, Is what Wesley termed
prevenient grace.	 His understanding of irresistible
grace which is given to 'every child of man'. 	 No one
is without it, not even 'Mahometans', 'pagans', or 'the
vilest of savages. e It Is as universal and irresis-
tible as original sin itself. The wilful transgression
of a known law of God does not result from a lack of
grace, but is the result of one suppressing and not
using the grace one has.	 This grace vindicates the
justice of God.
3.2.4. Prevenient Grace and 'Splendid Sins'
Because the re-inscription of the moral law as a
constitutive part of prevenient grace entailed a certain
knowledge of good and evil, it also meant the
possibility for one to do good works without them being
considered 'splendid sins', on one hand, while on the
other hand they were not given any attribute of saving
er 'On Working Out Our ( qn Salvation' (1785), BEW, III, 207.
Cf. his objections to Taylor's use of 'nature' in, DOS, Works, IX,
267-69. Also, ci. Thomas Hanton, Works, (1681), I, 181.
ee 'Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels' (1790), DEW, IV, 163.
ec 'Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels' (1790), 	 IV, 163.
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merit.°	 In doing so Wesley attempted to maintain the
integrity of his evangelica l understanding of
justification by faith alone, while acknowledging a
place for huanitarlan kindness and morality that are
'good and profitable to men'.'' Such pre-justification
works are not the result of human goodness, but of God's
prevenient grace. Because there can be no works to
salvation (only works from salvation), there is still a
wide difference,
between Christianity and morality. Indeed
nothing can be more sure than that true
Christianity cannot exist without both the
inward experience and outward practice of
justice, mercy, and truth; and this alone
[the outward practicel Is given in morality.
But it is equally certain that all morality,
all the justice, mercy, and truth which can
possibly exist without Christianity, profiteth
nothing at all, is of no value in the sight of
God, to those who are under the Christian
dispensation F...]. However just, true, or
merciful they may be, they are but atheists
still.
In Wesley's understanding, even an unjustified and
unrepentant sinner may do something good, but it is
ultimately done without any cause for self-
congratulations, which is denied by God's preventing
grace. It is not by one's inherent goodness that one
acts in kindness, Christian or not. It is only by God's
grace than any acts of mercy at all are done. Even
then, 'all works done before justification have in them
the nature of sin; and that, consequently, till he is
° 'The Reward of Righteousness' (1777), , III, 400-14 (see
Cutler's note 31 on p. 404 for the background to the phrase). This
was a sermon Wesley preached in Lewisham before 'The Humane
Society', 'instituted for the sake of those who seem to be drowned,
strangled, or killed by any sudden stroke. It is a glorious design,
in consequence of which many have been recovered that must otherwise
have inevitably perished' (JWJ, VI, 175, 1777); cf. 'Justification
by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 192-93 and note 69; 'Predestination Calmly
Considered'	 (1752), Works, X,	 222; 'Minutes of Some Late
Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII, 282-83.
91 
'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 192; cf. Article 13
of the 'Articles of Religion', and, 'Of Good Works' in, Sermons or
Homilies Appointed to be read in Churches in the Time of Queen
ElIzabeth (1828).
92 
'On Living Without God' (1790), 	 , IV, 174-75.
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justified a man has not power to do any work which is
pleasing and acceptable to God.''3
3.2.5. Prevenient Grace and Natural Theology
On the basis of the re-inscription of the moral law
and prevenient grace Wesley can be said to have a
natural theology, if by natural theology one means a
universal human ability to know God that does not depend
on special revelation.' 4 However, the basis of Wesley's
natural theology was not confined to the re-inscription
of the moral law. Wesley's understanding of providence
as God's guiding the course of human history (as was
discussed in chapter two) can also be interpreted as a
part of natural revelation.' 5 But God can also be
revealed through the natural order of creation. This
seems to have been the assumption of his natural
philosophy.' 8 Something of that assumption was
reflected in his sermon, 'The Imperfection of Human
Knowledge' (1784), where Wesley said,
If indeed God had stamped (as some have
maintained) an idea of himself on every human
soul, we must certainly have understood
something of these, as well as his other
attributes; for we cannot suppose he would
have impressed upon us either a false or
imperfect idea of himself. But the truth is,
no man ever did, or does now find any such
idea stamped upon his soul. The little which
we do know of God (except what we receive by
the inspiration of the Holy One) we do not
gather from an inward impression but gradually
acquire from without. 'The invisible things
of God', if they are known at all, 'are known
from the things that are made;' not from what
' 'The Principles of a Methodist' (1742), BEW, IX, 50-5!; cf.
'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I' (1745),
BEW, XI, 113, in which Wesley cites 'Article XIII. Of Works done
before Justification'. See 'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I,
193, for a syllogism explaining why works before justification are
not good.
' Hendricks, 'John Wesley and Natural Theology', WTJ,
18(1983)2, 7-17.
HE (1776), I. §9.
Cf. 'The Imensity of the Works of Creation', AN 10(1787),
442-3, 483-5, 538-9, 592, 642-3.
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God hath written in our hearts, but from what
he hath written in all his works."
While denying an innate knowledge of God, Wesley
advocated the empirical observations acquired through
Impressions and sensations 'from without' by way of
inspiration. In this respect Wesley had a qualified
sympathy for Joseph Butler's work in which he associated
natural revelation with the observation of nature.''
The re-inscription of the moral law with natural
philosophy combined, however, the intuitive with the
empirical- two lights making up a natural theology.''
But, in Wesley's opinion, all the lights of natural
theology put together,
availed no farther than to produce a faint
twilight.	 It gave them, even	 the most
enlightened	 of	 them,	 no Eelinchosl, no
demonstration, no demonstrative conviction,
either of the invisible or of the eternal
world. 1 00
Natural theology, empirical or intuitive, is not natural
salvation. There was no such thing as natural salvation
to Wesley. Saving knowledge of the eternal Is perceived
only by faith which apprehends through the work of the
Holy Spirit the specific (or special) revelation of God
in Christ as seen in the Scriptures.
" 'The Imperfection of Human Knowledge' (1784), BEW, II, 571.
Cf. his curious comment in ENNT, Matthew 2.1, where he said the
'Wise men' were 'gentile philosophers, who, through the divine
assistance, had improved their knowledge of nature, as a means of
leading to the knowledge of the one, true God. Nor is it
unreasonable to suppose, that God had favoured them with some extra-
ordinary revelations of himself, as he did Meichisedec, Job, and
several others, who were not of the family of Abraham.'
" Joseph Butler, Analogy of Religion: Natural and Revealed
(1736). This was in spite of Butler's prohibiting Wesley from
preaching in his diocese. See, flEW, XX, 112 (1746), and JWJ, V, 264
(1788); cf. BEW, XIX, 78 and note 98 (1739); BEW, XIX, 142 and note
9 (1740); 'Appendix B: Wesley's Interview with Bishop Butler', BEW,
XIX, 471-74; Baker, 'John Wesley and Bishop Butler', PWHS, 42(1980),
93-100.
" Outler maintained that Wesley's understanding of our ideas
of God are not empirical but intuitive, flEW, II, 571 note 14.
100 
'Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith' (1788),
	 , IV,
52-3, and notes 23, 24.
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3.2.6. Prevenient Grace and Intuitlonism
The question is how to understand the re-
inscription of the moral law as a constitutive element
of prevenlent grace in a way which Is consistent with
his empiricism. One way in which re-inscription may
easily be reconciled with his empiricism is by looking
at prevenient grace, not as being born in each person,
but as being 'infused', or 'breathed' into us by God
through the Holy Spirit.' 01	One attempt, at least
implicitly, to reconcile the two appeared	 In the
Arminian Magazine. There it was argued that the source
of inspiration and grace was the interaction of the
divine, the infinite, and the uncreated upon the souls
of the created in a supernatural way as to produce ideas
and sensations that are more forceful and vivid than the
ideas and sensations produced by material objects. The
conclusions one makes from such inspiration are of a
different quality than the deductions and discoveries
made from empirical observations and the ideas formed
from them. Because,
God, who is far more intimately present to our
souls than corporeal objects are; who can act
upon them invest them, and penetrate them may
open their intellectual faculties, shew them
the mysteries of his nature and providence by
an intuitive view, and thus inspire them to
write, speak, and think; to reveal what is
hid, and foretell what Is future, in a
supernatural manner. For this reason it is
that holy Writ calls the Prophets, the Seers,
because their intellectual eyes were opened to
see into the invisible world, and discover
many wonders of Providence, past, present, and
future. 102
This 'intuitive view' of inspiration can equally be used
to explain what Outler has called the 'intuitive
knowledge' of God given by the Holy Spirit. 103 Wesley
himself suggested such a view of Inspiration when he
said,
Out of darkness he commands light to shine,
and takes away the veil which the god of this
101 
'On Working Out Our Own Salvation' (1785), BEW, III, 203.102 
'Of Inspiration', AN 9(1786), 36-7.103 Outler, BEW, I, 35, 59-60, 276 note 46.
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world had spread over our hearts. And we then
see, not by a chain of reasoning, but by a
kind of intuition, by a direct view[. . .1.104
Here, and in many other places, Wesley made a clear
distinction between empirical knowledge and spiritual
knowledge which is mediated directly to the soul by the
Holy Spirit. This tilts a bit towards an illuminist
view of mysticism, an influence which was undeniably
present in the early days of the formation of Wesley's
theology. tos
 Even after his explicit rejection of
mysticism, he still saw the Holy Spirit as the one who
provides the necessary knowledge utilized in prevenient
grace and who appropriates it to the human soul.
3.2.7. Summary of Prevenient Grace
Sin is a willful transgression of a known law of
God. Prevenient grace provides the knowledge necessary
to make one cognizant of sin, which means it has more to
do with the conviction of sin than with Its forgiveness.
It does this mainly by way of Wesley's concept of the
're-inscrintion'.	 Pronerlv sneaking the renovation of
the image of God did not begi
even sanctification, but in
irresistible workings of the F
three important aspects to Ui
the Holy Spirit, the moral law,
Wesley's intuitionism which
empiricism, thus providing an €
knowledge of the moral law is
revelation of God by way of wf
natural theology. Prevenier
person not just as God's attemç
Himself, but also to make
responsible for personal sin.
knowledge being restored thr
certain measure of liberty
provides the volition to viol
with justification or
prevenient grace and the
ly Spirit.	 There are
s re-inscription: namely
and Intuitionism. It is
•ttempts to balance his
istemology of sin. The
urther reinforced by the
.t amounts to a Wesleyan
grace is given to each
to draw the person to
each individual person
Beyond a measure of
ugh prevenient grace, a
(or free-will)-- which
.te the law of God-- was
104 
'The End of Christ's Coming' (1781), BEW, II, 481.
105 CX!tler, BEW, I, 171 note 122; cf. Tuttle, M ysticism in the
Wesleyan Tradition (1989), pp. 24-25
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also restored. Through prevenient grace not only Is a
certain measure of knowledge restored, so is a certain
measure of liberty, or free-will, which provides the
volition to violate the law of God. Neither the
cognitive or volitional aspects of sin was given through
any innate sense, but through the work of the Spirit and
the Word.	 This means that in spite of the fall there
still remains in each person a faint Image of God,
albeit marred.	 Even the totally depraved are not
totally ignorant of God's moral law. Thus, Wesley
strikes middle ground between the moralists (such as
John Taylor) on the one hand, and the Calvinists on the
other.	 This is a divine gift which exceeds nature and
becomes the basis for Wesley's doctrine of 'prevenient
grace','° 6 which drastically reduces the range of
ignorance allowed by his doctrine of sin properly so
called.
Prevenient grace was Wesley's first step in the
order of salvation which was divinely predestined by
God, and an essential part of Wesley's theological
anthropology.' 07 Collins has observed that given
Wesley's notion of total depravity, it follows logically
that 'irresistible grace' had to find its way somewhere
into Wesley's order of salvation because human beings in
the natural state have not power to accept or reject any
offer of grace.	 For Wesley it was prevenient grace.
For Calvin it was sanctifying grace.' 0	This was the
proverbial 'hair's breadth' which separated the two.'°'
3.3. JustifIcation
The next stage in Wesley's order of salvation was
justification,	 or	 more	 specifically,	 present
'° 'The original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law'
(1750), DEW, II, 7 note 10.
'°' 'On Working Out Our Own Salvation' (1785), DEW, III, 203;
Cho, 'Adam's Fall and God's Grace: John Wesley's Theological
Anthropology', Evangelical Review of Theology , 10(1986)3, 202-13.
ioe Collins, Wesley on Salvation (1985), p. 24.
'°' 'Minutes of Some Late ConversatIons' (1749), Works, VIII,
284-85; cf. 'The Question, What is an Arminian?" answered. By a
Lover of Free Grace' (1770), Works, IX, 359.
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justification, as	 Wesley actually had a doctrine of
double-justification-- a doctrine	 rejected	 by the
Lutherans and the Calvinists.''° Because of the
dialogical nature of Wesley's order of salvation, he did
not hold to a doctrine of the perseverance of the
saints. Perseverance of the saints depended on God
determining the elect, and the elect persevering unto
salvation. On this basis justification was as certain
and irresistible as ejection. Wesley, however, rejected
such a notion. Without a doctrine of perseverance of
the saints there had to be in Wesley's theology a
doctrine of double justification, which consisted of
'present' and 'final' justification,'' 1 in which entire
sanctification must go before justification on the last
day.'' 2 One may have the assurance of 'present'
justification by the witness of the Spirit, that is to
say, that one's sins are forgiven 'now'. 1 ' 3 What Wesley
rejected was the notion that final justification is not
contingent on faith alone but also on works done
110 Schmid, Doctrinal Theology (1899), pp. 430 ff.; cf.
'Augsburg Confession', Part I, Art. IV, VI, XX; Part II, Art. III;
'Formula of Concord', Art. III; and, 'The Humble Advice of the
Assembly of DivinesE..]', more commonly known as, 'The Westminster
Confession of Faith' (1647), 'Chapter XI, Justification'.
" 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I'
(1745), BEW, XI, 115, 130; cf. 'The Righteousness of Faith' (1746),
BEW, I, 206; cf. 'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 190; 'An
Answer to the Rev. Mr. Church's Remarks on the Rev. John Wesley's
Journal' (1745), BEW, IX, 94-95; 'The Principles of a Methodist
Farther Explain'd' (1746), BEW, IX, 178-79; 'Some Remarks on Mr.
Hill's Farrago Double-Distilled' (1773), Works, X, 430-31, 444.
Wesley's sources I or double justification were probably Richard
Baxter's Confession (1655), Aphorismes of Justification (1649); and
John Goodwin's, Imputatio Fidei (1642), see Outler, BEW, I, 206 note
22. 112 
'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I'
(1745), BEW, XI, 106; 'A Letter to the Rev. Mr. Home: Occasioned by
his later sermon Preached before the University of Oxford' (1762),
BEW, XI, 444.113 See sermons 10-11, 'The Witness of the Spirit' (1746), 'The
Witness of the Spirit (1767), BEW, I, 267-313. In, 'Farther Thoughts
on Christian Perfection' (1763), Q. 20, Wesley stated that he
thought it was possible f or someone to have assurance from the Holy
Spirit that they would not fall from God, Works, XI, 421-22.
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subsequent to initial justification, 114 as suggested by
Bishop Bull and James Horn.115
Initial, or present justification, consisted of
repentance, faith 1 Initial justification (i.e. pardon,
forgiveness, acceptance, and initial sanctification),
freedom from outward sin, and acts of piety and mercy.
These attributes were reflected in what was perhaps his
most succinct and normative statement on justification,
which was actually his summary of the teaching of
justification In the 'Liturgy, Articles, and Homilies,
the doctrine of the Church of England':
(1). That no good work, properly so
called, can go before justification;
(2). That	 no	 degree	 of	 true
sanctification can be previous to it;
(3). That as the meritorious cause of
justification is the life and death of Christ,
so the condition of it is faith, faith alone;
and
(4). That both inward and outward
holiness are consequent on this faith, and are
the ordinary, stated condition of final
justification.'''
When stated negatively, Wesley thought: (1)
Justification is not being actually made just and
righteous, which is sanctification. (2) It is not 'the
clearing us from accusation,	 particularly that of
Satan', neither	 is it	 the clearing us from the
accusation brought against us by the law.'' 7 (3)
Neither does justification imply that God is deceived in
those whom he justifies, i.e. that God thinks the
justified 'to be what in fact they are not, that he
accounts them to be otherwise than they arel..) or
believes us righteous when we are unrighteous.'''' This
114 BEW, XIX, 128 (Dec. 13, 1739); cf. 'An Answer to the Rev.
Mr. Church's Remarks on the Rev. Mr. John Wesley's Last Journal'
(1745), BEW, IX, 99.
115 George Bull, Harmonia Apostolica (1670); cf. BEW, XIX, 202-
03 (1741), for Wesley's remarks upon reading Bull; cf. XIX, 281
(1742); James Horn, 'Works wrought through Faith a Condition of our
Justification', in, The Works of the late ri ght Reverend George
Home, D.D. (1831), III, Discourse LXII.116 
'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I'
(1745), BEW, XI, 115.
117 
'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 187-88.
116 
'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 188.
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was an attack on a mild distortion of the Puritan
doctrine of forensic justification In which the imputed
righteousness of Christ allows God to justify the elect
and regard them as if they were actually righteous.'''
Positively, he thought: (1) 'The plain scriptural
notion of justification is pardon, the forgiveness of
sins' past, in 'thought, word, and deed'' 20 , through the
merits of Christ' 21 ; and, 'received Into God's favour;
into such a state, that, if we continue therein, we
shall be finally saved'.' 22 (2) It is acceptance 'as if
we had never sinned'.' 23 (3) It is to be born of God.'24
(4)	 While	 not	 synonymous	 with	 justification,
sanctification was started at justification.' 25 If taken
in the largest sense, justification, 'implies a
deliverance from guilt and punishment, by the atonement
of Christ actually applied to the soul of the sinner now
believing on himE... J'"• 128
Who, then, are the justified? How one answers this
apparently simple question determines one's order of
salvation, and whether one holds to a doctrine of
justification by faith or not. For example, In his
attack on Wesley's preaching of justification by faith,
George Smith	 asserted that sanctification preceded
justification.' 2 ' To Wesley, this was justifying the
1	 BEW, I, 188 and note.
120 'Justification by Faith' (1746), DEW, I, 189-90; cf. 'The
Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), BEW, II, 157.
121 Preface', A Treatise on Justification: Extracted from Mr.
John Goodwin (1765), in Works, X, 317.122 
'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII, 275.
123 'JustIfication by Faith (1746), DEW, I, 190.
124 'The Principles of a Methodist' (1742), DEW, IX, 61.
125 'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII,
285; 'Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1777), Works, XI, 387.
128 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), DEW, I, 124.
127 EGeorge Smithi, 'The notions of the Methodists farther
disprov'd, in answer to their 'Earnest appeal', &c., with a
vindication of the clergy of the Church of England from their
aspersions; in a second letter to the Reverend Mr. John Wesley'
(Newcastle: 1743), pp. 6!, p. 7; and also, 'The notions of the
Methodists fully disprov'd, by setting the doctrine of the Church of
England concerning justification and regeneration in a true light;
in a letter to the Rev. Mr. John Wesley' (Newcastle: 1743). Wesley
makes note of this in, 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and
Religion, Part I' (1745), BEW, XI, 108-09.
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sanctified, or the godly. But, 'God justlfieth not the
godly, but the ungodly; not those that are holy already,
but the unholy.'' 2 Wesley thought Smith's problem was
that he had confused 'fruits meet for repentance' with
sanctification.' 29 	Sanctification and 'fruits meet for
repentance' are not synonymous.
3.3.1. Justification and Repentance
Based on Acts 16.30-34,	 Wesley hyperbolically
stated that, 'Repentance absolutely must go before
faith',' 3 ° saying, 'justifying faith cannot exist
without previous repentance'. 13 ' (He would qualify this
statement in another place, which will be seen below.)
To Wesley repentance consisted of two types: legal,
which 'is a thorough a conviction of sin', and brings
forth fruit worthy of repentance; and evangelical, which
'is a change of heart (and consequently of life) from
all sin to all holiness'.' 32 Legal repentance was the
repentance of sinners in conjunction with initial
justification, while evangelical repentance was the
repentance of believers in conjunction with entire
sanctification. We will consider legal repentance at
this time, and look at evangelical repentance in respect
to entire sanctification.
Legal repentance consisted of two aspects. The
first aspect was self-knowledge which consisted of the
acknowledgement of one's 'corrupt, sinful nature', and
129 
'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 191.
129 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I'
(1745), I3EW I XI, 110.130 
'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I'
(1745), BEW, XI, 106.
'' 'The Principles of a Methodist Farther Explained' (1746),
BEW, IX, 177; cf. 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion,
Part I' (1745), BEW, XI, 117, and note the textual difficulties
surrounding this passage; cf. 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), BEW, I,
127; 'The Way to the Kingdom' (1746), BEW, I, 225; cf. ENNT', Acts
16.30-34; cf. 'A Roman Catechism, with a Reply thereto' (1756),
Section II, in Works, X, 95, with its implicit attack on Bellarmine;
'Popery Calmly Considered' (1779), 'Section II. Of Repentance and
Obedience', in Works, X, 143-44.
132 F!NT (1755), Mt. 3.8.
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one's 'actual sins, both in word and deed'.' 33 For one
to do this Is to know one's self to be totally depraved
sinner, 134 which caused Wesley to exclaim, 'Sinner,
awaket Know thyself I Know and feel that thou "wert
shapen in wickedness, and that in sin did thy mother
conceive thee", and that thou thyself hast been heaping
sin upon sin ever since thou couldst discern good from
evil.''' 5 The ones who do are the ones who are 'poor in
spirit', and 'who know themselves', who are convinced of
sin; those to whom God hath given that first repentance
which is previous to faith in Christ.''3'
The second aspect of legal repentance was derived
from Matthew 3.8, which consisted of 'fruits meet for
repentance'. By fruits meet for repentance he meant,
forgiving our brother, ceasing from evil,
doing good, using the ordinances of God, and,
in general, obeying him according to the
measure of grace which we have received. But
these I cannot as yet term "good works",
because they do not spring from faith and the
love of God. ' Although the same works are then
good when they are performed by those who have
believed. 137
Such an understanding of repentance disqualified the
'fruits meet for repentance' as works unto salvation
because they did not have God in Christ as their object,
133 'The Righteousness of Faith' (1746), DEW, I, 212. Cf.
Calvin, Christian Institutes, I.!
'	
'The Way to the Kingdom' (1746), PEW, I, 225.
135 'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1748), PEW, I, 480, also 477; cf.
'Awake, Thou That Sleepest'(1742), BEW, I, 147; 'The Righteousness
of Faith' (1746), PEW, I, 212-13; 'The Repentance of Believers'
(1767), 13EV, I, 350; 'Circumcision of the Heart' (1733), PEW, I,
403; 'Sermon on the Mount, X' (1750), PEW, I, 653; 'Sermon on the
Mount, XIII' (1750), PEW, I, 697; 'Spiritual Idolatry' (178!), PEW,
III, 113. Believing that repentance preceded faith put Wesley in
direct conflict with William Law's, The S pirit of Prayer (1749),
which Wesley noted in 'On Dissipation' (1784), PEW, III, 123; cf.
ENNT (1755), Mt. 5.3.
" 'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1748), PEW, I, 477; cf. John
Norris, Practical Discourses, I, 4: 'Poverty of spiriti. . .]is not a
state of life but a state of mind, and we may take it either in
opposition to covetousness ort..]to pride and highmindedness.', in
PEW, I, 477 note 48; cf. also with CL, XLVI, 144-45.
137 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1745),
BEW, XI, 106, quoted by Wesley (with only slight variation in
punctuation) in, 'The Principles of a Methodist Farther Explained'
(1746), , IX, 176; cf. 'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' in
Works, VIII, 275-76, 281-82.
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or faith as their proper orientation. 138 Works can
neither save nor sanctify. In this respect 'fruits meet
for repentance' were similar to prejustificatlon works
of a humanitarian nature. However, experience of
conviction of sin, which led to the 'fruits meet for
repentance' often resulted in practical and ethical
manifestations in preparation for the orientation of
faith, which were often seen when,
The drunkard commenced sober and temperate.
The whoremonger abstained from adultery and
fornication, the unjust from oppression and
wrong. He that had been accustomed to curse
and swear for many years now swore no more.
The sluggard began to work with his hands,
that he might eat his own bread. The miser
learned to deal his bread to the hungry, and
to cover the naked with a garment. Indeed the
whole form of their life was changed. They
had 'left off doing evil and learned to do
well ' •
Although in and of themselves they did not justify,
taken together repentance-as-self-knowled ge and 'fruits
meet for repentance' were in some sense necessary before
justification.
But Wesley qualified his statement that repentance,
more specifically the 'fruits meet for repentance', must
always precede justification. He did this by
distinguishing between the 'remote' and 'proximate'
cause of justification. 14 °	 He knew that in some
instances, such as the thief on the cross next to
Christ,' 41 'fruits meet	 for	 repentance'	 are not
possible. Because they are not always possible they
cannot always be strictly necessary, and consequently
they can only be a 'remote' condition to justification.
In spite of the ethical manifestations often associated
'	 'Hypocrisy in Oxford' (1741), BEW, IV, 396-99. Note the
textual problems of this passage in note 31. Wesley was reacting to
Bull's, Harmonia Apostolica.
'	 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part III'
	
(1745),	 I XI, 274-75.140 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, Part I'
(1745), DEW, XI, 117; cf. 'A Letter to The Rev. Mr. Home' (1761),
DEW, XI, 451; also, 'An Answer to the Rev. Mr. Church's Remarks'
	
(1745),	 IX, 96.141 ENN (1755), Luke 24.40.
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with 'fruits meet for repentance' , because repentance Is
only remotely necessary to justification, repentance
alone does not justify. Faith alone is the 'proximate'
condition of justification, which means, 'there is no
justification without It.'' 4t This explicitly excluded
repentance as conjunctive with faith as a condition for
salvation. But together, faith as the proximate and
repentance as the remote causes of justification, they
were for Wesley the 'gate of religion'.'43
3.3.2. Justification and Faith
'But what Is faith?' Wesley would ask. His answer
was usually,
It is a divine 'evidence, and conviction of
things not seen'; of things which are not seen
now, whether they are visible or invisible in
their own nature. Particularly, It Is a
divine evidence and conviction of God and of
the things of God. This is the most
comprehensive definition of faith that ever
was or can be given, as including every
species of faith, from the lowest to the
highest.
As the discussion in chapter one of the philosophical
understanding of faith and its role In the scale of
assent	 implied,	 there	 are differing degrees, or
'species' of faith.	 Among the species of faith he
particularly noted the faith of a materialist, a
deist,' 45 a heathen, a devil, the Jews, John the
Baptist, the apostles while Christ was on the earth,
Roman Catholics, Protestants, and the faith 	 of a
servant. What these species of faith all have in common
is an 'evidence and	 conviction of	 such or such
142 'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 195-96.
'	 'The Repentance of Believers' (1767), BEW, I, 335
144 'On Faith' (1788), BEW, III, 492; cf. 'A Farther Appeal to
Men of Reason and Religion, Part I' (1745), BEW, XI, 106-07;
'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 194; 'The Scripture Way of
SalvatIon' (1765), BEW, II, 160-61, 167-68; 'OrIginal Sin' (1759),
BEW, II, 184; 'The Reformation of Manners' (1763), BEW, II, 313; 'On
Eternity' (1786), DEli, II, 369; 'On the Discoveries of Faith'
(1788),	 IV, 30; 'On Faith' (1791), DEW, IV, 188.
' That faith was necessary even to natural religion can be
seen in NP (1777), V, 199-201.
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truths'.' 4	For	 Christian	 faith	 it	 is more
specifically fides quae creditur, or the orthodox
content of faith. As important as orthodoxy and proper
teaching were to Wesley, f Ides quae creditur, to only
'believe that', cannot save, because it 'does not imply
the giving the heart to God'.'47
Saving faith consists of more than content. It
must also consist of orientation. This orientation does
not consist of self. Self-orientation is the essence of
sin, and was the substance of the fall. Neither can it
consist of works, which are tainted by the effects of
sin, or self-orientation. This orientation must consist
of,
a faith in Christ- Christ, and God through
Christ, are the proper object of it. Herein
therefore it is sufficiently absolutely,
distinguished from the faith either of ancient
or modern heathens. And from the faith of a
devil it is fully distinguished by this- it Is
not barely a speculative, rational thing, a
cold, lifeless assent, a train of ideas in the
head; but also a disposition of the heart.
For thus saith the Scripture, 'With the heart
man believeth unto righteousness.' And, 'If
thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord
Jesus, and shalt believe with thy heart that
God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt
be saved.hl4e
Put more specifically, saving faith has as its focus the
passion of Christ, or his 'passive righteousness' which
will be discussed below. Christian faith is the
unconditional trust in the saving merits of Christ's
life, death, and resurrection.' 49 When faith-as-assent
is appropriated to justification in the context of the
order of salvation it becomes fides qua creditur, belief
in, or the act of faith as unconditional trust in the
merits of Christ's passion and death to save the
believer.' 50 It was seen in chapter one how this faith
' The list is composite one drawn from 'On Faith' (1788),
BEW, III, 495-97; and 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), BEW, I, 119-20.
'' 'The Unity of the Divine Being' (1789), BEW, IV, 66.
'' 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), BEW, I, 120.
'" 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), BEW, I, 121.
'° See Cushman, Experimental Divinity (1989), pp. 78-80, 174-
76.
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occurs not by rational assent in the analytical sense,
but by rational assent in the sense of eternal reason,
and on the basis of God's revelation in Christ. The
instant God gives faith, whether in early childhood, in
the prime of life, or in old age, t5 ' that "'faith is
counted to him for righteousness"', so that God counts
us righteous from the time we believe in Christ, the
proper object of our faith.' 52 This was to Wesley true
faith, and 'as soon as anyone has true faith, in that
moment he is justified',' 53 and 'born of God', 154 not
having a servile faith, but a filial faith, or the faith
of a child of God.155
Even the faith of a child was expected to become
the faith of, 'young man' and eventually the faith of a
'father', showing that even saving faith had its various
degrees and maturity.' 58 However, faith as Christ-
orientation, whatever its degree, is the only condition
of our present and final salvation.' 57 Strictly
speaking, this is the only thing we are required to do
according to the covenant of grace. 158 Yet, because
faith as orientation on Christ as its proper object is a
part of the covenant of grace, it also is a gift of God,
151 
'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 194.
152 Romans 4.5 in 'Justification by Faith' (1746), DEW, I, 196.
153 
'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1745),
DEW, XI, 105.
'On Sin in Believers' (1763), DEW, I, 320.
155 
'On the Discoveries of Faith' (1788), BEW, IV, 35-36;
'Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith' (1788), DEW, IV, 49; 'The
Spirit of Bondage and of Adoption' (1746), DEW, I, 250; 'On Faith'
(1788), DEW, III, 497-500.156 
'On Sin in Believers' (1763), DEW, I, 321; 'Sermon on the
Mount, IV' (1748), j, I, 534-35; 'Christian Perfection' (1741),
DEW, II, 105; 'On the Trinity' (1775), BEW, II, 384-85; 'On
PerfectIon' (1784), DEW, III, 71-72; 'On Patience' (1784), DEW, III,
174-75; ENNT, Hebrews, 5.13-14; I Peter 2.3; cf. BEW, XIX, 153-57
(1740), where Wesley points out the fact that the degrees of faith
were one of the things that separated Methodists from Moravians, see
'A Short View of the Difference between the Moravian Brethren,
lately in England, and the Reverend Mr. John and Charles Wesley' (1745).
'The Righteousness of Faith' (1746), DEW, I, 206.
'The Righteousness of Faith' (1746), DEW, I, 209.
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which is to say, It is not derived by human work or from
human merit.'59
Fides qua creditur, or the act of faith as Christ-
orientation, in turn gives rise to the experience of
faith, or, 'a sure trust and confidence that Christ died
for my sins, that he loved me, and have himself for
me.''° This moment of the revelation of Christ, by the
inspiration of the Holy Spirit, as the experience of
faith, became the basis of his doctrine of assurance.'5'
In the end Wesley said that, strictly speaking,
neither faith (as fides qua creditur, or fides quae
creditur), nor works, justify us,
But God himself justifies us, of his own
mercy, through the merits of his Son
onlyE.. .]. For our corruption through original
sin is so great that all our faith, charity,
words, and works, cannot merit or deserve any
part of our justification for us. And
therefore we thus speak, humbling ourselves
before God, and giving Christ all the glory of
our justification.'8'
The righteousness of Christ is the only merit for one's
justification.
3.3.3. Justification and the Righteousness of
Christ
Does this mean that Christ's righteousness is
imputed to the believer? Historically, there was a
noted shift in Wesley's understanding of the doctrine of
the imputed righteousness of Christ. In sermons before,
'The Lord Our Righteousness' (1765)- e.g. 'Sermon on the
Mount, I' (1748, I.!!), and 'Sermon on the Mount, IX'
(1748,	 21)- when Wesley did use the phrase, he said it
generally referred	 to the	 imputation of Christ's
righteousness to the pardoned sinner, 'with studied
'' 'An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1745),
BEW, XI, 47-48; 'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 196; 'Of
the Church' (1785), , III, 49; BEW, XIX, 175 (Dec. 24, 1749);
JWJ, IV, 305-09 (1759); cf. Ephesians 2.8.
180 'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 194; cf. BEW,
XVIII, 249-50 (1738) and the language of his Aldersgate experience.
'' 'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII,
290; cf. 'The Witness of the Spirit, I' (1746), 'The Witness of the
Spirit, II' (1767), BEW I I, 269-98.
'' 'The Principles of a Methodist' (1742), BEW, IX, 52.
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Indifference to its controversial overtones'.' 3 Dy at
least 1765, however, he eventually came to see the
phrase 'the imputed righteousoss of Christ' as being
neither scriptural or necessary, in fact causing harm to
many. '4
Wesley was critical of the imputed righteousness of
Christ as taught by Calvinists because It made no
allowance for neither human response nor responsibility.
He thought this led to antinomianism, and used the
righteousness of Christ 'as a cover forE.. .1
unrighteousness'.' 65 The question then became, 'Does my
obeying God add value to the perfect obedience of
Christ?'. 1 ''	 That depends on what one thought Christ's
righteousness to be, which was a crucial issue since
Wesley affirmed with Luther, 'articulus stantis vel
cadentis eccleslae- the Christian church stands or falls
with it.'''7
The landmark sermon in regards to the matter was,
'The Lord our RIghteousness' (1765). There, the
righteousness of Christ is seen as twofold- divine and
human. The divine righteousness belonged to Christ's
divine nature, namely his 'eternal, essential, Immutable
holiness; his infinite justice, mercy, and truth: in all
which "he	 and the Father are one."'	 The human
righteousness	 of	 Christ	 belong	 to	 his	 human
It consisted of either the internal or
external human righteousness. His 'internal
righteousness' consisted of the Image of God, which was,
a copy of his divine righteousness[...J. It is
a transcript of the divine purity, the divine
163 DEW, I, 481 note 93.
164 'Preface', 'A Treatise on Justification, Extracted from Mr.
Goodwin' (1765), Works, X, 318; 'Remarks on Mr. Hill's Farrago
Double-Distilled' (1773), Works, X, 383, 427, 430; cf. 'Minutes of
some late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII, 277.
" 'The Lord Our Righteousness' (1765), 	 , I, 462; 'Thoughts
on Christ's Imputed Righteousness' (1762), Works, X, 315.
16$ 'Thoughts on the Imputed Righteousness of Christ' (1762),
Works, X, 312-15.
" 'The Lord Our Righteousness' (1765), , I, 450-51, and
note 15 on the aphorisms connection with Luther; cf. Hildebrandt,
From Luther to Wesley (1951), p. 16 and note.
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justice, mercy, and truth. It includes love,
reverence, resignation to his Father;
humility, meekness, gentleness; love to lost




For the believer to be renewed in the image of God is
essentially to be renewed in the image of the 'Internal
righteousness' of Christ.
The 'external righteousness' of Christ consisted of
his innocence, in-as-much-as he did no wrong,
	 which
amounted to a 'negative' righteousness. It also
consisted of a 'positive righteousness', which meant
everything Christ said or did in every situation was in
accordance with God's will.	 All of Christ's obedience
amounted to his 'active' righteousness.
His 'passive' righteousness consisted of the
'kenosis' of Philippians 2.1_13,189 and his suffering
the 'whole will of God from the time he came into the
world till "he bore our sins in his own body upon the
tree[ ...... It is at this point, i.e. the passive
righteousness of Christ as his passion and sufferings,
that Christology is linked to Adam and '0 felix culpa!'
as it was discussed in chapter three.
For if Adam had not fallen Christ had not
died.	 Nothing can be more clear than this;
nothing more undeniable. 	 The more thoroughly
we consider the point, the more deeply shall
we be convinced of it. Unless all the
partakers of human nature had received that
deadly wound in Adam it would not have been
needful for the Son of God to take our nature
upon him. Do you not see that this was the
very ground of his coming into the world? 'By
one man sin entered into the world, and death
by sin. And thus death passed upon all',
through him 'in whom all men sinned.' Was it
not to remedy this very thing that 'the Word
was made flesh'? That 'as in Adam all died,
so in Christ all might be made alive'? Unless
then many had been made sinners by the
disobedience of one, by the obedience of one
many would not have been 'made righteous'. So
there would have beertno room for that amazing
'' 'The Lord Our Righteousness' (1765), BEW, I, 452-53.
Notice the similarity with the 'copy' language of the 'divine mind'.
'' 'On Working Out Our Own Salvation' (1785), BEW, III, 201;
cf. ENNT (1955), Phil. 2.1-13.
ITO 
'The Lord Our Righteousness' (1765), BEW, I, 453.
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display of the Son of God's love to mankind.
There would have been no occasion for his
'being obedient unto death, even the death of
the cross'.L...J The fall of Adam produced the
death of Christt Hear, 0 heavens, and give
ear, 0 earth?'7'
The passive righteousness of Christ was God's answer to
the original sin of Adam, which made it the 'glorious
fault'. The greatest quality of the passive
righteousness was obedience as an accepted factor of the
Father/Son relationship, so that relational ity with the
Father is marked by obedience and passive righteousness.
It was the absence of obedience that severed the
divine/human relationship in the	 beginning.	 Only
Christ's obedience could restore it.
Although they have been separated for the sake of
discussion, to Wesley the active and passive
righteousness of Christ are never separated. It is
'with regard to both these' that Jesus is called, 'the
Lord our	 righteousness', and one is forgiven and
accepted by God.' 72 The life and death of Christ and
the righteousnessoc Christ are the only meritorious cause
of the believer's justification.'13
When it came to the issue of justification, Wesley
was insistent	 that he never taught that Christ's
righteousness is imputed to the believer. Instead, he
taught, 'That God forgives him that is unrighteous as
soon as he believes, accepting his faith instead of
perfect righteousness. '174	 The basis of the imputation
of faith as righteousness is unquestionably the
righteousness of Christ. Consequently, Clifford is not
entirely correct, when he said that when Wesley spoke of
the imputation of righteousness he meant that the
passive righteousness of Christ only was imputed to the
believer, while the active righteousness of Christ was
1T1 'God's Love to Fallen Man' (1782), BEW, II, 425-26, 433.
172 'The Lord Our Righteousness' (1765), BEW, I, 452-58.
'	
'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1745),
BEW, XI, 113-15; 'On the Wedding Garment' (1790), BEW, IV, 143.
'' 'Minutes of some late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII,
289; cf. 'The Righteousness of Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 206-07.
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for imitation, not Imputation. 175
 Christ's passive and
active obedience were seen as the foundation for faith
being imputed as righteousness,, both of which were
necessary for salvation.' 76
	Wesley argued that while
faith was imputed to the believer for 'preceding
righteousness', faith was not counted to the believer
for 'subsequent righteousness'. On this basis he could
say	 one's	 own	 righteousness	 does	 not	 precede
justification, but Is subsequent to it.'7'
This view was complimented and reinforced in the
sermon, 'On the Wedding Garment'.' 78
 Wesley rejected a
commonly held view, such as the one held by William
Burkitt, that the wedding garment in Matthew 22.12
referred to the Lord's	 Supper.' 79 	Instead, he
interpreted	 the	 wedding	 garment	 to	 mean	 'the
righteousness of the saints', and concluded,
The righteousness of Christ is, doubtless,
necessary for any soul that enters into glory.
But so is personal holiness, too, for every
child of man. But it Is highly needful to be
observed that they are necessary in different
respects. The former is necessary to entitle
us to heaven; the latter, to qualify us for
It. Without the righteousness of Christ we
could have no claim to glory; without holiness
we could have no fitness for It. By the
former we become members of Christ, children
of God, and heirs of the kingdom of heaven.
By the latter we are 'made
	 meet to be
partakers of the inheritance of the saints in
light '	 80
By Christian righteousness he meant love of God and
neighbour, expressed as Inward and outward
righteousness. 181
' 
'A Sufficient Answer to Letters to the Author of Theron and
Aspasio; in a Letter to the Author' (1757), Works, X, 302-04; cf.
Clifford, Atonement and JustIfication (1990), pp. 177-81.
'	 Clifford, Atonement and Justification (1990), p. 191.117 
'The Law Established through Faith, I' (1750), BEW, II, 28-
29.
'On the Wedding Garment' (1790), BEW, IV, 140-48.
'' BEW, IV, 140, note 2; William Burkltt, Expository Notes
with Practical Observations on the New Testament (1700), Mt. 22.2-
13; cf. ENN on the same passage.
180 'The Wedding Garment' (1790), I3EW, IV, 144.
'' 
'The Way to the Kingdom' (1746), BEW, I, 221-223.
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Christian righteousness, or personal holiness, was
the human response to the righteousness of Christ,
resulting in the orientation of faith on Christ as its
proper object. 'The imagination that faith supersedes
holiness	 is	 the	 marrow	 on	 antinomianism' .
Consequently, Wesley interpreted the righteousness of
Christ so as to allow a human response in an attempt to
make the righteousness of Christ more consistent with
the dialogical approach arising from the issue of free-
will which stemmed from his free-will account of the
origins of evil.1e3
The greatest anomaly in his normative expression of
Christ's righteousness was in respect to infants. Where
they were concerned, the righteousness of Christ was
imputed to them because they are incapable of faith.
'Therefore no infant ever was or ever will be "sent to
hell for the guilt of Adam's sin', seeing it is can-
celled by the righteousness of Christ as soon as they
are sent into the worId.lel This was signified at
infant baptism, which Wesley looked upon as the washing
away of guilt of original sin, 'by the application of
the merits of Christ's death'.'° 5
 The imputed
righteousness of Christ is cancelled when one commits
one's first proper sin, which Wesley's called sinning
away the 'washing of the Holy Ghost.teB
'The Wedding Garment' (1790), DEW, IV, 148; ci. 'A Blow at
the Root; or, Christ Stabbed in the House of His Friends' (1762),
Works, X, 364-69.
If one finds all of this a bit bewildering perhaps it is
reassuring to know that Wesley did not think an understanding of the
imputed righteousness of Christ was necessary for salvation, JWJ, V,
243-44 (1767).
JWL, VI, 239-40 (1776).
' 'A Treatise on Baptism', in, A Preservative against
Unsettled Notions in Religion (1758), 11.1, in Works, X, 190. This
was actually an abridgement of Samuel Wesley the elder's, 'The Short
Discourse of Baptism', which appeared in, The Pious Corinunicant
Tidh+ Ii, tr'r',i p, g1	 rT	 fli Or'rl11Y'a rrsy.n1.-srf +h P1
n the nature of it is descri
behaviour at and after itt.. .JTo which is added A Short Discourse
of Baptism (1700).
' DEW, XVIII, 242-43 (Hay 24, 1738). For a comprehensive
view of Wesley on the sacraments see Borgen, Wesley on the
Sacraments (1985), and Staples, Outward Si gn and Inward Grace (1991).
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3.3.4. Justification and Works
Proceeding from the orientation of faith on God in
Christ as its proper object was what could be described
as a positive and negative righteousness belonging to
the believer. The believer's expression of positive
righteousness was good works. What Wesley was trying to
show was that a biblical doctrine of faith and works had
been ignored by people who carry either to an extreme-
faith excluding works (or 'Solafidianism'), '' and works
excluding faith.' 88
	He thought the truth was found in
between these two extremes.
	 Faith imputed to the
believer as righteousness does not 'shut out good works,
necessarily to be done afterwards',
	 because faith
'which brings not forth good works',189
which doth not produce both inward and outward
holiness, which does not stamp the whole image
of God on the heart, and purify us as he is
pure; that faith which does not produce the
whole of the religionE.. .1, is not the faith
of the gospel, not the Christian faith, not
the faith which leads to glory.''90
Proper Christian faith fills the heart with love, and
love does the works of God, thus the 'altogether
Christian' is one whose faith is 'working by love'.'91
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to expect to ever be
'sanctified' , if one is not 'zealous of good works'
making works essential to Christian growth, and being
renewed in the image and mind of Christ. 192
 For Wesley
works were the result of the proper orientation of
faith, and a properly orientated faith resulted in
sanctification. The true praxis of such a faith was a
See, 'Cautions and Directions given to the greatest
Professors in the Methodist Societies' (1762), Sect. III,
'Antinomianism', in Works, XI, 431.
" 'Sermon on the Mount, VII' (1748), BEW, I, 592-93; cf.
'Free Grace' (1739), BEW, III, 550-5!.
' 'The Principles of a Methodist' (1742), BEW, IX, 51, 52;
cf. 'A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion' (1745) BEW, XI,
106.
190 'Sermon on the Mount, XIII' (1750), BEW, 1, 695-96.
'' 'The Almost Christian' (1741), BFM, I, 139; cf. 'Sermon on
the Mount, IX' (1748),
	 I, 642-43, 'Righteousness is the fruit
of God's reigning in the heart. And what is righteousness but love?'
192 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), BEW, II, 164.
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constitutive element of true faith, both of which became
an essential component of the Christian life, which is
another contributing factor	 to	 Wesley's practical
theology, and his social theology.'93 Below it will be
seen how praxis as the result of the orientation of
faith on Christ as its proper object is particularly
necessary for sanctification.
3.3.5. Justification and Freedom from Outward
Sin
The believer's expression of a negative righteous-
ness was by not committing outward sin, 194 since, 'He
that committeth sin is of the devil'. 195 It is precise-
ly at this point that the understanding of sin properly
and improperly so called, with its cognitive and
volitional aspects as discussed in the previous chapter
is implemented.	 The kind of sin the justified do not
commit is sin properly so called, which is deliberate or
willful sin.' 98 This sin had been made known to the
believer by prevenient grace as an epistemology of sin.
Deliberate and willful sin was the outward sign of the
loss of faith, which could only	 be lost through
disobedience. 197
3.4. Entire Sanctification
For Wesley, entire sanctification as a part of the
order of salvation involved, the conviction of inward
(original) sin; 198 second (evangelical) repentance; '
193 Marquardt, John Wesley 's Social Ethics (1992), p. 135.
" 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), BEW, I, 124; 'Christian
Perfection' (174!), BEW, II, 110.
195 I John 3.8, in 'The First-Fruits of the Spirit' (1746),
BEW, I, 245; 'The Spirit of Bondage and of Adoption' (1746), , I,
264; 'On Sin in Believers' (1763), BEW, I, 320; 'Sermon on the
Mount, V' (1748), BEW, I, 569; etc.
'The Great Privilege of those that are Born of God'
(1748), BEW, I, 436.
" 'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII,
283; and the 'ordo peccare' in, 'The Great Privilege of those that
are Born of God' (1748), SEW, I, 440-42; ef. 'The Wilderness State'
(1760), SEW, II, 208-1!, 214-17.
'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), SEW, II, 165.
'	
'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765),	 , II, 163-64, 169.
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faith unto entire sanctification;20° entire
sanctification, or being renewed in the Image of God,
and having the mind of Christ, so that one loves God and
neighbour; 201 beIng cleansed from all Inward sin;202
and, continued growth in grace, and works proceeding
from entire sanctification.203
3.4.!. Conviction of Remaining Sin
As justified Christians grow in grace they see
more and more the 'desperate wickedness' of their own
heart. 204	Soon they realize what a struggle it is
	
not
to	 sin	 outwardly,	 and	 frequently	 become
'backsliders'. 205 They feel
a natural tendency to evil, a proneness to
depart from God, and cleave to the things of
earth. They are daily sensible of sin
remaining in their heart, pride, self-will,
unbelief, and of sin cleaving to all they
speak and do, even their best actions and
holiest duties. Yet at the same time they
'known that they are of God'; they cannot
doubt of it for a moment. They feel 'his
Spirit clearly witnessing with their spirit
that they are the children of God'. They
'rejoice in God through Christ Jesus, by whom
they have now received the atonement'. So
that they are equally assured that sin is in
them and that 'Christ is in them, but the hope
of glory.20
This struggle is caused by 'two contrary principles in
believers- nature and grace, the flesh and the
spiritl...]'. 207
 The principle of 'nature' arises from
200 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), BEW, II, 165.
201 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), BEW, II, 160.
	
202 
'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765),	 II, 168.
203 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), BEW, II, 164.
204 'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1748), BEW, I, 482-83.
205 'A Call to Backsliders' (1778), BEW, III, 211-26; cf. 'The
Repentance of Believers' (1767), BEW, I, 350. For a negative
reaction to Wesley's use of 'backslider' see Richard Hill, 'Five
letters to the Reverend Mr. F[letche]r relative to his 'Vindication'
of the minutes of the Reverend Mr. John Wesley, intended chiefly for
the comfort of mourning back sliders and such as may have been
distress and perplexed by reading Mr. Wesley's minutes or the
vindication of them (177!).
208 'On Sin in Believers' (1763), BEW, I, 323.
201 'On Sin in Believers' (1763), BEW, I, 322.
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the 'carnal mind', 20 ' the moral antithesis to the mind
which was in Christ, which typified the attitude of the
original sin. The presence of the carnal mind after
justification indicates that although inward sin does
not reign, it still remains. 209 To this point in his
order of salvation Wesley would have been in agreement
with the Lutheran response to the issue, who said the
Christian is 'simul justus et peccator', at the same
time both justif led and a sinner. Although the Lutheran
basis was that repented sins are covered by the imputed
righteousness of Christ, while the cause of sin is never
dealt with at its root. 21 ° The Calvinist response would
have been essentially the same. According to the
Westminster Confession the elect are freed from sin only
after final perseverance and after entering into 'the
state of glory only'. 21 ' The opposite of the Lutheran
and Reformed views could be seen in Moravianism, as
represented by the views of Spangenberg and Zlnzendorf,
who held that a Christian Is justified and entirely
208 
'On	 Sin	 in	 Believers'	 (1763), BEW, I, 321, 329;
'Justification by Faith' (1746),
	
I, 192; 'The Way to the
Kingdom' (1746), DEW, I, 225; 'The First-fruits of the Spirit'
(1746), DEW, I, 239; 'The Witness of the Spirit, [I' (1767), , I,
291; 'On Sin in Believers' (1763), DEW, I, 318; 'The Repentance of
Believers' (1767), BEW, I, 34!, 350; 'The Circumcision of the Heart'
(1733), DEW, I, 409; 'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1748), DEW, I, 479,
483; 'Sermon on the Mount, X' (1750), DEW, I, 658; 'Sermon on the
Mount, XI' (1750), DEW, I, 665; 'The Law Established Through Faith,
II' (1750), DEW, II, 42; 'Wandering Thoughts' (1762), , II, 127;
'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), DEW, II, 165; 'Original
Sin' (1759), DEW, II, 183; 'Of the Church' (1785), DEW, III, 52; 'On
DissipatIon' (1784), DEW III, 119; 'Heavenly Treasure in Earthen
Vessels' (1790), DEW, IV, 162.209 
'On Sin in Believers' (1763), DEW, I, 319; 'Salvation by
Faith' (1738),	 , I, 123-24 (note the interesting textual problem
relating to 11.5); 'The First-fruits of the Spirit' (1746), I,
245-46; 'The Repentance of Believers' (1767), BEW, I, 336-47; 'The
Great Privilege of those that are Born of God' (1748), BEW, I, 435-
41; 'Sermon on the Mount, I' (1748), BEW, I, 482-83; 'The Scripture
Way of Salvation' (1765), I, 159, 165-66; 'Of the Church' (1785),
DEW, III, 53; 'On Temptation' (1786), DEW, III, 16!; 'The
Deceitfulness of the Human Heart' (1790), DEW, IV, 157; 'Death and
Deliverance' (1725), DEW, IV, 212.210 IXitler, DEW, I, 314, who also directs attention to, 'The
Apology of the Augsburg Confession' (1531), Article II, 'Original
Sin',	 35-45.2I CXitler, DEW, I, 314, who also draws attention to 'The
Westminster Confession', VI.v, IX.v, XIII-XVIII.
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sanctified at the same moment, since Christian
perfection is faith in the blood of Christ, which
imputes the perfection of Christ to the believer.22
Their sanctification of justification came into full
bloom in 'The Christian Magazine', where It was stated,
'for all who are united to Christ by the Holy Spirit's
dwelling in them are delivered from the guilt, the
power, or, in one word the being of sin'.213
The recent publication of Wesley's early, and
previously unpublished manuscript sermons has revealed
that he once held to the Lutheran and Reformed views
that the Christian is freed from sin 'in statu gloriae'
(in the state of glory only), as can be seen in Wesley's
first written sermon, 'Death and Deliverance' (!725).214
While never freed from the 'tyranny of sin', the best a
Christian could hope for was to be freed from the habits
of sins. 215 Wesley's understanding that the Christian
should be freed from at least 'wilful, habitual sin'
arose from his interpretation of Kempis. In the
'Preface' of Wesley's own publication of 'The Christian
Pattern' (1735), he said that It is necessary for
'...the soul be fully purged from all wilful, habitual
sin...' before it could be perfected in love. 2 '° The
tension between indwelling sin and holy living may be
further seen in 'Circumcision of the Heart' (1733).
There, Wesley identified circumcision of the heart with
holiness, which directly implied being cleansed from
sin and being 'renewed in the image of our mind'. 217 It
would be easy for one to use the later period of
Wesley's theological development to read into these
words a state of sinlessness. However, his first
published sermon, 'The Trouble and Rest of Good Men'
(1735), still confirmed his Lutheran/Reformed view that
212 BEW, XIX, 211-5. Zinzendorf, however, was also of the
opinion that Christians are miserable sinners until death.
213 'The Christian Magazine' (1762), 579.
214 'Death and Deliverance' (1725), BEW, IV, 212.
215 DEW, XXV, 318-19 (1731).





'The Circumcision of the Heart' (1733), DEW, I, 402-3.
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the Christian is freed from all sin in the state of
glory only. 21
 His transition from the Reformed!
Lutheran position was not even indicated in his post-
Aldersgate sermon,	 'Salvation by
	
Faith' (1738).219
There, sin was qualified once again by one very
important word- 'habitual'. This leads one to conclude
that up to this point (1738) Wesley's understanding of
sin may be summarized in the following way: (1) he
defined sin as a 'voluntary breach of a known law'
giving sin a cognitive and volitional quality; (2) even
so, the Christian would not be fully freed from the
tyranny sin until death, it could only be mortified
through holy living; which meant, (3) the best a




	 after his sermon,
'Salvation by
	 Faith',	 in	 the	 sermon 'Christian
Perfection' (1741), Wesley suddenly rejected the notion
that 1 John	 3.9	 meant	 Christians	 do	 not sin
'habitually', saying,
But by whom is this said? By St. Johnt No.
There is not such word in the text, nor In the
whole chapter, nor in all this Epistle, nor in
any part of his writings whatsoever. 	 Why,
then, the best way to answer a bold [i.e.
impudent 220 ] assertion is simply	 to deny
it. 221
His criticisms of those who held to the 'habitual'
interpretation would eventually become so strong that
they bordered on the verge of ridicule, as in 'The Marks
of the New Birth' (1748). There he said, 'But some men
will say, "True; 'whosoever is born of God doth not
commit sin' habitually." Habitually! Whence is that? I
read it not.' 222 This positional shift was firmly
completed in the sermon, 'The Great Privilege of those
that are Born of God' (1748), where he said once again
219 'The Trouble and Rest of Good Men' (1735), DEW, III, 534.
219 'Salvation by Faith' (1738), BEW, I, 124. 	 Cf. Wesley's
letter to the Bishop of Exeter, JWL, III, 323 (1750).
220 See Xitler's footnote, BEW, II, 107.
221 'Christian Perfection' (174!), DEW, II, 107.
222 
'Marks of the New Birth' (1748), DEW, I, 420.
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'whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin' and
remarked,
By 'sin' I here understand outward sin,
according to the plain, common acceptation of
the word: an actual, voluntary 'transgression
of the law' ; of the revealed, written law of
God; of any commandment of God acknowledged to
be such at the time that it Is transgressed.
But 'whosoever is born of God', whiehabideth
in faith and love and In the spirit of prayer
and thanksgiving, not only 'doth not', but
'cannot' thus 'commit sin'. 223
One should perhaps notice the deletion of any reference
to habitual sin from this quote.
What caused this shift? Or was it just a case of
semantics? Outler has suggested It was on account of
his reading Robert Gell's, An Essa y Toward the Amendment
of the Last Eng lish Translation of the Bible (1659).224
In the 'Preface', Gell implicitly argued for a new
translation essentially because the old one encouraged
a sinning religion.	 Instead, Gell saw in the Bible a
teaching in which,
The	 Lord	 requires	 of	 us	 not only a
mortification and dying unto sin, but also a
burial of all sin.
	 They are two Articles of
the Faith: 1. That Christ was dead. 2. That he
was buried. And so, thought the Spirit, the
sin must be put to death, Rom. 8.13. and
buried by holiness and love.22s
This was more or less the thesis of the work, in which
he went to argue that those who say the remains of sin
cannot be cleansed until death but far more trust in
human death than the death of Christ.	 Sin, even
223 'The Great Privilege...' (1748), BEW, I, 436. It was
Richard Hill who was among the first to note Wesley's change, and
was quick to accuse him of self-contradiction, a charge Wesley
naturally denied. See, Richard Hill, 'A Review of All the Doctrines
Taught by the Rev. Mr. John Wesley' (1772); 'Logica Wesleinsis; or,
The Farrago Double-Distilled' (1773); and Wesley's replies, 'Some
Remarks on Mr. Hill's 'Review of all the Doctrines taught by Mr.
John Wesley' (1772); 'Some Remarks on Mr. Hill's Farrago Double-
Distilled' (1773).
224 it1er, 'Introduction', BEW, I, 84-5. See Wesley's diary
for February 23, 1741; July 19, 1741, and his journal for April 17,
1777; also Charles Wesley's journal for July 10, 1741. Curnock has
said, 'This work is the first on a list of books entered on the
cover page of an early Oxford note-book in the Conference Office'
(JWJ, VI, 143 note 3).
225 Robert Gell, An Essay Toward the Amendment... (1659), 'Preface'.
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habitual sin, must be cleansed in this lifetime before
death. 22
 In his sermon, 'There is no necessity for a
wise and just man to sin', Gell utilized a definition of
sin which was also volitional and cognitive in nature in
order to define the sinless state. t27 In his sermon on
1 John 1.8, 'Some Saints not without Sin for a season',
Gell continued to say that while no one is without sin,
the Christian is not to remain in a sinning state. One
is to press on to perfection and sin not.	 He concluded
his thoughts In this section by saying,
Much more might be written on this subject,
had not my worthy friends Dr. Thomas
DraytonE. . . land Mr. William Parker published a
Treatise upon the same argument, entituled A
Rev indication of the possibility of a total
mortification of sin In this life; And of the
Saints perfect obedience to the Law of God, to
be the Orthodox Protestant Doctrine, &c.
Now that we and many thousands more, in
this and other nations, may not be thought
Insanire sine ratlone, to differ from others
in these points of doctrine without good
reason, I thought fit to annex hereunto a
brief Catalogue cursorily gathered, of such
Scriptures as peitos and expressly, or per
evolutionem terminorum, in terpretative, by
short and easie interpretation, speak the same
things; as being such as prove a possibility
oft. ..lhaving not sin, and living a perfect
life according to the will of God.228
228 Gel!, Essay , Sermon XVII, 'The Regenerate becomes
Degenerate', p. 750, 752.
227 Ge!!, Essay, p. 772.228 Gel!, Essay (1659), pp. 779-80. Only two copies of Drayton
and Parker's, Revindicatlon are known to exist- one in the Folger
Shakespeare Library in Washington, DC, and another in the McAlpirie
Collection at Union Theological Seminary in New York, NY. Outler
assumes there was a Vindication, and that it has not survived.
However, I have concluded that there never was a Vindication by
either Drayton or Parker. The original Vindication was probably
John Teridring's, A Vindication of the Orthodox Protestant Doctrine
Chaplain to the Right Honourable the E. of Pembroke (London: 1657).
According to Tendring, Drayton and Parker stood up in a public
congregation in Wilton, Wiltshire to oppose his views on sin and
righteousness. It was that event which prompted the writing of
Tendring's Vindication, in which he includes a series of letters
from Drayton, where Drayton puts to Tendring two points for debate,
'That sinne must of necessity have a being in the saints while they
live in the mortall body. That the righteousnesse of the law
consisting in the love of God above all and of our neighbour as of
(continued...)
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In Gell, Wesley saw someone who advocated not just that
the Christian should live a holy life, but that the
Christian could actually live a sinless life, freed not
just from wilful and habitual sin, but from sin
altogether, in perfect obedience to the will of God.
The conclusions inspired by Gell would eventually
lead Wesley to say,
But let us attend to the reason of the thing.
Why cannot the Almighty sanctify the soul
while it is in the body? Cannot he sanctify
you while you are in this house, as well as in
the open air? Can the walls of brick or stone
hinder him? No more can these walls of flesh
and blood hinder him a moment from sanctifying
you throughout.	 He can just as easily save
you from all sin in the body as out of the
body. 229
The short answer to the original question, 'Does sin
continue in the soul as long as the soul continues In
the body?' was eventually 'no' for Wesley. While sin
did in fact remain in the justified he eventually
believed that it must not remain. It was not just how
he defined	 sin which	 enabled him	 to draw such
conclusions.	 It was also how	 he understood the
body/soul duality. More specifically, it was his
concept of the ontological neutrality of the body, which
was derived from his doctrine of creation. The will,
which determined culpability, resides in the soul not in
the body.	 If outward sin is to cease the root of it,
229( 
.continued)
our selves, cannot in this mortal life be fulfilled in the Saints by
the grace of Christ.' On these points Drayton pointed out that
while Tendring would affirm these positions (positions affirmed by
the Westminster Confession), 'I have engaged myself to defend the
contrary in both.' Drayton had already established his beliefs that
perfection was the love of God and neighbour, which fulfills the law
of love, and that it was attainable in this life time in 'The
Proviso or Condition of the Promisesi. . .1' (London: 1657). William
Parker established his hope of sinless state in this life time in
his critique of the Westminster Assembly, The Late Assembly of the
Divines Confession of Faith Examined (London: 1651). Perhaps it
should also be pointed out that Gell and Parker are also mentioned
In AM, 2(1779), 397, in the context of a conentary on Acts 13.48.
NIge 1 Smith has noted that Drayton, Ge 11, and Parker were known as
'perfectionists' (Perfection Proclaimed (1989) p. 99); cf. Conway
Letters, M.H. Nicolson, ed. (New York: 1930), pp. 109, 275, 280, 350.
229 
'On Perfection' (1784), BEW, III, 80.
Chapter Five	 279
inward sin, or the carnal mind, must be dealt with, and
in its place must be given the 'mind of Christ'. This
real izatlon led to the second repentance.
3.4.2. Second, or Evangelical Repentance
In the same way one was to repent and show the
fruits	 meet	 for	 repentance	 in	 preparation for
justification,	 believers	 are	 also	 to repent in
preparation for sanctification. Whereas repentance for
justification was largely for outward sin, repentance of
entire sanctification was for inward sin, such as pride,
self-will, love of the world, inordinate affection, the
trp1ex concuplscentla, fear of dispraise, jealousies,
resentment, covetousness, the love of money.23°
What sort of 'fruits meet for repentance' did
Wesley	 think	 should	 follow	 justification, being
necessary to sanctification?	 He divided them into two
groups- works of piety and works of mercy. 23 ' Works of
piety consisted of public prayer, family prayer, praying
in our closet, receiving the Supper of the Lord,
searching the Scriptures, fasting, abstinence, or other
forms of self-denial as health allows 232 .	 Works of
mercy consisted of feeding the hungry, clothing the
naked, entertaining the stranger, visiting the
imprisoned, and sick, etc. These are the repentance and
fruits meet for repentance, which are necessary to full
sanctification. 233 Works of piety were mostly using the
chief 'means of grace'- prayer, Scripture, the Lord's
230 'The Repentance of Believers' (1767), DEW, I, 336-41.
231 'The Repentance of Believers' (1767), BEW, I, 343 and note
65; 'Sermon on the Mount, II' (1748), DEW, I, 493; 'Sermon on the
Mount, IV' (1748), DEW, I, 541; 'Sermon on the Mount, VI' (1748),
DEW, I, 573; 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), DEW, II, 166;
'Self-denial' (1760), DEW, II, 247; 'The t.nger of Riches' (178!),
DEW, III, 244; 'On Charity' (1784), DEW, III, 299; 'On Zeal' (1781),
BEW, III, 314-15; 'On Visiting the Sick' (1786), DEW, III, 385-86;
'On Faith' (1788), DEW, III, 500-01; 'On Worldly Folly' (1790), DEW,
IV, 135.
232 'Self-denial' (1760), DEW, II, 24!. ThIs was a touchy
subject with Wesley because of the death of Richard Morgan, DEW,
XXV, 335-44; cf. 'Minutes of Several ConversatIons' (1789), in
Works, VIII, 316.
233 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), 	 , Ii, 166.
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Supper, as channels, of God's 'preventing, justifying,
or sanctifying grace'. 234
 They are done out of love of
God, and If separated from the Holy Spirit they cannot
profit at all. 235 As means of grace they are not works
unto salvation, because one should not expect salvation
from them. They were works from salvation through which
one may seek sanctification. 23
 Works of mercy were
mostly the believer being a means of grace, so that
'whatever grace you have received of God may through you
be communicated to others; that every holy temper, and
word, and work of yours, may have an influence them
also'. 231
 Works of mercy are an expression of the
believer's love of neighbour, and by serving one's
neighbour, one serves God in one's neighbour.' 33
 In
this way the believer's works of mercy can be seen as
what I shall call	 'sacramental holiness'. Together,
works of piety and mercy could be seen as a positive
righteousness.	 They also indicate that for Wesley
Christian devotion leads to social action.' 39
	The
individual transformation which resulted from the
orientation of faith on Chrlst as its proper object,
resulted also in social tran1ormation,' 4 ° once again
showing the practical and holistic quality of his
thea I ogy. 2 41
3.4.3. Faith unto Entire Sanctification
Just as one is justified not by works but by faith,
so one is entirely sanctified not by works, but by
faith. 'Faith is the condition, and the only condition
of sanctificationl...]none is sanctified but he that
believes; without faith no man is sanctified'. 242
 And,
'If you seek it by faith, you may expect it as you are,
234 
'The Means of Grace' (1746), BEW, I, 381.
'The Means of Grace' (1746), BEW, I, 382.
'The Means of Grace' (1746), BEW, I, 391.
237 
'Sermon on the Mount, IV' (1748), BEW, I, 537, 541.
'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1777), Works,
XI, 440.
239 Marquardt, John Wesley's Social Ethics (1992), pp. 89-118.
240 Jennings, Good News to the Poor (1990), P. 17.241 See BEW, I, 343 and note.
242 
'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765) M. II, 163.
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and expect it now!'. 243 	 Consequently, it is attained
instantaneously'.' 44
	In that instant there is a death
to sin.245
3.4.4. Entire Sanctification
It was Wesley's belief that the reorientation of
faith on Christ as its proper object, that occurred in
justification, led to expressions of works of love and
eventually to the renovation of the image of God and the
mind of Christ in every Christian believer, which would
cast out the remains of original sin. This was the
unique work of the Holy Spirit. As such, justification
was then seen as what God does for the believer through
his Son, while sanctification is seen as what God works
in the believer by his Spirit.248
The historical development of the doctrine of
Christian perfection was traced by Wesley himself in, 'A
Plain Account of Christian Perfection'. There, it was
maintained by Wesley that throughout the development the
normative definition of sanctification was love for God,
love for neighbour, and having the mind which was in
Christ which comes as the result of being renewed in the
image of God, i.e. in the image of righteousness and
true	 holiness,	 or	 the internal righteousness of
Christ. 247
	In spite	 of his	 insistence of this
expression being the doctrinal constant there were
several shifts in his supportive opinions
	 to the
doctrine.
The first shift was that he admitted that he had
overstated his case in the preface to 'A Collection of
Psalms and Hymns' (1741), and had been 'far too strong'
243 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' (1765), BEW, II, 169.
244 
'On Patience' (1784), BEW, III, 178-79.
245 'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1766/77), Works,
XI, 402.
248 
'Justification by Faith' (1746), BEW, I, 187.
'-j" 
'The Circumcision of the Heart' (1733), DEW, I, 402, In, 'A
Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1766/77), Works, XI, 367;
'The Character of Methodist' (1742), BEW, IX, 35-36, in 'A Plain
Account', Works, XI, 371; 'Minutes of some late Conversations'
(1749), Works, VIII, 279, in 'A Plain Account' (1766/77), Works, XI,
387.
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in what he said regarding the extent of perfection.24
This would have coincided with his reading of Gell. He
eventually corrected himself in his sermon, 'Wandering
Thoughts' by re-emphasizing the nature of improper sin,
thus reducing the scope of perfectability.249
Second, he also admitted that until about 1758-59
he had been wrong in thinking that Christian perfection
was incapable of being lost, 250
 a mistake that was put
forth in some of the hymns. 251
 After 1758-59,
experience taught him that it was capable of being lost.
Entire sanctification could not completely eradicate
original sin and restore the image of God once and for
all.	 At one time he quipped, 'Hardly three in five'
keep their sanctification 'a year'. 252 	 The obvious
inconsistency of
	 holding the	 view that Christian
perfection was incapable of being lost was that instead
of perseverance of the saints in the state of
justification, it would have been perseverance of the
saints in the state of sanctification. This was the
second notable change in his thinking.
The third change in his thinking was more subtle
than the first two. The point of contetntion where
sanctification was concerned was not if it was to take
place, but when. 253
 Was it to take place before death,
at death, or after death? With a logic that sounded
much like Gell's, it was Wesley's firm conviction that
sanctification occurs in this llfetime,!s4 and that no
one who seeks to be sanctified will not 'die without
being sanctified, even if only at death.
	 If it occurs
in this lifetime he thought it should be sought sooner,
249 'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1777), Works,
XI, 379.
249 'Wandering Thoughts' (1762), BEW, II, 126-37.250 
'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1777), Works,
XI, 442, cf. 'Farther Thoughts on Christian Perfection' (1763), Q.
21, 30, in, Works, XI, 422, 426; and, 'Brief Thoughts on Christian
Perfection' (1767), Works, XI, 446.251 
'Brief Thoughts on Christian Perfection' (1767), Works, XI,
446. He did not mention which hymns were guilty, and it is difficult
to tell which ones he may have had in mind.
252 JWL, V, 273 (1771).
253 'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII, 294.
254 
'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII, 296.
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Instead of later, and attained today. 255
 Eventually,
however, he would come to say, 'As to the time. I
believe this instant generally is the instant of' death,
the moment before the soul leaves the body. But I
believe it
	 may be
	 ten, twenty,	 or forty years
before.' 258
 Although Wesley still believed in
sanctification in this lifetime, there was a shift from
thinking 'now' was the inormative experience to 'the
instant of death' as the normative experience. Perhaps
this should be interpreted as corresponding development
with the amissability of the experience.
	 The problem
was not obtaining the experience but maintaining it.
Eventually, Wesley was just as careful to say what
he thought Christian perfection was not: (1) perfection
in knowledge so as to be free from ignorance; (2)
freedom from mistakes; (3) freedom from infirmities; (4)
freedom from temptations; 25T
 (5) absolute perfection;25
or freedom from 'wandering thoughts'. 258 Neither is it
(6) angelic perfection; or (7) Adamic perfection. 28 ° In
short, Christian perfection is not the complete renewal
of the natural and political aspects of the image of
God. Neither does it consist of freedom from sins
'improperly so
	 called' that are 'inseparable from
mortality', which arise from the marred natural and
political images. 201
	Instead, it is the renewal of the
moral image of God, which consists of the internal
righteousness of Christ. In this way he was able to
talk about Christian perfection, while at the same time
conceding to the 'opposers of perfection' that 'we will
255 
'Minutes of Some Late Conversations' (1749), Works, VIII,
285, in, 'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1777), Works,
XI, 387.250 
'Brief Thoughts on Christian Perfection' (1767), Works, XI,
446.
'Farther Thoughts on Christian Perfection' (1763), Q. 14;
in Works, XI, 419.256 
'Christian Perfection' (1741), DEW, II, 100-04; cf. 'A
Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1766), Works, XI, 374.259 
'Wandering Thoughts' (1762), ., II, 132-34.200 'c Perfection' (1784) 4
 DEW, III, 72-73.281 
'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1766), Works,
XI, 396.
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allow sin, a little sin, to remain in us till death'.22
This quiet concession amounted to a re-approximation of
the Lutheran view that certain aspects of the 'remains
of sin', however minute, are ineradicable (fomes
peccati).
This concession acknowledged what his doctrine of
original sin, as it was developed by 1757, allowed-
moral perfection without human perfection. The moral
residue of original sin could be removed while the
aspects of humanity associated with the residual effects
of the marred political and natural image remained until
death.
The variances and changes aside, in terms of the
relational aspect of eternal reason, entire
sanctification was for Wesley the purification of our
relationships with God and neighbour from selfishness
and egocentricity. In terms of the rational aspect of
eternal reason, Christian perfection was for Wesley
being renewed in the image of God and having the mind
which was in Christ. To obtain this the moral image of
God is renewed in the believer. 	 In renewing the moral




Wesley would not have dared to presume that the
renovated image of God reflects the Father In the same
way Christ's does, or even in the same way Adam's did
before the fall. There are certain parts of the image
of God that entire sanctification does not pretend to
restore,	 for	 example	 perfect	 knowledge,263	 and
liberty. 264 Wesley indicated this when he wrote,
262 'On Perfection' (1784)., BEW, III, 85.
263 'The Imperfection of Human Knowledge' (1784), II, 568-
86; 'The Case of Reason Impartially Considered', (1781), BEW, II,
587-600.
264 Wesley does, however, speak of us having both a 'liberty of
contradiction' (i.e. a liberty to do both good or evil], and a
'liberty of contrariety' I I.e. a liberty to do or not to do good or
evil], cf. 'What is Man?' (1787), BEW, IV, 24, and note 19.
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But it may be observed the Son of God does not
destroy the whole work of the devil in man, so
long as he remains in this life. He does not
yet destroy bodily weakness, sickness, pain,
and a thousand infirmities incidental to flesh
and blood. He does not destroy all that
weakness of understanding which Is the natural
consequence of the soul's
	 dwelling in a
corruptible	 body;	 so that stIll[...lboth
ignorance and error belong to humanity. He
entrusts us with only an exceeding small share
of knowledge in our present state, lest our
knowledge should interfere with our humility,
and we should again affect to be as gods. It
is to remove from us all temptation to pride,
and all thought of independency (which is the
very things that men in general so earnestly
covet, under the name of 'liberty') that he
leaves	 us	 encompassed	 with	 all	 these
infirmities-particularly weaknesses of
understanding-till the sentence takes place,
'Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt
returni' Then error, pain, and all bodily
infirmities cease: all these are destroyed by
death. And death itself, 'the last enemy' of
man, shall be destroyed at the resurrection.
The moment that we hear the voice of the
archangel and the trump of God, 'then shall be
fulfilled the saying that is written, Death is
swallowed up in victory. This corruptible
body shall put on incorruption; this mortal
body shall put on immortality;' and the son of
God, manifested in the clouds of heaven, shall
destroy this last work of the devil.2s5
The phrase 'work of the devil' functioned as a euphemism
for the remains of sin.
	 But what he described was
actually what one might call the remains of sin
improperly so called. The remains of sin improperly so
called will not be destroyed until glorification, the
final step in Wesley's order of salvation. Consequently
a tension results between the existential aspects of
entire sanctification and the eschatological aspects of
glorification, and to what extent each restore the image
of God.	 Glorification will consist of the complete
renovation of the complete image of God in all its
aspects.	 Every aspect of human relationships will be
restored-	 the	 divine/human	 relationship,	 the
human/creation	 relationship,	 and the interpersonal
relationships of glorified believers. This will happen
285 
'The End of Christ's Coming' (1781), BEW, II, 482.
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only after	 death and the resurrection when final
justification takes place and the justified are given a
glorified body.
	 Then the therapy of the soul will be
complete.
Hence will arise an unmixed state of holiness
and happiness far superior to that which Adam
enjoyed in paradise. In how beautiful and
affecting a manner is this described by the
Apostle! 'God shall wipe away all tears from
their eyes; and there shall be no more death,
neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there
by any more pain; for the former things are
done away.' As there will be no more death,
and nor more pain or sickness preparatory
thereto; as there will be no more grieving for
a parting with friends; so there will be no
more sorrow or crying. Nay, but there will be
a greater deliverance than all this; for there
will be no more sin. And to crown all, there
will be a deep, an intimate, an uninterrupted
union with God; a constant communion with thee
Father and his Son Jesus Christ, through the
Spirit; a continual enjoyment of the Three-One
God, and of all the creatures in him! 280
Here one sees in Wesley the consumation of trinitarian
salvation as it reaches its proper end- uninterrupted
and undivided union with the Triune God.
And yet, even when one considers the evil caused by
the permission of free-will, even they will work for the
good of the redeemed. In view of this redemption,
we may well praise God for permitting these
temporary evils In order to our eternal good.
Ye, we may well cry out: '0 the depth both of
the wisdom and of the goodness of God! He
hath done all things well. Glory be unto God,
and unto the Lamb for ever and ever.'26'
The renewal of the image of God and mind of Christ in
the justified, sanctified, and glorified believer was
Wesley's ultimate solution to the problem of evil, and
the effects of sin, restoring the proper relations
between God and the redeemed, which had been lost
through original sin.
260 'The New Creation' (1785), BEW, II, 509-10.207 
'God's Approbation of His Works' (1782),
	 , II, 399.
Conc lus ions
1. A Critique
In chapter one three important concepts emerged. The
first was Wesley's epistemology, which consisted of Scrip-
ture, reason, and experience. It was then shown how these
concepts were derived from and related to the scale of
assent. Within the scale of assent to more important
concepts emerged: eternal reason, which was rational and
relational in nature; and, experience.
It was suggested that eternal reason (i.e. the nature of
God, and nature of humanity, and the necessary relations that
exist between them) was a central concept to Wesley's
Christian system. By eternal reason Wesley defined evil,
understood the moral law, and even related it to the image of
God and the mind of Christ.
It was within the context of experience that the concept
of personhood was developed, which for Wesley consisted of a
body and a soul. It is precisely here that Wesley's doctrine
of sin started to have difficulties. Wesley could never
resolve the relationship between the physical and the
metaphysical, and to what extent a metaphysical explanation
and understanding of original sin related to the physical
world. The specific example of this was the relationship
between the soul as it was defiled with original sin and the
body which was ontologically neutral to Wesley. His defini-
tions of actual sin properly and improperly so called were an
attempt to distinguish between the physical and metaphysical
attributes of sin. The physical attributes which contributed
to his understanding of sin were termed sin improperly so
called. The metaphysical attributes which contributed to his
understanding of	 sin were	 termed properly so called.
However, as he attempted to define what was essentially a
metaphysical	 attribute	 he	 resorted to epistemological
language, the language of cognition and volition. This
defined sin in terms of personality, which was, according to
his concept of personhood, to be understood as an attribute
distinct from personhood itself. 	 Although his opening
argument in Doctrine of Ori g inal Sin sought to establish the
relationship between original sin and actual sin, his
doctrine of actual sin was not developed in relationship to
original sin but holy living, which associated actual sin
with ethical behaviour and not metaphysics.	 The definition
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of personal sin became the means by which Wesley sought to
adjust the measure of the attainability of Christian perfec-
tion, so that it was neither too high or too low. Defining
Christian perfection in such a way so that it was neither too
high nor too low was a concern from the early days of his
ministry until the later period. 1
 It is what kept together
the two dialectical doctrines of original sin and total
depravity (a doctrine he drew more from the western and
Augustinian tradition), and his concern for sanctification
and the renewal of the image of God and the mind of Christ (a
doctrine he drew more from the Eastern tradition).
While his theology displayed a holistic quality his
anthropology did not. His rejection of the Lockian duality
of mind/body in favour of soul/body duality formed the basis
of his anthropology. This was not as progressive, or as
innovative as his trinitarian anthropology, which he even-
tually expressed as relationality. This demonstrated that
while Wesley defined a Christian's existence in terms of his
or her sociality, a sociality ultimately derived from the
relational nature of the trinitarian image and love of God
and neighbour, he failed to define personhood in a similar
way, resulting in a disjunction between the physical and
metaphysical nature of personhood.
2. A Proposed Resolution
Historically, what one sees in Wesley is a transition
from a purely rational understanding of the image of God to a
more relational understanding of it. It is at this point
that Wesley studies may benefit from current discussions in
systematic theology regarding theological anthropology,
particularly as noted in the introduction. Perhaps one way
the problem of the disjunction of personh000d could be
circumvented is to discuss personhood, and not just distinc-
tively Christian personhood, in terms of relationality,
rather than duality, thus defining personhood as one who
exists in relation to God and neighbour. These relationships
constitute personhood, either fallen or redeemed.
	 Sin,
'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection' (1777), Works, XI,
397.
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either original or actual, is what estranges one from God and
neighbour. Original sin Is an imputed estrangement from both
God and to a certain extent creation, which is constitutive
to human existence. Thiswasthrust of Wesley's doctrine of
original sin, which he eventually discussed in terms of the
lost moral and the marred natural and political aspects of
the image of God.	 The estrangement with God as a result of
having lost the moral image is initially overcome by
prevenient grace, which Is not to be confused with saving
grace. Actual sin is one's own participation in the estran-
gement from God and neighbour. What constitutes that
estrangement is the lack of love for God and neighbour, which
can only result from faith being orientated on the Father as
revealed in the Son, through the Holy Spirit.	 This orienta-
tion, which is known simply as faith, begins at justification
which renews the saving relationship with God. Faith as
orientation eventually leads to entire sanctification which
is what purifies selfishness, the essence of original sin,
from one's relationships with God and neighbour. The final
act of the renovation of the triune image of God and the
complete restoration of relationality does not take place
until glorification, when humanity and all creation shall be
renewed. Looking at anthropology, hamartiology, and soteriol-
ogy in this way provides a greater logical and inter-
doctrinal consistency, while at the same time working with a
central concept of Wesley's own Christian system, eternal
reason, or the nature of God and the nature of woman and man,
and the necessary relations that exist between them.
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